

# The Jeju 4·3 Incident Investigation Report

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The National Committee for Investigation  
of the Truth about the Jeju April 3 Incident

**Jeju 4·3 Peace Foundation**



# Foreword

The Jeju 4·3 Incident was a tragic incident the casualties for which are second only to the Korean War in modern Korean history. In the time of great tumult following the liberation from Japanese colonial rule, the Jeju people suffered a terrible loss of life and property. Unfortunately, a proper investigation into the Incident was not conducted for over a half century.

Finally, thanks to many people's devotion and an agreement between the ruling and the opposition parties, "the Special Law for Investigation of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims" was promulgated in January 2000 and this law made it possible for the central government to carry out a Investigation into the Incident.

So far, the government has endeavored to uncover the facts of the Incident and to honor the victims by establishing the "National Committee for Investigation of the Truth about the Jeju April 3 Incident" The government also formed the "Task Force for Preparing the Investigation Report" under the umbrella of the Special Committee and authorized it to collect and analyze documents and materials about the Incident from home and abroad.

As a result of these efforts, the Special Committee conditionally adopted the "Investigation Report of the Jeju 4·3 Incident" on 29 March 2003. The committee made a great effort to retain objectivity and fairness by mandating a six-month review and revision period in case new materials or testimony arose. After examining the subsequently raised opinions and reflecting some of them in the report, the special committee finally approved the Investigation report on 15 October.

This report focused on the finding of facts and on honoring the victims and

their families as designated within the purpose of the Special Law, but it did not examine the underlying nature of the incident or carry out a historical evaluation of it. I believe that is the responsibility of historians to come.

Finally, I hope this Investigation report will be a stepping stone for moving toward a bright future by contributing to upholding human rights, developing democracy, and achieving national unity, which is represented in the Jeju 4 · 3 Special Law.

December 2003.

Chairperson of the National Committee for Investigation  
of the Truth about the Jeju April 3 Incident  
Prime Minister **Goh Kun**

## Explanatory Note

The official English name for the publisher of Original Korean version of this publication is ‘The National Committee for Investigation of the Truth about the Jeju April 3 Incident.’

April 3 Incident in 1948 is termed as 4·3 Incident in this report.

The Special Law for Truth Investigation about the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims / Enforcement Ordinance / Regulations in this report is the most recent.

The Special Law was most recently revised in 2005 and the Enforcement Ordinance was updated on September 2012.

Important events in Korean history are termed as follows :

August 15 Liberation Day in 1945	8 · 15 Liberation Day
February 7 Protest Incident in 1947	2 · 7 Protest Incident
March 1 Independence Day in 1947	3 · 1 Independence Day
March 1 Celebration Day in 1947	3 · 1 Celebration Day
March 10 General Strike in 1947	3 · 10 General Strike
January 22 Arrest in 1948	1 · 22 Arrest
April 3 Incident in 1948	4 · 3 Incident
April 28 Peace Negotiation in 1948	4 · 28 Peace Negotiation
May 10 General Election 1948	5 · 10 Election
August 15 Riot Plot in 1948	8 · 15 Riot Plot
August 25 Secret Election in 1948	8 · 25 Secret Election
April 19 Revolution in 1960	4 · 19 Revolution
May 16 Military Coup in 1961	5 · 16 Military Coup

English names of people and places follow the notification no. 2000-8 of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism in Korea.

In the case of Rhee Syng-man, since the name has been used in not only official gazettes but most other reports as the above form, the same name is also used in the report.

With regard to the names of the Korean administrative districts, “do” means a province “si” refers to a city, and “gun” indicates a county.

Both “eup” and “myeon” signify a town.

A “eup” usually has a larger population than a “myeon”.

Lastly, “ri” indicates a village.

USAMGIK is short for United States Army Military Government in Korea during the peacetime occupation from 1945-1948.

A map of Jeju Island is included in the report in order to help readers understand the situation.

# **Photos of the Jeju 4·3 Incident**





△ Leading members of the US Military Government in Korea arriving at Jeju Airport. From the second on the left, Military Governor Major General Dean, an interpreter, Jeju Military Governor Mansfield, Civil Administrator Ahn Jae-hong, Commander-in-chief Song Ho-seong, Commissioner of the National Police Agency Jo Byeong-ok, Commander of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment Kim Ik-ryeol, and Commissioner of the Jeju Police Inspection Agency Choi Cheon. On this day, at a meeting in Jeju, a scuffle broke out between Jo and Kim. (May 5, 1948).

(Source: the US National Archive and Records Administration)



△ A view of Jeju City in a photo taken from a US reconnaissance plane. The shadow of the plane can be seen in the dotted circle. (May 1948).

(Source: the US National Archive and Records Administration)



△ A view of Jeju Harbor with a US Landing Ship, Tank (LST) in the dotted circle. (May 1948).


(Source: the US National Archive and Records Administration)




△ US 59<sup>th</sup> Army Military Government Company Headquarter sat Jeju Agriculture School with the American flag flying. (May 1948).  
(Source: the US National Archive and Records Administration)



△ Ora-ri burning in an image filmed from a US reconnaissance plane which also appears in a documentary film. (May 1, 1948). (Source: Documentary Film 'May Day on Jeju-do')



△ The Main Entrance to Jeju Police Inspection Agency with a policeman armed with an automatic rifle on guard. (May 1948).  
(Source: the US National Archive and Records Administration)



△ Confiscated weapons such as bamboo spears and axes are seen in the picture. (May 1948).  
(Source: the US National Archive and Records Administration)

▷ Arrested Armed Resistance in an image that appears in the documentary film 'May Day on Jeju-do'. Notably they are wearing straw shoes. (May 1948).  
(Source: the US National Archive and Records Administration)



△ A policeman is pointing at a road seemingly destroyed by Armed Resistance. (May 1948).  
(Source: the US National Archive and Records Administration)



△ Members of the Korea Constabulary are clearing stones from the road. (May 1948).  
(Source: the US National Archive and Records Administration)



△ People next to a temporary house made from reeds and pine tree branches. (May 1948).  
(Source: the US National Archive and Records Administration)



△ Jeju people, mainly women and children, escaping to the upland region of the island. (May 1948).  
(Source: the US National Archive and Records Administration)




△ People on their way down the mountain. (May 1948).  
(Source: the US National Archive and Records Administration)



△ People descending from the mountain. (May 1948).

(Source: the US National Archive and Records Administration)



△ USS John R. Graig (a destroyer) at Jeju Harbor. The destroyer was dispatched to Jeju at the request of the Jeju Military Governor after the boycott of the 5.10 general election in Jeju. A naval blockade was imposed. (May 12, 1948).

(Source: the US National Archive and Records Administration)



△ US Military Advisor Captain Lerch and a military officer discuss Anti-guerrilla Operations with a map spread on the ground. (May 15, 1948).  
(Source: the US National Archive and Records Administration)




△ Advisors to the Department of Internal Security in Jeju. From the right, Commander of the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment Park Jin-gyeong, Lieutenant Major Kim Jong-myeon, Brigadier General Roberts, Major Choi Gap-jong, Major Baek Seon-jin, and Captain Lim Bu-taek. (May 1948).  
(Source: General Kim Jong-myeon)



△ A C-47 Skytrain arrives at Jeju Airport. The military transport aircraft flew between Seoul and Jeju twice a week on a regular basis. (June 1948).

(Source: General Kim Jeong-mu)



△ Military Governor Dean is delivering his funeral address at the ceremony for dead Regiment Commander Park Jin-gyeong at Jeju Agriculture School where the headquarters of the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment was located. (June 18, 1948).


(Source: Mr. Wesolowsky who was a military advisor on Jeju)



△ Brigadier General Roberts (left) who came to Jeju to investigate the assassination of Major Park Jin-gyeong is returning a guard's salute when leaving the headquarters of the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment. (June 18, 1948). (Source: Mr. Wesolowsky who was a military advisor on Jeju)



△ Soldiers of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment in an operation near the summit of Mt. Halla. (September 1948). (Source: Mr. Wesolowsky who was a military advisor on Jeju)




△ (From right) Assistant Chief of General Staff of the National Defense Force Jung Il-gwon, Assistant Chief of Staff of the Coastal Guard Kim Yeong-cheol; and Commander of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment Song Yo-chan posing at Samseonghyeol. (October 1, 1948).  
(Source: General Kim Jeong-mu)




△ Military Chief of Staff and his company visited the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment. From the fifth on the right in the back row: Regiment Commander Song Yo-chan, Chief of Staff Chae Byeong-deok, Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics Kim Jeong-mu, Director of Operations Kang Mun-bong, Battalion Commander Lee Su-bok, Major Baek Seon-jin, JAG officer, and Vice Commander Seo Jong-cheol.  
(Source: General Kim Jeong-mu)



△ Military officers in front of a US transport aircraft. From the right in the back row, Assistant Chief of Staff of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment Han Yeong-ju, a US army pilot, Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics Kim Jeong-mu, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Tak Seong-rok. In the front row is a US military advisor and operation officer of the National Defense Force Ahn Gwang-su. (Source: General Kim Jeong-mu)



△ Tent camp at Jeju Agriculture School. From the fall of 1948, people including heads of organizations and local dignitaries began to be confined at the camp. (November 1948). (Source: the US National Archive and Records Administration)



△ Inmates waiting in line to be interrogated. (November 1948).  
(Source: the US National Archive and Records Administration)




△ President Rhee Syngman delivering words of encouragement to members of the Korea Constabulary about to be dispatched to Jeju Island. (Source: the Dong-A Ilbo)



△ Stone walls were built in coastal villages to protect the villages from the armed guerrillas. (January 1949). (Source: Photo album 'History of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment on Jeju Island')



△ Commandos of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment disguising themselves as armed guerrillas. The sign in the bottom left reads “disguising ourselves as rebels.” (February 1949). (Source: Photo album 'History of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment on Jeju Island')




◁ Women guard a village armed with bamboo spears. (March 1949).  
(Source: Photo album 'History of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment on Jeju Island')



△ People, mostly the elderly, women and children, who climbed down from the mountain due to the anti-guerrilla operations by Commander Yoo Jae-heung.  
(Source: Photo Album 'History of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment on Jeju Island')



△ An interrogation team screens defectors in a schoolyard. (April 1949).  
(Source: Photo album 'History of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment on Jeju Island')



△ A view of the alcohol factory near Jeju Harbor where defectors were accommodated en masse.  
(Source: the US National Archive and Records Administration)



◁ President Rhee Syng-man on a visit to Jeju delivering his speech at a welcome rally held at Gwandeokjeong Square. The soldier to the left of Rhee is Colonel Yoo Jae-heung. (April 9, 1949).  
(Source: Photo album 'History of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment on Jeju Island')



△ A Village being restored. (1949).  
(Source: Photo album 'History of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment on Jeju Island')



△ President Rhee Syng-man inspecting Jeju Island riding a military jeep. In the back row are Commander of the US 8<sup>th</sup> Army General Van Fleet and Head of the 1<sup>st</sup> Training Camp Brigadier General Jang Do-yeong. (July 3, 1952). (Source: The National Archive of Korea)



△ A Welcome Rally for President Rhee Syng-man held at Gwandeokjeong Square. (July 3, 1952). (Source: The National Archive of Korea)

## The Enactment of the Jeju 4·3 Special Law



△ President Kim Dae-jung signs the Jeju 4 · 3 Special Law at the Blue House as family members of the victims and representatives of civic groups look on. (January 11, 2000).



△ A signboard-hanging ceremony of the Jeju 4 · 3 Special Committee conducted with committee members from the government and the private sector. (August 28, 2000).



△ President Roh Moo-hyun at a luncheon with invited civil members of the Jeju 4·3 Special Committee. (April 2, 2003).



△ The Memorial Ceremony marking the 55<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Jeju 4·3 Incident held on the site of the Jeju 4·3 Peace Park. (April 3, 2003).



△ Prime Minister Goh Kun (center), Minister of Public Administration and Autonomy Kim Du-gwan, and Jeju Governor Woo Keun-min are burning incense at the memorial ceremony. (April 3, 2003).



△ Victims' family members check for names of victims on a memorial list. (April 3, 2003).



△ The groundbreaking ceremony for the Jeju 4 · 3 Peace Park at Bonggae-dong, Jeju City. (April 3, 2003).



△ Prime Minister Goh Kun gives an introductory speech at the 8<sup>th</sup> plenary session of the Jeju 4 · 3 Special Committee where the Jeju 4 · 3 Investigation Report was finally approved. (October 15, 2003).



△ President Roh Moo-hyun talks about the government's standpoint regarding the Jeju 4·3 Incident at a meeting with Jeju people. (October 31, 2003).

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# **I. A Summary of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident Investigation Report**

## **1. Background of Investigation Report**

On January 12, 2000 “The Special Law for Investigation of Truth about the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident and Honoring Victims” (hereafter referred to as “the Special Law”) was promulgated. The objective of this law is to conduct an official investigation of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident (hereafter referred to as “the Incident”) and honor the victims and their families. The death toll of the incident reached the second highest toll in modern Korean history after the Korean War. Through the enactment of the law, the Incident has finally been reevaluated by the government fifty years after the Incident took place.

No one was permitted to publically criticize the nature of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident until the Rhee Syng-man regime collapsed on April 19, 1960. Until then, the Incident had been interpreted as a communist rebellion led by the South Korean Labor Party and those who were killed by the military and police had been considered armed communist resistance or associates. Furthermore, the Incident had been described, without any concrete evidence, as communist rebellion aiming at ‘communizing’ Jeju Island and the whole Korean Peninsula, according to instructions coming from the Soviet Union, North Korea or the headquarters of the South Korean Labor Party.

However, when the Liberal Party regime fell because of the 4 · 19 Revolution in 1960, open debates over the incident began. In May 1960, seven students at Jeju National University formed the Association for Investigation of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident and launched its mission. Soon after, in Moseolpo in Namjeju-gun, victims’ families and citizens held a rally and urged to investigate the massacres of citizens done by government commando units.

On May 23, 1960, when the investigation committee for the massacres of

citizens in Geochang and Hamyang, in Gyeongsangnam-do, was organized at the National Assembly, law makers from Jeju proposed a similar investigation committee for the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident. The National Assembly accepted this proposal and established the Gyeongsangnam-do factfinding body (whose leader was Choi Cheon) to expand its investigation areas including Jeju Island and ordered this official body to investigate the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident for one day on June 6. Upon this decision, the former *Jeju Shinbo* (a local newspaper company) issued an announcement for receiving reports of the massacres of citizens at the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident and the Korean War and prepared to submit its report to the National Assembly Investigatory Committee.

On June 6, 1960, at the hearing held at the assembly hall of the Jeju Provincial Council, families of the Incident victims disclosed the illegality of the massacres and made an appeal to clear ten years of unbearably false accusations made against their lost family members. At this hearing, Assemblyman Jo Il-jae requested a summons of soldiers and policemen who had executed citizens to testify as witnesses at the hearing, and Assemblyman Park Sang-gil promised to enact a special law for punishing perpetrators when the issues of the statute of limitation was raised. During the three-day notice period, the total of 1,259 cases and the casualties of 1,457 people were reported to the Jeju Shinbo. On June 23, Shin Doo-bang, then managing director of the Jeju Shinbo, officially accused offending police officers of killing 10 family members in Oedo-dong, Jeju City.

The debates over the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident, which began with the 4 · 19 Revolution, were interrupted again by the 5 · 16 Military Coup d'Etat in 1961. On May 17, 1961, the very next day after the 5 · 16 Military Coup d'Etat, Lee Mun-gyo and Park Gyeong-gu, members of the 66 association for investigation of the incident, were arrested and served terms of imprisonment. Shin Du-bang was also prosecuted and the family members of the victims in Moseolpo were taken to the police station and suffered mistreatment. On June 15, the police destroyed and buried a stone monument erected in the previous year to cherish the memory of the victims. After the 5 · 16 Military Coup d'Etat, for some 20 years under military rule, debates concerning the Incident were banned once

more. Under the framework of a newly promulgated Anti- Communist Law, a new National Security Law and a system of guilt-by- association, no one dared to speak openly about the Incident. In 1978, novelist Hyeon Gi-yeong did write a collection of short stories called *Aunt Suni*, revealing a part of the truth and the scars of the Incident. However, he was subsequently taken to the nation's spy agency where he suffered maltreatment for writing these stories about the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident. The entire affair seemed to have been buried deep in historical neglect.

In 1987, however, debates over the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident began to be reinvigorated after the emergence of the democratization movement. Many memorial gatherings and academic seminars were held in 1988 marking the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the incident. In political circles, assemblymen talked about the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident during the parliamentary inspection of the administration.

Investigation campaigns for correcting the distorted truth of the incident increased in frequency in 1989. In this year, civic and social organizations in Jeju established a joint committee for the April Memorial Service and held the first memorial service at the Citizens' Hall. Immediately after holding a May 10 memorial service in commemoration of the Incident, a think tank called the "Jeju 4 · 3 Research Institute" was established. Additionally, on April 3, 1989, the *Jeju Shinmun* (a local daily newspaper) began to publish a series of articles called, "The testimony of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident." This was followed by another series called "A Talk about the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident" in another local daily, the *Jemin Ilbo* (later published as a book in five volumes in 1998).

In the 1990s, families of the victims and Jeju citizens began to request an investigation of the incident and the restoration of the victims' honor. Political circles, the local council and the local government started to pay attention to this request. In June 1990, families of the victims founded the association of the families of the victims of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident and held a memorial service in April 1991. On February 7 of the same year, the Jeju Provincial Council opened an office for receiving reports of the casualties and damage. As a result, in May 1995, the Jeju Provincial Council's Special Committee of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident published the first report of the casualties and

damage of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident, revealing the list of the names of 14,125 victims. In October of the same year, the Jeju Council and the Association of Student Bodies in Jeju presented a petition urging the enactment of the Special Law of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident and the formation of the Special Committee to the National Assembly, respectively.

In March 1996, Jeju Governor Shin Gu-beom officially requested the central government's investigation of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident. On November 12 of the same year, the Special Committee of the Jeju Provincial Council presented a petition for establishing the special committee of the National Assembly. On December 17, 154 assemblymen (more than the majority of enrolment in the National Assembly) supported this petition and they proposed a bill for the establishment of the special committee. Unfortunately, no progress was made in dealing with the bill at the National Assembly.

Reflecting on the changes in public sentiments, the Kim Young-sam Regime expressed its position, saying "if an officially recognized organization participates in the investigation, the government will fully cooperate with its investigation process" (May 8, 1993). Furthermore, after getting the signatures of 75 Assemblymen from the ruling and the opposition parties, Assemblyman Byeon Jeong-il from Jeju submitted a resolution for establishing the special committee for investigation on February 2, 1994. This was the first case in which a bill for establishing the special committee was submitted to the National Assembly.

Thus the investigation effort did not go smoothly. Lee San-ha (poet), Kim Yeong-ho (head of a publishing company) and Kim Myeong-sik (head of a research institute), who dealt with the incident as a source or subject of their creative activities and studies, were prosecuted in succession. Kim Dong-man (film maker), who made a documentary about the incident and Seo Jun-sik (human rights activist), who screened it, were also prosecuted for violating the National Security Law. Nonetheless, the campaigns for the investigation mission were not dampened but became increasingly fervent.

In 1998, marking the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident, the voices demanding the investigation report became louder and stronger. On April 1,

1997, the Citizens' Committee for Promoting the Memorial Service of the 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Jeju 4 · 3 was formed in Seoul by four co-chairs – Kang Man-gil, Kim Jung-bae, Kim Chan-guk and Jeong Yun-hyeong. On September 26 of the same year, the Jeju Citizens' Promotion Committee for Memorial Projects for the Victims of the Jeju 4·3 Incident was established. In 1998, civic organizations in Jeju set up the Jeju Citizens' Committee for Promoting Academic and Cultural Businesses of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident. Memorial Services, international symposiums, art festivals and religious activities were held under the initiative of these organizations.

In December 1997, Kim Dae-jung, presidential candidate of the National Congress for New Politics, promised to conduct a investigation report and restore the victims' honor if he was elected as the President of South Korea. According to his election promise, the National Congress for New Politics organized the Investigation Special Committee on March 30, 1998 and the committee held public hearings in Jeju in May and at the National Assembly on September 28.

In 1999, campaigns to find the truth unfolded in more concrete ways. On March 8, the Citizens' Coalition for Investigation and Honoring the Victims was founded in Jeju. In June, then-President Kim Dae-jung promised that the central government would fund three billion won to construct a memorial park, at the insistence of Jeju Governor Woo Keun-min, when he visited Jeju. This was the first step taken by the central government to resolve the conflicts caused by the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident.

Under the slogan of “We cannot carry forward the 20<sup>th</sup> century incident into to the 21<sup>st</sup> century,” people who took the initiative in investigation exerted a great amount of efforts to enact a special law before the closure of the 15<sup>th</sup> National Assembly set for the end of December 1999. In Jeju, 24 groups of the victims' families and other civic groups organized in solidarity and ran an aggressive campaign to enact the special law for the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident. In response to this, Jeju citizens gathered signatures and made a donation. Moreover, from this solidarity derived the declaration, urging the enactment of the Jeju 4 · 3 Special Law, from 694 civic activists out of 184 civic groups, making

known the appropriateness of the enactment of such special legislation on a national level.

On October 11, 1999, three assemblymen from the Grand National Party from Jeju announced a bill for the Special Law concerning the Jeju 4·3 Incident and the Grand National Party (the opposition party) also submitted a bill to the National Assembly as well at the suggestion of Assemblyman Byeon Jeong-il and 122 other assemblymen, while the National Congress for New Politics (the ruling party) decided to set up a special committee within the National Assembly and later enact a special law, nevertheless taking a rather passive attitude. On November 17, the National Congress for New Politics submitted a new resolution for establishing a special committee to the National Assembly, which was passed by the Steering Committee of the National Assembly on November 26. However, the National Congress for New Politics withdrew this resolution, as it was facing by a fierce resistance backbenchers who were against its plan.

In the end on November 24, Lim Chae-jeong, head of the policy planning committee of the party, promised to enact the Jeju 4·3 special law and the ruling party submitted a new bill calling for the Special Law to be submitted before the National Assembly at the suggestion of Assemblyman Chu Mi-ae and 102 other assemblymen. On December 7, a bipartisan Administration Autonomy Committee of the National Assembly consolidated two bills (one from the ruling party and the other from the opposition party) into one single bill and presented it to the Assembly plenary session on December 7, 1999. Fifteen days before entering into the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the National Assembly eventually passed the Special Law for Investigation of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims.

More than 10 years of effort to enact the Special Law finally paid off. On January 11, 2000, at the Blue House, President Kim Dae-jung signed the Jeju 4·3 Special Law, as eight representatives from the victims' families and civic groups who had led the campaigns watched the event. At the time President Kim said that the Jeju 4·3 Special Law would be a monumental landmark in the process of democratization, showing clearly that Korean society puts

human rights ahead of anything else. After all, the history of investigation report of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident advanced slowly but steadily running parallel with the stream of democratization in South Korea.

## 2. Grounds and Purpose of Investigation Report

Article 1 of the Jeju 4·3 Special Law describes that the purpose of the law is first to find out the truth about the incident and second to restore the victims' honor through the presentation of the truth regarding the 4·3 Incident. Therefore, investigation is the top priority in the making of this Special Law which starts from a premise that the interpretation of the Jeju 4·3 Incident committed by the former military regimes is problematic.

The necessity of the investigation can clearly be seen in the suggestions presented/made by assemblymen. As previously stated, the Jeju 4·3 Special Law was enacted by incorporating the two bills into one— the first from the Grand National Party at the suggestion of Assemblyman Byeon Jeong-il and 112 other lawmakers and the other from the National Congress for New Politics at the suggestion of Assemblyman Chu Mi-ae and 102 other National Assembly members.

The reason for submitting the bill from the Grand National Party assemblymen is as follows:

During the civil disturbance in Jeju on April 3, 1948, tens of thousands of innocent people were killed and quite a few policemen and soldiers were victimized. Many villages were burnt down. Jeju citizens and families of the victims have suffered severe disadvantages in both private and public life, being branded as rebellious elements. However, since the incident took place fifty years ago, no attempts have been made in a comprehensive manner to find out what happened. Different interpretations from different perspectives have intensified confusion. Therefore, this bill aims to make history right and contribute to national unity and democratization by conducting a government investigation into the incident and restoring the honor of the victims, their families and other people who were involved.

In other words, the intent of the bill was for the government to restore the honor of the victims, their family members and the entire Jeju citizenry by revealing the fact that during the Incident many innocent people were killed and some policemen and soldiers lost their lives. Jeju citizens had been

regarded as leftist elements, although not being officially characterized as such, and suffered great hardships in private and public life because of a guilt by-association strategy. We know that the bill focused on working out these problems.

Meanwhile, the reason for submitting the bill from the National Congress for New Politics assemblymen is as follows.

More than 50 years has passed since the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident occurred, but so far no attempts have been made by the government to find out the truth or to restore the honor of the victims. Therefore, this bill is submitted to the National Assembly with a view to contributing to national unity and enhancement of human rights by finding out the truth and honoring the victims and their family members.

The assemblymen from the National Congress for New Politics assume that the government should be held responsible for not honoring the victims and their family, blaming the government for not taking actions to examine the casualties. They believe that submitting this bill will finally help to achieve national unity and improve human rights.

With regard to the bill, Park Bong-guk, expert advisor to the administration autonomy committee of the National Assembly, commented, “The bill has been made for the purpose of healing the pain which our people suffered in the past.” He also said, “When examining the bill, assemblymen should be aware that they should have historical consciousness and mission.” After passing all these processes, the Special Law was presented and sailed through the 208<sup>th</sup> Assembly plenary session without voting on December 16, 1999. Before the law passed the session, assembly woman Chu Mi-ae said in her speech:

We have disregarded this Incident for almost half a century to the extent that we still don't know exactly how many people were killed during the incident. However, it is the duty of the next generation to pray for the repose of the victims and restore their honor by investigating the case if innocent people were killed and sacrificed. . . . Jeju citizens are fed up with waiting for the

Investigation and restoring the victims' honor. Let them heal the past wounds and face the new century. Since each party firmly promised them to pass this law, I appeal to all of you sincerely not to break your promise.

Lawmaker Chu Mi-ae emphasized the investigation of the victims who were falsely framed and thought "it is the duty of the next generation" to comfort the victimized souls. This confirms to Article 1 of the Special Law, which reads "The purpose of this law is to improve human rights and contribute to democratization and national unity by finding the truth about the Jeju 4·3 Incident and restoring the honor of the victims and their families."

All things considered, we can understand that the Special Law has been made as a renewed attempt to examine the Incident from a new, retrospective and objective point of view. Although there have been debates over the incident, it has not been yet characterized by the government since it took place fifty years ago. Moreover, if there have been any victims falsely framed in the past, they must now be honored.

In other words, the law is intended to carry out a thorough investigation into the Jeju 4·3 Incident and restore the honor of the victims and their families considering the fact that many innocent people were killed in the battle between the armed guerrilla units and the military and the police and their family members suffered hardships from the guilt-by-association system. In short, the law aimed to exonerate the innocent dead from all charges of being reds and their sympathizers and heal the wounds from the ideological conflicts through reconciliation and contribute to the improvement of human rights, democratization and national unity.

### **3. Organization and Operation of the Committee**

#### **A. Organization of the Committee**

According to the Jeju 4 · 3 Special Law, the highest decision-making body is the Special Committee for Investigation of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident and Restoring the Honor of the Victims. Enforcement Regulation No. 3 of the Special Law stipulates that the committee is to be composed of fewer than 20 people, including the prime minister, who is also the chairperson of the committee, the minister of justice, the minister of budget and planning, the minister of government registration, the governor of Jeju, representatives of the victims' families who are designated by the prime minister, relevant experts and people of learning and experience.

The committee was launched on August 28, 2000. The members of the committee were eight government ministers including the prime ministers as well as twelve civilians including representatives of the victims' families, scholars, lawyers, former army generals, and heads of civic groups. The first, second and third chairpersons of the committee were Prime Minister Lee Han-dong, Prime Minister Kim Seok-su and Prime Minister Ko Geon, respectively. The committee had the right to examine and make a decision about collecting and analyzing the data and preparing the Investigation Report.

Meanwhile, Article No. 7 of the Special Law prescribes that the task force for preparing the report can be organized separately in order to maintain objectivity and heighten efficiency. According to the Enforcement Ordinance No. 12 of the Special Law, the task force is composed of less than 15 people including director-general level officials who are appointed by the prime minister, the vice-governor of Jeju, representatives of the victims' families and relevant experts.

The task force was launched on January 17, 2000. The members of the task force were five director-general level officials from various government offices including the vice-governor of Jeju and ten civilians including representatives of the victims' families, scholars, lawyers and heads of civic groups. The head

of the task force was lawyer Park Won-sun. Under the umbrella of the task force, an Investigation team was organized with five expert advisors and fifteen investigators. The leader of the team was Chief Advisor Yang Jo-hun.

## **B. Operation of the Committee**

The Special Law defines the Jeju 4·3 Incident as “a disturbance which occurred on March 1, 1947 and developed on April 3, 1948 and as a following, armed conflict and suppression until September 21, 1954, during which many Jeju citizens were killed” (Article 2). Therefore, the investigation focuses on the armed conflict, the suppression of it and the killing of innocent people during the process for seven years and seven months from the shooting incident by the police on March 1, 1947 to the lifting of the standstill order on Mt. Halla on September 21, 1954. The committee initiated its mission with a basic policy of making a comprehensive and thorough investigation into the background of the incident, its development and the extent of the damage while placing emphasis on human rights abuses and the slaughter of innocent people.

According to the provisions, the collection and analysis of the data should be conducted for two years and the investigation report should be finished within 6 months after the data collection and analysis. The investigation began in September, 2000 and lasted for two and a half years until February 2003. The steps of the investigation are as follows.

1. making lists of the data and witnesses who are scheduled to give their testimony and selecting institutes and organizations from which the data will be collected.
2. collecting the data and recording the testimonies
3. analyzing the data and the testimony
4. making and examining the report

However, these steps were not taken in serial order but in a parallel way and constantly supplemented in order not to omit newly achieved fruits of the investigation or witnesses' important testimonies.

The committee checked the progress of the investigation, deliberated and voted for the report at its 7<sup>th</sup> plenary session on March 29, 2003. However, it decided to revise or complement the report if new data or testimony arose within 6 months after the vote. According to this policy, the committee received 376 opinions which demanded revision of the content of the report from 20 organizations, groups and individuals by September of the same year and formed and operated a subcommittee to review these opinions. As a result, 33 amendments were proposed and the committee voted for them at its 8<sup>th</sup> plenary session on September 15, 2003, thereby completing the final investigation report.

The task force, which has the actual responsibility to make the report, held 12 meetings and thoroughly reviewed everything from the basic plans of the investigation to the content of the report. The full-time Investigation team collected the data from institutes and organizations at home and abroad and recorded the testimony from witnesses in Jeju Island, Seoul, Japan and the United States, among others.

## 4. Investigation Activities

For more efficient investigation, there are some regulations in the Special Law. The first one stipulates that “the committee can request related data from concerned administrative bodies and organizations. When requested, they must comply with the request. (Clause 2, Article 6) The second one prescribes that “concerned administrative bodies and organizations must provide convenience to collect and read the data related with the Jeju 4·3 Incident (Clause 3, Article 6). The third regulation provides that if necessary data are kept in overseas countries, the government must negotiate sincerely with those countries in order to obtain them (Clause 4, Article 6).

Besides, there are also other ordinances which aim to promote the record of testimony such as “anyone can freely give his or her evidence about the Incident” (Clause 1, Article 5) and “no one is subject to any disadvantage or unfair treatment only because he or she is the victim of the Incident or a family member of the victims” (Clause 2, Article 5).

These rules actually helped with the investigation. There was not a single domestic agency or organization which denied submitting the related data or prevented the team from accessing them. The Korean embassies in foreign countries such as the United States, Russia and Japan, cooperated with the team in searching for relevant data. Unfortunately, however, some data had been missing or discarded. As seen in the table below, the committee searched for the data from 19 domestic institutes and administrative bodies and nine foreign countries and collected 10,594 cases of relevant data.

### \* Targeted Institutes and Foreign Countries

Division	Institute & Country
Domestic (19)	The National Assembly, The Ministry of Unification, The Ministry of National Defense, The National Archives of Korea, The National Institute of Korean History, The Republic of Korea Army, The Republic of Korea Navy, The Republic of Korea Marine Corps, The Defense Security Command, The Republic of Korea Defense

	Intelligence Command, The Institute for Military History Compilation, The National Police Agency, The Jeju Provincial Police Agency, The Jeju Police Station, The Seogwipo Police Station, The Jeju Provincial Council, The National Library of Korea, Other Media Organizations
Overseas (9)	The United States, Russia, Japan, Other similar cases (Taiwan, South Africa, Argentina, Spain, etc.)

\* Distribution of Data

Division	Number of Cases	Division	Number of Cases
Yearbook/Data from Military & Police/Laws and Regulations	267	Ruling of General Trial	1,562
Publication by government	245	National Assembly's Report of Massacres of Citizens	1,878
Work/Book	254	Data from the United States	1,870
Paper/Thesis	370	Data from Russia	19
News Article/Editorial/Contribution	2,912	Data from Japan	92
Memoir/Biography	55	Data from North Korea	
Video Clip/Photo Album	188	Translation/Others	65
Literary Work	13	Recorded Testimony	571
Official Gazette	132	Total	10,594

## A. Bibliographic Survey

### 1) Domestic

The bibliographic survey began with making lists of the data related to the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident. The lists were a compilation of published materials as well as unpublished materials, which may be found online. The list of about 1,500 source materials was drawn up.

The next step was to select target institutes and organizations. After several discussions, 19 domestic institutes and organizations were chosen. During this process, the task force team gave weight to securing the data from government bodies such as the records of the military and the police operations which were directly involved in the suppression of the incident, the minutes of the

Cabinet meetings, and the rulings of trials, etc. In addition, the team also tried hard to discover and secure the data from newspapers and magazines at the time, the stenographic records of the National Assembly, the laws, regulations and administrative orders of the US army military government in Korea, personnel orders, individual memoirs and the records from the armed guerrillas.

At first, the team contacted institutes and organizations to find out if they had data related to the incident and asked, if they had, to submit them to the team. The staff of the investigation team was also dispatched to those institutes and organizations to obtain the data. The staff members spent more than a few months searching for the data in important institutions and organizations like the National Archives of Korea located in Daejeon, the Institute for Military History Compilation in Seoul and the National Institute of Korean History in Gwacheon. Four team members were dispatched to the National Archives of Korea, conducting an intensive and thorough documentary survey for two months from April 2001. Thanks to the survey results, the team acquired the government's documents including the minutes of the Cabinet meetings from 1949 to 1950, files of instructions and documents ordered and approved by President Rhee Syng-man, and regulations. Moreover, a great deal of data related to the execution of a pecuniary punishment such as rulings of general trials, lists of prisoners who were tried by court-martial and identification certificates of prisoners who died in prisons were found and copied. With regard to the National Archives of Korea, additional surveys were conducted three times and about 2,500 pieces of data were secured.

Prior to this, from February to May 2000, for three months, five members were dispatched to the Institute for Military History Compilation to conduct a survey of documents. Besides the data related to the army, they tried to find the data from the USA during the reign of the US military before and after the Korean War. This was done with the intention of surveying all the US documents available in Korea, prior to the data collection in the USA. Four hundred and five (405) pieces of related data were obtained.

From August 2001, for two months, 8 members searched for the data in

the National Institute of Korean History. As a result, domestic data of the modern history of Korea as well as the data from the United States such as “the regular US army government and company” were acquired. Especially, through the search on discontinued newspapers such as the Dokrip Shinbo, the Donggwang Shinmun, the Hanseong Ilbo and the Hyeondae Ilbo, valuable articles about the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident could be excerpted. About 1,500 pieces of data were obtained from the institute.

Extensive data surveys were conducted in military-related institutes and organizations such as the Ministry of National Defense, the Republic of Korea Army, the Republic of Korea Navy, the Republic of Korea Marine Corps, the Defense Security Command, and the Republic of Korea Defense Intelligence Command. Through these institutes and organizations, materials such as personal information about major commanders stationed in Jeju, personnel orders on the Korea Constabulary, operation orders by the Republic of Korea army, and orders by the general court-martial and the army history logs were made available. Also secured was the list of 101 soldiers who were killed during the operations. However, the team could not acquire daily logs of battles or situations at the end of 1948 or at the beginning of 1949 when the casualties were most severe. In addition, there were almost no materials that could provide information of where military units were stationed, so the team could not confirm the situations of detailed military operations, post commanders and military troops, who were stationed in Jeju at the time.

With regard to the police, data surveys were conducted targeting the National Police Agency, the Jeju Provincial Police Agency, the Jeju Police Station and the Seogwipo Police Station. However, the only materials obtained from the police were the list of 122 policemen killed during the operations and the list of police commanders at the time. The team visited four archives of the National Police Agency and one archive of the Jeju Provincial Police Agency, searching for data but it could not find materials directly related to the incident. The police said that some of the materials were missing during the time of political transition such as the 4 · 19 Revolution and all the remaining data were finally discarded in accordance with “The Guidelines of

Ceasing the Guilt-by-Association System” issued on March 24, 1981 by the Ministry of Home Affairs. The investigation team secured a written confirmation of not keeping any materials in connection with the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident from heads of the police departments.

From the National Assembly, the team acquired “The Report of Massacres of Citizens,” which was made right after the 4 · 19 Revolution in 1960, the stenographic records of the members of the Interim South Korea Legislature during the reign of the US Military Government and the stenographic records of the National Assembly after the establishment of the South Korean government. At the Ministry of Unification, the team excerpted articles from North Korean newspapers and magazines. In addition, they collected papers and books from the National Library of Korea and obtained special programs and articles from TV stations and newspaper publishing companies. Also, from the Jeju Provincial Council, they obtained “The Report of the Casualties of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident” (14,125 people) made by the Council and analyzed it.

It is believed that the team made a successful attempt to collect and analyze the data. Yet the data from the parties concerned – the military/the police and the armed guerrillas – were relatively insufficient. The team had a hard time especially because of the data discarded by the police.

## 2) Overseas

To secure the data from overseas, the team dispatched its staff to three foreign countries – the United States, Russia and Japan. They conducted a survey with the help of resident experts. Among those countries, the US was given the most weight. Given that the incident occurred during the rule of the US Military Government and the anticipation that there would be a great deal of data about the incident there, an in-depth data search was carried out in the US.

The USA team was jointly organized with the Jeju local government and composed of three people – Jang Jun-gap, Kim Chang-hu, and Yang Jeong-sim. The first research was conducted from March 29 to April 27, 2001 and the second was carried out for 6 months from June 23 to December 1 of the

same year. To search for the data, the survey team visited the National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter referred to as NARA), the MacArthur Memorial and the U.S. Army Military History Institute.

The NARA was so cooperative with the survey that it even provided the team with an exclusive work table. The survey team collected about 800 pieces of materials related directly or indirectly to the incident. The quantity of materials was enormous, reaching more than 10,000 pages of copies. Among the data were the operation diaries of the 24<sup>th</sup> Corps Operations Directorate, materials from the Counter Intelligence Corps, reports by Ambassador John J. Muccio, official letters by Brigadier General William L. Roberts (head of the Provisional Military Advisory Group), reports about activities in Jeju by Colonel Rothwell H. Brown (commander of the 20<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment) and Lieutenant Major M. W. Schewe (the 24<sup>th</sup> Corps Operation Directorate). Articles of major US news papers such as the New York Times and the Washington Post were also obtained. Also found in NARA was a very valuable photograph in which William F. Dean, head of the US Military Government, Ahn Jae-hong, civil administrator, Jo Byeong-ok, head of the police, Song Hoseong, head of the Korea Constabulary, who arrived at Jeju Airport to attend a top-level meeting with heads of the US Military Government and Yoo Hae-jin, Jeju Governor and Kim Ik-ryeol, commander of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, who greeted them all appeared.

During its search, the US survey team found out that 28 pieces of material including a document titled “Cheju (Jeju) Do Island, Parts I & II” were categorized as confidential documents. So in November 2001, they asked the US Army Intelligence and Security Command, through the Korean Embassy in the USA, to allow access to the documents. With regard to this, the Command informed the survey team that the requested documents had been transferred to NARA. However, NARA replied that it was given just a list of the documents, not the actual materials. The survey team again asked the Command to confirm whether it had the documents and if they did, to allow the team to access the materials. Then, on July 4, 2002, the Command finally notified the team that it didn't have the related documents. The team was

sorry not to have checked these documents.

The search of Russian documents and data was conducted by three people – Kim Han-uk, Park Chan-sik, and Jeon Hyeon-su – targeting archives in Moscow from September 3 to 10, 2001. To search for the data and documents, the team of three visited six Russian institutes: the Russian Federation Records Management Institute, the Archive of Foreign Policy Documents, the Archive of Modern Documents, the Central Archive of the Russia Defense Department, the National Archive of Society and Politics Documents and the National Archive of Russia. As a result, 19 pieces of material were secured, including “the Intelligence Report on South Korea in April 1948” and “the Intelligence Report on elections in South Korea.”

With regard to the data search in Japan, two investigators – Yang Jo-hun, Kim Jong-min – carried out the search three times: in December 2000, December 2011 and July 2002. During their search, 92 items of data were obtained. In Japan, recording of testimonies from Korean residents were also conducted. Meanwhile, in the nearby sea of Tsushima Island, on-the-spot inspection about the possibility of recovering dead bodies of some victims of the 4·3 Jeju Incident who had been buried at the coastal waters of Jeju was conducted. This was because, in some cases, when people are drowned at the coastal waters of Jeju, they are swept out to Tsushima Island due to the ocean current and then float to the surface of the water later.

For effective search for data in overseas countries, some foreign experts were appointed to carry out a joint survey. Professor Fujiya Kawashima of Bowling Green State University and Dr. Park Myeong-rim, researcher at Harvard University, were the experts from the United States. Professor Moon Gyeong-su of Ritsumeikan University from Japan and Dr. Vartanov, Valeriy Nikolayevich, associate director of the Central Archive of Russian Defense, participated as a resident expert.

Meanwhile, in order to refer to investigation cases in foreign countries, the team tried to acquire foreign case studies. For example, the team succeeded in gaining the research report on the Taiwan 2·28 Incident, the investigation report by the National Commission on the Disappeared of Argentina, a report by the

South African Truth and Reconciliation Committee and a report from Spain.

### 3) Publication of the Sourcebooks

After collecting the materials regarding the incident, classifying them by source followed. This was considered necessary in order to use them as preliminary data for understanding the truth of the Incident, as well as understanding the background and development of the Incident and figuring out the damage and casualties. The twelve volumes of sourcebooks, entitled *The Archive of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident*, based on the vivid primary sources, were published. In order to raise reliability and historicity, the photocopied editions were also published in addition to translated versions.

#### \* Major Contents of the Archive

Volume No.	Division	Major Content	No. of Pieces	No. of Pages	Type
Vol. 1	Newspaper 1	Domestic Newspaper (1945.8 -1948.3)	415	448	Booklet
Vol. 2	Newspaper 2	Domestic Newspaper (1948.4 -1949.3)	464	540	Booklet
Vol. 3	Newspaper 3	Domestic Newspaper (1949.4-1961.11)	519	640	Booklet
Vol. 4	Government document, Stenograph of National Congress Magazine	Minutes of Cabinet meeting, Document approved by the President, Stenograph of National Assembly Domestic magazine	134	551	Booklet
Vol. 5	Military Government Data 1	Operation order, Personnel order, Army history journal, Police intelligence report			Booklet
Vol. 6	Official gazette	US Military government decree, US Military government notice of appointment, Official gazette of South Korea	132	572	Booklet

Vol. 7	US Data	US Army Command in South Korea	387	502	Booklet
Vol. 8	US Data 2	6 <sup>th</sup> Division, 7 <sup>th</sup> Division, Military Advisory Group, 971 Counterintelligence Corps, US Army Command in South Korea, UN Temporary Commission on Korea	243	469	Booklet
Vol. 9	US Data 3	US Army Advisors' Office in US Army Command in South Korea	137	516	Booklet
Vol. 10	US Data 4	US Far East Command, Joint Weekly Intelligence Analysis by US government and Korea government	153	422	
Vol. 11	US Data 5	US Delegation to Korea, US Embassy in Korea, US newspapers	136	405	
Vol. 12	Data from North Korea, Russia and Armed Guerrilla	North Korea newspapers/ magazines Data from Russia/ Armed Guerrillas	99	275	Copy

## B. Recording Testimony

Recently, oral history has been becoming more and more important in historical studies. Especially, in a unique case like the Jeju 4·3 Incident, recording witnesses' testimony was required. There are some reasons that the Incident is referred to as "unique" here. First, even though the incident recorded the second most casualties in Korean history, few official documents that can reveal the true nature of the incident survived. Second, there have been few comprehensive and concrete attempts to find the truth of the incident and, if any, they have been repressed for a long time. Third, interpretation and viewpoints towards the nature of the Incident still show a sharp contrast in society. In order to understand what really happened at the time, it was essential to record statements from the people who experienced the incident.

This it was not an easy task from the outset. First, it was difficult to decide who should be selected. Those who were in Jeju should be considered first, but at the same time, balance should be a factor in the selection process.

First of all, witnesses were chosen from those who had been mentioned in the existing materials such as the damage and casualty report of the Jeju Provincial Council, newspapers, broadcast programs and collections of testimony. Then, the committee received a recommendation for witnesses from institutes and organizations. The committee also launched its own selection from commanders of the suppression operations and ex-armed guerrillas. Through this process, a list of 2,870 people was completed, out of which about 500 people were screened into a final selection. The following were given priority: first, those who had unusual background rather than ordinary one; second, those who underwent a specific incident or came from a village which suffered severe damage; third, those who were recommended by institutes and organizations or discovered by the committee's own investigation. Some of the witnesses were replaced because they were dead by the time of interview or refused to testify and some important witnesses were added to the list.

Recording the testimonies of 503 witnesses was carried out for 16 months from July 2001 to October 2002. Every testimony was recorded with voice recorders and camcorders.

**\* Backgrounds of the Witnesses**

Total	Agriculture & Fishery	Soldiers	Police officers	Students	Housewives	People fled to a mountain	Right-wing organizations
503	90	45	48	55	39	52	66
	Left-wing organizations	Government employees	Company workers	Teachers	US citizens	Korean residents in Japan	Others
	20	9	10	13	3	35	18

The recording was conducted in Jeju, Seoul, Japan and even in the United States. Especially in Jeju, three (3) investigators resided there and carried out

the testimony recording. The recording in Japan was conducted among 35 Korean residents in the Osaka area. It was a great achievement that the investigators could hear testimony from a resident who alleged his attending the Sinchon meeting, where the decision to wage an armed resistance was made. Also, in the USA, it was significant for the team to meet and hear from three US military officers, Harold Fichgrund, advisor to the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, Charles L. Wesolowsky, advisor to the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment and Joseph Edward, advisor to the Battalion of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, all of whom worked in Jeju Island during the incident.

Among former military officers who participated in the suppression operation in Jeju, some refused to talk to the survey team. The committee sent official documents to twelve people, calling for cooperation because they kept refusing to give testimony despite several requests. Two of them later acceded to the recording.

For an effective survey, the investigation team drew up basic survey questions based on an in-depth analysis of the previous testimonies. To record the testimony, witnesses were first asked to talk about their experiences freely and then asked the survey questions. As a result of this investigation, a total of 7 volumes of the testimony sourcebooks (total 2,958 pages) were compiled.

Even though there was an advantage of recording the testimony because of the vividness of the voices from the people involved, there was also a limit to memory. Some witnesses had difficulty in recalling the details of the incidents, while others caused confusion. Therefore, it was essential to verify and analyze thoroughly all of their testimony. When quoting the testimony sources in writing this book, special attention was given. The most important thing was to judge whether the testimony corresponded with the facts. This could not be accomplished through the testimony of one witness alone. For verification, the testimony of one witness was compared with that of other witnesses and other documents. Also, a comprehensive analysis was done by interpreting the situations and circumstances of that time. In other words, cross checking was needed and adopted. Furthermore, witnesses' reliability was verified too.

## **C. Verification and Analysis**

Whatever it may be, a testimony or a bibliography, it is of value as an historical record only if it is true. Therefore, with regard to various data and materials, it is of utmost importance to winnow truth from falsehood. Among the existing data and materials on the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident, many of them are different from the truth. In many cases, distorted records and narratives were repeatedly cited and this might be the case due to the fact that previously, debates and discussions were strictly forbidden. To overcome this problem was another challenge. For this reason, the team was devoted to finding out whether a testimony or a reference was true. The aforementioned cross checking was one of the ways to overcome this difficulty. Under these circumstances, literature and recorded testimony are complementary to each other. Even if literature has distorted or misleading content, once it is printed, it can become an established theory as time goes by – particularly when it comes to the situation in which there is no other literature to refute to it. The very way to overcome this is recording testimony.

Despite a host of possibilities of revealing the new facts, however, testimony also has the possibility of causing confusion or being incorrect in date and figure because a long time has passed since the incident. In this situation, it is literature that can solve the problem and provide a clue to proceed. Therefore, it was inevitable for the investigation team to repeat the verification process crossing between the testimony and the literature. For this purpose, the development of a database computer program, which can/could search and process a lot of data, was needed. After that the team input the acquired data and materials into the program by subjects, completing the program system with which various elements of information such as dates of incidents, regions, subjects, names of people and names of institutes and organizations can be searched and sorted. The database search had the advantage of searching more extensive and more detailed data and materials by using not one but two or more fields. This way, the team verified the reliability of the testimonies and the literature and made an effort to find data and materials that were closer

to the truth.

Meanwhile, during the investigation and the verification process, the team put an emphasis on revealing the truth of the following key issues.

1. The 50 years history of Investigation of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident
2. The definition of the incident
3. The background and the cause of the incident.
4. The range of engagement and the roles of the South Korean Labor Party
5. The organization and the activities of the armed guerillas
6. The range of intervention and the roles of the Seobuk Young Men's Association
7. The number of deaths
8. The statistical analysis of the assailants
9. The damage done by the armed guerillas
10. The damage done by the punitive forces
11. The identification of villages damaged as a whole and their property damage
12. The legality of the court-martial
13. The issues on the enforcement of the martial law
14. The chain of command
15. The intervention and the roles of the US military
16. The damage from the guilt-by-association system

## Ⅱ. Background and Starting Point

### 1. Situation of Jeju before and after Liberation

#### A. Evacuation of the Japanese Army and Return of Jeju Citizens

##### 1) Geographical Characteristics of Jeju Island

###### ① Strategic Point of East Asia

Jeju Island, the biggest island in South Korea (1,825km<sup>2</sup>), is located southwest of mainland Korea. To the north, it is 142km from Mokpo; to the northeast, it is 286km away from Busan; to the east, it is facing Kyushu and Tsushima Islands of Japan and to the west, it looks out on Shanghai in China; to the south, it faces Okinawa and Taiwan across the South China Sea. Located in the center of the Far East, including the Korean Peninsula, China and Japan, Jeju Island has received attention as a strategic point from old times. In the 13<sup>th</sup> Century, the Mongol Empire occupied the island and ruled it for about 100 years, making it an outpost for invading Japan and the Southern Song. The Mongol Empire tried to invade Japan twice using Jeju Island as a stepping stone, but failed.<sup>1)</sup>

In 1937, during the second Sino-Japanese War, Imperial Japan, which occupied Korea by force, built an airport in Moseolpo, southwest of the island, and established the Omura Naval Air Group, making Jeju into an air base to bomb Mainland China. In early 1945 Japan fortified the whole island as the last bastion for fighting desperately against the USA, to protect the mainland of Japan.

After the liberation from the reign of Japanese Imperialism, there were a

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1) The National Jeju Museum. *The History and Culture of Jeju*. Tongcheon-Munhwasa, 2001, p.112.

few cases in which the geographical importance of Jeju Island came to the fore. On October 21, 1946, the Associated Press, in its article from New York, reported that Jeju Island had the possibility of turning into a Gibraltar of the West Pacific area in the future<sup>2)</sup>, causing a great sensation in the Korean media. On March 28, 1947, at the conference between South Korean President Rhee Syng-man and Mr. Draper, Under Secretary, the president said, "I've heard that the USA might have an intention to build a naval base on Jeju Island" and added, "If the Korean government is established, I'm sure that the Korean people will willingly let the USA construct a permanent base on Jeju Island."<sup>3)</sup> In March 1949, the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea visited Jeju and later stated in a report that the strategic importance of Jeju Island was obvious as it lies to the south of the Strait of Korea, to the south of Japan, and to the north of the coast of China."<sup>4)</sup> US Ambassador Muccio reported to the Secretary of State that at the summit talks between Rhee Syng-man and Chiang Kai-shek held in August 1949, Chiang had suggested building an air base on Jeju Island in which three fighter wings whose objective was to bomb mainland China would be stationed.<sup>5)</sup>

Thus, the geographical importance of Jeju Island was revealed most definitely right before the end of World War II. Located accidentally in the middle of the battlefield, Jeju Island was considered the last bastion for protecting mainland Japan by the Japanese army, and as a strategic point which should be occupied before advancing into Japan by the US army.

## ② Defensive Position of the Japanese Army

It was when the Philippines fell to the US army in September 1944 that

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2) *Hanseong Ilbo*, October 22, 1946; *Hq. USAFIK*, G-2 Weekly Summary, No. 59, October 31, 1946.

3) "Conference between Under Secretary Draper and Mr. Syngman Rhee, March 28 1948," Memorandum for Record, Department of the Army.

4) "Report on Trips to the Provinces Affected by Recent Disturbances, "Enclosure to Dispatch No. 358, dated June 17, 1949, from American Embassy, Seoul, Korea.

5) *Foreign Relations of the United States* (Hereinafter referred to as FRUS), 1949, VII: Korea (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1984), pp.1080-1084.

the Japanese Command began to take an interest in the defense of Jeju Island. Before then, the Japanese navy had taken responsibility for defending Jeju and only some hundreds of soldiers had stayed on the island.

However, as the war was going on to the Japanese army's disadvantage from the beginning of 1945, the issue of the defense of Jeju took on a new aspect. On February 9, 1945, the Japanese commander-in-chief ordered the army and the navy to prepare for decisive battles in seven directions as a warning for the battle in mainland Japan against the US army. The code name of the operations was "Gyeolho Operations." The main purpose of "Gyeol Chilho Operation" (meaning the 7<sup>th</sup> Gyeolho Operation) was to protect areas around Jeju Island.

On March 12, 1945, at the meeting of assistant chiefs of staff for operations of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, the order of conducting 'Gyeol Chilho Operation' was given to the commander of the 17<sup>th</sup> Army. According to the list of guidelines for conducting the operation, "The enemy (the US army) is expected to come ashore to the northern area of Kyushu or attack Jeju Island to build bases for breaking through the Strait of Korea... Strong military forces should be deployed on/to Jeju Island and defend the island to the death on their own account."<sup>6)</sup>

In accordance with these guidelines, the 58<sup>th</sup> Command was organized, which took the reins of all military forces in Jeju.<sup>7)</sup> The first commander was Lieutenant General Nagatsu and the commander at the time of the cessation of the war was Lieutenant General Toyama Noboru. The 96<sup>th</sup> Division, the 111<sup>th</sup> Division, the 121<sup>st</sup> Division, one brigade (the 108<sup>th</sup> Independent Mixed Brigade), a field artillery regiment, an engineering battalion and a transportation regiment were assigned to the command.

In April 1945, the 96<sup>th</sup> Division moved into Jeju from Seoul. The 111<sup>th</sup> Division, which had fought the war as the Kwangtung Army in Manchuria,

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6) Department of Handling Remaining Affairs of Japanese Army in Korea, "Preparation for the war in Korea", 1946, (*Brief History of Japanese Army in Korea*, Tokyo, Fujishuppan, 1989), pp.164-65.

7) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Weekly Summary, No. 3, October 2, 1945.

was dispatched to the west coast of Jeju. The 121<sup>st</sup> Division, which had been a subordinate to the Kwangtung Army, was also dispatched to the western part of the island. In May 1945, the 108<sup>th</sup> Independent Mixed Brigade came to the island from mainland Japan and took responsibility for defending the eastern part of Jeju.<sup>8)</sup>

After the fall of Okinawa on June 25, 1945, the commander-in-chief of the Japanese army issued a special order to the commander of the 17<sup>th</sup> Army on July 13. According to the order, the objective of the operation in Jeju was to deter the enemy's attempt to build any air and naval bases. Therefore, it specified that the 17<sup>th</sup> army should take the offensive at the beginning of the operation. Also, the order instructed that the commander of the 17<sup>th</sup> Army should prepare one army division in the southern area of the Korean Peninsula and send it to Jeju Island in the right time to beefup the military strength of the 58<sup>th</sup> Army when the enemy's attack on Jeju was most likely.<sup>9)</sup> Following the order, the 120<sup>th</sup> Division was originally scheduled to be dispatched to Jeju but this was not done because of the end of the war. At the time of Korea's liberation from Japanese Imperialism on August 15, 1945, there were about 600,000 Japanese soldiers under the supervision of the 58<sup>th</sup> Army Command on Jeju.<sup>10)</sup>

At this time, it was the plan of the Japanese army that they would fight to the last man against the US army when they landed on Jeju. The fact that

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
8) Lim Jong-guk, *History of Invasion of Korea by Japanese Army*, Vol. II, (Ilwol-seogak, 1989), pp.121-22.

9) Department of Handling Remaining Affairs of Japanese Army in Korea, "Preparation for the war in Korea", 1946, (*Brief History of Japanese Army in Korea*), pp.240-41.

10) According to the list of 'Troops on Jeju Island' written by Department of Handling Remaining Affairs in Korea in February 1946, the total number of Japanese soldiers on Jeju is 74,781 (*Brief History of Japanese Army in Korea*, 198), but when the numbers of soldiers in each troop are all aggregated, it becomes 61,090 causing confusion. According to the list of 'Japanese troops in Korea' drawn up by department of affairs in Korea (*The Records of the End of the War in Korea - Deployment of the US and the Soviet Union Armies and the Return of Japanese People*, p.24) and in *History of the Korean War*, Vol. I (p.437) published by the Institute for Military History Compilation of the Ministry of National Defense in Korea say the number is 60,668. An US intelligence report states the number is 66,780 including soldiers and workers from Korea. (Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 26, October 5, 1945.)

the Japanese army planned to wage a guerrilla war centering around Mt. Halla (1,950m above the sea level) was reflected on a map showing the basic disposition of the Japanese army on Jeju in August 1945. The map shows that the main positions of the Japanese army receded much from the coastal areas which were the first defense line to the mid-mountainous areas. The 96<sup>th</sup> Division and the 111<sup>th</sup> Division were stationed in the northern and western parts of the island respectively and in the eastern and southern parts, the 121<sup>th</sup> Division and the 108<sup>th</sup> Brigade were stationed. Interestingly, the Japanese army gave up defending the considerable portion of the eastern part of the island.<sup>11)</sup>

□ Basic Map of Disposition of the Japanese Army on Jeju Island



The Japanese army set up a plan of moving about 50,000 Jeju citizens out of 220,000, most of whom were children and the elderly and the infirm, into mainland Korea from May 1945. But this plan was interrupted by frequent air raids by the US army. The Japanese army planned to haul the islanders to Mt. Halla and force them to fight against the US army when it landed on the island.<sup>12)</sup> This was nothing short of mobilizing about 200,000 Jeju citizens as

11) Department of Handling Remaining Affairs, "Preparation for the war in Korea", (*Brief History of Japanese Army in Korea*), p.247.

expendables for the final battle against the US army.

As the whole island was being fortified, hardships that Jeju citizens suffered were the most severe in Korea. The Japanese army dug tunnels along the shorelines of Jeju-eup, Gosan, Moseolpo, Seogwipo and Seongsan and built special bases from which commandos could charge directly into the US navy vessels riding torpedo boats. It also put spurs to building two military airports (one in Jinddeureu, 10km to the east of Jeju-eup and the other in Jeongddeureu, 2km to the west of Jeju-eup), apart from the existing Moseolpo airport.

The mid-mountainous areas on Jeju also turned into military fortresses of the Japanese army. Huge military bases were built on Eoseungseng, in Gwaneumsa Temple and Noksanjang. All around the island, fire positions were constructed on every mountaintop and tunnels dug. At Eoseungseng (a small parasite volcano, 1,169m above the sea level), which the Japanese army considered as a retrenchment position for the last battle against the US army, many labyrinthine artificial caves were constructed by digging off the side of the mountain.

This large-scale construction work was assigned to Jeju citizens. By the end of the war, many young people had already been sent to Sakhalin, coal mines in Hokkaido or the South Sea Islands for forced labor or compulsory military service. Therefore, there simply weren't enough young people to do the work. Generally, the ages of people who were mobilized by the Japanese colonial government, according to the order of registering nations' occupational ability, ranged from 16 to 50. However, this standard did not apply in Jeju. In some cases, the elderly whose ages were 60 or even more were mobilized to do the work when the Japanese army was shorthanded.<sup>13)</sup>

What made Jeju people's life more difficult was offering war supplies by force. Especially, Korean government officials took in putting those materials in requisition and this fell under Jeju citizens' displeasure. This experience led to the spread of Jeju society's stronger atmosphere about punishing pro-Japanese factions than that in other regions right after the 8.15 Liberation.

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12) Lim Jong-guk, *History of Invasion of Korea by Japanese Army*, p.140.

13) The Jeju 4·3 Research Institute, *Now I can speak*, Vol. II, (Hanul, 1989), p.169.

After the war, those who helped the Japanese and took the initiative in drafting and conscripting young men and putting war supplies in requisition were accused of pro-Japanese factions and faced an ordeal. Also, some heads of a myeon (township) in Hallim, Daejeong, Seogwipo, Jungmun and Jocheon who held public office at the end of the war were put to shame because of these issues. On September 26, 1945, in one village in Jocheon-myeon, a man in his thirties was beaten to death by young men because of his pro-Japanese past.<sup>14)</sup>

Meanwhile, as Jeju Island was becoming the fortress of the Japanese army, raids and attacks on the island by the US Air Force planes and the US submarines began. On May 7, a passenger ship called Kowamaru carrying Jeju citizens who were removed by force from Jeju to Mokpo was raided by US war planes and sank into the sea with hundreds of innocent citizens on board.<sup>15)</sup> Also in July, US bombers attacked an armory in Hallim Port and the explosives in the armory exploded, killing and injuring citizens nearby. A record described that the raid destroyed 400 houses, killed more than 30 people and injured about 200 people.<sup>16)</sup>

On August 6, 1945, the USA conducted an atomic bombing against Hiroshima. Two days later, the Soviet Union entered the war at the end of it. A few days later, on August 15, Japan surrendered unconditionally, ending World War II. Nobody expected to see the war end this abruptly. According to the materials from the Japanese army, it anticipated that the US would land on mainland Japan at the end of October or early November. A book called *A Secret History of the Korean War* written by a Japanese person said, “The US 6<sup>th</sup> Army in Okinawa was preparing for its landing operation scheduled to be conducted on November 1, 1945.”<sup>17)</sup>

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14) Jeju Province, *History of Jeju Province*, Vol. II, (1993), p.57.

15) With regard to the casualties, “Preparation for the War in Korea” (*Brief History of Japanese Army in Korea*, p.189) written by the Department of Handling Remaining Affairs says the number is 500 while, *Blood History of Jeju Island* written by Kim Tae-bong states the death toll is 280, and *Liberation - 30 year's history of Jeju* (Munjosa, 1975, p.19) says the number is 257, respectively.

16) Jeju Province, *History of Jeju Province*, Vol. I, (1982), p.432.

If the war had continued according to this schedule, Jeju Island would have been under intensive air raids by the US air force between September and November of that year. The scale of US military troops estimated by the Japanese army was 2-5 divisions. This means that Jeju could have been a second Okinawa, where around 200,000 people including civilians were killed in the middle of fierce battles between the USA and Japan. Therefore, the liberation from the Japanese colonial reign on August 15, 1945 means not only being freed from the restraint of Japan but also being liberated from death. In addition, given that some of the positions in mountainous areas and weapons at this time were used later by the armed guerillas, we can say that the end of World War II is somewhat related to the Jeju 4·3 Incident.

## 2) Surrender and Repatriation of the Japanese Army

### ① Surrender and Disarmament of the Japanese Army

As Japan surrendered unconditionally, on September 2, 1945, a signing ceremony was held aboard the battleship USS Missouri anchoring in Tokyo Bay. The representatives of the Japanese government and army signed the official surrender documents, watched by Supreme Commander of Allied Forces General Douglas MacArthur and the Allied representatives from nine countries such as the US, the UK, China and the Soviet Union.

However it was another thing to disarm the Japanese army in the Korean Peninsula because, besides the USA, the Soviet Union entered the war later and stepped into the issues of the Korean Peninsula before and after the war. It was at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 that the Soviet Union's entering the war was first mentioned. US President Roosevelt asked Stalin to enter the war to end it early. However, when the Soviets did not enter the war, the US asked the Soviet Union again to advance into Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula at the Potsdam Conference.

Three days after the bombing of Hiroshima, the USA conducted another

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17) Sasaki Harutaka, *Secret History of the Korean War: the Founding of a Nation and its Ordeal*, translated by Kang Chang-gu, (Byeonghaksa, 1997), p.17.

atomic bombing against Nagasaki. The destructive power of the bomb was enormous. For the USA, it could end the war soon without the Soviet Union's help. But on August 8, the Soviet Union declared war against Japan and began to advance into the Korean Peninsula. By the time Japan surrendered unconditionally on August 15, the Soviet Union had already marched deep into Cheongjin. In those days, the US military leaders fell into a dilemma concerning the consequences of the Soviet Union's independent military actions. The war seemed to be ending soon due to the power of the atomic bombs and the Soviet Union's entering the war. On August 10, at the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, high-ranking officials urgently reviewed the measures which would be taken after the war. At this night session, the issue on how to divide the occupied territory on the Korean Peninsula between the USA and the Soviet Union was assigned to two young lieutenants, Bonesteel and Rusk. The two officers reviewed the issue staying up all night with a map of the Far-East spread on the table. Finally they picked one line of the latitude that passes through the northern area of Seoul as a demarcation line. In other words, the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel would become a dividing line between the occupied territory on the Korean Peninsula between the USA and the Soviet Union.<sup>18)</sup>

The plan of demarcating the North and South Korea by latitude 38 N was approved by US President Harry S. Truman and notified to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union did not object to it. Consequently, the United States came to station in the area below latitude 38 N where the capital Seoul was located and light industry and agriculture were developed. However, even though the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel began as the military line for the disarmament of the Japanese army, as the Cold War between the USA and the Soviet Union intensified and the confrontation between North and South Korea deepened, the parallel came to set in as not only a military demarcation line but also a political one, giving the Korean people much pain and suffering.

It was September 8, 1945, 25 days after the surrender of Japan, that the

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18) J. Lawton Collins, *War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969), pp.25-26.

US army first set foot on Korea. The US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps led by Lieutenant General John R. Hodge left Okinawa on September 5 and arrived in Incheon on September 8. The US 7<sup>th</sup> Division as an advanced party, made an entry into Seoul on September 9. On the same day, at the Governor-General building, Lieutenant General Hodge made the Governor-General of Korea, Abe Nobuyuki sign the surrender documents. With this, the Japanese reign ended and the rule of the US Military Government in Korea began. Before this, the Soviet Union 25<sup>th</sup> army had entered Pyongyang and occupied North Korea on August 26, 1945.

The US army treated the Japanese 58<sup>th</sup> Army stationed on Jeju Island separately from the 17<sup>th</sup> Army stationed in mainland Korea. The intelligence report of the US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps dated September 13, 1945 showed that the US army estimated the number of the Japanese soldiers in Korea as 179,720. Interestingly, in this report, the US army counted the number of the Japanese soldiers on Jeju separately from that in mainland Korea. Namely, the report described that the total number of the Japanese soldiers in Korea was 121,400 tallying up the number of the soldiers in Seoul (57,110), Gwangju (34,710), Daegu (13,480), Busan (15,420) and Yeosu (680). The number of the Japanese soldiers on Jeju was described separately as 58,320.<sup>19)</sup>

A book titled the *History of the United States Army Forces in Korea* dealt with this issue in detail in the chapter “Surrender and Disarmament of Japanese Soldiers on Jeju Island.” From this we knew that the brains of the US army paid close attention to this matter. In the book the US army was said to “set up a thoroughgoing plan to force the Japanese army on Jeju into submission and disarm the soldiers.” Lieutenant General Hodge finished prior consultation with Kozuki, the commander of the Japanese 17<sup>th</sup> Army, and then reported to Supreme Commander MacArthur, “I would dispatch a team for disarmament and investigation to the island.”<sup>20)</sup>

The decision was made to dispatch the team on September 28. The team comprised of Colonel Roy A. Green of the 184<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment, 38 officers

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19) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 4, September 13, 1945.

20) USAFIK, *History of the United States Army Forces in Korea* (hereinafter referred to as *HUSAFIK*), part I, chapter VII, (Tokyo and Seoul, 1947, 1948), p.526.

and enlisted men. A passage from the book describes the process of the surrender and disarmament as follows:

The party assembled at Kimpo (now Gimpo) Field early on the morning of 28 September. Colonel Green warned the members against picking up souvenirs or accepting gifts in the course of the surrender. They loaded into two C-47's and took off shortly after 0700. At about 0900 the planes were over Cheju west airport, one and one-half miles west of the city of Cheju. They circled the field, on which no American planes had yet landed, and found that in spite of a heavy rain which had fallen on the previous night a landing was possible. Seven Japanese staff officers met the party at the field. After a brief period of confusion, four decrepit sedans were produced, and the party drove through the city to a school building (Jeju Agriculture School) on the southern limits, which had been chosen for the ceremony... At 1045 the three Japanese signers, followed by three aides, entered the room. General Toyama (the Commander of the 58<sup>th</sup> Army) had removed all his decorations except for the Rising Sun, the Americans were relieved at seeing him, for it had been feared that he would feign illness in order to escape the necessity of surrendering to a colonel. Colonel Green and Commander Walden were already seated at a table at one end of the room and did not rise. Behind them were some staff officers and an interpreter, a color guard with the colors of the 184<sup>th</sup> Infantry stood slightly to one side. The rest of the American spectators stood behind the Japanese, who stood at attention by their chairs while Colonel Green introduced himself, read General Hodge's directive appointing him to receive the surrender, and indicated the documents to be signed – three copies in English and three in Japanese. Then he told the Japanese representatives to be seated.

All six copies were passed to General Toyama, then to Commander Hamada (the Commander of the Japanese Navy on Jeju), and finally to Senda (the Jeju Governor). They took six minutes to sign. After they had done so, the documents were passed to Colonel Green, who signed with three pens. Commander Walden signed last, the Americans required only two minutes to sign all copies. The only noise during the signing was the clicking of numerous cameras. At 1059 Colonel Green said, "These proceedings are closed."<sup>21)</sup>

It took only 14 minutes to complete the procedures of the surrender of the 60,000 Japanese soldiers on Jeju. The US army had the Japanese army sign

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21) Ibid., pp.527-528.

the separate surrender documents, because the US army judged that the Japanese 58<sup>th</sup> Army on Jeju was under a separate chain of command.<sup>22)</sup> After the ceremony, there was a discussion lasting for an hour between the two sides. Colonel Green and his company left for Seoul around noon on the same day. However, some US military officers including Colonel Harrison from the US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps G-2 stayed in Jeju for intelligence collection.<sup>23)</sup>

On September 28, another US disarmament party came to Jeju. A weekly summary by the US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps G-3 reported, “A disarmament party consisting of elements of the 7<sup>th</sup> Inf Div arrived 0800 at CHEJU (Jeju) Island, southwest of Korea in 2 LSMs with a destroyer escort. The surrender party from XXIV corps arrived at CHEJU in tow C47s at 0900.”<sup>24)</sup> Thus, the disarmament party landed at Jeju Port one hour before the surrender party arrived in Jeju. The disarmament party led by Colonel G. F. Powell, an ordinance officer, departed from Incheon Port on September 26 and arrived at Jeju Port on the same day. The members of the disarmament party, armed to the teeth, drove through the city of Jeju riding military trucks and stationed themselves at Jeju Airport. The disarmament party discarded weapons and explosives from the Japanese army into the sea which had remained untouched until that time and blew up Japanese airplanes. As is stated in *HUSAFIK*, “Disarmament on this heavily fortified island, which was about the same size as Okinawa, was naturally a serious problem.”<sup>25)</sup>

## ② Repatriation of Japanese Soldiers

By early October 1945, about 50,000 Japanese soldiers still remained on Jeju Island. According to an intelligence report on the 58<sup>th</sup> Army Command dated October 1, 1945, the total number of the Japanese soldiers of the 58<sup>th</sup> Army was 49,619. Besides the Japanese soldiers, there were 17,161 soldiers and laborers from Korea. The Korean soldiers and laborers were discharged from

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22) Lim Jong-guk, *Ibid.*, p.158.

23) USAFIK, *HUSAFIK*, part I, chapter VII, pp.529-530.

24) Hq. USAFIK, *G-3 Operations Report*, No. 25, September 28, 1945.

25) USAFIK, *HUSAFIK*, part I, chapter VII, p.531.

duty and returned home before September 1.<sup>26)</sup> However, a weekly summary by the US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps G-2 revealed that among the 17,161 soldiers and laborers, there were 5,277 Japanese soldiers who have their home in Korea.<sup>27)</sup>

The repatriation of the Japanese soldiers in Korea began on September 27, 1945. Busan Port was used to ship out the Japanese soldiers who were stationed in regions below Daejeon and Incheon Port was used to repatriate the soldiers who were stationed in regions above Daejeon. However, it was not until a month later that the repatriation of the Japanese soldiers in Jeju began on October 23<sup>rd</sup>, 68 days after the end of the Pacific War. There as on for the delay was that it was very difficult for the US army to secure a troop that would take care of the repatriation duty in Jeju. For this purpose, the 749<sup>th</sup> Field Artillery was dispatched to Jeju on October 22. This troop finished its duty of repatriating Japanese soldiers through Incheon Port and then was assigned to an other repatriation duty in Jeju.<sup>28)</sup>

The soldiers who boarded in Jeju were shipped to Sasebo Port, Kyushu. From October 23 to November 12, a total of ten times, more than 30 LSTs were mobilized to ship the soldiers from Jeju to Japan. Not only soldiers but also 860 Japanese civilians were repatriated, too. According to the statistics from the US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps G-2, the great number of soldiers were shipped out through Busan Port (382,499), followed by Jeju Port (50,844), Incheon Port (20,233) and Jinhae Port (17,409).<sup>29)</sup>

Although the US army was very concerned about the resistance from the Japanese army, there was no organized resistance. It was reported, however, that some Japanese soldiers burned themselves to death.<sup>30)</sup> And according to the data from the US army, some ships loaded with explosives were set on fire and exploded at Moseolpo Port at 2 a.m. on September 21, 1945, causing 4-5 ships to sink and injuring about 73 people.<sup>31)</sup>

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26) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 26, October 5, 1945.

27) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Summary*, No. 4, October 9, 1945.

28) USAFIK, *HUSAFIK*, part I, chapter VII, pp.536~545.

29) Hq. USAFIK, *G-3 Operations Report*, No. 94, December 6, 1945.

30) Lim Joeng-guk, *Ibid.*, p.165.

31) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 20, September 29, 1945.

However, the Japanese soldiers still showed indecent behavior towards Jeju citizens. They frequently threatened people with weapons which they were allowed to keep by the US army and made a backdoor deal with profiteers over war supplies. They even burnt a great deal of rice instead of distributing it to people who were suffering from a shortage of food. A US intelligence report also mentioned, “The 58<sup>th</sup> Army has provisions adequate for 4 months as of 1 Oct. Provisions on hand, chiefly rice, will suffice for 50 days’ civilian consumption from 1 Oct.”<sup>32)</sup> Nevertheless, the Japanese army burned the rice, which was laid in heaps at Jeju Airport, right before they withdrew from Jeju.

### ③ Surge of Returning Jeju Citizens

Right after the end of the war, Jeju Island experienced rapid changes in its population. About 60,000 Japanese soldiers left the island and the same number of Jeju citizens who were in Japan and other regions returned home.<sup>33)</sup> In 1945, as the island was being fortified, many people left for the mainland to avoid possible battles. Also, as a US army intelligence report states, “approximately 30,000 young men and women were sent to Japan as factory labor or war workers during the war,”<sup>34)</sup> a lot of young men left the island to be conscripted into the army or workforce. Considering all of these factors, as of August 15, 1945, the population in Jeju except the Japanese soldiers was estimated to be about 220,000. Within a year, this increased to over 280,000. The rate of the population increase before and after the liberation approached nearly 30% and especially, hosts of highly educated and intelligent young men returned home. Thus, the expansion of the population in both quality and quantity acted as a source of political tension after the liberation and had a big impact on the traditional Jeju society economically as well as socially.

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32) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 26, October 5, 1945.

33) With regard to the number of people who returned to Jeju, *Dong-A Ilbo* reported it was about 50,000 ~ 60,000 in its article on Dec. 21, 1946, while *Jeju Shinbo* said it is about 80,000 in its article on Feb. 10, 1947.

34) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 26, October 5, 1945.

\* Changes in Population in Jeju

Year	Korean	Japanese	Total
1916	202,072	840	202,926
1917	204,415	992	205,431
1918	203,409	811	204,327
1919	201,006	681	201,713
1920	200,584	724	201,326
1921	199,677	752	200,455
1922	197,999	692	198,719
1923	209,060	869	209,925
1924	214,584	792	215,426
1925	204,314	1,105	205,478
1926	209,841	1,083	211,010
1927	210,508	1,066	211,645
1928	204,420	1,116	205,609
1929	194,017	1,125	195,218
1930	198,304	1,185	199,577
1931	193,610	1,261	194,714
1932	199,269	1,313	200,642

Year	Korean	Japanese	Total
1933	188,509	1,355	189,940
1934	188,410	1,434	189,932
1935	197,543	1,425	199,063
1936	195,278	1,406	196,774
1937	199,742	1,486	201,277
1938	202,241	1,355	203,651
1939	204,650	1,354	206,052
1940	207,514	1,355	208,915
1941	216,081	1,402	217,530
1942	222,785	1,375	224,208
1943			223,200
1944			219,548
1945			
1946			276,148
1947			275,899
1948			281,000
1949			254,589

\* Table of Changes in Jeju Citizens in Japan

Year	Jeju Citizens Who Went to Japan			Jeju Citizens Who Returned Home	Jeju Citizens Who Remained in Japan (cumulative total)
	Total	Man	Woman		
1926	15,862	11,742	4,120	13,500	28,144
1927	19,224	14,479	4,745	16,863	30,305
1928	16,762	11,745	5,017	14,703	23,564
1929	20,418	15,519	4,903	17,660	35,322
1930	17,890	12,029	5,861	21,416	31,786
1931	18,922	11,635	7,287	17,685	33,023
1932	21,409	11,695	9,719	18,307	36,125
1933	29,208	15,723	13,485	18,062	47,271
1934	16,904	9,060	7,844	14,130	50,045
1935	9,484	4,327	5,157	11,161	48,368
1936	9,190	4,739	4,451	11,095	46,463
1937	7,484	3,917	3,576	8,004	45,943
1938	8,979	4,780	4,199	8,972	45,950

The changes in population in Jeju have different characteristics from those of other regions in Korea. The reason for this can be found in the unusual networks between Jeju and Japan. The Japanese colonial government began to operate a passenger ship that sailed regularly between Jeju and Osaka in 1918. The Japanese government supported this project and opened a new route as a government-directed service. The first ship was Hamgyeonghwan, a 500-ton ship, followed by Gangwonhwan, a 720-ton ship and Bokgyeonghwan, a 700-ton ship in 1924. In the 1930's, they were replaced by Gundaehwan, a ship of 930 tons, Gyeongseonghwan, a ship of 1,200 tons, and Bokmokhwan, at 1,600 tons.<sup>35)</sup>

The Japanese colonial government impoverished the Jeju agricultural community, which was poor by nature, by implementing the land survey registers in the 1910's. In addition to this, an increased tax burden, collapse of natural economic structure and control of industry by Japanese made the Jeju society poorer. At the time, Japan was suffering from a labor shortage because it was nurturing heavy industry with Osaka as the center. In the eyes of Japanese, the best labor market in all of Korea was poverty-stricken Jeju Island from which low-cost labor force could be extracted.

The regular line between Jeju and Osaka was a route to bring this kind of labor force into Japan. In the 1930's, when the price for one bag of rice was 5 won, the price for the steerage of Gundaehwan was 2 won 50 jeon, half the price of one bag of rice. The ships were anchored at the outer port of Jeju. When they departed from Jeju, they went around the island and boarded passengers using subordinate boats, starting from Aewol all the way around to Hallim, Gosan, Moseolpo, Seogwipo, Pyoseon, Seongsanpo, Gimmyeong, and Jocheon. Although it took two days to get to Osaka, Jeju citizens more frequently traveled back and forth between Jeju and Osaka, rather than between Jeju and Busan or Mokpo in mainland Korea.<sup>36)</sup>

In 1924, the Osaka Employment Agency conducted a sampling survey to grasp the distribution of the hometowns of Koreans living in Osaka. The agency conducted the survey of 1,000 Korean men and it turned out that 601

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35) Jeju Province, *History of Jeju Province*, Vol. I, p.1114.

36) Lim Chang-jun, "History of Development of Jeju," *Jeju Shinmun*, April 5, 1983.

people (61%) were from Jeju.<sup>37)</sup>

In the middle of the 1930's, about 50,000 Jeju citizens, a quarter of the total of the Jeju population were living in Japan. This means that if we count only youths, one out of two young people went to Japan. Among them were a large number of women. They made up a considerable portion of the workforce in Osaka where factories were concentrated. According to the 1935 edition of the *Booklet of Jeju Island Census*, "In 1934, 36,371 (72%) out of the total of 50,645 Jeju residents in Japan were residing in Osaka."<sup>38)</sup>

Although they earned low salaries, they saved money and remitted it to their hometowns, helping to boost the economy of Jeju. Also, they experienced the Japanese labor movement directly. Some of them brought their children or family dependants to Japan and educated them. That's why Jeju had more educated people than any other region in Korea.

When young men who went to Japan returned home, they were neither farmers nor typical laborers anymore. Having been exposed to the outside world, they were already much deviated from traditional patterns of behavior or ways of thinking in rural communities. They were the people who suffered from low wages and discrimination based on ethnicity and, to some extent, had national and social consciousness. The first things they did in their hometowns were forming independent organizations, operating night schools and setting up schools.

However, there were few workplaces or jobs in the home country that were suddenly liberated and the unemployment rate skyrocketed. Soon the Jeju society faced serious financial difficulties. Especially, the measures that limited items which could be brought into Korea from Japan and the ban on trading goods with Japan bore hard on their economic life. Right after the war, the General Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Tokyo severely restricted the goods and money which the returning Koreans carried. Professor Herbert P. Bix at University of Massachusetts said in his article *Regional Integration: Japan and South Korea in America's Asian Policy* that the General Headquarters

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37) Kim Chan-jeong, *Stranger aboard Gundaehwan*, (Ampaseogak, 1985), p.94.

38) Jeju Provincial Office, *Brochure of Jeju Province*, (1955), pp.20-21.

of the Allied Powers made a regulation under which Korean residents in Japan could go back to Korea freely but were allowed to have only 1,000 yen (equivalent to the price of 20 packs of cigarettes) besides personal belongings and they had to leave behind all their possessions, which they had earned from low wages and hard labor in mines and factories.<sup>39)</sup>

Before the 8 · 15 Liberation, Jeju province had bought about 40% of industrial products from Japan. But when the operation of passenger ships was interrupted and trade between Jeju and Japan was controlled after the liberation, Jeju came to suffer from harsh commodity shortage. In this situation, fishing boats of 20-50 tons began to cross the Korean Strait in order to carry the returnees and commodities. However, as the police cracked down on these activities, labeling them as illegal, the friction between the police and citizens began to rise. With regard to this situation, the *Jayu Shinmun* reported as follows:

It is said that the majority of goods that come to Jeju from Japan and other areas are from war-stricken countrymen rather than from dishonest merchants. The returning countrymen cannot simply give up their possessions in Japan, which they had earned after years of hard work, so they purchased goods and smuggled them into Jeju, deceiving the foreign authorities. As long as the law doesn't allow them to carry goods into Korea, there is no way of stopping them from smuggling items. If the authorities keep banning the goods, it will only benefit the foreign country. Thus, people just can't wait to see reasonable measures by the police.<sup>40)</sup>

Yet, things worsened when profiteers stepped in. Conspiring with officials from the US Military Government and police executives, they made profits from receiving seized goods from the crackdown on smuggling. At last, this matter became a serious social issue, making headlines in local<sup>41)</sup> and national<sup>42)</sup> newspapers labeling Jeju a haven for profiteers.

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39) Herbert P. Bix, *Regional Integration: Japan and South Korea in America's Asian Policy*, as quoted in *Modern History of Korea 1945-1975*, (Sagyejeol, 1984), p.155.

40) *Jayu Shinmun*, December 19, 1946.

41) *Jeju Shinbo*, January 28, 1947.

42) *Dong-A Ilbo*, February 5, 1947.

## B. Birth of People's Committee

### 1) Organization of Jeju People's Committee

“The Jeju People's Committee was the only political party in the island and the only organization acting like a government,”<sup>43)</sup> says Grant Meade in his book *American Military Government*. He was an officer from the US Military Government and also worked at the Jeollanam-do Provincial Office in 1945. John Merrill, in his Harvard University master's thesis in 1975 “The Cheju-do Rebellion,” says, “the Jeju People's Committee maintained a close connection with the US military company which was stationed on the island in the first year of the US Military Government rule. The US Company used the committee to govern the island and was in wholehearted support of the organization. It is estimated that this amazing cooperative relationship was based on the US Military Government's realistic perspectives about the dynamics of power in the island.”<sup>44)</sup> Merrill continues to say, “The Jeju People's Committee showed its strong will of independence and disliked being subordinate to the Joellanam-do People's Committee. It was when Jeju Island was raised to the status of a province in August 1946 that the relationship between the US Military Government and the committee began to sour.” The first draft of a report written by the US Military Government public opinion bureau in December 1946 says “The Jeju People's Committee had very strong numerical superiority and pursued moderate policies. In fact, these moderate policies were so appealing that the right wing was afraid that the power of the committee would get stronger.”<sup>45)</sup>

According to documents from the USA, the Jeju People's Committee seized the political and economical hegemony of Jeju right after the liberation. It is

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43) E. Grant Meade, *American Military Government in Korea* (New York: King's Crown Press, Columbia Univ., 1951), p.185.

44) John Merrill, “The Cheju-do Rebellion,” *Journal of Korean Studies*, Vol. 2, 1980, pp.151-152.

45) The Public Opinion Bureau in the US Military Government, Raw Report dated on December 9, 1946. as quoted in Bruce Cummings, *The Origin of the Korean War*, (Ilwolsseogak, 1986), p.432.

unique when compared with the situation of the mainland, where the activities of the People's Committee began to disappear from the end of 1945. Not only in the US documents but also in the reports of the domestic media, a similar point was made. A *Dong-A Il-bo* article reported on December 21, 1946, that the Jeju People's Committee was comprised of people in the leadership class who had spearheaded the anti-Japanese drive and had governed the island well without the confrontation with right-wing organizations such as the Korean Independence Party and the National Alliance for Promoting Korean Independence, which were separated recently.<sup>46)</sup>

From this it is well understood that the Jeju People's Committee had unique characteristics which can be boiled down to six points. First, it was an independent organization which was supported extensively. Second, it was led by people who had experience in anti-Japanese movements. Third, it pursued moderate policies. Fourth, it maintained a close connection with the US Military Government. Fifth, it had the longest term of existence in the nation. Lastly, it had strong identity and independence, properly distancing itself from the Jeollanam-do People's Committee.

In his book, Bruce Cummings enumerated seven environmental and ecological conditions for the growth and continuance of a local people's committee in Korea.

1. Regions in which the population decreased during the 1930's and the beginning of the 1940's and surged rapidly after the liberation
2. Regions in which the rate of tenant farmers was not high and the power of landowners collapsed or weakened and farmers had independence and ways to check the landowners to some degree
3. Regions with a long interlude between the end of the Japanese colonial rule and the beginning of the US Military Government rule
4. Regions in which communication facilities and transportation system were poor or a people's committee controlled these facilities and system
5. Regions with a history of farmers' radical movements
6. Regions with a relatively specialized occupational structure

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46) Roh Il-hwan, "Inspection Record of Treasure Island, Jeju," *Dong-A Ilbo*, December 21, 1946.

7. Regions not controlled completely by either the right-wing or the left-wing or regions with political complexity involving the ruling left-wing with moderate policies.<sup>47)</sup>

Cummings points out that Jeju was the perfect candidate satisfying the above conditions. When analyzed through the above frame, Jeju underwent severe outflow of population in the 1930's, and right after the 8 · 15 Liberation, it had an influx of population of about 60,000. While the rate of tenant farmers in Jeju was less than 10%, there was nearly no landed class. When the US 59<sup>th</sup> Army came to Jeju on November 9, 1945, Jeju had had the longest interlude between the end of the Japanese colonial rule and the beginning of the US Military Government rule. Also, Jeju is located farthest from Seoul and had poor means of transportation such as passenger ships and it had a history of radical incidents such as large-scale revolts by Jeju women divers during the Japanese colonial rule. In addition, Jeju experienced the changes in the traditional occupational structure due to the opening of the direct line between Jeju and Japan. Finally, it was unique that the Jeju People's Committee pursued moderate policies for quite a long time.<sup>48)</sup>

Grant Meade also revealed that the representative region in which a people's committee and the US Military Government maintained friendly relations was Jeju. This could be done because the regional branches of the US Military Government recognized people's committees for some time. Meade says in his book, "Unlike what happened in Seoul, there was no rapid resolution of people's committees in local areas." He adds "the reasons for this were because there was a lack of US military government personnel in local areas and there was necessity of maintaining law and order until a civilian government takes over the administrative power and Seoul had a strong right-wing oligarchy, whereas in local areas dominant progressive farmers and their interests prevailed."<sup>49)</sup>

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47) Bruce Cummings, *The Origin of the Korean War*, p.435.

48) Yang Hang-won, "Study on the Backgrounds of the Jeju 4 · 3 Riot," *Jeju Island Studies* 5 (1988): pp.211-15.

49) E. Grant Meade, *American Military Government in Korea*, p.61

## 2) Organization and Activities of the People's Committee

The People's Committee grew out of the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence. The committee was established by Yeo Un-hyeong and some others right after the liberation. On the morning of August 16, 1945, leaflets were distributed to stabilize public sentiment on the streets of Seoul under the name of the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence.<sup>50)</sup> At noon of the same day, at Whimoon Middle School, Yeo delivered his speech appealing for the establishment of the committee and its local branches. To the people his speech was considered an announcement of a policy to establish a new government.

Although the preparation committee had to maintain public order and manage of existing facilities, its main purpose was basically to perform transitional duties in order to set up an independent nation. This is what the general public desired to establish. Common concerns of activists, in local areas who heard the news of the end of the war, were how to establish a new nation in their liberated homeland. It was the central organization of the preparation committee that matched those common and realistic concerns.

The local organizations of the preparation committee were not uniformly established by the control of the central body. Organizations that sprang up in gun, eup, and myeon areas had various names such as the committee for preparation of Korean independence, people's committee, autonomy committee, and committee for maintaining public order. Such organizations spread across the country in an instant. By the end of August 1945, 145 organizations acting as a local branch of the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence had been established in the country.<sup>51)</sup>

The Jeju Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence was set up on September 10, 1945. About 100 people who represented each eup and myeon gathered at the Jeju Agriculture School and launched the organization

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50) The National Institute of Korean History, *History of Korea* Vol. I, (1968), p.13.

51) The Democratic People's Front, *One Year History after the Liberation*, (Munuinseogwan, 1946), p.81.

that would act as a provincial body of the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence. On the same day, an executive team was also formed. Oh Dae-jin from Daejeong-myeon was elected the chairperson; Choi Nam-sik from Jeju-eup became the vice-chairperson; Kim Jeong-no from Jeju-eup was chosen as the director of administration; Kim Han-jeong from Jungmun-myeon as the director of public order; Kim Yong-hae from Aewol-myeon the director of industry. In addition, another 10 people were selected as members of the executive committee including Kim Si-taek and Kim Pil-won from Jocheon-myeon, Kim Im-gil and Lee Won-ok from Daejeong-myeon, Jo Mong-gu from Pyoseon-myeon, Hyeon Ho-gyeong from Seongsan-myeon and Moon Do-bae from Gujwa-myeon.<sup>52)</sup> Most of them were in their forties or fifties and had experience in anti-Japanese resistance movements.

Across the nation, people in favor of the public trust were naturally recommended into the leadership of the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence. Once Japanese or their collaborators who had wielded power were gone, people could choose their local leaders easily even without any official and formal elections. There was a tacit standard in selecting the leadership among people. It was that people who had a strong will for establishing an independent country and had kept their spirit of resistance against the Japanese colonial rule were suitable for their new leaders.<sup>53)</sup>

Jeju was no exception. One witness who attended the meeting for the establishment of the Jeju People's Committee said that the representatives of the committee were not elected by vote but were naturally recommended into the positions. During the meeting, such impending topics as maintaining security and stabilizing prices were discussed. With regard to the scope of the participation in the committee, the witness said, "the attendees agreed that malicious pro-Japanese collaborators should be excluded but those who had been in a public office should not be ruled out if they are not so malicious."<sup>54)</sup>

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52) Jeju Province, *History of Jeju Province*, Vol. II, (1993), p.81.

53) Choi Sang-ryong, *The US Army Military Government and the Nationalism of Korea*, (Nanam, 1988), p.77.

54) Lee Un-bang (age 92, Daejeong-eup), Testimony recorded on November 9, 2001.

The local organizations in the country had been called “people’s committees” since the central preparation committee declared the establishment of the Korean People’s Republic on September 6, 1945. While the Korean People’s Republic was considered an interim government, people’s committees were considered interim local administrative bodies. However, it was not that all the local organizations turned into people’s committees right after the declaration of the Korean People’s Republic. It was different from region to region and from period to period.

At that time, there were almost no ideological conflicts. Most people participated in the Preparation Committee for Korean Independence if they hadn’t been notorious pro-Japanese collaborators. The regional organization of the preparation committee in Jeju was reorganized as a people’s committee, which claimed to be an interim administrative body on September 22. At the time, in Jeju, the organizational structure of the Jeju People’s Committee spread to each village, or ri, – having the most extensive organizational power.<sup>55)</sup>

In the first stage, the recommended heads of the eup and myeon committee were elders in towns who, in general, had nothing to do with ideology. They were Hyeon Gyeong-ho from Jeju-eup, Kim Yong-hae from Aewol-myeon, Kim Hyeon-guk from Hallim-myeon, Woo Yeong-ha from Daejeong-myeon, Kim Bong-gyu from Andeok-myeon, Kang Gye-il from Jungmun-myeon, Oh Yong-guk from Seogwi-myeon, Hyeon Jung-hong from Namwon-myeon, Jo Beom-gu from Posyeon-myeon, Hyeon Yeo-bang from Seongsan-myeon, Moon Do-bae from Gujwa-myeon and Kim Si-beom from Jocheon-myeon. Among them, Woo Yeong-ha, Kim Bong-gyu, Hyeon Jung-hong, Jo Beom-gu, and Kim Si-beom were the first heads of a myeon under the US Military Government. Especially, Kim Bong-gyu and Hyeon Jung-hong maintained their position until May 1948 after the outbreak of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident.<sup>56)</sup>

At first, the Jeju People’s Committee concentrated on maintaining public order rather than functioning as an administrative body. This was because

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55) Jeju Province, *History of Jeju Province*, Vol. II, p.49.

56) The 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *Talking about the 4 · 3 Uprising*, Vol. I, (Jeonyewon, 1994), pp.69-70.

the committee claimed to be an administrative body but the US Military Government didn't accept it. However, as mentioned earlier, even though it could not take over administrative bodies, in substance it exerted its influence to the organization of the staff of the eup and myeon offices. This was made possible with the connivance and consent of US 59<sup>th</sup> army, which under took an assignment of governing Jeju Island.

At the end of 1945, the US army in Jeju convened the executives of the committee asking them to cooperate with the military government in maintaining public order. Within the committee, there was a youth alliance, a women's association and a consumers' cooperative society. Activities for maintaining public order were mainly undertaken by the executives of the youth alliance of the Jeju People's Committee. One executive of the public order department of Hallim-myeon attested to the situation at the time as follows:

There was no conflict between the US Military Government authorities and the Department of Public Order of the Committee. Far from it, the US army held a meeting summoning the leaders of the youth alliance in each eup and myeon. The meeting place was Jeju Buk Elementary School and I attended the meeting as the chairperson of the Hallim-myeon youth alliance. Major Thurman A. Stout, the Jeju Military Governor, delivered a speech. He asked the executives to keep the Japanese army supplies safe, not to be stolen or burnt, because they were yours. He did not want any disturbances or acts of violence and asked them to work together to maintain public order. (Until 1946) Official documents from Jeju Governor Park Gyeong-hun were addressed to the head of the youth alliance in Hallim-myeon first, then to the head of the police box.<sup>57)</sup>

A story told by one policeman who was appointed as a chief of Sehwa Police Box in 1946 was also very suggestive of the social conditions at the time. When he received his written appointment, his boss (police superintendent) wrote a letter of introduction that was addressed to Moon Do-bae, the head of the Gujwa-myeon People's Committee for introducing the new chief and asking to look after him.<sup>58)</sup>

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57) Ko Gyeong-heup (age 88, Hallim-eup), Testimony recorded on December 14, 2001.

58) Jeong Seong-sun (chief of the Sehwa Police Box at the time) Testimony as quoted in the

Usually empty houses or houses that were managed by villagers for common use were used as offices of the preparation committee or the people's committee and in Aewol-myeon and Gujwa-myeon, their spaces were provided at the myeon offices. For most myeon offices, it was common practice to have a consultation with the executives of the people's committee when they implemented important administrative policies. Not only did the people's committees carry out security service activities, they also provided public education for agricultural methods, study meetings and athletic meets. In addition, the committees pushed forward the establishment of schools such as Daejeong School and Jocheon School.

The exemplary cases which show the Jeju People's Committee was moderate and powerful at the same time and independent were its boycott of the Daegu 10 · 1 Incident and participation in the elections for selecting members of the Interim Legislative Assembly of South Korea. These decisions ran counter to nationwide activities of the left-wing organizations.

On October 1, 1946, the police fired at a crowd of demonstrators in Daegu and this triggered a nationwide left-wing mass struggle in which about 1.1 million people from 73 cities and counties participated (some argued that the number was 3 million). This was one of the largest scale mass struggles after the 8 · 15 Liberation.<sup>59)</sup> Due to this incident, many civilians and policemen died.<sup>60)</sup> However, even though this incident caused quite a stir throughout the nation, in Jeju where the Jeju People's Committee prevailed, few joined in the struggle. Though, in those days, several national newspapers reported with one accord that the US army in Jeonnam Province was dispatched to Jeju because there was a disturbance there in the aftermath of the Daegu 10 · 1 Incident,<sup>61)</sup> this was misinformed. The truth can be seen in a New Year's address in 1947 delivered by Captain Kerry, information officer of the US Military Government office in Jeju. As he points out, "across the nation, disturbances happened and

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4 · 3 news team, *The 4 · 3 Incident Speaks*, Vol. I, p.71.

59) Joseontongsinsa, *1948 Yearbook of Joseon*, (1947), p.258.

60) Kim Sam-ung, *History of Massacres of Citizens after the Liberation*, (Garamgihoek, 1996), p.25.

61) *Dong-A Ilbo*, *Seoul Shinmun*, *Hanseong Ilbo*, *Dokrip Shinbo*, October 11, 1946.

many of your fellow countrymen were victimized by the disturbances. But I think it was very fortunate that there were no similar unhappy disturbances in Jeju because you have right awareness of the situation.”<sup>62)</sup>

Moreover, the Jeju People’s Committee participated in the election to choose members of an interim legislature, which the left-wing organizations boycotted nationwide. The committee helped two executives of the committee to be elected as members of the Interim Legislative Assembly, attracting the attention of the public. Just a year after it began to rule Korea, the US Military Government promoted the establishment of a law-making organ – so-called the Interim Legislative Assembly of South Korea – composed of mainly moderate right-wing and middle of the road figures. However, the left-wing camp boycotted the election because they believed the procedures of the election were similar to those for selecting members of the Privy Council in the period of Japanese occupation and the election could be a harbinger of the establishment of the South Korean government only.

October 31, 1946, the election for the Interim Assembly of South Korea was held nationwide and almost all elected members were from the right-wing camp. According to an article by the United Press, among elected members, 15 were from the Korean Democratic Party; 14 were from the Committee for Preparation of Korean Independence; 12 were independent; two were from the Korean Independence Party; and two were from the People’s Committee.<sup>63)</sup> The two members from the People’s Committee, who belonged to the left-wing, were elected in Jeju.

Moon Do-bae, who was elected as a member of the Interim Assembly, was a chairperson of the Gujwa-myeon People’s Committee. An anti-Japan activist, he was imprisoned for organizing the Jeju women divers’ rebellion in the 1930’s and served a three-year sentence. Kim Si-tak, also a member of the Interim Assembly, was the head of the literary department of the Jocheon-myeon People’s Committee.<sup>64)</sup> He was a doctor, running his clinic in Jocheon.

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62) *Jeju Shinbo*, January 1, 1947.

63) *Hanseong Ilbo*, November 6, 1946.

64) *Seoul Shinmun*, November 1, 1946.

Instead of attending the opening ceremony of the assembly on December 12, the two men held a press conference in Seoul and declared that they would not attend the assembly.<sup>65)</sup> It seemed that Lieutenant General Hodge was shocked at this. In a memoir between Hodge and Lieutenant-General Wedemeyer, Hodge says, “Jeju citizens elected two left-wing members of the Interim Assembly but they disappeared as soon as they arrived in Seoul.”<sup>66)</sup> The series of the events—for example, the boycott of the 10 · 1 Daegu Incident and participating in the election for the Interim Assembly of South Korea-- (though the elected members resigned later) describes the characteristics of the Jeju left-wing movements at that time. As we have seen before, supported by the public, the People’s Committee took a moderate and independent position. Since the police’s gun firing on the anniversary of 3 · 1 Independence Day in 1947, the cooperative relationship between the US Military Government and the People’s Committee deteriorated.

### **C. USAMGIK and Jeju’s Elevation to Province**

#### **1) Establishment of the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK)**

On 9 September 1945, in a ceremony at the Capitol Building in Seoul, the national flag of Japan was lowered and the American flag was hoisted after the signing of the surrender pact. This brought 36 years of Japanese colonial rule to an end and signaled the start of USAMGIK in South Korea.

The basic policy guidelines of USAMGIK’s three-year rule in Korea can be summarized in two policy documents: the MacArthur Proclamations 1 and 2, both of which begin with “To the people of Korea”. These proclamations were used as basic regulations for USAMGIK’s occupation policies in Korea where there was no constitution. On the same day, Proclamation 3 was also

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65) *Dokrip Shinbo*, December 15, 1946.

66) Bruce Cummings, *The Origin of the Korean War*, pp.337-338.

announced. However, the third proclamation was restricted to economic issues (currency).

In Proclamation 1, MacArthur declared that he would establish military control over Korea south of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel and announced the six conditions of the occupation. The conditions can be summarized as: ① all powers of government south of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel and the Korean people in those areas, would be for the present exercised under his authority; ② all government officials and employees shall perform their usual functions and duties until further notice; ③ acts of resistance to the occupying forces and any acts which may disturb public peace will be punished severely; ④ people's rights to property will be respected; and, ⑤ English will be the official language during the period of USAMGIK control.<sup>67)</sup> Proclamation 2 was about penalties for crime and violation of regulations. It stipulated that anyone who, "violates the provisions of the Instrument of Surrender, or any proclamation, order or directive given under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, or does any act to the prejudice of good order or the life, safety or security of the persons or the property of the United States or its Allies, or does any act calculated to disturb public peace and order, or prevent the administration of justice, or willfully does any act hostile to Allied Forces shall suffer death, by a Military Occupation court, or such other punishment as the Court may determine."<sup>68)</sup> The provisions of Proclamation 2 also covered the punishment of individuals caught up in the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident under the rule of USAMGIK.

On 12 September, USAMGIK office began its duties in Korea by appointing Major General Archibald V. Arnold, the commander of the US 7<sup>th</sup> Division, as military governor. However, military officers were not dispatched to local areas immediately, so in local areas the duties of USAMGIK started 1-2 months later than in Seoul. Originally, besides the 7<sup>th</sup> Division, the US 40<sup>th</sup> Division and the US 96<sup>th</sup> Division were also scheduled to be stationed in Korea. However, this plan was not realised because the 96<sup>th</sup> Division, which

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67) *Maeil Shinbo*, September 9, 1945.

68) *USAMGIK Official Gazette*, No. 2, September 7, 1945.

had been scheduled to be dispatched to the southern region of South Korea, including Jeju Island, was transferred to Tianjin, China to quell a disturbance there. Instead of the 96<sup>th</sup> Division, the 6<sup>th</sup> Division came to Korea. These troops began to arrive from the middle of September and were dispatched to Jeonbuk Province, and Jeonnam Province, which Jeju Island was part of at that time. Lieutenant Colonel Julius H. Lintner was appointed as the governor of Jeonnam Province on 25 September.<sup>69)</sup> It was not until the new governor had been selected that the former Japanese governor was finally removed from his position. According to the historical records of Gwangju City, the proclamation of the rule of USAMGIK over Jeonnam Province, and Jeju Island, was issued on 27 September 1945 at 10 a.m.<sup>70)</sup> However, USAMGIK hadn't begun to rule over Jeju until the 59<sup>th</sup> Military Government Company went ashore on Jeju on 9 November, 86 days after the 8 · 15 Liberation. This shows the extent of the administrative vacuum in Jeju at that time.

USAMGIK's policies in these early stages repeatedly caused confusion. At first, USAMGIK tried to keep Japanese-era officers in their positions, yet this policy was reversed and revised due to strong opposition.<sup>71)</sup> In particular, policies drawn up by the central military government rarely reached local government bodies, so there were many cases in which central policies and local policies diverged. Meade, who was in charge of the Jeonnam area, recalled that he didn't receive any briefing about his place of work and US military officers carried only a few documents. These were copies of the Cairo Declaration, MacArthur's three proclamations, secret implementation plans for the military government - hastily drawn up at the meeting of the joint chiefs of the US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps and the 7<sup>th</sup> Fleet - thirteen or fourteen laws and regulations printed by the military government, general rules, and warnings.<sup>72)</sup>

Meade pointed out that there were three major obstacles in implementing

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69) USAFIK, *HUSAFIK*, part III, chapter III, "Cholla-Namdo (Jeonnam Province)"

70) Gwangju City, "The Liberation and the Era of the US Military Government," *History of Gwangju City*, Vol. II, (1976), p.507.

71) *Maeil Shinbo*, September 16, 1945.

72) E. Grant Meade, *American Military Government in Korea*, p.67.

USAMGIK's duties in Korea, including: (1) lack of precedents in given situations; (2) lack of information about problems, and; (3) lack of experience of the governors; (4) lack of effective communication, and; (5) accompanying difficulties in instilling western concepts of democracy in Asia.<sup>73)</sup> Particularly, the language barrier was so problematic that there were even several cases in which interpreters influenced major policy decisions.

During this time, the US Army's presence in local areas was usually completed in three stages. At first, an inspection team was dispatched to a target local area, and then tactical troops occupied the area. Finally, military officers were sent and a military administration was established. However, as previously mentioned, on Jeju Island, the US Army's main purpose in stationing troops was to ensure the surrender of the Japanese, disarm Japanese soldiers and repatriate them. According to these objectives, the team led by Colonel Green for inducing the surrender and the team for disarming the Japanese soldiers came to Jeju on 28 September. On 22 October, the 749<sup>th</sup> Field Artillery came to the island and began its mission to repatriate the Japanese soldiers. Finally, on 9 November, the 59<sup>th</sup> Military Government Company, which would establish a military administration, came to Jeju. On 11 November, as tactical troops, the detachment of the 51<sup>th</sup> Field Artillery which was assigned to the 20<sup>th</sup> Regiment of the 6<sup>th</sup> Division was dispatched to the island.

A document titled *Unit History of the 59<sup>th</sup> Military Government Company on Jeju* reported that the 59<sup>th</sup> Military Government Company was formed from military government reserves in California, USA. The company departed the US on 26 September, arrived at Incheon Port on 21 October, and went ashore to Jeju Island on 9 November. It was composed of 47 members - seven military officers and 40 enlisted men - when they arrived in Jeju.<sup>74)</sup> The military strength of the company increased to a total of 74 members - 11

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73) Meade, *American Military Government in Korea*, p.5.

74) "Unit History", January 23, 1946, Record Group (hereinafter referred to as RG) 407: *The Adjutant General's Office Entry 427: WW II Operation Reports, 1940-48*, Central File, Box 21878, National Archives and Records Administration (hereinafter referred to as NARA), Washington D.C.

officers and 63 enlisted men - as of January 1947.<sup>75)</sup> The commander of this company was Major Thurman A. Stout. He was the highest ranking officer in Jeju and took over as head of the Jeju Administration; the position had previously been held by a Japanese person. In August 1946, when Jeju was raised to the status of a province, Major Stout was appointed as the governor of Jeju Province. The media referred to the position as 'Jeju military governor'.

The Jeju military government used the provincial government building of the Japanese colonial period as its office building. Also, Major Stout himself took up his duties in the building. Before long, as the co-governor system (one American and one Korean) was introduced, Park Gyeong-hun was appointed as Korean governor in February 1946. Park and Stout shared the same office, with an interpreter between them.<sup>76)</sup> Given that a similar case in which an American and Korean governor shared the same room was recorded in Gwangju,<sup>77)</sup> it seems that this was a common practice in other regions.

Under the command of Major Stout, there was a judge advocate, an intelligence officer, an information officer, an administrator of property, and a medical officer to implement duties of the military government as American military officers. In its early stages, the military government company focused on maintaining public order and managing empty properties. The judge advocate - in charge of police authority and judicial power - and the administrator of property - managing national property which had been controlled by the Japanese colonial government - took center stage. At first, the position of judge advocate was taken by Captain Jones and then went to Captain Partridge in the latter half of 1946. Captain Partridge faced the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident a year later. With regard to the position of the administrator of property, Captain Martin and Captain Kerry took the job in rotation.

Although USAMGIK received some praise for its achievements, such as introducing some form of democracy to South Korea, the public was also

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75) "Cheju (Jeju) Task Force," January 1947, The Orlando W. Ward Papers, Korea, 1946-1949 and other materials, Box 5, US Army Military History Institute, Pennsylvania.

76) Jeju Province, *History of Jeju Province*, Vol. II, p.65.

77) Gwangju City, *History of Gwangju City*, p.507.

disappointed with its trials and errors in implementing policies in the early stages. One of the representative mistakes made by the military government was failing in cleaning up the vestiges of Japanese imperialism and retaining the organizations and collaborators of that era by maintaining the systems of the Japanese Government-General of Korea. Meade pointed out that officers of the military government authorized the positions of incumbents regardless of the individuals' background as they went from place to place. He added that many mayors, police superintendents and other local high officials were appointed without properly examining their qualifications and reputation.<sup>78)</sup>

The situation in Jeju was no different. Officials of the Japanese colonial era were appointed to their previous positions once more. Crucially, even pro-Japanese policemen became USAMGIK policemen. In addition, the unreasonable grain collecting policy which didn't take account of the local situation caused resentment among the Jeju people. In particular, in Jeju, the problem of collusion between USAMGIK officers and local profiteers became prominent. In the 'Report of the trip to [Jeju] during the period 4-6 December 1946,' Feraru, assistant section chief of the public opinion bureau of USAMGIK, reported that there was intelligence that Major Stout, who was central to USAMGIK in Jeju, Captain Partridge and Captain Martin were implicated in a certain corruption case.<sup>79)</sup> Corruption cases like this attracted much attention on a national scale in 1947.

## 2) Establishment of Jeju Province

### ① Political Significance of the Establishment of Jeju Province

On 1 August 1946, during the rule of the US Military Government, Jeju Island became an independent province, separated from Jeonnam Province. Jeju was raised from an island to become the ninth province of Korea. The

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78) E. Grant Meade, *American Military Government in Korea*, p.65.

79) "Report of Trip to the Province of Cheju (Jeju) during the Period 4-6 December 1946," December 9, 1946, RG 338: Records of U.S Army Command (1942-), U.S Army Forces in Korea 1945-49, Entry No. 11071, Box No. 16, NARA, Washington D.C.

establishment of Jeju Province was based on USAMGIK Korea Ordinance 94, 'Establishment of Cheju (Jeju) Province' which was declared in the name of Military Governor Archer L. Lerch. Ordinance 94 comprised of six articles. Article 1 was about separating Jeju Island from Jeonnam Province and Article 2 stipulated that the name of the new province shall be 'Jeju Province'. Article 3 specified that there should be two guns (districts), Bukjeju-gun and Namjeju-gun. Article 4 and 5 stated each gun's jurisdictions, making it public that Jeju Province's administrative districts should be comprised of two guns, one eup and 12 myeon. Besides, Article 6 stipulated that this ordinance should become effective as of midnight 31 July 1946.<sup>80)</sup> By this ordinance, Major Stout became the American governor of Jeju and Park Gyeong-hun became the Korean governor. Park Myeong-hyo was appointed as head of Bukjeju-gun and Kim Yeong-jin was selected as head of Namjeju-gun. However the implementation of Jeju Province was not welcomed in the whole by the Jeju people. In particular, the Jeju People's Committee opposed it. As previously mentioned, John Merrill pointed out in his thesis that it was when Jeju Island was raised to the status of a province that the relations between USAMGIK office in Jeju and the Jeju People's Committee started to sour. This kind of mood in Jeju at the time was reported in one domestic newspaper as follows:

There has been great diversity of opinions regarding the establishment of Jeju Province. People in the conservative camp are fully supportive of the policy but the majority of residents of the province, including the Jeju People's Committee, are against the decision to raise the island's status to a province. They oppose the policy for a number of reasons. First, they hate being separated from Jeonnam Province and facing the difficulty of securing food and other supplies due to isolation from the mainland. Secondly, those who are really looking forward to seeing the establishment of an interim government soon hope that the incoming government will deal with the administrative district organization reflecting the collective opinion of the nation. Thirdly, they are worried about tax increases due to the expansion of administrative bodies through the implementation of Jeju Province. Also, they think it is unnecessary to increase the number of policemen several times, which once was around 200 before

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80) *USAMGIK Official Gazette*, No. 94, July 2, 1946.

liberation [from Japan]. In addition, it is said that Jeju people glance suspiciously at the birth of Jeju Province as the foundation for making Jeju a military base.<sup>81)</sup>

It seems that the establishment of Jeju Province was decided by considering suggestions from local dignitaries from the right-wing camp, the US military administration in Jeju and political analysis by USAMGIK. Since 1945, the right-wing camp in Jeju launched a movement to support the implementation of Jeju Province through organizing the Promotion Committee for Establishing Jeju Province, led by Kim Hongseok and presenting a petition to Military Governor Arnold.<sup>82)</sup> Separately, the US military authorities in Jeju demanded the separation of Jeju's administrative district as an independent province. In his thesis, Meade reported that making Jeju an independent province was a result of consistent pressure on USAMGIK from officers of the US 59<sup>th</sup> Military Government Company.<sup>83)</sup> On 2 June 1946, Major General Archer L. Lerch, who succeeded Arnold, visited Jeju and examined the possibility of raising the status of Jeju to that of an independent province.<sup>84)</sup>

Jeju had historically been an independent country named *Tamna* and the people have strong tendencies of independence by nature. A US military periodic report in April 1949, which comprehensively analyzed the situation in Jeju, said, "The centuries-old practice of using Jeju as a place of exile for minority political groups and governmental maladministration gradually built up in the island a separatist psychology. The consciousness of being a people apart was more than the geographical separation of 60 miles of water, and the feeling was aggravated by the police of mainland governments' tendency to treat the island more in the nature of a possession than as an inclusive portion of Korea."<sup>85)</sup> Meade analyzed that the Japanese Imperial government had regarded Jeju as a Korean Sicily. (Sicily is an island located to the south of Italy and has a history of being ruled by the central government for a long

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81) *Jayu Shinmun*, December 19, 1946.

82) Jeju Province, *History of Jeju Province*, Vol. I, pp.441-43.

83) E. Grant Meade, *American Military Government in Korea*, p.82.

84) *Seoul Shinmun*, June 5, 1946.

85) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1097, April 1, 1949.

time and resisting against it.) Japan had merged Jeju with Jeonnam Province to break up the strong spirit of independence expressed by the natives of the island.<sup>86)</sup>

Despite this history and its own independent line from the Jeonnam People's Committee, the Jeju People's Committee opposed the separation of Jeju from Jeonnam Province when USAMGIK attempted it. The ostensible reasons for the opposition were economic burdens and some others but in fact it opposed the policy because it doubted the intention of the US Military Government. The moment that Jeju Island became a province was when USAMGIK began to strengthen its raids on the left-wing camp when the first talks of the Joint American-Soviet Commission were in recess. Controversies over the qualifications of political parties and civic organizations in Korea that were supposed to participate in the commission had risen at the preliminary talks of the commission since May 1946. Right after the first Joint American-Soviet Commission ended fruitlessly, USAMGIK announced the Political Party Registration Law which regulates secret activities of political parties and took a policy of strengthening the police and the Korean Constabulary.

The establishment of Jeju Province not only simply raised the status of the island but also served as momentum for establishing new organizations of the police and the Korean Constabulary and strengthening the existing structures from that of a country to the level of a province. In fact, in Jeju, the administrative organizations were expanded and reorganized; the police organizations were also expanded, which involved-establishing the Jeju Police Inspection Office and setting up the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment of the Korean Constabulary. Therefore, for the Jeju People's Committee, it could anticipate that its boundaries would decrease and its activities would be limited more. Against this backdrop, the argument was raised that the issue of establishing Jeju Province should be dealt with after the establishment of the Korean government, not under the US Military Government. After the birth of Jeju Province, the Jeju People's Committee still used a term which meant 'an island,' instead of using the term

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86) E. Grant Meade, *American Military Government in Korea*, p.34.

for ‘province’ in its name to show objection to Jeju’s new status. (In Korean, the two words are homonyms.)

## ② Expansion of Police Organizations

As Jeju Island became a province, its police organizations also expanded and restructured. The police body in Jeju was raised to the Jeju Inspection Station on 1 August 1946 and then raised again to the Jeju Inspection Agency on 11 September. Under the umbrella of the agency there were five departments, including the general affairs department, public security department, communication department, investigation instruction department and inspection department. On 14 December, a second district police station was built in Seogwipo, which was in addition to the first in Jeju-eup.<sup>87)</sup> So, the police organizations in Jeju were expanded under one inspection agency with two police stations, from the one police station that had existed when Jeju Province was established.

In April 1946, as the national police system was restructured into the district police system, the police organizations in each province were renamed district police agencies, rather than ‘police departments’. Accordingly, the police organization in Gyeonggi Province was renamed the 1<sup>st</sup> District Police Agency and that in Gangwon Province was called the 2<sup>nd</sup> District Police Agency. At the time, the police body in Jeonnam Province to which Jeju Island had belonged was called the 8<sup>th</sup> District Police Agency. Under this standard, since Jeju became a province it should have been the 9<sup>th</sup> District Police Agency, but this didn’t happen. Instead, an inspection agency was set up in Jeju.

In terms of the commanders’ ranks, the police inspection agency that was installed in Jeju can be considered a mid-level organization, between a police agency and a police station. At the time, the structure of police ranking was as follows: police commissioner – senior superintendent – senior superintendent inspector – senior inspector – inspector – assistant inspector – police officer.<sup>88)</sup> At the time, it was common practice for the head of the district police agency

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87) Jeju Provincial Police Agency, *History of Jeju Police*, (1990), p.90.

88) *Dokrip Shinbo*, September 20, 1946.

to be appointed to senior superintendent and the head of the police station was designated to the level of senior inspector. The rank of Kim Dae-bong, who was assigned as the first head of the Jeju Inspection Agency, was a senior superintendent inspector. The Jeju Inspection Agency was renamed the Jeju Police Inspection Agency on 9 March 1947, right after the 3·1 Incident.<sup>89)</sup>

When the Pacific War ended suddenly, one of the most flustered groups in Korea was Korean police officers under the Japanese Government-General of Korea. According to data from the police, between 15 August and 8 September 1945, when the US Army came to Korea, 90% of Japanese policemen held their positions while, 80% of Korean policemen disappeared.<sup>90)</sup> By the end of the Pacific War, the total number of policemen in Jeju was 101 and, among them, 50 policemen were Japanese and 51 policemen were Korean.<sup>91)</sup>

However, USAMGIK immediately used the police structure of the Japanese Government-General of Korea as the basis of its police organizations. Thus, the names of the police bodies and ranks in the colonial era were still used after liberation. Soon after, hosts of policemen from the Japanese colonial era were employed by USAMGIK police. It is revealed that as of the end of 1946, 949 police officers (82%) out of 1,157 police executives who held positions higher than an inspector were from the Japanese colonial era.<sup>92)</sup>

The Jeju police was no exception. Almost all the positions of police executives in Jeju were filled by those who once had been policemen in the Japanese colonial era. At first, the police were put in a defensive corner because they were conscious of public sentiment and controversies over their past. Therefore, the police were cooperative with or acquiesced to activities of the Jeju People's Committee's units for securing public order. However, as the police force was strengthened with the establishment of Jeju Province, the

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89) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 26, 1947.

90) The Capital Precinct Police Agency, *History of Capital Precinct Police Agency after Liberation*, (1947), p.94.

91) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 26, October 5, 1945.

92) Bruce Cummings, *The Origin of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947* (New Jersey: Princeton University, 1981), p.166.

police's influence gradually increased.

In its early stages, USAMGIK adopted a policy of depending on the police to maintain public order. Therefore, the police became administrative authorities, with strong legal backing in the period after liberation. They also functioned as riot police. In terms of armament, they were armed better than the Korean Constabulary and the number of police personnel kept increasing.

The number of police personnel in Jeju increased to 330 people as of February 1947, up from 101 people during the Japanese colonial period.<sup>93)</sup> In March 1947, preparing for a possible demonstration on the anniversary of 3/1 Independence Movement Day, the Jeju police called in 100 policemen from the mainland, triggering a shooting incident on that day. Due to some Jeju policemen resigning in protest at the shooting incident, the police carried out an extensive reorganization of its structure and increased its personnel to 500 by absorbing 245 policemen who were dispatched from the mainland in April 1947.<sup>94)</sup> Right after the armed revolts by the guerillas, the number of policemen on Jeju reached 2,000, with police reserves joining from the mainland.<sup>95)</sup>

The Jeju police under USAMGIK had three characteristics. First, most of the policemen including the executives were people who had been policemen in the Japanese colonial period. Second, there was a high proportion of policemen from other provinces outside of Jeju, especially those in the railroad police and people who had fled to South Korea from the North. Third, the Jeju police received support from the police reserves frequently. An example of this was in July 1947, when 75% of the policemen in Jeju were police reserves from the mainland.<sup>96)</sup>

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93) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 497, February 27, 1947.

94) *Jeju Shinbo*, April 28, 1947.

95) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, July 30, 1947.

96) Yang Bong-cheol, *Study on Characteristics and Activities of Jeju Police – Focusing on the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident*, master's thesis at graduate school of education at Sungkyunkwan University, (2002), pp.5-6.

### ③ Foundation of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment

On 16 November 1946, as Jeju Island became a province, the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment of the Korean Constabulary was founded in Moseolpo in Jeju and First Lieutenant Jang Chang-guk was appointed as the first commander of the regiment.<sup>97)</sup> The foundation of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment had a direct bearing on the establishment of Jeju Province. USAMGIK, which created the Korean Constabulary, began setting up regional regiments according to the Bamboo Plan, the objective of which was to establish one regiment in each province. The Bamboo Plan was about setting up police reserve squads by recruiting applicants from that particular region. This plan had already been carried out in the Philippines by the US Army there.<sup>98)</sup> According to this plan, USAMGIK established regiments in eight provinces between January and April 1946 and it formed the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment on Jeju Island last, after the island became a province.

Right after the 8 · 15 Liberation, people who had been serving in the army in Japan and China returned home and private military groups and vigilantes became active among those with military experience as they returned to their hometowns. Their numbers were so great that such groups recorded by USAMGIK reached more than 30 in November 1945.<sup>99)</sup> To control them, in November 1945, USAMGIK proclaimed USAMGIK Ordinance 28<sup>100)</sup> and created the National Defense Command and the Bureau of National Defense to manage and control the military organizations, making private military groups and vigilante groups illegal.

Also, in order to overcome the pressing language barrier, the military government set up the Military English Academy to train cadets for the defense force. USAMGIK tried to select young men who had military experience in Japan, Manchuria and China in similar proportions; however, the mainstream faction

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97) The Institute for Military History Compilation of the Ministry of National Defense, *History of the Korean War – Liberation and Foundation of National Forces*, Vol. I, (1967), p.301.

98) Han Yong-won, *Theory of Military Development*, Bakyongsang, (1969), p.206.

99) The Institute for Military History, *History of the Korean War*, p.247.

100) *USAMGIK Official Gazette*, No. 28, November 13, 1945.

of the Liberation Army (which was in China) opposed this plan because they thought they could not work with the people who had served in the Japanese Army, so hosts of young men who had been in Manchuria and Japan entered the Academy. Among 110 commissioned officers of the Academy in 1946, 87 officers had served in the Japanese Army, 21 men were from Manchuria and only two officers had served in the Liberation Army.<sup>101)</sup> In the end, like the police organizations, those who had military experience in the Japanese Army were mainly appointed as military officers. On 15 January 1946, USAMGIK established the Korean Constabulary and began to form regional regiments by province. As a newcomer, the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment in Jeju was formed six months later than other regiments on the mainland and had a different personnel composition to those regiments. Other mainland regiments were understaffed, mostly with local personnel, but the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment received 54 key members from the 4<sup>th</sup> Regiment in Gwangju.<sup>102)</sup> According to a document from the Defense Ministry, those 54 members were “delinquents, trouble makers and left wing and impure elements that were hard to control.”<sup>103)</sup>

The headquarters of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment was “Omura Barracks” in Moseolpo where the Japanese Navy Air Service was stationed in the Japanese colonial era. Moseolpo is the region where the first airport in Jeju was built and used as a military base for bombing mainland China during the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. Using the Japanese barracks as its headquarters, the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment began to recruit soldiers among young men in Jeju from March 1947. In order to recruit more soldiers, the regiment showed the public its close-order drill at Jeju Buk Elementary School and continued to recruit young men at the eup and myeon offices going around the island.

Through this recruitment, during 1947, the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment enlisted young men eight times, from 40 to 80 men each time. These enlisted men were called “1<sup>st</sup> recruits” to “8<sup>th</sup> recruits”, according to the timing of their enlistment. It was not until January 1948 that the number of soldiers of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment

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101) Han Yong-won, *Foundation of National Forces*, Bakyeongsa, (1984), p.74.

102) Jang Chang-guk, *A Graduates of the Korea Military Academy*, Joongangilbosa, (1984), p.98.

103) The Institute for Military History, *History of Korean War*, p.302.

reached 400.<sup>104)</sup> After that time, the regiment kept recruiting soldiers from Gyeongsang Province and Jeolla Province and the number of its enlisted men reached 800 right before the 4 · 3 Incident.

From the initial stages, recruitment for the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment faced many difficulties. Sometimes the recruits made do with clear soup and dumplings due to the shortage of supplies, and their equipment was poorer than that of the police. In those days, there were also rumors that the regiment was not a regular army but an assistant organization to the police and soldiers for the regular army would be recruited later. Among young men especially, rumors had spread that the Korean Constabulary was a mercenary unit for the US Army.

The first commander of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, First Lieutenant Jang Chang-guk recalls those early days. He said that when he paid a courtesy call to an American commander of the Korean Constabulary and the principal of the military academy, they warned him that he must be cautious because the left-wing camp had a very powerful influence in Jeju. He also recollected that he instinctively felt that Jeju was under the influence of the left-wing camp when he heard one young man saying, “The Korean Constabulary is a mere mercenary unit of the US Army, not a regular army of Korea” at his welcoming reception.<sup>105)</sup> At this point, ideological issues had not emerged as serious matters when the Korea Constabulary recruited soldiers across the nation.

In the beginning, USAMGIK stuck to its stance of treating everyone equally regardless of their background. USAMGIK ignored the Korean advisor’s suggestion of adopting a personal reference system to prevent communists from enlisting in the Korean Constabulary. As a result, many members of the Preparation Squad for the National Armed Forces, sponsored by the Korean Communist Party, penetrated the Korean Constabulary and it is known that the South Korean Labor Party, the Korean Communist Party’s later incarnation, managed them by installing itself within the department of the military.<sup>106)</sup>

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104) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Summary*, No. 124, January 30, 1948.

105) Jang Chang-guk, *A Graduates of the Korea Military Academy*, pp.113-114.

In the materials from the Jeju armed guerillas, it is recorded that the Jeju Committee of the South Korean Labor Party had four men from Moseolpo enlist in the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment during the regiment's first recruitment, but two of them left later.<sup>107)</sup>

Another pertinent point is that the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment emphasized that the regiment was neither right-wing nor left-wing when the regiment advertised for recruitment in the local press. Several times from 22 April 1947, the regiment placed an advertisement titled: "To the young men on Jeju" in the Jeju Shinbo under the name of Commander Chang Chang-guk. The telling observation is as follows:.

The Korean Constabulary is neither a right-wing organization nor a left-wing one. It is a patriotic military agency for young bloods that love their compatriots and are willing to die for their country. We are not the hunting dog of a certain country. We are not a puppet of a certain political party. We are simply the bulwark of the state which tries to pursue Korea's independence and defend our beloved homeland.<sup>108)</sup>

It seems that the US Military Government's policy of consolidating both the right-wing camp and the left-wing camp contributed to the regiment having to place this advertisement. As the talks of the Joint American-Soviet Commission broke down and went into recess, USAMGIK pushed its campaign to consolidate the right-wing and the left-wing camp in order to prevent a pro-Soviet government from being established. This policy proposed the exclusion of both extreme leftists and extreme rightists by USAMGIK itself. Therefore, the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment's declaration of its being neither right-wing nor left-wing can be interpreted as reflecting USAMGIK's stance.

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106) The Institute for Military History, *History of the Korean War*, p.401.

107) "The Report on the Protest of the Jeju Island People's Guerrilla Units" as quoted in *Mt. Hallasan Knows - the Buried Truth of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident*, in Moon Chang-rae eds., (Daeriminswaesa, 1995), p.75.

108) *Jeju Shinbo*, April 22, 1947

## **D. Political and Social Circumstances**

### 1) Political Situation

#### **① Dispute over Trusteeship**

The political history of Korea in 1946 can be summarized as “political disputes and confrontations between the right and the left over the trusteeship.”<sup>109)</sup> The idea of setting up a Joint Commission to make recommendations for a single free government in Korea at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers at the end of December 1945 caused ideological confrontations between Korean political forces for the first time and brought the most noteworthy political disputes in the political history of Korea. It was at the Cairo Conference that the independence of Korea was guaranteed for the first time. This resolution of making Korea an independent nation was confirmed again at the Yalta Conference and the Potsdam Conference. However, in the declaration of the establishment of an independent nation on the Korean Peninsula at the Cairo Conference, conditions and expressions such as “in due course” were used. This meant that the independence of Korea was not an immediate thing and there would be a trusteeship for a certain period of time. It was at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers that foreign ministers from the USA and the Soviet Union - both of whom set up military governments in Korea following the Pacific War - and a foreign minister from the UK, gathered and discussed concrete proposals for the trusteeship of Korea. A roadmap was outlined which included setting up an interim government in Korea to clear away the remnants of Japanese colonialism and Korea would be ruled by four nations (the USA, the UK, China and the Soviet Union) for five years, in consultation with the Korean government. To move this plan forward, they agreed to form a joint American-Soviet commission and discuss the issue with political parties and civic organizations in Korea.<sup>110)</sup> Some

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109) Kim Hak-jun, “Backgrounds of Division of Korea and Process of its Perpetuation,” *Understanding of History before and after the Liberation*, Vol. I, (Hangilsa, 1979), p.84.

110) Lee Dong-hyeon, *Study on the Trusteeship in Korea*, (Pyeongminsa, 1990), pp.74-78.

pointed out that the idea of the trusteeship of Korea was a product of compromise between the USA, the Soviet Union and Korea. In other words, the principle of “the participation of the interim Korean government” reflects the Soviet Union’s intention to have left-wing political parties and civic organizations, which had the upper hand at the time, participate in the process of establishing the independent Korean government while the principle of “participation of the four nations [the USA, the Soviet Union, the UK and China]” shows America’s intention of holding a numerical advantage against the Soviet Union by including pro-American nations such as the UK and China.<sup>111)</sup>

When news of the trusteeship broke to Korean people, most of them took it as another version of colonial rule. They considered it an insult to them because they believed that Korea would be under the reign of the four nations, merely replacing the previous colonizer. Immediately, forces of the provisional government of Korea led by Kim Gu, set up the Committee for Total National Mobilization Against Trusteeship and waged a strong anti-trusteeship movement. The anti-trusteeship movement of Rhee Syng-man and the Korean Democratic Party was cautious and careful at first but day by day it became more and more focused. On the contrary, the left-wing forces showed ambiguous attitudes toward the trusteeship. To begin with, they opposed the trusteeship or showed reservations, but later, on 2 January 1946, the National People’s Representative Conference of the People’s Republic of Korea shifted its position toward supporting the trusteeship, saying “It was a mistake that they had opposed the trusteeship because of the lack of proper information”. The People’s Republic of Korea argued that the decision of trusteeship was a progressive one to guarantee Korea’s liberation and independence and it was the most appropriate solution judged from the domestic circumstances.<sup>112)</sup> Soon after, the Korean Communist Party made a statement in support of the trusteeship.

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111) Lee Wan-beom, “Issues of the Trusteeship on the Korean Peninsula,” *Understanding of History before and after the Liberation*, Vol. III, (Hangilsa, 1987), p.232.

112) *Chosun Ilbo*, *Seoul Shinmun*, January 4, 1946.

However, regardless of the anti- and pro-trusteeship movements, the Joint American-Soviet Commission was being prepared at the time. In preparation for the commission, USAMGIK thought that it was necessary to unify all the right-wing forces and launched the Representative Democratic Council as a consultative body to the military government. Rhee Syng-man was appointed as the first chair of the council; Kim Gu and Kim Gyu-sik were designated as vice-chairs. However, as the first talks of the Joint American-Soviet Commission didn't produce any results, USAMGIK tried to set up the Committee for Left-Right Cooperation and the Interim Legislative Assembly of South Korea after fierce confrontation and conflict over the qualifications of political parties and organizations to participate in the interim government.

In response to this movement, the left-wing camp set up the National Front for Democracy on 15 February 1946 which succeeded the National People's Representative Conference of the People's Republic of Korea. The National Front for Democracy was a united front of the left-wing camp, including leftist parties, such as the Korean Communist Party, the People's Party of Korea, the Korean New People's Party, but also labor organizations, farmers' organizations, youth leagues, women's leagues and cultural organizations. Yeo Un-hyeong, Park Heon-yeong and Huh Heon were inducted as co-chairs. The Representative Democratic Council was an organization mainly rooted in Seoul, while the National Front for Democracy was national in scope, having not only a central office but also many local chapters around the nation.

However, in Jeju, the circumstances around the trusteehip unfolded in a different way from on the mainland. Triggered by the large-scale anti-trusteeship demonstration in Jeju-eup at the beginning of January 1946, many anti-trusteeship rallies were also held at the myeon level. Groups associated with the Committee for Preparation of Korean Independence and the Jeju People's Committee led those rallies.<sup>113)</sup> Also, by the first half of 1946, most of the local organizations of the National Front for Democracy were set up in South Korea but in Jeju it was not until February 1947 that the Jeju Committee of

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113) Jeju Province, *History of Jeju Province*, Vol. II, 1993, p.52

the National Front for Democracy was established, even though the left-wing camp had a strong influence in the region. Before long, left-wing groups in Jeju defined their position by supporting the trusteeship following the directions of the dominant group. But this stance did not receive the public's support.

## ② Left-wing Parties and Organizations

The first organization of a political party in Jeju after the 8 · 15 Liberation was the Jeju Committee of the Jeonnam Province Chapter of the Korea Communist Party. It is known that, at the beginning of October 1945, about 20 people who had experience in leading socialist movements during the Japanese colonial era gathered at a private house and formed the committee.<sup>114)</sup> Those joining the party needed to pass a strict screening process and, by the end of 1946, on the whole, less than 100 people became members of the party in Jeju.

The Jeju Committee of the Korean Communist Party neither put up a signboard nor worked under the name of the Korean Communist Party. They just focused on doing the business of the Jeju People's Committee and leading a popular movement through its substructure, such as youth leagues. On 23 November 1946, the Jeju Committee of the Korean Communist Party which had been the only left-wing party in Jeju until then, was restructured into the Jeju Committee of the South Korean Labor Party as three leftist political parties, the Korean Communist Party, the People's Party of Korea and the Korean New People's Party were combined into the South Korean Labor Party.

Leftist parties led by Park Heon-yeong, Yeo Un-hyeong and Baek Nam-un, meaning the Korean Communist Party, the People's Party of Korea and the Korean New People's Party maintained their own identities with regard to tradition, ideology and objectives behind revolution. However, they took joint steps in pursuing important policies such as supporting the trusteeship, clearing away the remnants of Japanese colonialism and carrying out land reform. In

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114) Lee Un-bang (age 92, Daejeong-eup, attendee of the meeting for establishing the Korea Communist Party), Testimony recorded on 9 November 2001. With regard to the time of the establishment of the committee, Kim Bong-hyeon and Kim Min-saeng argue in their book that the committee was set up on December 12, *History of Armed Uprising of Jeju People*, (Bunyusha), p.14.

February 1946, they jointly reacted to the first talks of the Joint American-Soviet Commission by establishing the National Front for Democracy.<sup>115)</sup>

They began to face political attacks from USAMGIK after the first talks of the Joint American-Soviet Commission went into recess indefinitely. In May 1946, USAMGIK arrested executives of the Korean Communist Party on charges of circulating counterfeit bills and, on 6 September of the same year, leftist newspapers such as the Haebang Ilbo were discontinued by the military government.<sup>116)</sup> On 7 September, the military government issued a warrant of arrest for Park Heon-yeong. While the military government took the offensive against the Korean Communist Party, it also tried to combine the right-wing and the left-wing camps by attracting Yeo Un-hyeong, the moderate leftist, and Kim Gyu-sik, the moderate rightist. Reflecting on this development, the leftist forces keenly felt the necessity to set up a legal mass party in order to secure their existence and foothold, so they established the South Korean Labor Party by merging the three political parties. The South Korean Labor Party was registered as a legal political party with the US Military Government.<sup>117)</sup> At the inaugural meeting of the party, even some executives of USAMGIK and staff of the Counter Intelligence Corps attended. Huh Heon was appointed the representative of the party and Park Heon-yeong was named the vice representative. However, the reigns of the party were held by Park Heon-yeong, who was in Haeju avoiding arrest.

In Jeju at this time only the Korean Communist Party had a chapter there so they just changed the organization's name to a new one. At the beginning of December 1946, executives of the Jeju Committee of the Korean Communist Party held an urgent meeting at Kim Yu-hwan's house in Jocheon and formed the Jeju Committee of the Jeonnam Province Chapter of the South Korean Labor Party.<sup>118)</sup> The position of chair went to Ahn Se-hun in Jocheon who

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115) Kim Nam-sik, "The Korea Communist Party and the Merge of the Three Parties," *Understanding of History before and after the Liberation*, Vol. III, (Hangilsa, 1989), p.140.

116) *Dokrip Shinmun*, September 7, 1946.

117) Ha Seong-su, *History of the South Korea Labor Party*, (Segye, 1986), p.172.

118) The 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *Talking about the 4 · 3 Incident*, Vol. I, pp.535-36.

had been imprisoned for organizing a socialist movement during the Japanese colonial era. Major activists in those early days were Kim Yu-hwan, Kim Eun-han, Moon Do-bae, Hyeon Ho-gyeong, Jo Mong-gu, Oh Dae-jin, Kim Han-jeong, Lee Sin-ho, Lee Un-bang, Kim Yong-hae, Kim Jeong-no, Kim Taek-su, Moon Jae-jin, Boo Byeong-hun, Song Tae-sam, Lee Do-baek, to name but a few.<sup>119)</sup>

The Jeju Committee of the South Korean Labor Party actively tried to increase the number of its members to further its longstanding objective of becoming a mass party. It is said that the committee had a clearly marked office in Chilseongtong, the central district of Jeju-eup.<sup>120)</sup> The Jeju Committee of the South Korea Party arranged a rally to commemorate the Independence Movement Day on 1 March 1947 and at this time the number of its members increased to about 3,000.<sup>121)</sup> Prior to this, the Jeju committee also established subsidiary organizations. The local branches of the National Front for Democracy, youth leagues and women's leagues hadn't been organized in Jeju even then. These organizations were formed between January and February 1947.

The inauguration ceremony for the National Front for Democracy was held at the Joil Club, with around 500 people attending on 23 February 1947 - a year later than in Seoul. This was because the right-wing forces in Jeju were relatively weak compared to the left-wing camp which had a united organizational structure. Moreover, the influence of the Jeju People's Committee on Jeju people was still intact up to that time.

For the positions of chairs, Ahn Se-hun, the chair of the Jeju Committee of the South Korean Labor Party, Lee Il-seon, a Buddhist monk, Hyeon Gyeong-ho, the principal of Jeju Middle School, were inducted as co-chairs.

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119) The 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4 · 3 Incident Speaks*, Vol. I, p.198, the Jeju 4 · 3 Research Institute, *The Long Journey of the 4 · 3 Incident*, vol. III, (Baeksanseodang, 1990), p.104.

120) Kim Si-jong (age 74, Japan, former member of the South Korea Labor Party), Testimony recorded on December 24, 2001.

121) Kim Saeng-min (age 77, Jeju City, former member of the South Korea Labor Party), Testimony recorded on July 13, 2001.

Also, Kim Taek-su, Kim Yong-hae, Kim Sang-hun, and Oh Chang-eun were selected as the vice-chairs. At this ceremony, Joseph Stalin, Park Heon-yeong, Kim Il-sung, Huh Heon, Kim Won-bong and Yoo Yeong-jun were inducted as honorary chairs of the committee. Jeju Governor Park Gyeong-hun attended the ceremony and delivered his congratulatory speech.<sup>122)</sup> Also, Captain Partridge, adviser to the police, and Kang In-su, the head of the Jeju Inspection Agency, gave lectures to the attendees on the subject of preventing a breach of order.<sup>123)</sup>

Meanwhile, with regard to left-wing youth organizations, in the early days, youth leagues were organized and mainly acted as the department of public order under the Committee for Preparation of Korean Independence and the Jeju People's Committee. Then on 12 January 1947, the Jeju Committee of the Joseon Democratic Youth League was founded.<sup>124)</sup> Kim Taek-su was elected as chair at the age of 47, having participated in the anti-Japanese movement. The organization of the Joseon Democratic Youth League in Jeju was also established about nine months later than the same organization in Seoul. The Jeju Committee of the Joseon Democratic Youth League had a far-reaching structure having its sub organizations in eup, myeon and ri areas. According to articles of local newspapers about the inauguration meetings in myeon areas, heads of police boxes attended and delivered congratulatory speeches.<sup>125)</sup>

In April 1947, USAMGIK issued an order to disband the Korean Democratic Youth League (a right-wing youth organization) through Administrative Order 1<sup>126)</sup> and in May, it also issued order to disband to the Joseon Democratic Youth League (a left-wing youth organization) through Executive Order 2<sup>127)</sup> describing both of them as terrorist organizations. In response to this, in Seoul, the Joseon Democratic Youth League was restructured into the Joseon Democratic and Patriotic Youth League on 6 June. The Jeju Committee of the

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122) *Jeju Shinbo*, February 26, 1947.

123) *Jeju Shinbo*, May 28, 1947.

124) *Jeju Shinbo*, January 10, 1947.

125) *Jeju Shinbo*, January 28, 1947.

126) *USAMGIK Executive Order No. 1*, May 16, 1947.

127) *USAMGIK Executive Order No. 2*, May 16, 1947.

Joseon Democratic Youth League also disbanded after six months from its establishment and was established again as the Jeju Committee of the Joseon Democratic and Patriotic Youth League (Chair Kang Dae-seok). However, it changed only its name and there were no structural changes. Later, this league became the basis of the self-defense forces and armed guerrilla units when the 4 · 3 armed uprising occurred.

Along with the youth league, the Jeju Women's League which would go on to have an extensive structure rooted in eup, myeon and ri areas was set up on 15 January 1947. Kim I-hwan was chosen as the chair and Ko In-seon and Kang Eo-yeong were appointed as the vice-chairs. After finishing the restructuring process, the Jeju Committee of the South Korean Democratic Party decided to organize a rally asking for the resumption of the talks of the Joint American-Soviet Commission, linking it to the ceremony of 1 March Independence Movement Day.

### ③ Right-wing Parties and Organizations

Right after the 8 · 15 Liberation, right-wing forces in Jeju participated in activities of the Preparation Committee with Hong Sun-nyeong as the central figure, but these groups steadily lost heart in responding to activities of the Jeju People's Committee, losing ground to the left-wing forces. However, with Rhee Syng-man and Kim Gu's homecoming and the momentum of the anti-trusteeship movement, they gained confidence and revitalized. The right-wing forces, which had been on the defensive due to the powerful left-wing achieved success in winning people over to some extent through launching the anti-trusteeship movement.

On 26 December 1945, the Jeju Chapter of the National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence was launched. Park U-sang took on the chair's position. Among right-wing figures in Jeju at the time were Park Myeong-hyo, Kang Ji-su, Hong Sun-yong, Hong Sun-nyeong, Kim Geun-si, Park Jong-hun, Kim Chung-hui, Kim Hui-su, Hwang Sun-ha, Moon Jae-suk, and Park Chi-sun, to name but a few.<sup>128)</sup>

As the first talks of the Joint American-Soviet Commission broke down, the

leadership of the right-wing camp in Seoul began to split into three. Right-wing leaders, with Rhee Syng-man as the central figure, wanted to set up an independent government in South Korea excluding their northern counterparts. The other movement led by Kim Gyu-sik and his followers was about cooperating with the left-wing forces. The third was Kim Gu's faction, which wanted to maintain the anti-trusteeship stance but was sandwiched between the former two positions. Even though they had cooperated over the issue of the anti-trusteeship movement and the establishment of the National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence, Rhee Syng-man and Kim Gu became estranged about this time.<sup>129)</sup>

Under these circumstances, on 14 July 1946, Kim Gu visited Jeju and inspired the right-wing forces there. The purpose of his visit was to strengthen organizations of the Korean Independence Party in Jeju of which he was the leader. The Jeju Chapter of the party had already been established but its influence on Jeju was insignificant. Flying to Jeju by US military plane, he gave a lecture on pressing issues at Jeju Buk Elementary School. He delivered an impassioned speech, saying "Our people should be united and we should devote ourselves to establishing a united fatherland." On the same day, the Jeju Chapter of the Korean Independence Party was reshuffled and Hong Sun-yong was selected as a new chair.<sup>130)</sup>

Despite efforts to extend their power, the right-wing camp in Jeju kept losing ground to left-wing forces at the beginning of 1947. In particular, the more the right-wing forces went to rural areas in Jeju, the more they became inferior in power and influence. This phenomenon was reflected in the US Army intelligence reports. The following excerpt is from a report titled "*Rightist parties on JEJU-DO*" written by the USCIC right after the outbreak of the 4 · 3 Incident.

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128) Kang Yong-sam · Lee Gyeong-su, *Annals of Jeju*, (Taegwangmunhwasa, 1984), pp.514-16.

129) Lee, "Issues of the Trusteeship on the Korean Peninsula," *Understanding of History before and after the Liberation*, Vol. III, p.265.

130) Jeju Province, *History of Jeju Province*, Vol. II, p.54.

Two CIC reports dated 21 March state that the Rightist National Society for the Acceleration of Korean Independence and the Korean Independence Party on JEJU Island are poorly organized and lacking in funds. Each party reportedly has only about 1,000 members on the entire island. These parties have met such stiff opposition from the Leftists on the island that they find it difficult to do anything politically.<sup>131)</sup>

Meanwhile, with regard to the development of establishing right-wing parties, the situation in Jeju was relatively simple compared to Seoul. The period during which right-wing parties were organized in Jeju was a time when right-wing youth organizations were expanding nationwide and there were fierce disputes over the trusteeship of Korea.

In March 1946, the Jeju Chapter of the Young Men's Association of the National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence (Chair Kim Chung-hui) was set up.<sup>132)</sup> In February 1947, the Jeju Chapter of the Korean Liberation Young Men's Association (Leader Kim In-seon) was also founded.<sup>133)</sup> These two organizations were combined into the Daedong Youth Corps in October 1947 and later, during the whirlpool of the 4 · 3 Incident, members of the Daedong Youth Corps participated in suppressing the uprising.

The branches of the Committee for Preparation of Korean Independence and the People's Committee were already rooted in local areas when the right-wing organizations began to establish their branches there. Therefore, the right-wing camp had difficulty winning members over to their side. Kim In-seon, who played a leading role in campaigning for the right-wing youth movement in Jeju as the chair of both the Jeju Chapters of the Korean Liberation Young Men's Association and the Daedong Youth Corps, recalled the situation, saying: "These right-wing organizations were set up revolving more around influential figures than ideology."<sup>134)</sup>

In November 1947, the Jeju Chapter of the Seobuk Young Men's Association

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131) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 486, March 22, 1947.

132) Kang Yong-sam, Lee Gyeong-su, *Annals of Jeju*, p.575.

133) *Jeju Shinbo*, February 1, 1947.

134) Kim In-seon, Testimony as quoted in the 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4 · 3 Incident Speaks*, Vol. I, p.149.

(Chair Jang Dong-chun) was established, and the Jeju branch of the Joseon People Youth Association (Leader Baek Chan-seok) was set up in December. As the left-wing forces were restricted in their activities due to crackdowns by the police following the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident, the left-wing forces became more active and made an effort to expand their influence over the island. Nevertheless, it is interesting that the Korean Democratic Party, one of the major right-wing political parties in Korea at the time, failed to take root in Jeju.

## 2) Socio-economic Situation

At the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, as the colonial economy of Japan infiltrated the island, Jeju's natural economy began to collapse. Many farmers had to cross the Korean Strait to Japan and were absorbed as workers in Japanese industry. As the Pacific War ended, they returned home to Jeju, but were ill-equipped for the stagnant economy there.

After the 8 · 15 Liberation, the economic situation in Jeju was very bad. People who returned home from Japan suffered high unemployment and the remittance of money from Japan was interrupted. A commodity shortage exacerbated the situation and to make matters worse cholera broke out and the 1946 barley harvest was extremely poor.

From the spring of 1946, cholera began to spread to many places in South Korea and by June patients and the dead were being reported in Jeju for the first time. In response to this, USAMGIK designated Jeju as a newly infected area and controlled traffic between the mainland and Jeju, saying "People cannot enter the island without going into six-day quarantine."<sup>135)</sup> As summer approached, the outbreak was becoming severe. USAMGIK reports recorded the death toll up until 29 August 1946, but after that there were no records about the death toll from the disease. In the last report at the end of August, the death toll in the nation was 7,193, with 369 of these in Jeju.<sup>136)</sup> However,

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135) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 257, June 18, 1946.

136) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 317, August 29, 1946.

as the last USAMGIK report said that 424 new cases of cholera appeared, it is estimated that the actual death toll in Jeju must have been much higher than 369. Jeju, whose population accounted for 1% of the total Korean population, was affected worse than other regions. Jeju people were agitated over the measures that controlled the comings and goings of villagers in order to prevent the spread of the disease.

In the same year as the cholera epidemic, Jeju people struggled with starvation, too. The soil of Jeju is so barren that rice paddies are almost non-existent and the main farm products are barley, millet and potatoes. However, 1946 was very bad for farm production, especially barley. The output of barley in Jeju in 1944 was 48,213,940 liters and this decreased sharply by 31% to 15,081,300 liters in 1946. The 1943 output of other mixed grains and products, such as sweet potatoes and millet, was 69,692,580 liters, but by 1946 that had dropped to 42,595,380 liters, 61% of the 1943 level.<sup>137)</sup>

Despite the population of Jeju increasing due to the influx of people from Japan and other regions, food output remained poor and the food shortage became serious. Some people eked out a living by gathering kuzu vine roots and seafood and others had to have so-called 'seaweed rice' which was a mixture of seaweed and barley bran. Even potato pulp, which was usually used as pig feed, was circulated for food.<sup>138)</sup> Belatedly, grains from other regions were carried into the island but they were not enough to relieve the starvation. In addition to this, the confusing policies of USAMGIK exacerbated the situation and public discontentment grew.

USAMGIK abolished the distribution system of rice in the Japanese colonial era and introduced the free sale system through General Notification 1, announced on 5 October 1945. However this new system soon brought more confusion to the market. Some landowners and officials dominated the rice market and this caused the price of rice to skyrocket unprecedentedly. As things came to a head, the military government promulgated Ordinance 24, 'National Rice Collection', in January 1946<sup>139)</sup>, which allowed the authorities

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137) The Inspection Department of the Joseon Bank, *Annals of Korea's Economy*, p.4.

138) Jeju Province, *History of Jeju Province*, p.59.

to purchase rice. This resurrected the rice delivery system of the Japanese colonial era. Farmers resisted this and the left-wing camp also waged a campaign against the ordinance making it into a political issue. In response to this, USAMGIK drafted punishment regulations for opposition to the rice collection system and enhanced the enforcement of the system.

Military Governor Lerch revealed in a press conference that the number of people who were taken into custody for not conforming to the rice collection order was 8,631 nation wide<sup>140)</sup>, making the conflict between the military government and farmers very serious. Apart from this, Jeju yielded the lowest rice harvest of the whole nation, yet the target rice to be collected was 900,000 liters in 1946, of 784,440,000 liters nation wide.<sup>141)</sup> However, according to a US report as of January 1947, 69.5% of the target had been collected nationally but in Jeju only 1% of the quota had been collected.<sup>142)</sup> According to another USAMGIK report as of 15 February 1947, 78% of the target amount of rice had been collected nationally, but in Jeju the figure was 22%. As of 22 February, 81% of the target amount had been collected nationwide, but only 44% of the Jeju quota was collected.<sup>143)</sup> Clearly, Jeju performed poorly in its rice harvest compared to the rest of the nation. Moreover, in the summer of 1947, there was violence between government employees who were purchasing rice from farmers and young men in villages.

Meanwhile, the enthusiasm for education in Jeju was another distinguishing social phenomenon. In every village, residents tried to establish elementary schools and in every myeon people launched campaigns for founding secondary schools. Through this kind of movement, from the 8 · 15 Liberation to 1947, for two years, 44 elementary schools and 10 secondary schools were newly established.<sup>144)</sup> Also, the number of elementary school students increased rapidly from 20,000 to 38,000 and the number of secondary school students

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139) USAMGIK *Official Gazette* No. 45, January 25, 1946.

140) *Jayu Shinmun*, March 21, 1947.

141) *Hanseong Ilbo*, *Dokrip Shinmun*, October 18, 1946.

142) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 437, January 22, 1947.

143) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 468, February 28, 1947.

144) The Education Committee of Jeju Province, *History of Jeju Education*, (1979), p.113.

rose from 3,000 to 3,600.<sup>145)</sup>

From 1946, liberal student movements became active. Student strikes in opposition to the Japanese imperial education system and fascist education occurred at Jeju Agriculture School and Ohyun Middle School. From 1947, the student movements escalated into social movements beyond the boundaries of the schools. The first demonstration called for the boycott of western confectionery and the second was part of the 3 · 1 Independence Movement Day demonstrations.

On 10 February 1947, students at middle schools and high schools in Jeju City held an anti-western confectionery demonstration at the plaza in front of Gwandeokjeong where the USAMGIK office was located. With regard to the number of students attending the demonstration, a weekly summary from USAMGIK put it at 300-400<sup>146)</sup>, while the Jeju Shinbo reported that the number was about 1,000.<sup>147)</sup> The military government labeled the demonstration as the first anti-US demonstration held in Jeju. A US G-2 report said, “Approximately, 350 students demonstrated against an MG unit which broke up the demonstration and drove the students from JEJU(-eup).”<sup>148)</sup>

At the beginning of 1947, boycotting western confectionery was a national issue. Not only among the left-wing camp, but right-wing forces also participated in the boycott movement. The publicity department of the National Society for the Acceleration of Korean Independence released a statement on 8 January stating, “Western confectionery imports, such as drops, exceeded 180,000,000 won” and arguing “Korean people should boycott western confectionery and buy more domestic goods”.<sup>149)</sup> Though the student anti-western confectionery movement in Jeju appeared an immature form of anti-Americanism, it managed to exert influence on the general public. Then, following soon after it, the 3 · 1 Independence Movement Day Demonstration was held.

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145) *Jeju Shinbo*, January 26, 1947.

146) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Summary*, No. 75, February 20, 1947: Hq. 6<sup>th</sup> Inf Div, G-2 Report, No. 485, February 15, 1947.

147) *Jeju Shinbo*, February 10, 1947.

148) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Summary*, No. 75, February 20, 1947.

149) *Hanseong Ilbo*, January 8, 1947.

Another issue causing commotion on Jeju in early 1947 was the problem of corruption. In those days, smuggling was prevalent in Jeju and fishing boats frequently crossed the Korean Strait to carry goods to Japan, or living necessities to Jeju. Although the police considered this illegal and cracked down on it, some police officers conspired with the smugglers. When ships were caught smuggling, they frequently made under-the-table deals, rather than following the proper legal process. As officers in the military government and high ranking officials in the police were engaged in this corruption, the issue escalated into a society-wide problem.

One representative incident of this kind was the Boksihwan Incident which led to the expulsion of the head of the Jeju Inspection Agency. On 11 January 1947, the Boksihwan ship traveling to Beophwan Village was raided and found to be carrying materials donated by Jeju residents in Japan for producing electricity in the village. The materials had been donated by Korean residents in Japan who were from Beophwan Village. Rumors began to circulate that high ranking police and USAMGIK officials were involved in the case and local media started to carry out in-depth reports into the case.<sup>150)</sup> Immediately, the incident made the headlines in major newspapers under the headline of ‘Jeju, world of corruption’ creating quite a stir across the nation.<sup>151)</sup>

An inspection team from Seoul came to Jeju and began its investigation, as a result of which Shin U-gyun, the head of the Jeju Inspection Agency, was relieved of his duties on 20 February<sup>152)</sup> and dismissed on 24 March at the central police agency inquiry commission.<sup>153)</sup> After this incident, Kang In-su from Jeonnam Province was appointed as head of the Jeju Inspection Agency as a successor to Shin U-gyun. Later Kang faced the 3 · 1 Incident. At that time in Jeju society, the word ‘corruption’ was on everybody’s lips. The word also had symbolic meaning, signaling distrust of the police and USAMGIK officers.

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150) *Jeju Shinbo*, January 28, 30, and February 2, 4, 6 and 8, 1947.

151) *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, *Dong-A Ilbo*, *Seoul Shinmun*, February 5, 1947.

152) *Hanseong Ilbo*, February 21, 1947.

153) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 28, 1947.

## 2. 3 · 1 Incident and the Lead-up to Armed Uprising

### A. 3 · 1 Incident and General Strike

#### 1) 3 · 1 Incident

March 1, 1947 was a very important date that marked a milestone in the modern history of Jeju. Jeju left-wing sympathizers were fired at by police after organizing a demonstration on the 28<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the 3 · 1 Independence Day Movement, triggering fierce controversy in Jeju, where there hadn't been serious civil disturbance up to that point. In protest against the shooting incident, government employees went on general strike, which had never happened in Korea before.<sup>1)</sup> In response to this, the military government mobilized the police reserves and right-wing youth organizations, such as the Seobuk Young Men's Association, en masse to suppress the disturbances by force. This initiated a state of all-out confrontation between the military government and the left-wing forces in Jeju. Eventually, the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident would become the starting point for the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident.

#### ① Setting up the Preparation Committee for the 3 · 1 Independence Movement Day Demonstration

The prospects for the Joint American-Soviet Commission appeared gloomy in 1947. As conflict grew between the USA and Soviet Union, the issue of Korea's independence grew into a conflict between Cold War factions. In the midst of this, left-wing forces in Korea were increasingly put on the defensive, especially after the Daegu Incident in October 1946, during which the left-wing camp organized violent demonstrations in 73 cities and counties in Korea for two months, shaking USAMGIK. This also led to other serious consequences, such as the collapse of many left-wing organizations. Against this backdrop, the South Korean Labor Party declared that it would become a mass party, and

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1) Joseontongsinsa, *1948 Yearbook of Joseon*, (1947), p.318.

after its establishment on 23 December 1946, the Korean Labor Party hurried to align its organization and, at the same time, made an effort to resume the Joint American-Soviet Commission talks, considered crucial for the movement. At this time, as the ceremony for the 3·1 Independence Day Movement approached, the South Korean Labor Party ordered its local chapters to hold large-scale ceremonies and associate them with the struggle to demand an immediate resumption of the Joint American-Soviet Commission.<sup>2)</sup>

The South Korean Labor Party and other political organizations prepared for the ceremonies of the 3·1 Independence Movement Day of that year. Right-wing parties and civic groups also set up preparation committees for the event and sought a way to hold a mass rally. Some tried to find a way to hold the ceremony jointly between the two forces in many regions such as Seoul and Incheon, but the negotiations for that fell apart and the two camps decided to hold their own ceremonies. In the left-wing camp, it was the National Front for Democracy that led the preparation for 3·1 Independence Movement Day. Embarrassed by the left-wing camp's plans to mobilize a large crowd nationwide, USAMGIK issued guidelines to the police and military government companies across the country, limiting the 3·1 Independence Movement Day ceremonies as much as possible and strictly prohibiting parades and demonstrations. In addition, as 3·1 Independence Movement Day approached, the military government declared emergency martial law across the nation.<sup>3)</sup>

Meanwhile, left-wing forces in Jeju were increasingly sensitive about the escalation. Until then, the left-wing in Jeju had maintained a moderate stance and there hadn't been all-out confrontation between the left-wing forces and the military government. However, as mentioned earlier, from the beginning of 1947, the left-wing forces in Jeju had expanded the scope of their operations through establishing sub-organizations, such as the Joseon Democratic Youth League, women's leagues, and the National Front for Democracy. On 17 February 1947, they formed 'the Jeju preparation committee for the ceremony of the 3·1 Protest'.

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2) Kim Nam-sik, *Study on the South Korea Labor Party*, (Dolbegae, 1984), pp.275-78.

3) *Jeju Shinbo*, February 18, 1947.

The following article, ‘The formation of the Preparation Committee for 3 · 1 Celebration’, appeared in the Jeju Shinbo:

The Jeju preparation committee for the ceremony of the 3 · 1 Protest was established to mark the 28<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the 3/1 Protest on a grand scale across the province .At 2 p.m. on 17 February, many prominent figures across society from public offices, education, Confucian circles, and schools gathered at Mr. Kim Du-hun’s house and discussed various affairs with Mr. Ahn Se-hun as chair. They decided to leave all decisions up to the preparation committee and inducted Ahn Se-hun into the chair, and Hyeon Gyeong-ho and Oh Chang-heun were vice-chairs. They also decided to set up a general affairs department, treasury department, and mobilization and publicity department and selected 28 committee members before they closed the meeting at around 5 p.m.<sup>4)</sup>

A book titled “*History of the Jeju Police*”, published by the Jeju Police Bureau said that the preparation committee, which was comprised of representatives from public offices and local dignitaries in Jeju-eup, was established on 17 February 1947. The book also revealed the details of the elected committee members. The list of the committee members is as follows:

- △ Chair: Ahn Se-hun (age 53)
- △ Vice Chairs: Hyeon Gyeong-ho (age 54), Oh Chang-heun (age 35)
- △ General Affairs Department: Kim Seung-mun (age 33), Park Tae-hun, Kim Yeong-hong (age 42), Yang Eul (age 35), Ko Chang-mu (age 35)
- △ Treasury Department: Kim Du-hun (age 40), Jo Eung-man (age 43), Kim Tae-gyeong (age 50), Kim Cha-bong (age 50)
- △ Finance Department: Hong Jong-eon (age 40)
- △ Mobilization and Publicity Department: Lee Il-seon (age 53), Kim Yong-hae (age 35), Kim Jeong-ro (age 50), Kim Mun-gyu (age 30), Kim Tae-hyeon (age 43), Ko Chil-jong (age 35), Lim Chang-un (age 35), Kim Deok-hun (age 39), Kim Im-saeng (age 26), Ko Won-gyeong (age 26), Lee Jeong-suk (age 30), Yang Gun-ok (age 30), Kim Si-bong

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4) *Jeju Shinbo*, February 18, 1947.

(age 40)<sup>5)</sup>

At the committee, even the right-wing figures and executives from the police and the prosecution were included. One of the members, Senior Inspector Kim Cha-bong was deputy commissioner of the Jeju Inspection Agency and another committee member, Inspector Kim Seung-mun was section chief of the 1<sup>st</sup> District Police Station.<sup>6)</sup> Yang Eul was deputy public procurator at the Jeju Prosecution Office.<sup>7)</sup> With regard to this, it is stated in *History of the Jeju Police* that, “Some of the members were inducted as members by others regardless of his or her own intention.”<sup>8)</sup>

At the same time, the South Korean Labor Party issued a general mobilization order in the days leading up to 3 · 1 Independence Movement Day. The party also delivered detailed guidelines for the preparation of the ceremony to its sub-organizations and cells in eup and myeon areas and workplaces, systematically directing proceedings. Slogans from the Jeju Chapter of the South Korean Labor Party discovered by the Jeju 4 · 3 Research Institute show the fact that they dealt with economic issues, social issues, and local issues comprehensively as well as political issues such as establishing an independent nation through the resumption of the Joint American-Soviet Commission.

1. The preparation committees shall be organized immediately by eup and myeon with people from the people’s committees, the Joseon Democratic Youth Leagues, women’s leagues, other organizations and workplaces. The preparation committees shall have a mobilization department, publicity department and preparation department. Also the preparation committees by village and workplace shall be formed according to the committees in eup and myeon. But at schools, teachers and students shall be the representatives of the preparation committees.
2. By 24 February, state our people’s stance of establishing a democratic provisional government through associating the cause, progress, meaning and results of

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5) Jeju Police Bureau, *History of Jeju Police*, (1990), p.281.

6) *Jeju Shinbo*, January 16 and February 8, 1947.

7) Hq. USAFIK, Ordinance 15, November 16, 1946.; *Jeju Shinbo*, April 28, 1947.

8) Jeju Police Bureau, *History of Jeju Police*, p.281.

the 3 · 1 Independence Movement with the October Daegu Incident and the present state of affairs. Make each preparation committee in villages and workplaces report on publicity and propaganda activities and the number of people it can mobilize to the preparation committees in eup and myeon and each preparation committee in eup and myeon shall report that to the provincial preparation committee.

3. From 25-28 February, hold meetings in eup and myeon areas and workplaces and resolve to participate in the 3 · 1 demonstration. Organize mobilization units by group and workplace, select the leader and self-defense team (2 or 3 people) and report the results to the preparation committee in villages.
  4. On the day, the readers and self-defense team shall mobilize people by group and workplace and make them gather by the time appointed at the designated place by the preparation committees in each village.
  5. The preparation committees in each village shall lead the mobilized people in demonstration formation to the time and place designated by the eup and myeon preparation committees. Make the people raise group flags and mark flags, especially the flag of the people's committee. (…)
12. Slogans (general)
- Free democratic and patriotic activists!
  - Free all persons concerned with the people's protest
  - Withdraw immediately the arrest order of Supreme Leader Park Heon-yeong!
  - Support the establishment of a democratic provisional government!
  - Hand over power to the People's Committee!
  - Abolish all the administrative bodies from the Japanese colonial era!
  - Implement immediately the single progressive tax system!
  - Overthrow the Interim Legislative Assembly!
  - Eradicate sympathizers of Japan, traitors, and fascists!
  - Fulfill immediately the decisions of the Moscow Conference!
  - Mop up profiteers who destroy the people's economy!
  - Guarantee absolute freedom of speech, press, association, strike, demonstration and religion!
  - Let the people solve the problems of food shortage by themselves!<sup>9)</sup>

Five days before the ceremony of the 3 · 1 Independence Movement Day, the Jeju Committee of the National Front for Democracy was established. Like

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9) The Jeju Committee of the South Korean Labor Party, *Guidelines of the 3 · 1 Independence Movement Protest*, 1947. 2 as quoted in the Jeju 4 · 3 Research Institute, *Jeju Uprising*, 1<sup>st</sup> issue, (Silcheonmunhaksa, 1991), pp.161-63.

in other regions, the National Front would come to the forefront in hosting the ceremony of the 3 · 1 Independence Movement Day in Jeju. Ahn Se-hun, who was the co-chair of the Jeju committee of the National Front for Democracy, also took the position of Jeju preparation committee chair for the ceremony of the 3 · 1 Protest. On 25 February, Ahn and other chair and vice-chairs of the National Front visited Captain Partridge and asked him to approve the rally.<sup>10)</sup>

Meanwhile, on 22 February, the Jeju police announced a statement which had four directions including disapproving any types of demonstration. The directions included: ① any ceremonies hosted by government offices and other organizations should be conducted at work; ② parades and demonstrations are absolutely banned in all cases; ③ other ceremonies should be performed by ri, dong or eup and people from other ri, dong, or eup are not permitted to attend those ceremonies, and; ④ if ceremonies are to be conducted in ri, dong, or eup, application forms should be submitted to the authorities in advance without fail.<sup>11)</sup>

However, the Jeju preparation committee for the ceremony of the 3 · 1 Protest set up a plan to conduct ceremonies by myeon. In areas such as Jeju-eup, Aewol-myeon and Jocheon-myeon, people would gather at Jeju Buk Elementary School and jointly perform a large-scale ceremony there. One right-wing figure argued that the ceremony at Jeju Buk Elementary School came to be held jointly by the right-wing and the left-wing camp together after much meandering.<sup>12)</sup>

On 28 February, Jeju Military Governor Major Stout summoned Ahn Se-hun and others to his office and had a prior consultation about the ceremony of the 3 · 1 Independence Movement Day. Regarding this meeting, *History of the Jeju Police* reports that, with Kang In-su, the head of the Jeju Inspection Agency, Captain Partridge, and Kang Dong-hyo, section chief of the 1<sup>st</sup> District

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10) *Jeju Shinbo*, February 26, 1947.

11) *Jeju Shinbo*, February 24, 1947.

12) Lee In-gu (former director of Commerce and Industry Department of the Jeju Provincial Office), Testimony as quoted in the 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4 · 3 Incident Speaks*, Vol. I, (Jeonyewon, 1994), p.261.

Police Station, attended. Major Stout gave the members of the preparation committee notice that parades and demonstrations would be strictly banned and the ceremony should be conducted at Jeju West Airport, which was located away from the town, if they wanted to hold it.<sup>13)</sup>

However, on 23 February, police reserves consisting of 100 policemen from Chungnam Province Police Agency and Chungbuk Province Police Agency (50 policemen from each province) came to Jeju.<sup>14)</sup> Eventually, these police reserves caused the shooting incident on 1 March 1947.

Jeju has a history of the central regime dispatching troops to the island whenever there had been disturbances. At the end of the Joseon era, when the feudal age began to collapse, there were six revolts raised by Jeju people, and every time the central regime dispatched soldiers from the mainland to suppress them. During the Japanese colonial reign, every time there were anti-Japanese movements, such as the Jocheon Demonstration in 1919, the strike of students at Jeju Agriculture School in 1931, and the Jeju Haenyeo (women divers) Protest in 1932, armed policemen from Jeolla Province Police Station were sent to the island. Previously, soldiers or policemen from the mainland had always been dispatched after the outbreak of disturbances on the island; however, sending the police reserves in 1947 broke with precedent, as policemen were dispatched before trouble had flared.

With regard to this, according to the police documents, USAMGIK in Jeju reported the unstable situation in Jeju to Seoul and asked the central military government to take measures to set up countermeasures. As a result, 100 policemen arrived in Jeju and members of the Seobuk Young Men's Association followed them successively.<sup>15)</sup> However, a police official in charge of inspecting people gave a different interpretation about the dispatch of the police reserves. He argued that the unstable situation before the ceremony of the 3·1 Independence Movement Day was a nationwide phenomenon, not specific to Jeju and the Jeju police did not request the dispatch of an

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13) Jeju Police Bureau, *History of Jeju Police*, p.282.

14) *Hanseong Ilbo*, March 4, 1947.

15) Jeju Police Bureau, *History of Jeju Police*, p.277.

additional police unit. According to him, in some ways, the reason for sending the police reserves was because Shin Ugyun, who had been dismissed from his post because of the Boksihwan corruption case, went to Seoul and smeared the Jeju Police and its performance.<sup>16)</sup>

### ② 3 · 1 Independence Movement Day Shooting Incident

On 1 March 1947 at 11 a.m. a big crowd gathered in the vicinity of Jeju Buk Elementary School where the ceremony of the 28<sup>th</sup> 3 · 1 Independence Movement Day was held. The estimated number of participants on that day was about 25,000~30,000<sup>17)</sup> and separate ceremonies were also held in 10 myeon areas with thousands attending the ceremonies in each area. The Jeju police, which had bolstered their forces to 430 policemen (330 policemen from Jeju and 100 policemen from the police reserves) dispatched 150 policemen out of the 430 in Jeju-eup<sup>18)</sup> and tried – but failed – to block people from rural areas. These people were not only from Jeju-eup, but also from Aewol-myeon, Jocheon-myeon and students gathered at the school. The students had already held their own ceremony at 9 a.m. at Ohyun Middle School and then joined the ceremony.

In his speech at the ceremony, Ahn Se-hun, the chair, called for the rejection of foreign influence by succeeding the spirit of the 3 · 1 Independence Movement and establishing an independent, democratic and united nation. After him, other representatives from all walks of life delivered their speeches to reignite the spirit of the 3 · 1 Independence Movement and secure independence.

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16) Park Un-bong (section chief of the Inspection Department of the 1<sup>st</sup> District Police Station at the time), Testimony as quoted in Jeju Province, *History of Jeju Province*, Vol. II, p.70.

17) With regard to the number of people, in *Dong-A Ilbo* (March 4, 1947), the statement by Jo Byeong-ok (commissioner of the National Police Agency) (as quoted in *Jeju Shinbo*, March 22, 1947), Kim Bong-hyeon and Kim Min-saeng's *History of Armed Uprising of Jeju People* (Osaka, Bunyusha, 1963, p.44), argues that there were 30,000, while *History of Jeju Police and the Investigation Report of the 3 · 1 Ceremony* by the organizers (as quoted in the Jeju 4 · 3 Research Institute, *Jeju Uprising*, 1<sup>st</sup> issue, 185) stated there were 25,000. Especially, the investigation argues that the number of people 'who were mobilized' was 17,000 and the number of 'other' people was 8,000.

18) Hq. 6<sup>th</sup> Div, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 497, February 27, 1947.

Slogans supporting the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers and pressing the resumption of the Joint American-Soviet Commission were also heard. According to *History of the Jeju Police*, the police stationed its staff in important places and ordered the crowd to return home, but people did not comply with the order. As tens of thousands of people assembled, the police consulted with the military government and decided to acquiesce in conducting the ceremony and arrest the leaders later in order to avoid bloody suppression.<sup>19)</sup>

As such, was the assembly at Jeju Buk Elementary School lawful or not? *History of the Jeju Police* described it as an ‘unauthorized assembly’.<sup>20)</sup> Also, in a periodic report of the 6<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division to the 24<sup>th</sup> Corps, the assembly on that day was described as ‘an unauthorized parade and meeting.’<sup>21)</sup> However, it turned out that the assembly on 1 March 1947 was actually an authorized one. The Jeju situation was mentioned in a statement issued by Chief Jo Byeong-ok of the National Policy Agency, which dealt with the ceremonies of the 3 · 1 Independence Movement Day and public order. With regard to the permission of the assembly, he said, “Originally the police in Jeju authorized only the assembly, but not the parade. However, because the organizers demanded the approval of the parade, the police was obliged to cancel the permission of the assembly, too. But on the first day of March, as citizens gathered at Namsan Elementary School [misreporting of Jeju Buk Elementary School], the police approved the assembly unavoidably.”<sup>22)</sup>

The legality of the assembly was also confirmed in the sentencing of the trial of Ahn Se-hun who had been accused of organizing the assembly and the disturbance. On 6 October 1947, at the final trial (Judge Choi Won-sun), the Jeju District Court found Ahn Se-hun not guilty, stating “The ceremony of the 3 · 1 Independence Movement Day is recognized as an authorized one by the authorities. Thus the defendant is proved not guilty.”<sup>23)</sup>

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19) Jeju Police Bureau, *History of Jeju Police*, p.283.

20) Jeju Police Bureau, *History of Jeju Police*, pp.282-283.

21) Hq. 6<sup>th</sup> Inf Div, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 500, March 2, 1947.

22) *Kyunggyang Shinmun*, *Chosun Ilbo*, March 4, 1947.

23) Jeju District Court, Sentence, Trial No. 532. October 6, 1947.

At 2 p.m.<sup>24)</sup> on the day, regardless of the opposition of the US Military Government, a parade which was not permitted by the authorities began. People who walked out of Jeju Buk Elementary School formed two lines of procession. One line headed for Seomuntong district passing through Gwandeokjeong Square where USAMGIK office and the Police Agency were located and the other line headed for Dongmun tong district passing through Bukshinjakro where the prosecution office stood. People who lived on the western side of the center of Jeju-eup joined the procession line heading west and those who lived on the eastern side of the town center united with the procession line to the east, showing off their power as they went back to their villages.

It was after the demonstration had exited Gwandeokjeong Square at around 2:45 pm that a child was kicked by the horse of a mounted policeman in the square and the crowd went into uproar. According to the testimonies of witnesses at the scene and in-depth reporting of the accident, there were 100 to 200 people here and there beside the buildings after the demonstrators had passed through the square in an “S” shaped line. The accident happened as a mounted policeman turned back to the 1st District Police Station. A child of about six years old suddenly jumped out onto the street and was kicked by a horse. The mounted policeman tried to move on as if nothing had happened. The people thereupon shouted and swarmed around him. Some people even threw stones at him and chased him, yelling “get him!” Chased by the crowd, the mounted policeman rode the horse in confusion to the police station where his colleagues were stationed, and at that moment gunshots were reportedly heard.<sup>25)</sup>

At that time, in front of Gwandeokjeong, armed policemen from the police reserves from the mainland were standing guard. As the crowd swarmed them, the police mistook their actions for attacking the police station and fired into

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24) *Hanseong Ilbo*, March 4, 1947.; Hq. 6<sup>th</sup> Inf Div, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 500, March 2, 1947.

25) Ha Du-yong (age 75, Jeju City), Testimony recorded on June 28, 2001.; Jeong Yeong-taek (age 80, Japan), Testimony recorded December 27, 2001.; *Jeju Shinbo*, March 12, 1947.; *Dokrip Shinbo*, April 5, 1947.

the crowd. Six civilians were killed and another six people were injured because of this shooting. Among the victims were an elementary school student and a woman in her twenties holding an infant. The list of the victims is as follows: Huh Du-yong (age 15, elementary school student), Park Jae-ok (age 21, woman), Oh Mun-su (age 34), Kim Tae-jin (age 38), Yang Mu-bong (age 49) and Song Deok-su (age 49).<sup>26)</sup>

The shooting on that day was out of proportion and against the purpose of breaking up the crowd. Among the victims, a few collapsed in the middle of the square. Most of the victims fell on the street in front of Siksan Bank or at the corner of the alley to the provincial hospital, both of which were a considerable distance from the police station. Examination of the victims conducted at the provincial hospital revealed that all the victims were shot in the back except one.<sup>27)</sup> Taking it all into consideration, it seems clear that the crowd would have dispersed if the police had just fired blanks. With a dozen people shot dead or injured, the shooting incident became of central public concern and initially the focus was on the agitated state of the policemen from the police reserves.

On the same day, there was a second shooting incident in front of the provincial hospital which again demonstrated how agitated the policemen from the police reserves were. At the time, one policeman had been hospitalized due to a traffic accident the previous day and two of his colleagues were at the hospital guarding him. As soon as the gunshots were heard from the Gwandeokjeong area and the bleeding victims were carried into the hospital, Policeman Lee Mun-gyu (from Chungnam Gongju Police), terrified by the circumstances, fired indiscriminately and seriously injured two passersby.<sup>28)</sup> A US intelligence report also described the shooting incident as ‘irreconcilable with rational thinking’ and analyzed the psychological state of the shooters of the two shooting case as follows: “It must be borne in mind that those who reportedly did the firing in JEJU City had been trained in [Daejeon] and will

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26) Jeju Province, *History of Jeju Province*, p.72.

27) *Dokrip Shinbo*, April 5, 1947.

28) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 22, 1947.

long remember the profane atrocities committed against fellow policemen by Leftist rioters in the fall of 1946.’<sup>29)</sup> This means that the policemen had experienced the October Daegu Incident and were psychologically unstable, which made them prone to overreact in agitated situations such as these.

After the shooting incidents in front of the Jeju Inspection Agency, the crowd and the police confronted each other. Most of the demonstrators were students and women from the women’s leagues. About 50 armed policemen stood behind military vehicles with machine-guns mounted and faced off the crowd. The armed policemen were under Police Advisor Captain Partridge’s direct command. The crowd stood face to face with the policemen for about an hour before dispersing on their own after being persuaded by reporters of the Jeju Shinbo. No lives were lost in this confrontation.<sup>30)</sup>

Clashes between the public and the police surrounding the ceremonies of the 3 · 1 Independence Movement Day happened not only in Jeju but also in other regions. Demonstrators came into conflict with one another or the police in many places around the nation such as Seoul, Busan, Jeongeup, Suncheon and Yeongam. Due to these disturbances, 38 people were killed or injured in total (16 people died and 22 people were injured).<sup>31)</sup> However, as *History of the Jeju Police* reveals, in the case of the Jeju 3 · 1 Shooting Incident, there was great difficulty in appeasing the general public because the police were seen as the aggressors and the public as victims.<sup>32)</sup>

Regardless of the circumstances, the police focused more on establishing that the shooting was just, rather than trying to appease public sentiment. While admitting that the shooting incident in front of the provincial hospital was ‘inconsiderate,’ they crucially maintained that the shooting at Gwandeokjeong Square was self-defense with the purpose of maintaining public order. In particular, the central police agency in Seoul explained that the police fired at the crowd because the demonstrators tried to besiege and attack the police

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29) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Summary*, No. 79, March 20, 1947.

30) *Jeju Shinbo*, April 6, 1947.

31) *Kyunggyang Shinmun, Chosun Ilbo*, March 4, 1947.

32) Jeju Police Bureau, *History of Jeju police*, p.289.

station which some media repeated in their reporting of the incident.<sup>33)</sup>

Also, commissioner of the Jeju Inspection Agency, Kang In-su announced a statement with a similar point and became the focus of severe criticism in the local media. The Jeju Shinbo refuted his statement in its editorial, stating that: “According to the statement announced by the commissioner of the Jeju Inspection Agency, it seems that there were demonstrators in the square marching along the street in an “S” shaped column, but it is not true. This reporter can confirm this report of the police is incorrect because this reporter witnessed the incident in person and if the police require witnesses, this reporter can make dozens of people testify for the case.”<sup>34)</sup> Jeju Governor Park Gyeong-hun, who submitted his resignation right after the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident, clarified his position, saying “I am not in a position to refute the police’s announcement because I’m in public office but it was true that the shooting happened after the demonstration passed through the square and the victims were not the demonstrators but spectators.”<sup>35)</sup>

In regard of the cause of the firing, initially US military intelligence emphasised ‘the demonstrators’ attack on the police station’, but later on 20 March the US Army reconsidered the cause of the shooting incident. In other words, the weekly summary of the US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps reported, “A mounted policeman en route to the District #1 station to report, slightly injured a child who inadvertently ran into his horse. A jeering crowd, estimated at less than two hundred, followed him to the District #1 police building. Those on guard assumed that it was an attack and opened fire. Previous to this instant, demonstrators had been marching in an “S” shaped column.”<sup>36)</sup>

Major Stout, who was in charge of USAMGIK in Jeju, also stated his views on this issue, saying “The shooting incident in front of Gwandeokjeong happened because the policemen mistook the situation in which the crowd chased the policeman, who hit the child accidentally, for an attack on the police station.

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33) *Dong-A Ilbo*, March 4, 1947.

34) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 12, 1947.

35) *Dokrip Shinbo*, April 5, 1947.

36) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Summary*, No. 79, March 20, 1947.

As revealed later, the crowd was not carrying anything like clubs but only placards made of bamboo.”<sup>37)</sup> However, the police intransigently described the incident as “an attack on the police station by the crowd”, insistently putting emphasis on a hard-line stance rather than soothing the public sentiment.

The police imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew from the evening of the very day of the shooting incident. The curfew began at 7 p.m. and ended at 6 a.m. the next day. Though the police reserves from Chungnam Province and Chungbuk Province had already been dispatched to Jeju, due to a lack of staff resulting from the emergence alert, the Jeju police requested assistance from Jeonnam Province Police, the nearest province to the island. In the evening of 1 March 1947, 100 policemen from Mokpo police departed for Jeju.<sup>38)</sup> From 2 March, Jeju police began to arrest the executives of the ceremonies of the 3 · 1 Independence Movement Day and secondary school students. For one day on 2 March, 25 students were taken to the police station and soon rumors that the police were beating and torturing them passed around.<sup>39)</sup> To make matters worse, when the police statement which justified the firing was announced, public discontent reached boiling point.

As it became known that the firing policemen had been mainlanders and their victims were not demonstrators but bystanders, both left-wing and right-wing figures expressed their concern. The left-wing forces launched systematic anti-police campaigns, losing no opportunity to rouse public support. At first, they pasted leaflets on walls and telephone poles and conducted fundraising campaigns for the dead and injured. The Jeju Committee of the National Front for Democracy suggested setting up a joint investigation team which would comprise individuals from across the political divide, but police rejected the proposal. However, a investigation team led by the government was established on 3 March.<sup>40)</sup>

The Jeju committee of the South Korean Labor Party masterminded the

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37) *Dokrip Shinbo*, April 5, 1947.

38) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 469, March 2, 1947.

39) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 8, 14, 1947.

40) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 8, 1947.

movement of the left-wing camp. On 7 March the committee sent long written instructions detailing “How to Protest regarding the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident” to each eup and myeon committee. The excerpts of the written instructions are as follows:

- With regard to the shooting incident that happened in Jeju-eup on 1 March, the standing committee of the Jeju committee convened an emergency meeting of the Jeju-eup standing committee. At the joint meeting, the participants approved the following policies for protesting based on proposals from the Daejeong-myeon committee and agreed to set up a strike committee of the party. The strike committee would lead future protests for solving issues relating to the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident.
- As to the policies of the protest: ① gaining legitimacy for conducting a heroic mass struggle as an extension of the 3 · 1 protest; ② staging a protest for weakening American Imperialism and reactionary camps, and; ③ politically and ideologically preparing for a mass struggle of the second stage of the revolution.
- With regard to activities of the organization, the eup and myeon committees should internally set up strike committees for the 3 · 1 Incident and legally form Emergency 3 · 1 Incident Response Committees in eup, myeon, ri, and gu as independent protest organizations.
- The general strike team should prepare three copies of a statement with the following demands and send one copy to the Jeju Military Governor, another to the Military Governor in Seoul and submit the last one to each emergency response committee. The team should go on general strike at noon on 10 March.
- Our demands are: ① On the charge of murder, the execution of Kang Dong-hyo who gave the order to fire in addition to the policemen who actually fired; ② the removal of the chief executives of the police from their positions immediately; ③ the immediate guarantee of the livelihoods of the families of the dead and the provision of the injured with sufficient medical fees and compensatory funds; ④ the release of people arrested in connection with the 3 · 1 Incident; ⑤ the disarming of the police immediately, and; ⑥ the ousting from the police of Japanese sympathizers and traitors.<sup>41)</sup>

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41) The Jeju Committee of the South Korea Labor Party, *How to Protest Regarding the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident*, March 7, 1947, as quoted in the Jeju 4 · 3 Research Institute, *Jeju Uprising*, 1<sup>st</sup> issue, (Silcheonmunhaksa, 1991), pp.189-195.

Under these policies, on 5 March, dozens of executives from the Jeju committee of the South Korean Labor Party gathered at Kim Haeng-baek's house, located in Samdo Village, Jeju-eup and founded 'the South Korean Labor Party strike committee to the Jeju 3 · 1 Incident.' They elected Kim Yong-gwan as chair and Lee Si-hyeong as vice-chair. In addition, on 9 March, at Kim Du-hun's house in Ildo Village, Jeju-eup, dozens of high-profile personalities gathered and formed 'the emergency response committee to the 3 · 1 Incident'. Hong Sun-yong was elected as chair and the position of vice-chair went to Ahn Se-hun.<sup>42)</sup> At the time, Ahn Se-hun was the chair of the Jeju Chapter of the South Korean Labor Party and Hong Sun-yong, a representative right-wing figure, was holding the position of chair of the Jeju Chapter of the Korea Independence Party.

The content of the proposals – as written instructions – from the Daejeong-myeon committee must also be considered. Lee Un-bang who was the head of the South Korean Labor Party in Daejeong-myeon at that time, answered as follows:

Facing this unexpected incident, the Jeju Chapter of the South Korean Labor Party began to conduct a fundraising campaign for the families of the victims. At the party members' meeting in Daejeong-myeon, people also discussed taking countermeasures. The incident couldn't be avoided any more in the light of the seriousness of it. However, because they [the police] were fully armed and equipped, and we hadn't any weapons to hold, it was simply unthinkable to go head-to-head with the police. Thus, as a way of protesting peacefully and expressing our views, we unanimously decided to go on a general strike on a provincial scale and dispatched Lee Seung-jin from the organizing department of the Daejeong-myeon committee as a contact to the headquarters of the Jeju Chapter and had him propose these to the chapter.<sup>43)</sup>

Lee Seung-jin, mentioned above, was the real name of Kim Dal-sam who would be the commander-in-chief of the armed guerrillas during the later Jeju

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42) Jeju Police Bureau, *History of Jeju Police*, pp.289-290.

43) Lee Un-bang, *The Truth of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident*, as quoted in the Jeju 4 · 3 Research Institute, *Now I Can Speak*, (Hanul, 1989), p.208.

4 · 3 Incident.<sup>44)</sup> At the time, Lee was 22 years old (born in 1925), a teacher at Daejeong School and the head of the organizing department of the Daejeong-eup Chapter of the South Korean Labor Party. It is said that the Daejeong-myeon chapter decided to propose a general strike – peaceful but forceful – as a way of protesting against USAMGIK and dispatched Lee Seung-jin to the Jeju Chapter.

## 2) 3 · 10 General Strike and USAMGIK's Response

### ① 3 · 10 General Strike

From 10 March 1947, a general strike of civilians and government officers, unprecedented in Korean history, began in Jeju. It was a large-scale general strike in which not only government offices, but also communication centers, transportation companies, factory workers, teachers and students, even translators in the military government participated. The general strike assumed the character of a political protest against the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident and the police response to it. As mentioned earlier, this strike was being masterminded systematically by the Jeju committee of the South Korean Labor Party.

At noon on 10 March, at Jeju provincial office, there was a staff discussion meeting. At this meeting, the staff of Jeju provincial office requested that a investigation team produce a report of the incident, but the request was denied by the team. In response, a meeting was held to push forward their demands. The meeting was held at 1 p.m. and about 100 public employees, including Jeju Governor Park Gyeong-hun and head of the General Affairs Department, Kim Du-hyeon attended: the attendees formed the Jeju Provincial Office Committee for Dealing with the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident. They presented six

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44) One witness argued that Lee Seung-jin used the alias of 'Kim Dal-sam' because he urged Lee to do that. Lee Sam-ryong said, "When there was an opinion of using a false name at the end of 1947, I advised Lee Seung-jin to use 'Kim Dal-sam' as his alias because Lee's father-in-law (Jang Mun-seok) had used the same name as a false name during the Japanese colonial era." Lee Sam-ryong (age 79, Japan, a member of the political committee of the Jeju Chapter of the South Korean Labor Party at the time), Testimony recorded on July 11, 2002.

demands which would be delivered to Lieutenant General Hodge and Jeju Military Governor Stout. It was also stated that about 140 government employees in the Jeju Provincial Office would not work until all six demands had been accepted by the military government. The statement supporting the general strike can be summarized as follows:

The 3 · 1 Independence Movement in the past was a struggle to recover the occupied nation and free our people. However, the movement failed to achieve these objectives because of brutal suppression by Japan, collaboration with the Japanese colonial government by the leadership, and the unfavorable international situation at the time. When looking back at the 3 · 1 Independence Movement with passion and new hope, the Jeju people held the ceremony in order to cherish the memories of the past victims and be aware of the fact that now is the time to develop the spirit of the movement into one for achieving independence. Though the ceremony was held in a dignified manner with 30,000 people attending, and the participants marched peacefully and orderly, some vicious policemen fired at the innocent citizens, killing six people and injuring many. We cannot but say that was an insult to the history of the anti-Japanese struggle and the loss of ethnic fraternity. Firing at people marching peacefully was an unprecedented incident which hadn't been witnessed before, even in the Japanese colonial era, and was thought an absolute impossibility in liberated Korea. Here we are pointing out that there are many contradictions in the stance of the police and, as faithful public servants of 300,000 Jeju people, we also announce that the protest against injustice will continue until the last, alongside the innocent people based on calm assessment of the situation.

#### **Demands**

- ① Disarm the police and cease torture immediately for establishment of democratic police!
- ② Execute immediately the officer in command and the policemen who fired at the crowd!
- ③ Have the police executives resign over the incident!
- ④ Guarantee the livelihoods of the families of the victims and the injured!
- ⑤ Do not arrest patriotic figures with regard to the incident!
- ⑥ Purge pro-Japanese policemen!<sup>45)</sup>

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45) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 12, 1947.

On 10 March, in addition to the Jeju provincial office, people who were working at the harbor affairs office, weather bureau, Shinhan Public Corporation, and transportation businesses, such as Jeju Transportation Company and Namil Transportation Company, went on strike. Furthermore, teachers and students at Ohuyn Middle School, Jeju Middle School, the teacher training school and staff of Jeju Dong Elementary School, Jeju Nam Elementary School and Jeju Buk Elementary School participated in the general strike. On 11 March, workers and staff at Buk Jeju-gun office, the Jeju-eup office, the Jeju Post Office, radio station, finance associations, and Namjin Transportation Company went on strike. On 12 March, the general strike expanded to people and staff at the tax office, customs, translation team in the military government, Siksan Bank, Namjeon, farmers of Shinhan Public Corporation, association for daily necessities and barbers' associations. The representatives from public offices, schools, and businesses held a meeting on 11 March and decided to form a united front for producing actual results of the strike. They established 'the Jeju-eup Joint Strike Committee (chair Ko Ye-gu)'.<sup>46)</sup>

The wave of the strike spread to other myeon areas in an instant. The following is the general strike situation by myeon as of 13 March.

- △ Aewol-myeon: the Aewol-myeon office, Aewol Middle School, elementary schools, post office, finance association
- △ Hallim-myeon: the Hallim-myeon office, Hallim Middle School, elementary schools, finance association, post office, starch-manufacturing plant
- △ Daejeong-myeon: the Daejeong-myeon office, Daejeong Middle School, fishermen's association, finance association, post office, starch-manufacturing plant, stores and street stalls
- △ Andeok-myeon: the Andeok-myeon office, elementary school
- △ Seogwi-myeon: the Namjeju-gun office, Seogwi-myeon office, finance association, Seogwi Middle School, elementary schools, hydroelectric power plant
- △ Namwon-myeon: the Namwon-myeon office, elementary school
- △ Pyoseon-myeon: the Pyoseon-myeon office
- △ Seongsan-myeon: post office
- △ Gujwa-myeon: the Gujwa-myeon office, finance association, post office, elementary

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46) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 12, 14, 1947.

schools

- △ Jocheon-myeon: the Jocheon-myeon office, Jocheon Middle School, elementary schools<sup>47)</sup>

As it turned out later, besides the above public offices, schools and businesses, some policemen in active service from Jeju in the Moseolpo, Jungmun and Aewol police boxes also participated in the general strike. On 13 March, at the Jungmun police box, six policemen, including the chief of the police box, submitted their resignation and left the police box. Before they did that, they posted a statement in front of the police box building which read, “We, the staff of the Jungmun police box, have worked with a sense of duty of maintaining the public order. However, due to the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident, we have lost our reason for keeping this job as policemen. Therefore, we are leaving our workplace because we cannot obey the atrocious orders from the superior office”.<sup>48)</sup> Because of such desertion from duty, 66 policemen were later dismissed.<sup>49)</sup>

About the general strike in Jeju, the Dokrip Shinbo reported, “Workers and staff of 156 organizations and businesses joined the strike.”<sup>50)</sup> However, *History of the Jeju Police* argued that all government offices and organizations joined the strike except the police and the judiciary bodies and then number of the offices and organizations were 166 and the number of participants was 41,211. Accordingly, the actual situation was as follows:

- △ 515 people from 23 public offices including the Jeju Provincial office and the eup and myeon offices
- △ 3,999 teachers and students from 13 middle schools including Jeju Agriculture School
- △ 35,861 people from 92 elementary schools including Jeju Buk Elementary School
- △ 136 people from eight post offices including the Jeju Post Office

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47) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 14, 1947.

48) Jeju Police Bureau, *History of Jeju Police*, p.294.

49) *Seoul Shinmun*, April 2, 1947.

50) *Dokrip Shinbo*, April 5, 1947.

- △ 121 workers from seven transportation companies including Jeju Transportation Company
- △ 36 workers from eight bank branches including Saksan Bank
- △ 542 people from 15 organizations and businesses including Namjeon local office<sup>51)</sup>

However, even in this record, the aforementioned policemen were not included. Also in some areas, shops and stores closed, joining the strike. If these situations are considered, it leads to the conclusion that more people participated in the general strike than those officially recorded.

Meanwhile, the fundraising campaigns for helping the victims' families, which had been conducted sporadically, became more active as the Jeju Shinbo, the only local daily at the time, concentrated the fundraising campaign through its newspaper. The company placed a story entitled "Fundraising campaign for the families of the victims of the 3·1 Incident" in its paper on 10 March. The story highlighted the wrongful deaths of the victims, saying: "the victims met violent deaths bearing a bitter grudge without achieving the honor of independence". The nature of this stance contradicted the police's testimony that the killings were self-defense.

The fundraising campaign spread throughout the island. Funds were raised at workplaces, schools and markets. In the newspaper on 14 March, an article reported, "A donation to the Daejeong-myeon People's Committee by people in the myeon exceeds 30,000 won", implying that the Daejeong-myeon committee was taking the lead in fundraising efforts in that region. This shows that the people's committees in Jeju areas were actively operating by that time.

Right-wing dignitaries also joined this fundraising campaign and Kang In-su, the head of the Jeju Inspection Agency and some policemen from the police reserves made donations. A fraternity of Jeju people in Seoul called "The Jeju People's Association in Seoul" donated 50,000 won and another fraternity of Jeju citizens in Gwangju, "The Jeju People's Association in Gwangju" contributed 23,025 won, as well. When the fundraising campaign

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51) Jeju Police Bureau, *History of Jeju Police*, p.290.

ended in June, the donations had reached 317,118 won.<sup>52)</sup> Given that the monthly school fee for a middle school student at that time was 50 won, this was a considerable amount of money.

## ② US Military Government's Response

“Communist-incited disturbances on the island were held to a relative low by occupying U.S. Forces until 1 March 1947 when police attacked a group of leftist SAM IL Day celebrants in JEJU City and killed several people. Prompt reprisals against police were taken by offended islanders, and a year-long period of bloody violence was touched off.”<sup>53)</sup>

The above excerpt comes from an intelligence report by the US military headquarters which analyzed the situation in Jeju from the perspective on 1 April 1949. To conclude, this report confirms that from a US Army perspective at the time, the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident triggered the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident.

Right after the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident, USAMGIK kept an eye on the situation in Jeju. The US Armed Forces in Korea and USAMGIK jointly set up an investigation team and dispatched it to Jeju on 8 March. The head of the team was Colonel James A. Casteel.<sup>54)</sup> It was a very exceptional case as USAMGIK dispatched an investigation team to examine such an incident in a local area, and appointing an active-duty colonel to serve as team leader under USAMGIK.

At 11 a.m. on 10 March, with Jeju Military Governor Stout and Jeju Governor Park Gyeong-hun, the investigation team examined the scenes of the shootings at Gwandeokjeong Square, and in front of the provincial hospital, hearing testimonies from eyewitnesses.<sup>55)</sup> In the afternoon, the team invited the parties interested in organizing the 3 · 1 ceremonies to the office room of the military governor and listened to their opinions. When the investigation team also

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52) *Jeju Shinbo*, June 22, 1947.

53) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1097, April 1, 1949.

54) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 479, March 13, 1947; *Jeju Shinbo*, March 12, 1947.

55) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 12, 1947.

began to investigate the cause of the general strike it sought to thoroughly uncover the underlying truth. On 12 March, an interview between Major Stout and a reporter from the Jeju Shinbo was conducted. To perceive the situation at that time, the interview is reproduced below:

- Q.** I've heard the investigation has been completed. Why haven't the results been announced yet?
- A.** The investigation team finished its investigation and submitted the report. But when I read it, I realized that there had been many things missing. So, I returned the report to the team and ordered a reinvestigation of the incident. Everything related to the incident should be examined without omission. Just now, Colonel Casteel arrived in Jeju and began to investigate the case thoroughly.
- Q.** Then, when will the investigation be finished and when will the results be announced?
- A.** I will announce them as soon as I can.
- Q.** Who do you think is responsible for the shooting incident that killed and injured dozens of people?
- A.** I can't talk about that before the investigation is finished.
- Q.** It is said that for two days over 10 and 11 March, the staff and workers of public offices and businesses went on a general strike and delivered their demands to the military government. What do you think of their demands?
- A.** I think there is no reason for the strike. Furthermore, many of their demands are not related to the 3/1 Shooting Incident.
- Q.** Due to the general strike, almost all provincial services, such as administration, transportation and communication haven't functioned properly. Are you preparing measures for dealing with this situation?
- A.** Jeju people will be the eventual victims of this strike and USAMGIK will not be affected by the strike. Thus the strike will eventually harm the Jeju people.
- Q.** The US Military Government's here to protect the interests of the Korean people. So, it seems that it is your duty to mitigate the impact of the strike.
- A.** That question is irrelevant. I was bold enough to say it when the organizers of the strike visited me. I even pointed out the folly of the strike and advised them to stop it. And also I think that this strike will not solve anything.
- Q.** Then you see the demands as unjust?
- A.** The demands in the petitions are ill founded. Each petition has arguments which are not based in truth and it seems that all the petitions were prepared

by one organization. And all the petitions are practically the same. (…)

- Q.** Jeju citizens are greatly interested in Colonel Casteel's investigation and anticipate an impartial examination.
- A.** Colonel Casteel is investigating everything relevant to the incident and will report the results to the superior office when he finishes the investigation. Therefore, we cannot see the results anytime soon but the investigation will be conducted rapidly and democratically. Neither I nor Colonel Casteel can say who's good or who's bad. Anyway, the offenders will be brought to trial and will have the opportunity to defend themselves.<sup>56)</sup>

As the investigation team dispatched from the central USAMGIK began its examination to uncover the facts of the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident, the police changed their stance and admitted some responsibility. On 11 March, the head of the Jeju Inspection Agency, Kang In-su expressed his regret, saying “The policeman who fired in front of the provincial hospital belongs to the 1<sup>st</sup> District Police Station and was dispatched to the hospital on that day by his commanding officer who came to Jeju from Chungnam Province. Unfortunately, it was not until Colonel Casteel from the US Armed Forces in Korea investigated the case yesterday that I realized the concerned policeman fired his pistol without thought. So, here I express my regret at the firing incident in front of the provincial hospital.”<sup>57)</sup> However, the police took a hard-line stance again as the general strike spread across the whole island from 10 March.

The US investigation team was closely monitoring the development of the situation but remained silent on the investigation results. Even Colonel Casteel didn't leave any announcement when he left Jeju on 13 March. Furthermore, Jeju Military Governor Stout who had said he would announce the results of the investigation as soon as possible was tight-lipped about it. Thus, there is no way of identifying the official stance of the US investigation team. However, in an intelligence report which seems to have been based on the report of the investigation team, the investigation team's stance about the incident can be

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56) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 14, 1947.

57) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 14, 1947.

indirectly revealed. The following is an excerpt from the intelligence report by the US 6<sup>th</sup> Division on 14 March 1947.

A general strike is in progress in JEJU Island. The management and labor of all transportation agencies including a large percentage of the shipping are on strike. This applies also to all factories, both Korean owned and those supervised by MG. The teachers and pupils of all schools are also on strike. 75% of the Korean MG employees are on strike. Although many and varied demands are being made by the elements, the basic reason for the strike appears to be a hatred for the police because of police action during the 1 March riot; this hatred has been engendered by recent agitation of the populace by the "South Korean Labor Party" (Communist). No violence had been reported as of the end of this period."<sup>58)</sup>

The intelligence report written by the US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps dated 15 March also cited the 6<sup>th</sup> Division's report, saying "The reasons for the strike are varied, but the basic reason appears to be a hatred of the police following their action in the 1 March riot. This has been encouraged by agitation from the South Korean Labor Party."<sup>59)</sup> In conclusion, these US reports summarize the causes of the Jeju general strike as twofold: the first is that Jeju citizens' hostility towards the police, triggered by the shootings, had been increasing and the US reports, in regard to this, referred to Jeju people's sentiment as "hatred," an extremely emotive word to use; the other reason was cited as the instigation of the South Korean Labor Party, which aggravated the people's sentiment.

At the time, there were two kinds of US Army intelligence reports. One was a daily report, and the other one was a weekly report which analyzed the developments over a week. One weekly report of the US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps, dated 20 March, had a comprehensive analysis of the Jeju general strike. A telling aspect of the analysis is that the US Army saw not only the left-wing forces, but also the right-wing camp in Jeju participating in the strike. In other words, the analysis says, "the general strike is believed to be Communist-inspired, but

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58) Hq. 6<sup>th</sup> Inf Div, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 512, March 14, 1947.

59) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 480, March 15, 1947.

was participated in by both Left and Right as a protest against the killing of six persons and the wounding of six others during unauthorized demonstration and rioting on 01 March in JEJU City.’<sup>60)</sup> Meanwhile, this weekly summary carried out analysis on the left-wing tendency of Jeju people. The analysis is as follows:

More detailed information as to the general strike in JEJU City is lacking due to a partial breakdown in communication with that city. The most recent reports indicate that the strike is abating. The province of JEJU DO is known as a Leftwing stronghold with a reported seventy percent of its population being sympathizers or affiliates with Leftwing parties. Notable is that this strike indicates what can happen in a Korean community when the majority of the populace, either Right or Left, obdurately support what they believe to be just demands.<sup>61)</sup>

After all, the US Army intelligence reports drew the conclusion that the 3 · 10 General Strike was amplified due to the hostility of the Jeju people towards the police and the instigation of the South Korean Labor Party. However, USAMGIK put forth a policy that focused more on eradicating the left-wing elements rather than addressing public grievances. Jo Byeong-ok, the chief of the National Police Agency at the time, undertook the task of eliminating the left-wing elements on the island.

On 14 March, the day after the US investigation team left the island, Jo Byeong-ok flew to Jeju by US transport plane.<sup>62)</sup> Jang Yeong-bok, deputy director of the Department of Public Security of the National Police Agency, accompanied Jo. An armed security guard under the command of a senior inspector escorted him. His declaration to the Jeju people, issued on arrival, was as follows:

I came here with great interest after hearing the news that every institute and organization of public administration, industry and education had halted its

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60) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Report*, No. 79, March 20, 1947.

61) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Report*, No. 79, March 20, 1947.

62) *Hanseong Ilbo*, March 15, 1947.

activities in regard to the unfortunate incident that happened on 1 March. I came here with measures to protect the life and property of Jeju people and I also have fundamental policies to eliminate the root causes of the unrest which have afflicted Jeju society through deceptive propaganda and destructive plots. I will implement these measures and policies in consultation with people in charge of provincial administration and public safety. I hope that all Jeju citizens are reassured about their safety and cooperate with the police in maintaining peace and order in the island. There is nothing that endangers the process of establishing an independent nation more than public disorder, such as rioting. Frequent rioting damages the country's dignity and credibility by projecting an image to the world of the Korean people as unable to sustain political and moral autonomy. My fellow Jeju citizens! I sincerely hope that you will contribute to the establishment of an independent nation through reflecting on yourselves and returning to your work and doing your utmost in your jobs.<sup>63)</sup>

In this declaration, there was not a single phrase that explains the police stance or expresses his regret about the situation triggered by the shootings of the police as the chief of the National Police Agency. Rather, he indirectly implied the 3·1 Incident was a 'riot'. When he mentioned his policies to eliminate the root causes of disorder, he meant that he would dispatch a number of police reserves from other regions and exert force to restore public safety on Jeju. In reality, the police reserves began to arrive on Jeju in quick succession. For example, the very next day following Jo Byeong-ok's arrival, about 200 policemen from Jeonnam and Jeonbuk provinces were sent to Jeju.

On his first day on Jeju, the commissioner of the National Police Agency visited the Jeju provincial office and called on public employees to stop the strike. A former government employee who had been present at the scene testified that Jo Byeong-ok gave a very surprising remark on that day. According to him, Jo summoned the public employees of the provincial office and urged them to call off the strike and, on the spot, he added that the Jeju people had rebellious ideas and he could wipe out all the Jeju people if they got in the way of the foundation of the nation.<sup>64)</sup> On 15 March, on the second day of

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63) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 16, 1947.

64) Kim Hyeong-jung (age 88, Jeju City, former government employee), Testimony recorded on September. 13, 2002.

his visit, he also delivered a speech which made a similar point to local dignitaries at Jeju Buk Elementary School. In those days, the National Police Agency began to hint that Jeju was an “island of reds”. On 12 March, Choi Gyeong-jin, deputy head of the National Police Agency, briefed reporters on the Jeju situation and revealed the agency’s plan to dispatch additional police reserves to the island in a press conference, saying “Originally, 90% of Jeju people are tinged with left-wing ideology.”<sup>65)</sup> Given that the second-in-command of the National Police Agency expressed the opinion that “90% of Jeju citizens are leftists”, even before his superior had reached Jeju, this demonstrates the level of prejudice the executives of the police held about Jeju Island at the time. On 14 March, 122 policemen from Jeonnam Province and 100 policemen from Jeonbuk Province left Mokpo Harbor and arrived on Jeju the next day. On 18 March, 99 policemen from Gyeonggi Province were sent to the island. With this, the total number of policemen from the police reserves was increased to 421, including 100 policemen from Chungnam Province and Chungbuk Province in February.<sup>66)</sup>

The number of policemen of the police reserves from the mainland exceeded the number of policemen originally stationed in Jeju, with the latter being 330. As the police units arrived in Jeju one after the other, Jeju policemen were forced to take a back seat. To make matters worse, as some Jeju policemen walked out in sympathy with the strikers, Jeju policemen attracted mistrust from the incomers. On 16 March, within the Jeju Inspection Agency, a special Criminal Inspection Section (Chief Lee Ho) was formed with policemen from the mainland at the center.<sup>67)</sup>

Jo Byeong-ok ordered the police to arrest the leaders of the demonstration from 15 March as the police reserves were reinforced. The first place that was raided by the police was the headquarters of the strike committee for the general strike and the executives of the committee were arrested. The executives

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65) *Hanseong Ilbo*, March 13, 1947.

66) Hq. 7<sup>th</sup> Inf Div, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 59, March 13, 1947; *Dokrip Shinmun*, April 5, 1947.

67) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 18, 1947.

of the National Front for Democracy and the South Korean Labor Party were also rounded up one after the other. At an 18 March press conference, the head of the Jeju Inspection Agency, Kang In-su disclosed, “About 200 people have been arrested on charges of arranging an illegal demonstration and causing disturbance across the whole province.”<sup>68)</sup> As time went by, the intensity of the apprehension increased more and more.

After a six-day stay in Jeju, on 20 March, the commissioner of the National Police Agency, Jo Byeong-ok released a statement about the Jeju 3·1 Shooting Incident at the pressroom in USAMGIK office in Seoul. While mentioning the responsibility of the two shooting incidents in Jeju, he said that: ① the firing by the policemen in front of the 1st District Police Station, considering all the circumstances, was a response in self-defense with the purpose of maintaining public order, and; ② the shooting in front of the provincial hospital was inconsiderate behavior by the policeman.<sup>69)</sup>

## **B. Sweeping Roundup and Clashes between Officials and the People**

### 1) Sweeping Roundup

The Jeju general strike, which began on 10 March, tailed off around 20 March. A US Army periodic report said, “A report received on 19 March, states that 90% of the striking Military Government employees and 50% of the transportation employees have returned to work on the island province; the situation is reported as quiet.”<sup>70)</sup> Domestic media began to report on the general strike situation under the heading of “Strike of Jeju government employees finished”. The *Kyunghyang Shinmun* reported, “The strike of Jeju government employees was unprecedented and widespread since the beginning of the rule of USAMGIK and, considering the importance of the situation, the

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68) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 20, 1947.

69) *Daedong Shinmun*, March 21, 1947.

70) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 483, March 19, 1947.

head of the National Police Agency himself conducted an on-site survey on 14 March and is now seeking ways to retrieve the situation. According to a report sent to the National Police Agency by Jo at 10 p.m. on 18 March, they called off the strike and began to return to their work from that day.”<sup>71)</sup>

The Seoul Shinmun reported that 56 workplaces out of 174 public offices, organizations and schools ended their strike, but the remaining 118 workplaces were still on strike.<sup>72)</sup> However, on closer inspection these statistics show that almost all public offices had called off the strike while people at elementary and secondary schools continued. It wasn't until the end of March that teachers and students finally ended the strike. The Jeju Shinbo reported, “Students at secondary schools in Jeju-eup began to go to school from 24 March. The rate of students who went to school on 24 March was around 30% and on 26 March the rate was about 50%. The chance is that the rate will probably increase steadily.”<sup>73)</sup> With this, the general strike in Jeju began to settle down as of the end of March. However, from this point in time, the police's large-scale raids began to emerge as a new controversial issue.

The police, who had begun to arrest people involved in the strike from 15 March under the orders of Jo Byeong-ok, were arresting and interrogating the executives of the businesses on strike, starting with arresting the executives of the Democratic People's Front, such as Kim Du-hun and Ko Chang-mu on the first day of the round up. As Kang In-su, head of the Jeju Inspection Agency, revealed on 18 March, 200 people were arrested over just two days. This kind of round up continued and the number of people arrested reached 300 by the end of March and hit 500 around April 10.<sup>74)</sup> As April began, the people who had been arrested were classified between those who would be brought to trial and those who were to be freed after admonition. Among the arrested figures were high-ranking officials, teachers, policemen, and executives of different organizations. In Particular, on 31 March, about 10

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71) *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, March 20, 1947.

72) *Seoul Shinmun*, March 21, 1947.

73) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 28, 1947.

74) *Jeju Shinbo*, April 12, 1947.

executives of Jeju Provincial Office were arrested, including Lim Gwan-ho, director of the Industry Department, sending shock waves through Jeju society. The Jeju Shinbo reported this case as follows:

As the Jeju Shinbo already reported, the number of people who had been arrested on suspicion of leading and organizing the strike reached about 200 in the vortex of the round up. On 31 March and 1 April, for two days, even though people think that the interrogation with regard to the strike had ended, another round up led to the arrest of 10 executives of the provincial office including Lim Gwan-ho, director of the Department of Industry, Lee Gwan-seok, director of the Department of School Affairs, Song In-taek, director of the Department of Human Resources, and Kang San-yeom, director of the Department of Accounting. This movement by the police and its possible consequences are attracting people's keen attention.<sup>75)</sup>

The most noticeable figure here is Lim Gwan-ho, director of the department of industry of Jeju Province. He was inducted as chair of the strike committee of Jeju Provincial Office by his colleagues<sup>76)</sup> and it seems that was why the police arrested him. Interestingly, later, he was appointed as Jeju Governor in May 1948 when the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident was in full swing.

The interrogation of the arrested people was conducted mainly by policemen from Seoul and other provinces. On 15 March, a Special Crime Investigation Division was set up within the Jeju Police Inspection Agency and, Kang In-su, head of the agency, revealed, "[The Division] is made up of policemen from the mainland."<sup>77)</sup> As the number of people arrested was increasing, nationally well-known interrogators were dispatched to Jeju one after the other. Among them there were agents from inspection bureaus which had made a name for themselves by investigating the Daegu incident. As the situation went this way, the necessity of raising the status of the commanding officer of the investigation arose and at the end of March Kim Tae-il, deputy commissioner of the 1<sup>st</sup> District (Gyeonggi Province) Police Agency was dispatched to Jeju

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75) *Jeju Shinbo*, April 4, 1947.

76) Jeju Province, *History of Jeju Province*, pp.75-76.

77) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 18, 1947.

as commanding officer.<sup>78)</sup>

At that time, rumors abounded that the police were harshly torturing the arrested people. The police denied the allegations but many of those who were arrested at the time argued that they had been tortured. One witness who had been an employee of the provincial office argued, saying “The policemen from the mainland beat me and told me to confess who the leaders of the strike were. During the interrogation, I heard endless screams coming from the next room and one of my colleagues couldn’t even walk because of the beating.”<sup>79)</sup>

The allegations of torture were also raised during the trial. The accused argued, “The police report is not true at all. I have never confessed this even though I was almost unconscious because of the harsh torture”<sup>80)</sup> or “They did unthinkable things as policemen of a democratic nation, such as torturing me even before asking me anything.”<sup>81)</sup>

As the situation came to this, many people felt forced to leave their jobs and escape the police, especially people in the education field. There were not enough teachers in schools because many of them had already been arrested, or some had escaped police arrest. Some parents of students at Jeju Buk Elementary School held an emergency meeting on 26 March and asked the police to release the arrested teachers immediately. They suggested employing temporary teachers if immediate release was impossible.<sup>82)</sup> The vacancies were filled by teachers who had defected from North Korea. In the case of Daejeong Middle School, where Kim Dal-sam had worked as a teacher right before the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident, there were more teachers from North Korea than those from Jeju.

Such an unstable situation across Jeju society caused young men to return to Japan. Kim Min-ju, who studied Jeju society in Japan, maintained, “After

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78) *Dokrip Shinbo*, April 5, 1947.

79) Ko Sun-hyeop (section chief of the Livestock Department of the Jeju Provincial Office at the time), Testimony as quoted in the 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4 · 3 Incident Speaks*, p.364.

80) *Jeju Shinbo*, April 22, 1947.

81) *Jeju Shinbo*, May 10, 1947.

82) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 28, 1947.

liberation, about 3,000 Jeju young men went over to Japan mainly in 1947. It is probably a lie if anyone says he or she came to Japan in 1948 or 1949 after the incident.”<sup>83)</sup>

Meanwhile the left-wing camp went on a nationwide general strike for 24 hours under the leadership of the Democratic People’s Front. As a result, the railroads and plants across the nation stopped. The demands of the left-wing camp were: the immediate punishment of the policemen who fired at the ceremony of the 3 · 1 Independence Movement Day; the guarantee of freedom for the labor union movement; the cancelation of Park Heon-yeong’s arrest warrant, the immediate release of executives of the Korea Labor Unions Council; the immediate enacting of liberal labor laws, and; the lifting of the suspension of left-wing newspapers.<sup>84)</sup> USAMGIK regarded this as an illegal strike and began a search for the strikers nationwide. Due to the strong response of the military government, from 1 – 28 March 1947, 2,176 people were arrested by the police across South Korea. 230 of these were arrested in Jeju.<sup>85)</sup> Considering the fact that the population of Jeju accounted for 1% of the total population of South Korea, it can be seen that the number of arrests in Jeju was ten times as high as the national average.

On 19 March, the Democratic People’s Front in Seoul announced that it would dispatch its special investigation team to Jeju, looking into the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident and the 3 · 10 General Strike as important issues.<sup>86)</sup> The team, which was made up of four people, arrived in Jeju on 24 March. The leader of the team was Oh Yeong, director of the Inspection Department of the Central Headquarters of the Democratic People’s Front; lawyer Yoon Hak-gi and the other two men were also members of the investigation team. They said they would stay on Jeju for a week and conduct an investigation into the 3 · 1 Incident from various angles.<sup>87)</sup> However this investigation was

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83) Kim Min-ju (age 71, Japan), Testimony recorded on July 8, 2002.

84) Kim Nam-sik, *Study on the South Korea Labor Party*, p.280.

85) *Minju Ilbo*, March 30, 1947.

86) *Hanseong Ilbo*, 19 March 1947.

87) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 26, 1947.

interrupted when Oh Yeong was arrested in Seogwipo on 28 March.<sup>88)</sup> His arrest seems to have been related to the 3·22 General Strike organized nationally by the Democratic People's Front.

Even at this time, the central headquarters of the Democratic People's Front made it clear that it organized the strike to protest against the oppression of the police, not the military government itself. According to a periodic report of the 6<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, the Democratic People's Front sent a letter to the military government to clarify its position that the recent strike was for opposition to fascistic repression among reactionary police and pro-Japanese who had wormed their way into USAMGIK, not against USMGIK itself. In this letter, the front argued that the Jeju strike was included as a strike against the police.<sup>89)</sup>

It was also unusual that many policemen participated in the general strike in Jeju. The National Police Agency regarded those who deserted their jobs or submitted their resignations as strike sympathizers, referring them to the inquiry commission and dismissing them. 66 policemen were dismissed at this time and three of them were taken into custody for questioning by the prosecution.<sup>90)</sup> Among those 66 policemen, four assistant inspectors and six police officers were from the Jeju Police Inspection Agency, three assistant inspectors and 39 police officers were from the 1st District Police Station, and one inspector, one assistant inspector and 12 police officers belonged to the 2<sup>nd</sup> District Police Station.<sup>91)</sup> As for the policemen who fired at the people, only police officer Lee Mun-gyu, responsible for the shooting in front of the provincial hospital, was expelled.<sup>92)</sup> The number of policemen who participated in the strike accounted for 20% of the total number of policemen in Jeju. The vacancies were filled by policemen from other regions. Also, this gave opportunities for members of the Seobuk Young Men's Association, which was categorized as a far right organization by USAMGIK at the time, to join

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88) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 30, 1947.

89) Hq. 6<sup>th</sup> Inf Div. *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 532, April 3, 1947.

90) *Seoul Shinmun*, April 2, 1947.

91) *Dokrip Shinmun*, April 2, 1947.

92) *Seoul Shinmun*, March 21, 1947.

the Jeju police.

Meanwhile, the military government trials of the accomplices of the 3 · 1 incident and the 3 · 10 General Strike began from 3 April 1947 in Jeju. The first hearing was held at the Jeju district court. Captain Samuel J. Stevenson, judge advocate of the Jeju military government, was a chief judge and Captain Partridge joined the trials as a prosecuting attorney. As the trials proceeded, interpretation began to emerge as the biggest problem.

On April 10, the Jeju police inspection agency made an announcement that 260 people out of 500 people under arrest had been or would be forwarded to the trials –199 people had already been sent to the trials and 61 people would be forwarded to them.<sup>93)</sup> However, as warrants were being processed more and more people were taken into custody, and it was inevitable that the number of people sent to trial would increase. Therefore, as US Army officers came to lead the trials, precise communication between the accused and the judges emerged as a very serious issue. Under these difficult situations, the hearings were held four times by 12 April.

Furthermore, Military Governor Archer L. Lerch ordered a stop to the trials whose defendants were all Koreans and ordered the transfer of existing Korean defendants under the military government court to the Korean courts.<sup>94)</sup> Outwardly, it was announced that this measure was taken in order to transfer the judicial power to the Korean courts and the prosecution office according to the policy of transferring duties of the military government to Koreans. But, in reality, the measure seems to have been taken by consideration of the limitations of the military government trials, such as the interpretation problem. At the time, the number of people in custody due to the 3 · 22 General Strike and other incidents was reaching 2,000 nationally.

As judicial power was transferred from USAMGIK courts to the Korean courts, the trials of the 3 · 1 Incident, which Korean judges and prosecutors were attending, began from 21 April.<sup>95)</sup> The hearings had been held more than

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93) *Jeju Shinbo*, April 17, 1947.

94) *Hanseong Ilbo*, April 17, 1947.

95) *Jeju Shinbo*, April 22, 1947.

10 times by 23 May. During this period, a total of 328 people faced judicial action. Only 52 people were sentenced to imprisonment, 56 people were freed with fines and the remaining 168 people had their indictment suspended or were exempted from indictment.<sup>96)</sup> These court rulings were relatively lenient compared to the tough stance of the police. The tendency for mild punishment was common in other regions and this eventually provided a reason for reviving the military government courts later.<sup>97)</sup>

Hyeon Gyeong-ho, the co-chair of the Jeju Committee of the Democratic People's Front was punished with a fine of 5,000 won<sup>98)</sup> and Ahn Se-hun, the head of the Jeju Committee of the South Korean Labor Party and the co-chair of the Jeju Committee of the Democratic People's Front, were sentenced to one year's imprisonment, a five-year suspended sentence and a fine of 5,000 won.<sup>99)</sup> The maximum sentence given at the trials was one year's imprisonment, delivered to Huh Du-mun and others.<sup>100)</sup> The laws and regulations applied at these trials mainly followed MacArthur Proclamation 2, Article 4 of USAMGIK Ordinance 19 and USAMGIK Ordinance 72. At the trials, judges concluded that some preparation meetings for 3·1 Independence Movement Day ceremonies were approved by the authorities but others were not. With regard to the ceremonies on the day, the judges concluded that the demonstration was carried out without the approval of the authorities but the ceremony held at Jeju Buk Elementary School was an approved rally.

The police's roundup did not end there. From the 3·1 Shooting Incident in 1947 to right before the outbreak of the Jeju 4·3 Incident in 1948, over a year 2,500 people were apprehended.<sup>101)</sup> Due to this, the jails in Jeju were so overcrowded that a US inspection team pointed out, "The Jeju jail presents the worst case of crowding found in any penal institution in Korea. Thirty-five

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96) *Jeju Shinbo*, May 26, 1947.

97) Shin Sang-jun, *The Jeju 4·3 Incident*, Vol. II, (Korea Welfare Administration Research Institute, 2002), pp.140-141.

98) *Jeju Shinbo*, May 26, 1947.

99) Jeju District Court, Sentence 1947 Criminal Trial, No. 532, October 6, 1947.

100) *Jeju Shinbo*, April 28, 1947.

101) Hong Han-gyun, *Various Aspects of Jeju Island in Riots*, (Sincheonji, 1948), p.8.

prisoners (are) in a cell, ten by twelve feet. A total of 365 prisoners in a relatively small jail.”<sup>102)</sup>

## 2) Clash between Officials and the Public

### ① Clash between the Public and Police

After the 3 · 1 Incident, there were many cases of clashes between the people and the police. With the Udo incident and the Jungmun Village incident in March 1947 as a starting point, the Jongdal Village incident occurred in June and the Bukchon Village incident happened in August.

The Udo incident refers to a demonstration on 14 March 1947 in which members of the Joseon Democratic Youth League on Udo (an islet to the east of Seongsan Harbor) went on a demonstration, and then broke and incinerated the sign of the Udo police box. On the day, about 1,000 people, half of Udo’s population, gathered at an elementary school, established an emergency measure committee of the 3 · 1 Incident and announced a statement against the police shootings. Then they marched around the islet. During the rally, some policemen from the Udo police box confiscated leaflets prepared by the members of the youth league. After the demonstration, some of the executives of the youth league visited the police box to protest the confiscation and burnt down its sign.<sup>103)</sup> At the time, three policemen worked at the Udo police box but they couldn’t do anything about it. This incident was not more widely known outside of Udo until 12 days later and 15 policemen from police reserves were urgently dispatched to the island.<sup>104)</sup> However, the executives of the youth league had already left the islet and only a few suspects were apprehended.

The Jungmun incident was a shooting incident that happened on 17 March 1947 in which policemen from police reserves fired at a demonstration and

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102) “Report of Special Investigation – Governor Ryu, Hai Chin of Cheju-do Island,” March 11, 1948, Report of Special Investigation by Lt. Colonel Lawrence A. Nelson, USAMGIK.

103) *Jeju Shinbo*, April 2, 1947.

104) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 28, 1947.

injured eight people. As mentioned earlier, all the six policemen from Jeju at the Jungmun police box, including Yang Gyeong-han, chief at the police box, had resigned in protest at the 3/1 Shooting Incident in Jeju-eup. In consternation, the Jeju police sent about 20 policemen from police reserves to the Jungmun police box, with Inspector Kim Gyeong-sul as a commanding officer.<sup>105)</sup> Soon the policemen from the police reserves began to arrest local figures who participated in the demonstration. Among the apprehended was Lee Seung-jo, head of the Jungmun School, and Kim Seong-chu, chair of the Jungmun Chapter of the Joseon Youth League, both of whom were respected by the local residents. Lee Seung-jo had graduated from the law department of Kansai University and served as the head of Jungmun-myeon after liberation. Kim Seong-chu had served a prison term for involvement in labor movements during the Japanese colonial era and after liberation had devoted himself to youth and night school movements.

At 11 a.m. on 17 March, around 1,000 local people gathered in Jungmun Village and held a rally. At the rally, they resolved to demand the immediate release of the apprehended and rushed to the Jungmun police box at around 1 p.m. As the situation became serious, local dignitaries, including the head of the myeon, visited the police box first and negotiated for the discharge of the arrested with the policemen. However, the policemen from the police reserves rejected the demand flatly. When the demonstrators reached the front of the police box, the commanding officer warned them to disband. As they did not comply with the repeated order, the policemen fired at them.<sup>106)</sup> Because of this shooting, eight local residents including Kang Sang-jun were seriously or slightly injured.<sup>107)</sup>

The Jongdal Village incident was a case of assault and battery in which three policemen who were cracking down on an illegal assembly of the Joseon Youth League were beaten and injured seriously by a group of young men who attended the assembly. On 16 May, USAMGIK disbanded the Joseon

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105) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 24, 1947.

106) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 24, 1947.

107) Jeju Province, *History of Jeju Province*, p.80.

Youth League through an administrative order. However, as the 2<sup>nd</sup> Joint American-Soviet Commission Talks resumed on 21 May, the central headquarters of the Joseon Youth League organized the Joseon Democratic and Patriotic Youth League and registered the organization with USAMGIK as a legal organization in order to respond to the above development. The members of Joseon Youth League in Jongdal Village held a meeting to discuss the future of the organization in this transitional period. At around 8 p.m. on 6 June 1947, about 200 young village men gathered at the beach of Jongdal Village, Gujwa-myeon and held a village meeting of the Joseon Youth League. The Sehwa police box obtained this intelligence and dispatched three policemen to crackdown on the meeting, Kim Sun-yeong, Hwang Jong-uk, and Choi Han-su. As the policemen appeared, the participants of the meeting began to anger. Even Boo Ok-man, the vice-chair of the Jongdal Village Joseon Youth League, instigated the participants, saying “We have no reason to run away because we haven’t done anything illegal.” Soon, there were scuffles between the policemen and the young men. The policemen were placed on the defensive and they jumped into the sea as a last resort. However, the policemen became exhausted and almost passed out and Boo Ok-man hooked them up from the sea. In the end, the policemen ended up bound by the young men with a rope they were carrying.<sup>108)</sup> The young men feared the possible consequences from the accidental violence and began to flee from arrest. The injured policemen were carried to the police box by carriage by village residents. Soon the police had more policemen on special alert. From then, the cat-and-mouse game began between the policemen and the participants of the meeting. A US Army weekly summary recorded, “06 June 47 – Policemen in [GUJWA MYEON], two miles north of [SEONGSAN], were beaten and tied with wire while disbanding an illegal meeting of the SOUTH KOREAN LABOR PARTY which was being held on a tug at the seacoast. The responsible persons have not been apprehended.”<sup>109)</sup>

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108) Kim Yeo-ok (witness of the Jongdal-ri incident), Testimony as quoted in the 4·3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4·3 Incident Speaks*, p.446.

109) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Summary*, No. 92, June 19, 1947.

On 16 June, the police announced that with regard to the Jongdal Village incident, the number of wanted men was 71.<sup>110)</sup> In the end, 42 out of the 71 wanted men were arrested and brought to trial.<sup>111)</sup> The ringleader Boo Ok-man was given a four-year sentence which was the toughest one. Proclamation 2, USAMGIK Ordinance 19, Criminal Law 95 and 106 were applied to him and he was punished for obstruction of justice, sedition, injuring and illegal detention.<sup>112)</sup> Some documents reported that two policemen died later but there was no record of additional application of murder or manslaughter charges against him during his four-year time in prison.

The Bukchon Village incident resulted in injury to police after a clash with residents due to a crackdown on the distribution of illegal leaflets. The policemen who were on emergency alert as national liberation day approached noticed that the local residents were putting up the leaflets. While they were on patrol, the policemen spotted people who were putting the leaflets around Bukchon Village. When the local residents saw the policemen approaching, they began to run away and the policemen fired at them. Due to this firing, two women and one man were injured including Jang Yun-su, a teenage girl. Enraged at this, another girl sounded a siren and gathered the village residents. They decided to protest to the police. Just at this time, two policemen including police officer Kim Byeong-taek, who hadn't left the village yet, were caught and beaten by the residents.<sup>113)</sup>

Not satisfied with this, the residents of Bukchon Village flocked to the Hamdeok police box 3 km away from the village and lodged a complaint about the shooting by the policemen. The policemen at Hamdeok police box mounted a machine gun on the roof of the building and dispersed the protesters by firing blanks. With regard to this incident, the Hanseong Ilbo reported, "With the second anniversary of the national liberation day two days ahead, a clash between local residents and policemen occurred at Bukchon

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110) *Jeju Shinbo*, June 18, 1947.

111) *Jeju Shinbo*, June 26 1947.

112) *Jeju Shinbo*, July 12, 1947.

113) *Hanseong Ilbo*, August 17, 1947.

Village, Jocheon-myeon, Bukjeju-gun at about 11 a.m. on 13 August. Three people from each party were seriously injured and more people were wounded on both sides. The policemen moved out to crackdown on the distribution of leaflets but got involved in violence with the local residents.”

In the weekly report of the US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps, this incident was described as if two separate incidents had happened. The report said, “13 August 47 – One woman was accidentally wounded and two policemen were beaten in HAMDEOK on JEJU island, when a mob of approximately two hundred attacked the police box. Police reinforcements dispersed the mob. (6<sup>th</sup> Div.)” and “13 August 47 – Two women and one man were wounded by wild gun fight between police and leftists in BUKCHON and HAMDEOK. The trouble started when police attempted to tear down illegal leftist posters from walls in BUKCHON. Reinforcements of policemen were necessary to disperse the mob. (CIC S/I)”<sup>114)</sup> 40 residents were apprehended due to this incident.<sup>115)</sup>

Meanwhile, at that point a national movement of posting leaflets began which Jeju people became particularly active in. As the talks of the Joint American-Soviet Commission resumed, USAMGIK issued Administrative Order 3, which banned any political rally during the talks. However, as public criticism about this measure grew at home and abroad, the military government revoked the order on 9 July. They announced that they would maintain crackdowns on street demonstrations for political purposes. Around this time, posting leaflets and staging unauthorized demonstrations were common from village to village in Jeju. The Jeju police regarded these kinds of activities as illegal and tightened control on them. During June, around 30 people including eight students at a training school for elementary school teachers, two students at Jeju Agriculture School and two students at Jocheon School were arrested or brought to trial on the charge of distributing leaflets and holding unauthorized demonstrations.<sup>116)</sup>

The court sentenced the three students at the teacher training school to five

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114) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Summary*, No. 102, August 28, 1947.

115) *Jeju Shinbo*, August 30, 1947.

116) *Jeju Shinbo*, June 6, 16, 20, 26, July 2, 4, 1947.

months in prison and sentenced another five students at the same school. Two students at Jocheon School were also sentenced to five months in prison suspended for three years for violating USAMGIK Proclamation 2, and the military government Ordinance 19.<sup>117)</sup> The court also sentenced the two students at Jeju Agriculture School to probation. However, Jeju Agriculture School expelled the two students from school saying the measure was “the ruling office’s instructions.”<sup>118)</sup> This created quite a stir. Other students at the school made a strong protest against this measure and all the second-year and third-year students even threatened to drop out of school collectively.<sup>119)</sup>

According to a US Army periodic report, by August 1947, anti-American leaflets were distributed, too. The report said, “An inflammatory leaflet, attacking the US Army recently picked up on JEJU DO. It reads in part: “Drive away the UNITED STATES Army whose desire is to take KOREA from Koreans for their own use.”<sup>120)</sup> However, in reality, the most frequently mentioned issue on the leaflets at the time was the delivery of barley to the government.

## ② Sweeping Reshuffle of Personnel within the Military Government

As of March 1947, the administration and the public order of Jeju Island were under the control of four people: an American military governor of Jeju (official title was ‘chief secretary of civil affairs’), a councilor to the police, a Korean Jeju governor and a head of the Jeju Police Inspection Agency. Also, there was the commander of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment of the Korea Constabulary in Moseolpo, but he could not influence current affairs because it had not been long since the establishment of the regiment. Anyway, five heads of the Jeju military government including the commander of the 9<sup>th</sup> regiment were replaced with new faces after the 3·1 Shooting Incident. On 2 April 1947, Lieutenant Colonel Russel D. Barros took the position of Jeju military

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117) *Jeju Shinbo*, June 20, 1947.

118) *Jeju Shinbo*, July 6, 1947.

119) *Jeju Shinbo*, July 14, 1947.

120) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 602, August 8, 1947.

governor after Major Stout.<sup>121)</sup> He was 37 years old when he became the Jeju military governor. He was from the east coast of the US and had worked as a journalist before he joined the military. He fought battles in the Philippines during the Pacific War and after the end of the war he was involved in establishing the Korean Armed Forces as the second commander of the Korean Constabulary.<sup>122)</sup> It was Barros who had advised Jang Chang-guk to be cautious about the leftwing dominance on Jeju Island when Jang visited him before departing for Jeju as the first commander of the newly established 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment in Moseolpo.<sup>123)</sup> Barros worked as a military governor of Jeju, in complete charge of the military government, until December 1947 when he was replaced with Major John S. Mansfield.

With regard to the position of Jeju Governor, Yoo Hae-jin from Jeonbuk Province assumed the position on 10 April 1947 after Park Gyeong-hun.<sup>124)</sup> In a notice of appointment from the South Korean interim government, it was recorded that Park was relieved of responsibilities on 12 March. It seems that he was dismissed retroactively, on the date of the submission of his resignation. The Jeju Shinbo reported, “According to a reliable source, Governor Park seems to have submitted his resignation to Governor Stout on 14 March.”<sup>125)</sup> Also, the Dokrip Shinbo added, “(Governor Park) submitted his resignation to Advisor Stout feeling the responsibility for the 3 · 1 Incident and the 3 · 10 General Strike.”<sup>126)</sup>

Yoo Hae-jin, 43 years old, had no connection with Jeju Island. His appointment was offered on the recommendation of Ahn Jae-hong, civil administrator of the US Military Government. Yoo Hae-jin entered politics right after liberation following Ahn Jae-hong when Ahn established the Nationalist Party. Later, Yoo became the director of the Ministry of Agriculture when the Korean Independence Party was formed through the merger of the Nationalist

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121) *Jeju Shinbo*, April 6, 1947.

122) *Jeju Shinbo*, April 8, 1947.

123) Jang Chang-guk, *A Graduates of the Korea Military Academy*, p.113.

124) South Korea Interim Government, Notice Appointment of No. 1, December 1947.

125) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 16, 1947.

126) *Dokrip Shinbo*, April 5, 1947.

Party, the New Korea People's Party and the Korea Independence Party. It is said that civil administrator Ahn urged Yoo to make every effort to keep left-wing elements from taking root in Jeju and maintain public order when he appointed him as Jeju governor.<sup>127)</sup>

On 31 March 1947, the position of the commissioner of the Jeju Police Inspection Agency went to Kim Yeong-bae from Seoul.<sup>128)</sup> He had worked as secretary general of Seoul National University before being appointed as the head of the Jeju Police Inspection Agency. He held the post until April 1948. His predecessor Kang In-su who had been appointed to the post on February 20 was dismissed only 40 days into his appointment in the aftermath of the 3 · 1 Incident. *History of the Jeju Police* reported that Kang Dong-hyo, head of the superintendent of the Jeju Police, was fired in order to appease public sentiment on the day of the 3 · 1 Incident.<sup>129)</sup> However, it came out into the open that Kang was dismissed on 24 May 1947 and the reason for the dismissal was not responsibility for the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident but his involvement in a bribery case.<sup>130)</sup>

Advisor to the police, Captain Partridge, who had played an important role in developing the Jeju Police, was also replaced with a new face in June 1947. His successor had been an advisor to the crime investigation section of the National Police Agency before he was selected as the replacement advisor. The new advisor was a veteran detective who had worked for the US police for 15 years and he also had come to Jeju to investigate the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident as a member of the investigation team led by Casteel. He warned against torture by policemen in his inaugural speech saying, "Many people are taken into custody now on the charge of distributing illegal leaflets. If any policeman tortures any of them while interrogation, he will be punished severely and even dismissed."<sup>131)</sup> Meanwhile, on 21 May 1947, the commander

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127) Kim Jong-bae, "Biographies of Jeju Governors," *Jemin Ilbo*, August 11, 1990.

128) *Jeju Shinbo*, April 8, 1947.

129) *Jeju Shinbo*, May 26, June 6, 1947.

130) *Jeju Shinbo* June 18, 1947.

131) *Jeju Shinbo*, June 18, 1947.

of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment Jang Chang-guk was replaced with Major Lee Chi-eop.<sup>132)</sup> This replacement had nothing to do with the 3 · 1 Incident.

What USAMGIK seemed to be trying to do with this reshuffling was to revitalize the atmosphere, yet seen from what happened later in Jeju, their intention can be summarized as reinforcing the right-wing forces. In this reshuffle, figures from Jeju were completely excluded. Even the positions of the police executives began to be filled by people from the mainland.

With regard to activities in Jeju, among the new faces Jeju Governor Yoo Hae-jin received the most public attention. As he began his position as governor, he spoke of his plans, saying, “I will steer the middle course in leading Jeju Province excluding both the far right and the extreme left in politics.”<sup>133)</sup> However, his eventual actions were far from what he promised. While in office, he devoted himself only to eradicating his political foes. Even a US report described him as “an extreme rightist.” Governor Yoo brought seven members of the Seobuk Young Men’s Association with him as his bodyguards. These people stood guard over the official residence of the governor every night.<sup>134)</sup> The first thing he did as governor was purge government and public officials. Those who organized or participated in the general strike were dismissed by reason of having rebellious ideas. This kind of purge spread to not only provincial offices but all administrative bodies such as county offices, police and transportation and communication departments. The educational field was no exception. Vacancies in public offices were increasing day by day and those vacancies were filled mainly by people from North Korea.

Governor Yoo also took the lead in collecting grain, for which Jeju Province had showed the poorest performance in the nation before his inauguration. In 1947, USAMGIK decided to collect 102,384 tons of grain and assigned 2,448

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132) General Headquarters of Korea Constabulary, Special Command No. 58, May 3, 1947; Special Command No. 59, May 4, 1947.

133) *Jeju Shinbo*, April 22, 1947.

134) Park Un-bong (chief of Inspection Department of the 1<sup>st</sup> District Police Station at the time), Testimony as quoted in the 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4 · 3 Incident Speaks*, p.404.

tons of grain to be collected from Jeju. The decision was made not by considering conditions in Jeju but by simply assigning the quota as one fifth of the total output. The harvest of barley on Jeju in 1947 was as poor as that of the previous year. However, regardless of this situation, Governor Yoo encouraged people to collect grain by mobilizing administrative power.

The first clash between officials and the public happened in Myeongwol Village, Hallim-eup in July 1947. The administration set out the grain collection by force by mobilizing members of the rightwing young men's associations but this created friction with local residents. When asked about this clash in Myeongwol Village, military governor Barros answered, "I don't know anything about it because it's done by Governor Yoo's instructions."<sup>135)</sup> The second incident occurred in Donggwang Village, Andeok-myoen on 8 August 1947. About 50 residents assaulted three officials who had been demanding grain collection while staying at the house of the head of the village. The village residents requested the officials readjust the quota but when the officials did not accept this demand they began to attack them in a fury.<sup>136)</sup> Regardless of this kind of friction, in November 1947, Governor Yoo reported to the central government that Jeju Province exceeded the quota by collecting 104% of the target amount.

Governor Yoo was about 180cm tall and always wearing sunglasses. He was a ball of fire who overwhelmed people around him. In the summer of 1947 there were even leaflets encouraging his assassination circulating around the island. A report of the US 6<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division reported, "The Governor, an extreme rightist, is unpopular with the leftists and several leaflets demanding his assassination have been distributed."<sup>137)</sup> According to an anecdote, feeling threatened, he always carried with him a gun borrowed from the police whenever he went to bed.<sup>138)</sup>

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135) *Jeju Shinbo*, July 30, 1947.

136) Hq. 6<sup>th</sup> Inf Div, USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 672, August 21, 1947; Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 608, August 16, 1947.

137) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 602, August 8, 1947.

138) Kim Jong-bae, "Biographies of Jeju Governors," *Jemin Ilbo*, August 29, 1990.

Governor Yoo was audited by USAMGIK from November 1947. This audit led by Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence A. Nelson, special inspector of the military government, was conducted intensively in Seoul and Jeju from 12 November 1947 to 28 February 1948. Lieutenant Colonel Nelson wrote up a long special report on the results of this audit.<sup>139)</sup> This report titled, “*Report of Special Investigation – Cheju-do Political Situation*,” revealed that the audit was conducted under the command of E. J. Johnson, chief advisor of the provisional government of Korea.<sup>140)</sup> However, closely analyzed, the audit seems to have been conducted on the request of US military officers stationed on Jeju, including Jeju Military Governor Lieutenant Colonel Barros. The report described the reason for conducting the audit as follows – “[The administration in Jeju] is unsatisfactory from any reasonable Korean standard. The infliction of politics in every phase of government has produced a type of government, which any intelligent person would reject.”<sup>141)</sup>

Lieutenant Colonel Nelson conducted an extensive investigation into Governor Yoo’s personal matters and his provincial governance. During this process, he received opinions from officials in the military government in Jeju and the central military government in Seoul. The following is an excerpt from Judge Advocate Captain Samuel J. Stevenson’s opinion about Governor Yoo.

The Provincial Governor has adopted the slogan of the ultra rightist in that all people who disagree even on minor points with the Han Kook or the Acceleration of Independence party are automatically leftists. He also despises and will not work with coalition plans or personnel.

Since the 1<sup>st</sup> of April, to the best of my knowledge he has not permitted any meeting by any party except those he definitely approves. This is acting to drive moderate leftist parties underground. I have no doubt that these moderate leftists are holding meetings without permission. Sooner or later the police will be

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139) Kim Chang-hu, “Report of Special Investigation by Nelson – Jeju Governor Yoo Hae-jin in the Political Situations in Jeju,” *Jeju Research*, issue No. 17, (the Jeju Society, 2000), p.96.

140) “Report of Special Investigation – Governor Ryu, Hai Chin (Yoo Hae-jin) of Cheju-do Island,” March 11, 1948, Report of Special Investigation by Lt. Colonel Lawrence A. Nelson, USAMGIK.

141) Ibid.

informed of a meeting and requested to break it up and arrest the leader. This will lead to violence and will create much sympathy for the leftist parties and act to drive moderate leftists and some coalition members further left.<sup>142)</sup>

Henry C. Merritt, an official of the Counter Intelligence Corps, also gave his view about Governor Yoo to Lieutenant Colonel Nelson.

I arrived on Jeju-Do in June 1947 and have been OIC of the CIC Sub-Det. since that time. I have known Governor You Hae-jin since my arrival. Governor Yoo is an extreme rightist and is active in many right-wing groups. Yoo has been elected as advisor to the [Korea Liberation Young Men's Association] and the [Daedong] Youth Corps (···) Since my arrival on Jeju-Do I have known of Leftist groups asking permission to hold meetings but never once has permission been granted. That automatically makes all Leftist meetings illegal. Rightist Groups have but to ask for permission and it is granted without any question. Governor Yoo is in my estimation very dictatorial and if any person does not agree with him one hundred percent he is very apt to be automatically classed as a strong leftist.<sup>143)</sup>

The judge advocate and the officer of the CIC had similar views about Governor Yoo. Both thought that Governor Yoo was an extreme rightist and tended to brand anyone who didn't agree him as a leftist and he made illegal assemblies unavoidable by not approving them from leftist or moderate organizations.

At the time, the right to approve assemblies lay in the hands of the governor. His partiality in approving assemblies was already reported in the press. The Jeju Shinbo raised this issue during the interview with Lieutenant Colonel Barros on July 1947. When asked to give his opinion on the matter, Lieutenant Colonel Barros answered, "Governor Yoo has never told me about this, but I am investigating his partiality in approving assemblies because I have gotten reports about this from other people. Also the authorities should approve assemblies only if organizers officially go through formalities described by the

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142) "Opinion of Political Situation in Cheju Do as of November 15, 1947," November 21, 1947, Report of Special Investigation by Lt. Colonel Lawrence A. Nelson, USAMGIK.

143) "Governor Ryu, Hai Chin, Activities of" November 21, 1947, *ibid.*

central government. From now on I hope anyone will tell me if Governor Yoo does not approve assemblies even if they are applied for according to the procedures.”<sup>144)</sup> But this issue was not corrected.

Meanwhile, Jeju Military Governor Barros complained to Special Investigator Lieutenant Colonel Nelson about Governor Yoo’s right-wing activities. Barros added, “He [Governor Yoo] has never allowed a meeting of any party except the ones that are closely affiliated with his side. Terroristic acts of the Rightists are increasing on the island and the Governor has taken no steps to stop such action. A number of people have been relieved from office since the Governor’s arrival but relieved in a Korean manner.”<sup>145)</sup>

After the extensive investigation, Lieutenant Colonel Nelson concluded that Governor Yoo was very problematic. The following are excerpts from *Report of Special Investigation – Governor You Hae-jin of Cheju-do Island*.

- Governor Yoo Hae-jin has repeatedly demonstrated his inability to properly administer a Province as a governor. He has made futile attempts to control political thought by ruthless and dictatorial methods. He has driven the Leftist factions underground, where their activities have grown more dangerous. Leftist members and sympathizers have increased.
- Many terrorist acts have been caused by the police under the Governor Yoo regime. All top police positions are filled with non-natives of Jeju and he has filled many positions of appointment with mainland people which has not been placidly accepted by natives of Jeju-do.
- His administration of the summer grain collection program and the rationing of foods is typical of the general mismanagement found in all branches of Government (…). He permitted the grain to remain in village warehouses and reported a 100% collection, when the collection was only 15% of the quota. The mishandling of the summer grain program led to an unequal rationing system in the various guns.
- The Jeju jail presents the worst case of crowding found in any penal institution in Korea. Thirty-five prisoners in a cell, ten by twelve feet. A total of 365 prisoners in a relatively small jail. This is a good example of his program for

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144) *Jeju Shinbo*, July 28, 1947.

145) “Memorandum to Lt. Col. Nelson, “November 21, 1947, Report of Special Investigation by Lt. Colonel Lawrence A. Nelson, USAMGIK.

converting Leftists to Rightists.<sup>146)</sup>

On 11 March 1948, based on these investigation results, Lieutenant Colonel Nelson made four recommendations to the Military Governor in Seoul, namely: ① “Governor Yoo should be replaced”; ② “the Department of National Police should conduct an investigation into the administration of police on Jeju Island”; ③ “an American Police Advisor should be assigned to duty with the 59<sup>th</sup> Military Government Headquarters and Headquarters Company,” and; ④ “the Department of Justice should investigate the matter of over-crowded Jails.”<sup>147)</sup> Military Governor Dean ordered that the police advisor’s taking control of the 59<sup>th</sup> Military Government Company be investigated<sup>148)</sup> alongside jail overcrowding<sup>149)</sup> but he did not approve the replacing of Governor Yoo despite it being raised as an essential measure to appease public sentiment. The Jeju 4 · 3 Incident occurred against this backdrop.

### ③ Enhancement of Right-wing Forces

With regard to the background and development of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident, the changing relationship between the US and the Soviet Union had a big influence. When the two nations were in a cooperative mood, feelings of reconciliation also sprang up in Jeju, but if the relationship had gone sour, political tension intensified accordingly on the island. The Cold War became a global reality after the declaration of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, which was a hard-line policy against the Soviet Union. The Korean Peninsula became a frontline in the conflict between ‘East and West’ and Jeju Island became embroiled in the conflict.

However, this conflict had not suddenly arisen, but had been blowing hot and cold for a while, which led to some ideological confusion in policy. An early case of this was USAMGIK’s attempts to consolidate the right-wing and

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146) “Report of Special Investigation – Governor Ryu, Hai Chin of Cheju-do Island,” March 11, 1948, *ibid.*

147) *Ibid.*

148) “Assignment of Personnel,” March 29, 1948, *ibid.*

149) “USAMGIK, Department of Justice,” April 26, 1948, *ibid.*

the left-wing camps in 1946 and then later happened when the second talks of the Joint American-Soviet Commission began from May 1947. During the first talks of the commission, arguments over the qualifications of political parties and civic organizations participating in the provisional government became central and eventually led to the breakdown of talks. However, during the second talks of the commission, both parties agreed to include only political parties and civic groups that were in favor of the decisions of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers and would cooperate in implementing those decisions when establishing a provisional government in Korea. Eventually, the Korean Democratic Party changed its stance and submitted a written oath of not opposing the decisions of the Moscow Conference. The right-wing political parties and civic groups also changed their attitude and decided to join the joint commission.<sup>150)</sup>

However, the US and the Soviet Union once again came into confrontation over compiling a list of political parties and civic organizations with which to discuss the establishment of a provisional government. From February to July 1947, during the period of the dispute over the trusteeship, 166 political parties and civic organizations registered themselves as legal with the military government. Among them, more than 70% of the right-wing parties and organizations were registered during June 1947 when the second talks of the Joint American-Soviet Commission were held.<sup>151)</sup> The Soviet Union argued that these parties and organizations were hurriedly established so they must be excluded from the process but the US insisted that all of them be included. Due to this confrontation, in August 1947, the second talks of the Joint American-Soviet Commission faced falling apart.

At this time, USAMGIK claimed it would treat the right-wing camp and the left-wing camp equally. Government officials in Jeju took the same stance. In July 1947, Lieutenant Colonel Barros announced, “Whether he or she is from a left-wing or a right-wing organization, he or she can be a government and

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150) *Seoul Shinmun*, June 17, 1947.

151) Choi Sang-ryong, *The US Army Military Government and the Nationalism of Korea*, (Nanam, 1988), pp.277-278.

public employee. That's the principle of democracy."<sup>152)</sup> Even the commissioner of the Jeju Police Inspection Agency, Kim Yeong-bae said, "I will try my best to consolidate the Right and the Left in harmony at least in Jeju."<sup>153)</sup>

However, a change in this stance was on the cards when the second talks of the Joint American-Soviet Commission fell apart. The arrest of left-wing figures with the 8 · 15 National Liberation Day approaching in 1947 was the beginning of this change. In only two days in Seoul, 1,300 executives of leftist parties and organizations, such as the Democratic People's Front, the South Korean Labor Party, the Korea Labor Unions Council, and the Korea Farmers' Council were apprehended. Arrests spread across the nation and the US military announced that a total of 13,769 people were arrested during this period.<sup>154)</sup> The *Dokrip Shinbo* called this "the largest-scale apprehension since the 8 · 15 Liberation"<sup>155)</sup> The military government argued that the arrests had been conducted because they had obtained intelligence about a "8 · 15 riot plot," but the left-wing camp refuted these allegations saying that it was a fabrication.

On Jeju Island, the police began to conduct a general crackdown on executives of the Democratic People's Front, the South Korean Labor Party and public employees from 14 August. About 20 people, including eight employees at the provincial office, doctors and nurses at the provincial hospital, and operators at post offices were apprehended.<sup>156)</sup> Among the detainees was Park Gyeong-hun, the first Jeju governor, causing deep reverberations across Jeju society. He had been the head of the Jeju Committee of the Democratic People's Front.

The Jeju Committee of the Democratic People's Front had been through trying times since the police roundup following the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident. Many of the executives of the Front were arrested or fled to Japan to avoid arrest, which resulted in its activities reducing greatly. Then, as the second

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152) *Jeju Shinbo*, July 30, 1947.

153) *Jeju Shinbo*, July 16, 1947.

154) Kim Cheon-yeong *Chronology of Korea's Modern History*, (Hanulrim, 1985), p.766.

155) *Dokrip Shinbo*, August 13, 1947.

156) *Jeju Shinbo*, August 20, 22, 1947.

talks of the Joint American-Soviet Commission resumed, the activities of the Democratic People's Front revved up nationally and the Jeju Committee also carried out large-scale restructuring in line with this. In July, Park Gyeong-hun was chair and Kim Si-beom, who had been an anti-Japanese activist and the first head of Jochoen-myeon, was selected as vice-chair. With regard to Park's induction as Front chair in Jeju, the Jeju Shinbo reported, "Park's decision to go into politics was unexpected and people will be paying attention to his activities in the future."<sup>157)</sup> This shows how his entering into politics came as a surprise to Jeju people at the time.

Given that Park graduated from the law department of Keijo Imperial University and he was the first son of the richest man (Park Jongsil) in Jeju and Park Gyeong-hun was the first Jeju governor under the US Military Government, his becoming the chair of the Jeju Chapter of the Democratic People's Front, which had an antagonistic relationship with the military government, was quite a surprise to everybody. However, Park had already indicated his opinion that the police were responsible for the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident. According to the testimony of Park's wife, he resigned from his position because, even though he had made every effort to do so, he couldn't resolve the situation.<sup>158)</sup> His remark that "the victims (of the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident) were bystanders" also seems to be in agreement with his aforementioned stance.

*Report of Special Investigation – Cheju-do Political Situation* by Nelson describes the reason for his arrest in detail. The report quoted are port written by Lee Ho, a persecutor of the Seoul High Prosecutors' Office. According to Lee, at the end of July 1947, Park Gyeong-hun, the chair of the Democratic People's Front in Jeju met the commissioner of the Jeju Police Inspection Agency. He got permission to obtain signatures of the members of the Democratic People's Front in Jeju to present a petition to the Joint American-Soviet Commission. It is said that the petition advocated the stance of the communists. In other words, the petition insisted that the name of the new

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157) *Jeju Shinbo*, July 18, 1947.

158) Choi Gap-su (wife of Park Gyeong-hun), Testimony as quoted in the 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4 · 3 Incident Speaks*, p.486.

country be “the People’s Republic” and the administrative body be “the People’s Committee”, both of which had been supported by the communists. But Park Gyeong-hun was under investigation on suspicion of violating public order by getting signatures not only from the members of the Democratic People’s Front but also from ordinary Jeju citizens.<sup>159)</sup>

Park was released on 17 August, four days after his arrest. Other detainees were released one after the other. Some detainees were interrogated by the police on the charge of holding an illegal meeting but soon they were granted bail, too. Compared to the unusual start of the apprehensions, the end was very simple. During the incident, Jeju Military Governor Barros advocated for Park. He said, “Ex-Governor Park is not a Communist and is very pro-American. He is Leftist for his own political reasons and because he is not a rightist. He is not a dangerous person to Korea or to the Military Government.”<sup>160)</sup>

As the second talks of the Joint American-Soviet Commission broke down and the Korea issue was tabled by the USA at the UN, where the Western nations enjoyed an absolute majority, the relationship between the USA and the Soviet Union was going steadily downhill and the polarization between the two political camps in domestic politics became more serious. From this point of time, the right-wing forces were reinforced dramatically in South Korea.

In Jeju, from September 1947, strengthening of the right-wing youth organizations became noticeable. The Jeju Chapters of the Daedong Youth Corps and the Seobuk Young Men’s Association were launched, both of which were heavily implicated directly or indirectly in the disturbances leading up to the 4 · 3 Incident. The Jeju Chapter of the Joseon People’s Youth Association was also founded, led by Lee Beom-seok, who had come from the Independence Army.

The Daedong Youth Corps was established on 21 September 1947, with Lee Cheong-cheon, who had been the commander of the Independence Army, as

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159) December 5, 1947, “Handling of the Prosecution of Park Gyeonghun and Three Others of the Charge of Violating Proclamation No. 2”, Report of Special Investigation by Lt. Colonel Lawrence A. Nelson, USAMGIK.

160) “Memorandum to Lt. Col. Nelson,” November 21, 1947, *ibid.*

the central figure. The Daedong Youth Corps, which had united 22 right-wing young men's associations, made clear that it supported Rhee Syng-man's political stance. At the time in Jeju, there were two right-wing young men's organizations: one was the Jeju Chapter of the National Society for the Acceleration of Korean Independence (Chair Kim Chung-hui) and the Jeju Chapter of the Korea Liberation Young Men's Association (Leader Kim In-seon). As the two organizations had been consolidated into the Daedong Youth Corps on the mainland, naturally, the issue of merging the two Jeju Chapters was raised. After hearing the news of the integration of the two organizations, the two chapters in Jeju formed a preparation committee for consolidating on 2 September 1947. However, the two chapters experienced discord over the matter of who would take primary control in organizing executives; therefore, in the end, 'two separate chapters' of the Daedong Youth Corps were established. Specifically, on 30 September, the Jeju Chapter of the Daedong Youth Corps was formed mainly by members of the Korea Liberation Young Men's Association<sup>161)</sup> and on 3 October, the Jeju branch office of the Daedong Youth Corps was established at the instigation of the members of the National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence.<sup>162)</sup> However, following this on 4 November, both parties announced the two organizations would be merged and on 21 December they held a meeting and elected Kim In-seon as the organization head and inducted Kim Chung-hui as an advisor, resolving the conflict.<sup>163)</sup> The number of members of the Jeju Chapter of the Daedong Youth Corps reported to the headquarters in Seoul was 1,000.<sup>164)</sup>

There is an intriguing report which argues that the Counter Intelligence Corps intervened in the merging of the two organizations. The intelligence report of the US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps also says that there were many cases of violence in recruiting members of the Daedong Youth Corps. The report quotes a periodic report of the CIC saying "CIC reports that in two locations there has

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161) *Jeju Shinbo*, October 4, 1947.

162) *Jeju Shinbo*, October 6, 1947.

163) *Jeju Shinbo*, December 24, 1947.

164) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 688, November 19, 1947.

been a marked decrease of rightist terrorist activities. These locations are given as JEJU DO, where the DAEDONG YOUTH CORPS has recently been engaging in terrorism in connection with a membership drive, and INCHEON. CIC credits their own efforts on JEJU with the coalition there and the merging of all rightist youth groups and increased activity of the police with the decrease in INCHEON.”<sup>165)</sup> The Jeju Chapter of the Daedong Youth Corps spread throughout rural areas on the island and, at the time of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident, it played a role as an auxiliary organization of the police.

While the Jeju Chapter of the Daedong Youth Corps was composed of right-wing youth from Jeju, the Seobuk Young Men’s Association was made up of people only from North Korea. It was 2 November 1947 when the Jeju branch office of the Seobuk Young Men’s Association was officially formed. They held a meeting on that day at the Jeju theater and elected Jang Dong-chun as the chair.<sup>166)</sup> However, the members of the Seobuk Young Men’s Association began to come to Jeju right after the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident. Many of them were penniless because they had to flee suddenly from the North Korea Communist Party. At first, they sold the Korean flag or photos of Rhee Syng-man. But later, from the second half of 1947, they began to work for the police, administration bodies and schools and their numbers were increasing. The power of the Seobuk Young Men’s Association became stronger day by day. Seonu Gi-seong, who was the de facto leader of the Jeju Chapter of the league, reflected on this in his book, saying “There was a saying that even a baby stops crying when it hears the words ‘Seobuk Young Men’s Association’.”<sup>167)</sup> At the time, the youth league was supported by Rhee Syng-man. A US intelligence report points out, “They [members of the Seobuk Young Men’s Association] have engaged in a “Red-hunt”, energetically lashing out against those persons they suspect of being “anti-Democratic.”<sup>168)</sup> The report continues, “They vigorously oppose “Trusteeship”; however, they may

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165) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 667, October 24, 1947.

166) *Jeju Shinbo*, November 8, 1947.

167) Seonu Gi-seong, *History of Youth Movement in Korea*, (Geummunsa, 1973), p.713.

168) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Summary*, No. 90, June 3, 1947.

be expected to cooperate with, or demonstrate against, the US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION as directed by RHEE.”<sup>169)</sup>

In Jeju, under the guise of eradicating leftists, many cases of violence by the Seobuk Youth Association took place. This happened for economic as well as ideological reasons as members had no regular income. A US intelligence report by the US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps dated 24 November 1947 shows the situation at the time, stating, “Following an outbreak of terrorism against island residents on JEJU-DO by a traveling group of right-wing SEOBUK YOUTH ASSOCIATION members, SEOBUK officials apologized to CIC on 18 November and promised that their members would instigate no more terrorist incidents on the island. Terrorism had been resorted to by the rightists in their campaign to collect money for the association. Five known beatings had occurred and at least an equal number of threats were made.”<sup>170)</sup> Another US intelligence report on the next day of the former report quoted a report of the CIC, saying “The chair of the Jeju Chapter of the Seobuk Young Men’s Association described Jeju as ‘Little MOSCOW’.”<sup>171)</sup>

There is even a court record of punishing one member of the youth association for acts of violence at that time. The accused was the head of the general affairs department of the association. According to the record, he hauled a young man, who had been a member of the Joseon Democratic Youth League, to the office of the Seobuk Young Men’s Association and beat him badly and three days later he interrogated and tortured a citizen under the guise of cracking down on smuggling boats. However, he was only fined for these acts of violence.<sup>172)</sup>

It is not easy to ascertain the exact number Seobuk Youth Association members who came to Jeju before the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident. However, documents from the left-wing camp claim that the number was 760, including 300 members who stayed in Jeju-eup.<sup>173)</sup> The dispatch of the members of the

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169) Ibid.

170) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 692, November 24, 1947.

171) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 693, November 25, 1947.

172) Jeju District Court, Sentence 1947 Criminal Trial No. 613, December 30, 1947.

league to Jeju increased after the outbreak of the Jeju 4·3 Incident. Moon Bong-jae, the head of the Seobuk Young Men's Association at the time once revealed that the league sent 500 members to Jeju Island on the request of Rhee Syng-man.<sup>174)</sup> One journalist reported as follows: "For the members of the Seobuk Young Men's Association, Jeju Island is 'an island of nightmares' and for Jeju people, the Seobuk Young Men's Association was 'the shadow of a nightmare'."<sup>175)</sup> But the reality was much more intimidating than that.

A meeting for another right-wing organization, the Joseon People Youth Association, was held at the Jeju-eup office on November 5, 1947. At the meeting, Choi Nam-sik, who had been a vice-chair of the Jeju Chapter of the Committee for Preparation of Korean Independence, was selected as the chair.<sup>176)</sup> However, as Choi resigned from the position on that day for some reason, Baek Chan-seok succeeded to his position. The Joseon People Youth Association, as a relative newcomer, was hindered in recruiting new members by the Daedong Youth Corps and even the Seobuk Young Men's Association. Especially, the committee was criticized by the Rhee Syng-man faction because it was hesitant in participating in the general election on 10 May 1948, which was led by Rhee to establish a nation south of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel, dividing the peninsula. For these reasons, the committee suffered during the period leading up to the Jeju 4·3 Incident, as, for example, some members of the Joseon People Youth Association were branded as 'reds' and killed.

In strengthening right-wing organizations like this, Jeju Governor Yoo and the CIC played an important role. Even Governor Yoo, who was implementing policies of enhancing the right-wing forces in Jeju, took the position of advisor to both the Korea Liberation Young Men's Association and the Daedong Youth Corps.

Meanwhile, two cases of violence occurred for which Governor Yoo was

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173) Kim Bong-hyeon & Kim Min-saeng, *History of Armed Uprising of Jeju People*, (Bunyusha, 1963), p.53.

174) The North Korea Institute, *North Korea*, (April, 1989): p.127.

175) Lee Gyeong-nam, *50 Year's History of Youth Movement*, *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, January 28, 1987.

176) *Jeju Shinbo*, November 8, 1947.

fingered as a mastermind. On 6 and 7 September 1947, for two days, unidentified assailants trespassed on houses of local dignitaries connected to the Jeju Committee of the Democratic People's Front in Jeju-eup and ransacked the properties, shocking Jeju people. On the first day, they trespassed on the house of Park Taehun, the head of the Jeju office of the Provisions Corporation. In actual fact, they had mistaken Park Tae-hun for Park Gyeong-hun, the chair of the Jeju Chapter of the Democratic People's Front at the time. Park Tae-hun was actually a younger brother of Park Gyeong-hun. On the second day, the assailants trespassed on the house of Hyeon Gyeong-ho, who was the principal of Jeju Middle School and had been the chair of the Democratic People's Front right before Park. At the time Hyeon was not at home. They pretended they were staff from the inspection agency and searched through the rooms. After the search, they beat Hyeon's wife with a club.<sup>177)</sup> The CIC launched an investigation and found out that the unidentified assailants called Hyeon at his home twice right before the incidents. The CIC investigated an operator at the telephone office. The operator stated that the calls were made from the house of Jeju Governor Yoo. Governor Yoo denied complicity in the incident when he was pressed by the CIC.<sup>178)</sup> The intruders even turned out to be members of the Seobuk Young Men's Association, but the investigation came to nothing.<sup>179)</sup>

The CIC also directly and indirectly influenced the activities of the right-wing political organizations. It was the middle of March 1947 right after the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident and the 3 · 10 General Strike that the agents of the CIC began to arrive in Jeju. The first report delivered by the CIC in Jeju on 21 March says, "The rightist National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence and the Korean Independence Party on JEJU Island are poorly organized and lacking in funds."<sup>180)</sup> According to a report titled '*CIC History*' written by U.S. Army Intelligence Center, as of May 1947, there were nine

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177) *Jeju Shinbo*, September 10, 1947.

178) *Jeju Shinbo*; Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 632, September 13, 1947; November 21, 1947, "Governor Ryu, Hai Chin, Activities of," Report of Special Investigation by Lt. Colonel Lawrence A. Nelson, USAMGIK.

179) The 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4 · 3 Incident Speaks*, p.488.

180) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 489, March 26, 1947.

district offices of the CIC around the nation including Jeju.<sup>181)</sup> According to this record, the Jeju district office of the CIC was still being operated at the end of 1948.<sup>182)</sup> It has been proven in many intelligence reports from different sources that the purpose of the CIC's presence in Jeju was not only to analyze and report incidents in Jeju but also to become involved in politics in Jeju, as indicated by the changing situation after their arrival. The contents of the CIC reports such as consolidating two Jeju Chapters of the Daedong Youth Corps into one by 'our efforts', or the Seobuk Young Men's Association members' apology to the CIC, show their involvement in Jeju politics.<sup>183)</sup> In December 1947, the Jeju district office of the CIC made a report of the significant intelligence it had obtained. The intelligence argued, "Public feeling is such that unless justice is soon brought to bear on the JEJU police, all organizations will attack the JEJU-DO inspection command."<sup>184)</sup> In addition, another intelligence report entitled 'Current communist activities in South Korea' written by the US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps which seems to have been drawn up based on a January 1948 report by the district office of the CIC in Jeju also attracts attention.

The island of JEJU-DO is divided into right and left-wing camps but many intelligent leaders and the masses do not side with either party. There is no apparent trouble with the leftists and most of the so-called leftists are not communists. Since the majority of the islanders are ignorant of national and international political developments, they are easily swayed by all sorts of propaganda, emanating from either the right or the left, with the rightists pointing up a "Red scare" and making every effort to dominate the island, mainly through youth groups and the exclusion of leftists from public office.

Significantly, the left-wing of JEJU-DO is not anti-American and recent instances of terrorism have been rightist instigated. As a group the people are primarily concerned with their inherent poverty and evidence a lesser interest in politics.<sup>185)</sup>

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181) United States Army Intelligence Center, *History of Counter Intelligence Corps*, part, CIC During the Occupation of Korea (March 1959), p.138.

182) *Ibid.*, p.8.

183) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Summary*, No. 116, December 4, 1947.

184) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 708, December 13, 1947.

185) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Summary*, No. 123, January 23, 1948.

## **C. 2 · 7 Protest and Death from Torture**

### **1) The 2 · 7 Protest**

On 14 November 1947, The UN General Assembly adopted a resolution which was tabled by the USA. The resolution called for a general election under the supervision of the UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK). According to that resolution, the general election was scheduled to be carried out at the same time in both North and South Korea under the principles of universal suffrage, secret election and proportional representation to the population prior to 31 March 1948. The National Assembly would then be formed soon after and a unified government would be set up.

However, the resolution of the general election proportional representation to the population was weak in certain aspects particularly as it required the cooperation of the Soviet Union. The UNTCOK which had begun its duty in Seoul from the beginning of January 1948 couldn't go into North Korea because of the Soviet Union's refusal, as expected. Faced with not fulfilling its duty, the UN proposed an alternative, including plans to carry out the general election in the areas accessible by the commission, meaning the election would be held in South Korea only. As it became clear that this proposal was likely to be accepted, many political parties and organizations vehemently opposed it by announcing successive statements against the plan. Their reason for the objection was that if the election was held only in South Korea, it would perpetuate the division of Korea. Not only the left-wing camp but also some right-wing political groups and moderates sided with this stance. Over the issue of holding the election in South Korea only, the right-wing camp split in two. Kim Gu and Kim Gyu-sik and their followers suggested negotiations with North Korea in order to unify the two Koreas, while opposing the establishment of a government only in South Korea. The other line came from Rhee Syng-man and the Korean Democratic Party. They were promoting the establishment of a government only in South Korea, keeping step with the US Military Government.

Under these circumstances, the South Korean Labor Party set up a strategy to disrupt the election: the so-called ‘2·7 Protest for Saving the Nation’ which instigated a general strike from 7 February 1948. The South Korean Labor Party presented nine slogans for the protest. They are as follows:

1. We oppose the UN Temporary Commission on Korea which is implementing policies that aim to perpetuate the division of Korea.
2. We oppose the establishment of a government only in South Korea.
3. The matter of establishing a unified Korean democratic nation should be left to the Korean people by simultaneously withdrawing the troops of the two foreign nations.
4. Pro-Japanese collaborators and instruments of international imperialism should be opposed, such as Rhee Syng-man and Kim Seong-su.
5. Enact labor laws and social insurance programs immediately to protect laborers and office workers.
6. Double the wages of laborers.
7. Hand over power to the People’s Committee.
8. Confiscate lands from landlords and distribute them to farmers for free.
9. Hurray for the Korean People’s Republic!<sup>186)</sup>

On 7 February in concert with the South Korean Labor Party, the Democratic People’s Front also issued a statement arguing, “The whole Korean people must stand up for the protest for saving our nation, in solidarity with laborers on general strike.” Under the instructions of the South Korean Labor Party, every labor union under the Korea Labor Union Council initiated a strike all across the nation. Transportation, telegraphic and telephone company workers, plus factory workers and miners went on strike. In Busan, there was even a demonstration using boats. About 300,000 members of the Party were mobilized in waging the strikes.<sup>187)</sup> Police stations were attacked, trains were destroyed, telephone poles were cut and bridges were exploded.

According to statistics tallied nationally, from February 2 to 20, there were 30 strikes, 25 walkouts, 103 demonstrations and 204 signal fires lit. Also, 8,479

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186) Department of Public Security at the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office of Korea, *Records of Left-wing Trials*, Vol. I, (1965), p.372.

187) Ha Seong-su, *History of the South Korea Labor Party*, (Segye, 1986), p.191.

people were arrested during the strikes.<sup>188)</sup> The department of state affairs announced that 39 people died and 133 people were injured.<sup>189)</sup>

However, and unexpectedly, on February 7, the situation on Jeju was relatively stable under the police's emergency guard. A US intelligence report of the US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps briefly stated that "Disturbances on JEJU-DO, since the initial uprising date of February 7, have been limited to illegal meetings and distribution of leaflets."<sup>190)</sup>

But the situation in Jeju changed from 8 February and rallies occurred in several areas. A US intelligence report of the US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps also described these changes. The report said, "On the nights of February 9, 10 and 11, 17 separate communist instigated riots and demonstrations occurred in the JEJU-DO area. These riots included attacks on six police boxes, the distribution of leaflets and demonstrations by mobs armed with swords and clubs. Notably, no deaths were reported, but two policemen were severely beaten. Approximately 290 arrests were made by the police in the three day period."<sup>191)</sup>

The allegations of attacks on six police boxes in the US intelligence report have not been confirmed. However, incidents of policemen being beaten and the shooting incident at the Gosan police box have been confirmed through newspaper articles at the time and testimonies of witnesses.

The policemen-beating happened in Sagye Village on February 9, 1948. Young men in Sagye Village were scheduled to gather at a village hall and hold a rally against the general election being held only in South Korea. They noticed that two policemen had already arrived in the village, and they ambushed them. The young men dragged the policemen to the village hall and pressed them to confess why they came to the village and who the informer was. The young men of the village had made every effort to detect betrayers believing that the information on rallies had been leaked to the police after the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident. The beaten policemen were rescued by the police

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188) Kim Nam-sik, *Study on the South Korea Labor Party*, (Dolbegae, 1984), p.306.

189) Kim Cheon-yeong, *Chronology of Korea's Modern History*, p.949.

190) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 759, February 14, 1948.

191) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 781, March 12, 1948.

unit which was sent later.<sup>192)</sup> Some documents described this incident mistakenly as ‘The Seogwang Village incident of burying policemen alive’.

The Gosan Village shooting incident on February 10 was an incident in which policemen fired at demonstrators to disperse them and one citizen was severely injured. On that day, about 100 young men in Gosan marched around the village and gathered at Gosan police box. At the time there were only three policemen at the station. The policemen ordered them to disperse, pointing loaded guns at them. However, as the crowd didn’t obey the order, one of the policemen fired at them and Sin Eung-seon, a village young man, was shot in the leg. The demonstrators dispersed after this single volley. Later, around 10 men were arrested on charges of holding the demonstration.<sup>193)</sup>

After the 2·7 Protest, the Jeju police made a sweeping roundup of people across the whole province. In one case, the police arrested 94 people in Samyang Village, Jeju-eup and freed them later.<sup>194)</sup> In those times, the intensity of the interrogation by the police increased more and more.

## 2) Incident of Deaths Resulting from Torture

In March 1948, three young men in succession died after being arrested and tortured by the police and this shocked the Jeju people. Kim Yong-cheol (age 21), who was a second-year student at Jocheon School, died suddenly at Jocheon police box on March 14, two days after his arrest. The autopsy revealed that he had died of torture. Yang Eun-ha (age 27) from Yeongrak Village, Daejeong-eup, was in custody at Moseolpo police box and also died from police torture on March 14. In late March, Park Haeng-gu (age 22) was shot dead by a police unit made up of the members of the Seobuk Young Men’s Association. Before he was killed, Park had been beaten and hacked by club and stone so severely that he was barely alive.

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192) The 4·3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4·3 Incident Speaks*, pp.543-544.

193) Yang Sun-bong (age 81, chief of Gosan Police Box at the time), Testimony, *Jeju Shinbo*, February 14, 1948.

194) *Jeju Shinbo*, February 14, 1948.

In Jeju, issues of torture by the police had never been raised from Liberation to the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident. However, after the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident, this issue had become a social problem. Many witnesses gave testimonies that the interrogation of the police reserves began with beating. Especially, the coercive interrogation skills of the special crime investigation division terrorized the Jeju people. The railroad police and policemen who defected to South Korea from the north, replacing the police reserves, held the prejudice that the Jeju people held seditious thoughts, while many Jeju people harbored ill will against them in turn, despising them as ‘those who came from the mainland’. This kind of mental conflict became amplified day by day and was portrayed in various forms of torture.

The torture incident at Jocheon police box was covered first by the local media six days after its occurrence. The article about the incident in the Jeju Shinbo is as follows:

A young man from Jocheon Village died suddenly at Jocheon police box of the 1st District Police Station while he was in custody at the station as a suspect of the 3 · 1 Incident last year. The dead man’s name is Kim Yeong-cheol (age 22) from Ha-dong, Jocheon Village, Jocheon-myeon. He had been wanted by the police as a suspect of the 3 · 1 Incident last year. He was arrested in Daeheul Village, Jocheon-myeon at dawn on 4 March where he had been hiding. He had been in custody since his arrest, but died suddenly on May 6. On receiving the report of the death, the prosecution office dispatched Jang Si-yeong, a doctor, and its staff to the police box under the direction of Prosecutor Chae Yong-byeong. Park Geun-yong, deputy commissioner of the Jeju Police Inspection Agency, and an American from the CIC also accompanied them. They conducted an autopsy on the body and a thorough investigation of the scene of the incident. They have returned to Jeju-eup. The investigation is going to continue, based on the report by the doctor, and the CIC is also conducting an investigation of this case. The development of the incident is being watched with keen interest.<sup>195)</sup>

Before this report, the residents of Jocheon-myeon had already come to the conclusion that Kim Yong-cheol died from torture and were agitated over the

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195) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 12, 1948.

news. The police made up a story that he died from illness but that was not quite convincing because he had bruises all over his body. Students at Jocheon School staged a demonstration calling for an investigation into the cause of death. Local dignitaries also regarded the situation as very serious and called upon the military government to conduct a thorough investigation.

The investigation of this incident, however, faced criticism relating to the selection of the doctor who would perform the autopsy. The police highly recommended Dr. Song Han-yeong, who was the director of the Health and Hygiene Department of Jeju Provincial Office. However, as Dr. Song, Moon Yong-chaе, the superintendent of the 1<sup>st</sup> District Police Station, and Jo Han-yong, the chief of the Jocheon police box - who caused the incident - were all from North Korea, the decision had to be reconsidered. Subsequently, the prosecution office designated Dr. Jang Si-yeong, who was from Jeju, as the doctor for the autopsy.

Unprecedentedly, the autopsy was performed twice. The first autopsy was not performed properly because of obstruction from the police and, as the matter became controversial, the American advisor ordered a second autopsy to be performed. The second autopsy, conducted the next day, revealed that the cause of the death was cerebral hemorrhage caused by external blows. Regardless of the continuous placation from the police, Dr. Jang reported to the prosecution office that Kim Yong-cheol died from cerebral hemorrhage cause by external blows.<sup>196)</sup> Jang's report led to the imprisonment of all five policemen from Jocheon police box. According to witnesses, the policemen hung Kim by the heels and beat him with clubs.<sup>197)</sup>

Even before the dust of the Jocheon incident had settled, on 14 March, another death from torture occurred at Moseolpo police box. The Jeju Shinbo reported this incident as follows:

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196) Jang Si-yeong (age 81, doctor who performed the autopsy), Testimony recorded on October 19, 2002.

197) Kim Yong-cheol (witness of the torture), Testimony as quoted by the 4·3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4·3 Incident Speaks*, p.560.

At the same time as wild speculation is spread about the unclosed incident at Jocheon police box in which a young man suddenly died, another similar incident occurred at Moseolpo police box on 14 March. A young man identified as Yang Eun-ha (age 27) from Yeongrak Village, Daejeong-eup, died suddenly on the morning of 14 March at Moseolpo police box. He had been in custody at the police box on the charge of violating the proclamation, and died suddenly at 4 a.m. in the morning, 14 March. Upon this urgent report, the commissioner of the Jeju prosecution office, the head of the investigation division of the Jeju police inspection agency and Dr. Moon Jong-hu were sent to the police box and examined the dead man. Upon the examination, it turned out that Yang died from damage to his 'testicles'. It is said that two policemen, Ko Eung-chun (police officer) and Byeon Tae-mun (detective), who interrogated Yang, were arrested immediately at the dictation of the commissioner and are under interrogation now.<sup>198)</sup>

This incident is also recorded in a US intelligence report by the US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps. It reads, "Two policemen were placed under arrest by fellow policemen on charges of having beaten a MOSEOLPO JEJU-DO prisoner to death on March 14."<sup>199)</sup> Yang was renowned for being a good public speaker in the village. He had even delivered a speech to the residents of his village right before his arrest, insisting, "We must desperately oppose the election which is restricted to be held only in South Korea, because it will perpetuate the division of Korea."

One witness who was jailed together with Yang gave his testimony about the situation. He said, "The policemen began their interrogation by beating detainees. The policemen beat us with clubs or trampled on us with sticks between our legs or tortured us with electricity. What angered and frustrated the detainees most was that the policemen tortured us just for fun when they got bored."<sup>200)</sup> Yang's brother testified, "The policemen hung my brother from the ceiling by his hair and pierced his testicles with awls. In the end my brother died because of that."<sup>201)</sup> Again, the police tried to conceal the

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198) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 16, 1948.

199) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 794, March 27, 1948.

200) Kim Si-byeong (prisoner at the Moseulpo Police Box at the time), Testimony as quoted by the 4·3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4·3 Incident Speaks*, p.570.

case. When the brothers of Yang Eun-ha rushed to the police box after hearing the news of their sibling's death, they saw a pit had been dug beside the dead body in the backyard of the police box as if the police had tried to bury his brother's body.<sup>202)</sup>

The two torture incidents in Jeju were mentioned at the 4<sup>th</sup> meeting of the UNTCOK held at Deoksugung Palace in Seoul on April 17, 1948. At this meeting, Manet, a French representative who had visited Jeju, brought this issue up and Military Governor Dean replied to it. The content of the minutes is as follows:

As a member of Group Number 1, he [Manet] also wanted to call the attention of General Dean to the fact that the Korea Police were sometimes reverting to methods inherited from the Japanese, and he referred to two deaths of Koreans, which had occurred during interrogations by the local police on the Island of Jeju-do (...). General Dean, Military Governor, stated that one of the deaths had occurred on 6 March, was investigated, and had been referred for trial to a Military Court. An investigation of the second case is now being made. If the investigation reveals the conditions alleged, the guilty parties will likewise be tried by Military Court.<sup>203)</sup>

Perhaps because of the international attention such as this, all 11 policemen at the Jocheon police box and the Meseolpo police box were brought to court martial and sentenced to imprisonment. On May 6, 1948, three policemen from Jocheon police box were sentenced to five years in prison and two policemen were sentenced to three years in prison, respectively.<sup>204)</sup> On June 9, with regard to the torture incident at Moseolpo police box, five policemen were sentenced to five years in prison; one policeman was sentenced to one

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201) Yang Seok-ha (age 77, Japan, younger brother of Yang Eun-ha), Testimony recorded on July 7, 2002.

202) Yang Sin-ha (age 65, cousin of Yang Eun-ha), Testimony recorded on August 23, 2002.

203) "United States Temporary Commission on Korea, Main Committee, Summary Record of the Fourth Meeting," April 17, 1948, RG 338: Records of U.S. Army Command (1942-), U.S. Army Forces in Korea 1945-49, Entry No. 11071, Box No. 3, NARA Washington, D.C.

204) *Chosun Ilbo*, May 9, 1948.

year in prison.<sup>205)</sup>

While the former two torture incidents attracted attention enough to be mentioned at the UNTCOK meeting, the execution of Park Haeng-gu went unnoticed in the vortex of the outbreak of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident. Park Haeng-gu, a young man from Geumreung Village, Hallim-myeon was caught by the police and members of the Seobuk Young Men's Association. He was beaten by them and was shot dead immediately. Before the day of his execution, there was a ship launching ceremony in the village. At the ceremony, Park Haeng-gu, who was drunk at the time, had a heated argument with right-wing young men about ideology and shouted at them "Traitors to the people!" That was the cause of the incident. The date of his execution is estimated to be March 29, 1948.<sup>206)</sup>

## **D. Preparation for Armed Uprising by Jeju Chapter of South Korean Labor Party**

### **1) January 22 Arrest**

Communists have called for riots to break out on JEJU-DO "between the middle of February and 5 March," according to translations of papers seized during a raid on an illegal meeting of the communist SOUTH KOREAN LABOR PARTY branch in JOCHEON conducted on 22 January. Instructions had also been issued for communists to "assassinate the police staff and high officials and seize police arms." While several SKLP staff members are believed to have escaped from police who broke in on the early morning (0300 hours) meeting, 106 people who were attending the meeting were arrested and an additional 63 were picked up before noon of the same day. A mimeograph machine and a large quantity of paper were confiscated. (CIC S/I, 05 Feb. C-3)<sup>207)</sup>

In addition to the 106 leftists who were arrested on 22 January, in connection with an illegal communist meeting where riot orders were discovered, 115 more

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205) *Chosun Ilbo*, June 15, 1948.

206) Lee Chi-haeng (age 70, Hallim-eup, a middle school student at the time), Testimony recorded on December 13, 2001.

207) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 752, February 6, 1948.

leftists had been arrested up to 26 January. Of the 221 total, 63 were released following police interrogation. Three released were members of the communist SOUTH KOREAN LABOR PARTY. The political affiliation of the remainder was not reported. (CIC P/R #32. Police rpt)<sup>208)</sup>

The above excerpts are from intelligence reports of the US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps. In short, they show that: ① the police raided the illegal assembly of the Jocheon Chapter of the South Korean Labor Party, arrested 106 people and a total of 221 people were arrested by 26 January; ② papers ordering rioting between the middle of February and 5 March were confiscated, and; ③ 63 detainees who were members of the South Korean Labor Party were released. A report of the US 971<sup>st</sup> CIC in Korea titled ‘Conspiracy by the Jeju Do South Korean Labor Party’ says that some papers confiscated ordered opposition to the UN commission, the general election and USAMGIK, and supported the establishment of the People’s Republic of Korea.<sup>209)</sup>

From 1947, the Jeju Committee of the South Korean Labor Party had managed its members in secret as it attempted to extend its influence. Particularly experiencing the sweeping roundups of the police after the 3 · 1 Incident, the Jeju Chapter of the party managed its members thoroughly by organizing a network of small and independent groups. At the time, USAMGIK and the Jeju police knew that the Jeju Chapter of the South Korean Labor Party had a solid organizational base but couldn’t uncover its organizational tree, nor the scope of its membership. That’s partly because the Jeju Chapter of the South Korean Labor Party thoroughly managed its organizations and networks, but also because the police intelligence network could not penetrate the public due to distance between the people and police.

However, an incident occurred which would unveil the organizational structure of the Jeju Chapter of the party. The incident began as Kim Saeng-min, a contact in the department of organization of the chapter, was arrested by the police in the middle of January. Kim who had endured torture and placation

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208) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 753, February 7, 1948.

209) 971 Counter Intelligence Corps, USAFIK, *CIC Semi-Monthly Report*, No. 3, February 15, 1948.

by the police began to confess 10 days after arrest. His confession and conversion to the police led to the outright exposure of the organizational structure which had been shrouded in mystery to the outside world. The police raided a meeting in Shinchon Village, Jocheon-myeon based on Kim's intelligence on 22 January. Shinchon Village was the hometown of Kim Saeng-min and had a hideout of the organizing department of the chapter which was a core department to the chapter. The head of the organizing department at the time was none other than Kim Dal-sam.

However, considering all the circumstances, some content of the US intelligence reports provokes some questions. The first is whether there was really a meeting with more than 100 attendees at 3 o'clock in the morning. The second doubt is whether the documents instructing the organization of riots between the middle of February and 5 March were real or not, and the last one is why the police released the members of the South Korean Labor Party.

The testimonies given by residents who had been arrested in the morning that day tell a different story from the US reports. Below is the testimony given by 18-year-old Huh Chun-seop:

At dawn on that day, two policemen came to my house and told me to come to the school because there would be a speech by the newly appointed police superintendent. When I arrived at Shinchon Elementary School, I realized that almost all the residents were present. About 70~80 policemen were scattered around the school fence and seven or eight GMC trucks were parked around the school. The police said the residents except the elderly, children, and the disabled would travel to the police station (in Jeju-eup) by truck. We rode to the 1st District Police Station beside Gwandeokjeong Square by truck. When we arrived at the police station, the policemen who had been kind to us suddenly took a completely different attitude and began to shout "Comrades of the South Korean Labor Party" at us. It was then I realized something was wrong. All of the people who went there wrote their names on paper and were put in jail in smaller groups. There wasn't even room for sitting because several hundreds of people were locked up at the same time. From that day, the police began torturing people one by one. They beat us with pieces of firewood and whips. What they mainly wanted to know was whether we joined the South Korean

Labor Party or not. If anyone denied joining the party, they were tortured. The police set the detainees free several times. Six people, including Lee Deok-gu, stayed behind bars longest. Eventually they were also released, 42 days after detention.<sup>210)</sup>

Huh Chun-seop said that most people who were actually involved in leftist activities avoided the arrest as if they had been informed of the roundup in advance, but Lee Deok-gu (who would become the second commander-in-chief of the guerrilla unit) had his eardrums ruptured and his toes broken under severe torture.

Kim In-pyeong who had his shoulder blade broken after being hit with a piece of firewood, was released after 10 days and testified, “My brother and I were arrested together. Because that was during the cold winter season, my cousin visited the police station bringing with her our clothes, but she was also arrested by the police and suffered hardships. I still don’t understand why we were arrested.”<sup>211)</sup>

Even Kim Saeng-min who confessed the organizational structure of the chapter to the police said that he did not know why the police arrested the village residents. He delivered the names of the executives with positions higher than district heads, but later he realized that the police caught only ordinary people.<sup>212)</sup> Considering the above circumstances and testimonies, it is probable that the police, who failed to catch core executives such as Kim Dal-sam and others, arrested ordinary residents and reported to the US Army that they arrested “the participants in the illegal assembly of the South Korean Labor Party”.

With regard to the papers instructing the organization of riots, the papers do not show who gave such instructions and even considering the armed protests that occurred later in the period between the middle of February and

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210) Huh Chun-seop (age 72, Jocheon-eup, inmate at the time), Testimony recorded on September 26, 2001.

211) Kim In-pyeong (age 77, Jocheon-eup, inmate at the time), Testimony recorded on October 11, 2001.

212) Kim Saeng-min (age 79, Jeju City, a contact of the Jeju Chapter of the South Korea Labor Party at the time), telephone interview on January 3, 2003.

5 March there are still many unanswered questions. In regard to this, materials from the leftwing camp insist that the existence of the papers itself was ‘a pure invention’ in order to choke off the influence of the South Korean Labor Party’.<sup>213)</sup> Notable is the fact that the Jeju CIC office categorized the reliability of this intelligence as ‘C-3’.<sup>214)</sup>

The third question regarding why the police released members of the South Korean Labor Party was a very delicate issue at the time. Considering the testimonies, it is true that the police had a strong will to punish people only if they were the members of the South Korean Labor Party. However, USAMGIK ostensibly recognized the South Korean Labor Party as a legal political party by that time. The USA, when submitting the issue of setting up a government in Korea to the UN, had made it clear both internally and externally that any political parties and organizations could engage in politics with no limitations. On 23 January 1948, the UNTCOK designated six politicians in South Korea and three politicians from North Korea as negotiating partners over the issue of the general elections both in South and North Korea. Notable is the fact that Huh Heon and Park Hyeon-yeong, both of whom were leaders of the South Korean Labor Party, were included in the South Korea politician group besides Rhee Syng-man, Kim Gu, Kim Seong-su and Kim Gyu-sik.<sup>215)</sup>

A scholar who has studied the South Korean Labor Party argued, “As the South Korean Labor Party was a legal political party under the rule of the US Military Government, people were not arrested only because they were members of the party. They were arrested on the charge of attending unapproved assemblies or being involved in plotting riots, violating USAMGIK Proclamation 2, etc.”<sup>216)</sup> An atmosphere like this could be detected in the press conference

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213) Kim Tae-hyeon, Kim Min-ju, *ibid.*, p.70.

214) The US intelligence reports classified the reliability of informers from ‘A’ to ‘F’ and that of intelligence from ‘1’ to ‘6’. For instance, ‘A-1’ means both the informer and his/her intelligence can be completely trusted, while ‘F-6’ means the informer cannot be trusted at all and neither can the intelligence. Thus, ‘C-3’ means that the intelligence may be true but cannot be trusted completely.

215) Ha Seong-su, *History of the South Korea Labor Party*, (Segye, 1986), p.184.

of Kim Yeong-bae, the commissioner of the Jeju Police Inspection Agency held on 1 March, a week after the 1·22 arrest. Commissioner Kim said, “Among the detainees, innocent people are being released one after the other” and added, “The police are not oppressing the people only because they joined the South Korean Labor Party but are trying to deal a hard blow to illegal acts committed by them.”<sup>217)</sup>

However, the contact’s confession dealt a blow to the Jeju Chapter of the South Korean Labor Party. After the 1·22 arrest, the roundups of the executives of the party by the police continued. During this period, important figures such as Ahn Se-hun, chair of the Jeju Chapter of the South Korean Labor Party, Kim Yu-hwan, Kim Eun-han, Kim Yong-gwan, Lee Jwa-gu, and Lee Deok-gu were arrested.<sup>218)</sup> It is said that Kim Dal-sam who would be a lynchpin of the armed protests later also was arrested but fled while the police were taking him to the police station.

These sweeping roundups of the police, which uncovered the structure of the Jeju Chapter of the South Korean Labor Party, fizzled out in the end. It’s because not only did they reveal little about the plot of riots but also USAMGIK granted a large-scale amnesty to political offenders in March 1948, with the 5·10 general election ahead, at the request of UNTCOK. Due to the amnesty, all of the important figures of the Jeju Chapter were freed before the outbreak of the 4·3 Incident.

Though the executives of the Jeju Chapter of the Korean Labor Party were released, the exposure of the party’s structure had a decisive effect on the later course of the Jeju Chapter. There was heightened tension among the members of the South Korean Labor Party caused by the possibility that their organization may collapse and they may lose their lives. Eventually, the hardliners succeeded in taking the initiative in restructuring the organization through stimulating a sense of crisis. This reshuffle of the leadership is said to have contributed to

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216) Kim Nam-sik (age 80, Seoul, Author of *Study on the South Korea Labor Party*), Telephone interview conducted on January 6, 2003.

217) *Jeju Shinbo*, February 4, 1948.

218) Jeju Province, *History of Jeju Province*, p.84.

the armed uprising later.

## 2) Decision to Begin an Armed Uprising

Once it became apparent in February 1948 that the general election would be held only in South Korea, the intense confrontation between USAMGIK and left-wing forces came to the surface. The left-wing camp conducted fierce anti-election campaigns including demonstrating, distributing leaflets, cutting telephone poles, destroying railroads, and attacking police boxes. For example, on 26 February, 26 police boxes in Jeonbuk Province were simultaneously attacked and as a result four police boxes were destroyed and two were burnt down. A US intelligence report by the US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps said that during February 125 police boxes attacks were reported, while such cases had never occurred in January.<sup>219)</sup>

This pressing development on the mainland facilitated the reshuffle of the leadership of the Jeju Chapter of the South Korean Labor Party, which had been hit by the exposure of its organizational structure to the police. The materials from the South Korean Labor Party argue that the leadership of the Jeju Chapter faced alternative courses of ‘just sitting and waiting for death’ or ‘standing up and fighting’.<sup>220)</sup> Considering the testimonies from witnesses who participated in discussions on waging an armed uprising, it seems that there was a head-to-head within the leadership, between those who thought the armed uprising was too early and those who were in favor of it. After heated debates regarding the course of action the hardliners gained control of the organization.

For the hardliners, the 5 · 10 general election justified the public propaganda because they could argue that the election would obstruct the unification of Korea. The hardliners also hoped that they could gain popularity, which they had lost due to suppression by the police and the Seobuk Young Men’s Association. In addition, if a government was established only in South Korea,

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219) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Weekly Summary, No. 133, April 2, 1948.

220) *Noryeok Inmin* (the South Korea Labor Party organ), May 25, 1948.

the party would lose its foundations completely. This was a matter of whether they could survive or perish. This was another part of the hard-liners' logic in trying to prevent the election from happening.

Due to the conflict over the chapter's future course between the hardliners and the moderates, right before the outbreak of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident, young and radical new faces replaced the existing leadership, mainly composed of elders who had conducted socialist movements during the Japanese colonial era. The representative figure of the newly emerging hardliners was Kim Dal-sam, who was 23 years old at the time. He was a teacher at Daejeong Middle School. As a head of the organizing department of the Daejeong-myeon Chapter of the South Korean Labor Party, he proposed the organization of a general strike to the Jeju Chapter after the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident in 1947. After that, he rose as a young leader holding positions of vice-director and then director of the organizing department of the Jeju Chapter. After the decision to wage an armed uprising was taken, he took the military position of managing the guerilla units. Some argue that the reason for Kim's rapid rise as a new leader despite his relatively young age was because his father-in-law, Jang In-mun, worked for him behind the scenes, as a member of the central committee and head of the organizing department of the South Korean Labor Party in Seoul.

It was at the Shinchon meeting in February 1948 that the decision to wage an armed uprising was made.<sup>221)</sup> Lee Sam-ryong, a guerrilla who took refuge in Japan and now lives in Tokyo, attended this meeting and gave this testimony on the circumstances at the time:

It was between the end of February 1948 and early March when the decision to wage an armed uprising was made. A meeting was held in Shinchon and 19 people who were executives and heads in the Jeju Chapter and in each myeon gathered at a private house in Shinchon. The attendees were Jo Mong-gu, Lee Jong-u, Kang Dae-seok, Kim Dal-sam, me [Lee Sam-ryong], Kim Du-bong, Ko Chil-jong, Kim Yang-geun, etc. Lee Deok-gu wasn't present. At this meeting, Kim Dal-sam insisted on organizing an armed uprising. The reason that he took the initiative was because he was impetuous. However, the attendees were divided

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221) The Jeju 4 · 3 Research Institute, *Now I Can Speak*, (Hanul, 1989), p.163.

between hardliners and moderates. There were seven moderates including Jo Mong-gu and people from Seongsanpo. They insisted that they needed to be cautious saying, “We don’t have much so, we should wait and watch how things go.” The rest [12 people] were hardliners including me, Lee Jong-u, and Kim Dal-sam. At that time, there were no instructions from the central headquarters of the party. The Jeju Chapter made the decision autonomously.

In deciding the armed uprising, an organizing instructor [called ‘org’] from the Jeonnam Chapter of the party always attended meetings. He stayed at Kim Du-bong’s house. After liberation, Kang Mun-seok never visited Jeju. Though he was in his twenties, Kim Dal-sam was controlling the organization because he was head of the organizing department and most of the senior executives were serving their sentences or had fled from arrest. Senior executives such as Ahn Se-hun, Oh Dae-jin, Kang Gyu-chan and Kim Taek-su had already left Jeju.

However, originally we targeted the vicious police and the Seobuk Young Men’s Association, not the Korean Constabulary. We didn’t have any intention to confront the US Army, either. Of course, we bore a grudge against them to some degree but they possessed a lot of new weapons. We were no match for them. We couldn’t have expected the US Army to attack us after we waged an armed uprising. We just hoped that an armed uprising would bring us some of the results we desired. We never dreamed of a prolonged war. That’s why we even negotiated with Kim Ik-ryeol [the commander of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment] during the uprising.

Anyway, our knowledge and level of analyzing the situation were not much more than that. We could not grasp what was going on and were not cautious enough. That’s why we were swayed so easily by Kim Dal-sam’s instigation. However, when the torture incidents occurred, the people in the chapter became convinced that in the end their decision was right. Kim Dal-sam notified us of the d-day of the uprising saying, “I will take the responsibility of commanding the armed units.” The d-day was set about 10 days before the outbreak of the Jeju 4·3 Incident. As the plan did not leak out beforehand, the organization could be safe. After the outbreak of the uprising, I stayed at a hideout of the Jeju Chapter located in Sinpyeong Village, Daejeong-myeon.<sup>222)</sup>

Lee’s testimony provides a window to the Shinchon meeting to some degree, which has been mentioned continuously to now. It is also a newly discovered fact that the decision to wage an armed uprising was made by a 12-7 vote

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222) Lee Sam-ryong (age 79, Japan, a member of the Political Committee of the Jeju Chapter of the South Korea Labor Party at the time), Testimony recorded on July 11, 2002.

with a heated debate between the hardliners and the moderates. Testimonies from other witnesses of the South Korean Labor Party also underpin the argument that the leadership of the Jeju Chapter of the South Korean Labor Party targeted only the police and the Seobuk Young Men's Association for their attack and could not predict the involvement of the Korea Constabulary nor the US Army. They point out that the leadership made the mistake of being too complacent and interpreting the situation for its own advantage.

Kim Si-jong, who acted as a member of the Jeju-eup chapter of the party and then fled to Japan, testifies, "I thought the 4 · 3 Incident would last three months at best. I had confidence that by June many parts of the island including Jocheon-myeon would be under our control. There were also expectations that the troops on the mainland might rise in revolt and respond to our uprising. We did not infiltrate into Jeju-eup at the time because we believed that if we occupied the suburbs of Jeju-eup and isolated it from other regions, the eup would naturally fall into our hands. We were naïve to think like that."<sup>223)</sup>

Lee Un-bang who was a leader of the Daejeong-myeon Chapter of the South Korean Labor Party and served time in prison right after the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident, testified, "The new faces in the leadership who insisted on waging an armed uprising took an optimistic view of the political situation. They mistakenly believed that, with the overflowing sentiment that the election scheduled to be held only in South Korea should be stopped, an armed uprising in Jeju would trigger a nationwide revolt and in turn the revolt would prevent dispatching any forces to Jeju to quell the uprising. They thought the Korea Constabulary would maintain neutrality and, if so, the police could not suppress the revolt by themselves and the US would not intervene in the suppression of the uprising because their involvement might make the uprising into an international issue."<sup>224)</sup>

Kim Saeng-min, who was a contact of the Jeju Chapter of the South Korean

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223) Kim Si-jong (age 74, Japan, a member of the Jeju Chapter of the South Korea Labor Party at the time), Testimony recorded on December 24, 2001.

224) Lee Un-bang (age 92, Daejeong-eup, a head of the Daejeong-eup Chapter of the South Korea Labor Party), Testimony recorded on November 9, 2001.

Labor Party and later switched sides to the police argued, “We expected that North Korea would invade South Korea in 1949, not in 1950. If the US and the Soviet Union armies withdrew in both Korea, the uprising could be a domestic issue. In other words, if the US Army withdrew from South Korea, the South Korean Labor Party would be powerful in influence in the region. Moreover, given that the Eighth Route Army was already stationed in North Korea, we judged that both the domestic and international situation would be in our favor. That’s why the hardliners believed if we endure a little longer while waging an armed uprising, we would be successful. However, the moderates opposed the plan arguing that waging an armed uprising would only isolate us.”<sup>225)</sup>

It seems that the decision to wage an armed uprising was finally approved at a meeting of the standing committee of the Jeju Chapter of the South Korean Labor Party around 15 March 1948, with the organizing instructor [org] from the Jeonnam Chapter in attendance. A document titled ‘*Report on the Protest of the Jeju Island People’s Guerrilla Units*’<sup>226)</sup> records the background of the decision as follows:

After the 3 · 1 Incident and the 3 · 10 General Strike last year, the police and the Seobuk Youth Association have suppressed Jeju people mercilessly. They arrested, beat, and tortured people. Furthermore, even innocent people were killed by torture before and after the Shinchon incident in January this year. The police and the Seobuk Young Men’s Association intensified and developed their actions to the level of subjugating and slaughtering Jeju people. Therefore, we rose in arms for the purpose of opposing the elections and the establishment of a government only in South Korea even though this way demanded the people’s blood.

With regard to the 3 · 1 protest, the action corps of each level laid the foundation of establishing self-defense units. Right after the 3 · 1 protest, the

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225) Kim Saeng-min (age 78, Jeju City, converted from the left to the right), Testimony recorded on October 24, 2002.

226) This report is alleged to have been obtained by the police commandos when they shot Lee Deok-gu dead on June 7, 1949. Moon Chang-song, ex-policeman, published a book titled “*Mt. Hallasan Knows – the Buried Truth of the 4 · 3 Incident*” in 1995 compiling a manuscript of the report.

Jeju Chapter ordered each myeon office to organize self-defense units but this could not progress well.

On 15 March, as the situation took a turn for the worse, the standing committee of the Jeju Chapter of the party held an assembly with the instructor from the Jeonnam Chapter as the central figure and decided to wage an armed uprising as a way of, first, protecting the organization and, second, opposing the election and the establishment of a government only in South Korea.<sup>227)</sup>

All in all, the Jeju Chapter of the South Korean Labor Party which was put on the defensive decided to wage an armed uprising for the two purposes. The first one was to protect its organization and the second one was to oppose both the election and the establishment of a government in South Korea only. During this process, the newly emerging young leadership drove the chapter to an armed uprising, being too optimistic about the circumstances at home and abroad.

### 3) Preparation for Armed Uprising

The Jeju Chapter of the South Korean Labor Party prepared for the armed uprising through restructuring the organization and securing supplies and weapons. *The Report on the Protest of the Jeju Island People's Guerrilla Units* explains this preparation process as follows:

By 25 March, the standing committee organized a military committee and delegated authority to the committee in organizing a self-defense unit [about 200 men], securing supplies and weapons, and strengthening propagandist work by assigning the tasks.

On 28 March, the second meeting was held behind schedule. The participants reviewed the progress up to that time and decided to launch the counterattack operation between 2 a.m. and 4 a.m. on April 3.<sup>228)</sup>

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227) "The Report on the Protest of the Jeju Island People's Guerrilla Units," in Moon Chang-song, ed., *Mt. Hallasan Knows – the Buried Truth of the 4 · 3 Incident*, (1995), pp.16-17.

228) "The Report on the Protest of the Jeju Island People's Guerrilla Units," in Moon Chang-song, ed., *Mt. Hallasan Knows – the Buried Truth of the 4 · 3 Incident*, (1995), p.17.

The Jeju Chapter of the South Korean Labor Party restructured its organization into a struggle committee and established a military department. The military committee was formed under the military department and the chair of the military committee would take both the position of the head of the military department and the commander-in-chief of the armed guerrilla units. This position went to Kim Dal-sam, making Kim hold the real power of waging an armed uprising. As to the organizations of the armed forces, three armed troops including a guerrilla unit, a self-defense unit and a special guard under the immediate control of the military committee were established. As progress was checked on 28 March, it turned out that the armed groups consisted of 320 men in total from eight eup and myeon, including Jeju-eup, Jocheon-myeon, Aewol-myeon, Hallim-myeon, Daejeong-myeon, Jungmun-myeon, Namwon-myeon and Poseon-myeon out of 13 eup and myeon on Jeju Island. The guerrilla unit consisted of 100 members and the self-defense unit comprised of 200 men. The special guard was made up of 20 people.<sup>229)</sup> Also the guerrilla unit had smaller units under its control such as platoons (10 men), companies (20 men) and battalions (40 men).

The secured weapons were 27 type-99 short rifles, three pistols, 25 grenades, seven smoke bombs and bamboo spears.<sup>230)</sup> Some materials and documents argue that the guerrillas were armed heavily with weapons of the Japanese army, such as machine guns and even cannons, but in reality they had only 30 guns in total. *The Report on the Protest of the Jeju Island People's Guerrilla Units* states, "One of the main causes of the failure of the 4 · 3 Incident is that we couldn't secure enough grenades and incendiaries."<sup>231)</sup>

Meanwhile, by that time, local youths were seen training on oreum (parasitic volcanic cones) in the upland areas on Mt. Halla. Around 20 March, the first clash between the armed guerrillas and the police occurred on Saebyeol

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229) "The Report on the Protest of the Jeju Island People's Guerrilla Units," in Moon Chang-song, ed., *Mt. Hallasan Knows – the Buried Truth of the 4 · 3 Incident*, (1995), p.11.

230) "The Report on the Protest of the Jeju Island People's Guerrilla Units," in Moon Chang-song, ed., *Mt. Hallasan Knows – the Buried Truth of the 4 · 3 Incident*, (1995), p.19.

231) "The Report on the Protest of the Jeju Island People's Guerrilla Units," in Moon Chang-song, ed., *Mt. Hallasan Knows – the Buried Truth of the 4 · 3 Incident*, (1995), p.30.

Oreum in Aewol-myeon, halfway up Mt. Halla. At the time, 67 self-defense unit members stayed in a camp for training. A total of nine policemen and members of the Seobuk Young Men's Association made a surprise attack on the camp. In response to this, the guerrillas fired back at them and the policemen and the members of the Seobuk Young Men's Association retreated. No lives were lost from this clash but one member of the self-defense unit was slightly injured.<sup>232)</sup> The military committee of the Jeju Chapter of the South Korean Labor Party set April 3 as the d-day for the attacks and mapped out a plan for attacking. According to the plan, they would occupy the Jeju Police Inspection Agency and the 1st District Police Station by mobilizing the special guard and attacking 14 police boxes around the island by dispatching the guerrilla units and the self defense unit.

Before this, the Jeju Chapter of the party had already infiltrated four members into the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment of the National Defense Squad in Moseolpo. Two of them quit in the middle of the mission but the remaining two kept working as spies. The military committee contacted the spies in advance and checked the possibility of mobilizing the members of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment in the attack. The two spies said 400 men out of the 800 unit members in total would surely join the attack and another 200 members could be manipulated to join the attacks. They also added that hard-line opposition was mainly 18 officers and noncommissioned officers and once they were removed mobilizing the members of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment would be no problem. The spies asked the military committee to send five trucks to the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment because there weren't enough vehicles in the regiment but they promised to attack the targets on foot even if they could not secure the vehicles.<sup>233)</sup>

In the end, the mobilization of the unit members of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment wasn't realized. An agent from the Jeju Chapter went to the meeting point with five trucks but the spies didn't show up. After asking all around, the agent found

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232) "The Report on the Protest of the Jeju Island People's Guerrilla Units," in Moon Chang-song, ed., *Mt. Hallasan Knows – the Buried Truth of the 4 · 3 Incident*, (1995), p.46.

233) "The Report on the Protest of the Jeju Island People's Guerrilla Units," in Moon Chang-song, ed., *Mt. Hallasan Knows – the Buried Truth of the 4 · 3 Incident*, (1995), p.76.

out that the two spies had been locked up in the guardhouse.

#### 4) Authenticity of the Theory that the Seoul Central Headquarters Directed the Uprising

Some materials argue that the Jeju 4·3 Incident was carried out on instructions from the central headquarters of the South Korean Labor Party in Seoul. Based on this argument, some go even further and suggest that North Korea and the Soviet Union maneuvered behind the scenes. The source of this theory was the writing of Park Gap-dong, allegedly in charge of underground operations of the South Korean Labor Party, when the Jeju 4·3 Incident was mentioned in his serial in the Joongang Ilbo from 1973. He argues in his serial, “The 4·3 riot broke out upon orders of the central headquarters of the South Korean Labor Party.” Park’s serial came out as a book titled ‘Park Heon-yeong’. Since then, his argument has been quoted and reproduced by conservative writers. The major content of his argument is as follows:

Following the policy of ‘aggressively boycotting the general election’, the South Korean Labor Party chose Jeju Island as the place to wage an armed rebellion. The reason the party selected Jeju Island, which is located far from the mainland, was that they thought, due to its geographical features, the communists’ activities had been most active there since the 8.15 Liberation and Jeju’s people were quite receptive to communism because of the communists’ active propaganda and activities (...)

Meanwhile, the instructions to riot were delivered to the Jeju Chapter. The instructions seemed to be delivered to Kim Dal-sam, the commander-in-chief of the armed guerrillas, in the middle of March (...).

At 2 a.m. on 3 April, Moon Sang-gil deceived soldiers of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment and provided them with arms. Moon transported the soldiers with three trucks and attacked the Jeju Police Inspection Agency and the 1st District Police Station. Taking this attack as the signal, the armed guerrillas attacked 14 police boxes on the island simultaneously (...).

During that time, the central headquarters of the South Korean Labor Party dispatched Lee Jung-eop, who was in charge of the military department and Lee Jae-bok, who was in charge of the party’s agents, as military leaders of the

guerillas and attempted to expand military activities. The headquarters also sent Jang Mun-seok, who was the father-in-law of Kim Dal-sam, the leader of the riot, and the head of party propaganda to the island as an instructor to plan policies and structure the organization.<sup>234)</sup>

However, this is far from what really happened as there is no concrete evidence that the events were directed by the instructions of the headquarters of the South Labor Party. There is little to link the Seoul headquarters with the occupation of the Jeju Police Inspection and the 1<sup>st</sup> District Police Station by troops under Moon Sang-gil, the attacks on all the 14 police boxes and the dispatch of Lee Jung-eop, Lee Jae-bok and Kang Mun-seok to the Jeju Chapter of the party.

With regard to his writing, Park Gap-dong, who lives in Tokyo, explained, “That was not what I wrote. Others redrafted my writing when it was put in the paper.” Park also insisted, “People say the Jeju 4·3 Incident was an anti-campaign against the 5·10 general election but, if so, why was the campaign so violent only in Jeju? The 4·3 Incident was caused by the tyranny of the police and the Seobuk Young Men’s Association. It was not a full-scale armed struggle but an uprising to fight against the police and the youth association on their own.”<sup>235)</sup>

Kim Nam-sik, an expert on the South Korean Labor Party, explained, “The struggle against the 5·10 general election was a combination of a political movement and an armed struggle through public mobilization, not a full-scale armed revolt. Thus there was no response from the mainland to the uprising. The distinct characteristics of Jeju triggered the uprising together with the instigation by Kim Dal-sam and others.”<sup>236)</sup>

Dr. John Merrill maintained in his paper, “The attacks on April 3 began as a campaign against the general election which was scheduled to be held

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234) Park Gap-dong, *Park Heon-yeong*, (Ingansa, 1983), pp.198-199.

235) Park Gap-dong (age 84, Japan, author of *Park Heon-yeong*), Testimony recorded on July 11, 2002.

236) Kim Nam-sik (age 80, Seoul, author of *Study on the South Korea Labor Party*), Telephone interview conducted on January 6, 2003.

only in South Korea but conducted by the hostile leadership of the Jeju Chapter of the South Korean Labor Party.”<sup>237)</sup> In an interview with Korean media, John Merrill said, “In my conclusion, there were no instructions from the central headquarters of the South Korean Labor Party” and argued, “It is important for understanding the 4 · 3 Incident to analyze the uprising by time slot.”<sup>238)</sup>

Witnesses who had joined the South Korean Labor Party denied there was involvement from the central headquarters of the party and maintained that the attacks were carried out by the Jeju Chapter, autonomously. Lee Sam-ryong, who had been a member of the political committee of the Jeju Chapter argued, “[The Uprising] was a decision of the Jeju Chapter and there were no orders from Seoul.”<sup>239)</sup> Lee Un-bang, who had been the head of the Daejeong-myeon of the party in 1947, argued in *The truth of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident*, “The 4 · 3 Protest was carried out by some immature and adventurous leaders at the wrong time without proper preparation. The armed guerrillas charged toward the targets armed with only a few pistols. The uprising was completely isolated from the nationwide struggle due to the autonomous decision by the leadership and also ended in such a way.”<sup>240)</sup>

The doubts about the theory of the involvement of the central headquarters of the South Korean Labor Party are also raised in some books written by former army generals. Kim Jeom-gon, who went into the first reserve as a major general, argues against this theory by presenting six counter arguments in his book *The Korean War and Strategies of The South Korean Labor Party*. One of his six counter arguments is that Jeju is isolated from the mainland by land, sea and air so, communizing Jeju Island first and then advancing North is simply unrealistic and irrational considering the capacity of the armed guerrillas and the political situation at the time. Kim maintained, “Only Jeju Island

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237) John Merrill, “The Cheju-do Rebellion”, *Journal of Korean Studies*, vol. 2, 1980, p.166.

238) Interview with John Merrill (*Jemin Ilbo*, June 15, 1990)

239) Lee Sam-ryong (age 79, Japan, a member of the Political Committee of the Jeju Chapter of the South Korean Labor Party at the time), Testimony recorded on July 11, 2002.

240) Lee Un-bang, “The Truth of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident,” as quoted in the Jeju 4 · 3 Research Institute, *Now I Can Speak*, (Hanul, 1989), p.233.

showed a different type of struggle from the mainland in waging a campaign against the 5 · 10 general election and that's because the uprising surely broke out accidentally and deviated from the central line of the party."<sup>241)</sup>

Baek Seon-yeop (who went into the first reserve as a general) who had been the commander of the suppression troops of Mt. Jiri wrote, "The Yeosu-Suncheon Incident was not caused by instructions from the central headquarters of the South Korean Labor Party. Like the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident, the incident broke out as an arbitrary decision made by a lower branch of the party."<sup>242)</sup>

The fact that there were no instructions from central headquarters is also confirmed concretely by examining the failure of mobilizing soldiers of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment on 3 April. *The Report on the Protest of the Jeju Island People's Guerrilla Units* described this issue as follows:

The agent went to meet the spies in the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment with the final instructions but they didn't show up because they were confined in the guardhouse. Thus, instead, the agent met Second Lieutenant Moon Sang-gil. Moon told the agent that there were two spy rings in the regiment. One was a ring controlled by the central headquarters of the South Korean Labor Party with him (Moon) as the central figure and the other organization was a spy ring that had been organized by the Jeju Chapter with noncommissioned Officer Ko Seung-ok as its central figure. Moon said that right before the 4 · 3 Incident, Officer Ko had asked him to mobilize the soldiers of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment in the uprising but he had refused to do so saying that he couldn't participate in the attacks without orders from Seoul.

The agent was very surprised at this news. But, on the spot, he asked Moon again and again to join the uprising for the protection of lives and property of 300,000 Jeju people and for the victory of the struggles to save the nation. However, Second Lieutenant Moon stubbornly refused to join the attacks as he had not received the orders from the mainland. In this way, the plan of mobilizing the soldiers of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment in the uprising failed.<sup>243)</sup>

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241) Kim Jeom-gon, *The Korean War and the Strategy of the South Korea Labor Party*, (Parkyeongsa, 1983), pp.142-160.

242) Baek Seon-yeop, *The Annals of Mt. Jirisan*, (Koreaone, 1992), p.157.

243) "The Report on the Protest of the Jeju Island People's Guerrilla Units," in Moon Chang-song, ed., *Mt. Hallasan Knows – the Buried Truth of the 4 · 3 Incident*, (1995), p.77.

This record supports the argument that the armed uprising in Jeju did not involve the central headquarters of the South Korean Labor Party. Thus, it can be said that the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident was caused by the combination of the characteristic features of Jeju, the conflict between the Jeju people and the police and the Seobuk Young Men's Association after the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident, and the decision made by the Jeju Chapter of the South Korean Labor Party with the intent of exploiting the tension from these conflicts to oppose the 5 · 10 general election which was scheduled to be held exclusively in South Korea.



### III. The Development Process

#### 1. Armed Uprising and 5 · 10 General Election

(April 3, 1948 - May 10, 1948)

##### A. The Situation on April 3, 1948

###### 1) The Slogan of the Armed Uprising

Around 2 a.m. on April 3, 1948, the armed uprising led by South Korea Labor Party's Jeju branch begun with signal fires blazing at every Oreum<sup>1)</sup> on the mountainside of Mt. Halla. At dawn that day, approximately 350 armed rebels simultaneously attacked 12 of 24 provincial police boxes. The police, Seobuk Young Men's Association's accommodation, and houses of key figures affiliated with right-wing organizations including National Congress for Promoting Independence were also targeted for attack. This action triggered the bloodshed which lasted for six years and six months, until the Mt. Halla standstill order was lifted on September 21, 1954.

The armed rebels stirred up the uprising under the banner of resistance against the oppression of the police and right-wing youth associations, opposition to the unilateral election and government, while promoting reunification and independence, the anti-American and save-the-nation movement. Slogans of the armed rebels are included in *The 4 · 3 Armed Uprising History of Jeju People*<sup>2)</sup> written by Kim Bong-hyeon and Kim Min-ju, and published in Japan in 1963. This book contains two letters of appeal which were distributed by

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1) An adventive cone or parasitic volcano in Jeju Island

2) Kim Bong-hyeon, a former history teacher at Ohyun Middle School, was engaged as a head of Culture Department of the Jeju National Democratic People's Front in 1947 and left for Japan just before the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident occurred. Co-author Kim Min-ju, a student of Jocheon School, joined an armed resistance group in Mt. Hallasan in 1948.

the armed rebels when it started action on April 3. The following is an appeal & warning sent to the police, public officials, and members of Daedong Youth Corps by the armed rebels:

Dear police officers! We resist against oppression. The Jeju Island guerrilla unit defends the people, standing with them. Conscientious police officers! If you don't want a resistance, be on the people's side. Conscientious public officials! Take the line as soon as possible to carry out your missions, protect your jobs, and fight with the vicious colleagues to the end. Conscientious police officers and youngsters, who are you fighting for? Koreans should defeat foreign invaders who trample on our territory and should throw down traitors, who betray their own country and people and who slaughter patriots. Police officers! Point a gun at the traitors. Do not point a gun at your parents and siblings. Conscientious police officers, young people, and democratic figures! Be on the people's side immediately. Respond to and rise up against the anti-American and save-the-nation movement.<sup>3)</sup>

The following is a letter of appeal, sent by the armed rebels to the Jeju people:

Fellow citizens! Respectable parents and siblings! Today, on this day of April 3, your sons, daughters, and little brothers and sisters rose up in arms for the reunification and independence of our homeland, and for the complete liberation of the people. We must risk our lives for the opposition to the betrayal of the country and the unilateral election and government. We rose up in arms against the brutal slaughter done by American cannibals that force you into hardship and unhappiness. To vent your deep-rooted rancor we rouse up in arms. You should defend us who fight for the victory of our country and should rise up along with us, responding to the call of the country and its people.<sup>4)</sup>

This can be summarized as follows: first, as is implied in the sentence, “we resist against oppression,” it means the armed rebels will resist the oppression of the police and right-wing youth associations; second, it means that they will

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3) Kim Bong-hyeon, Kim Min-ju, *The 4 · 3 Armed Uprising History of Jeju People*, Bunyusha, 1963, pp.84-85.

4) *Ibid.* p.85.

desperately oppose the unilateral election and government, and win the reunification and independence of their homeland; third, it is the resistance to the American military administration, which is expressed as the “anti-American and save-the-nation movement.”

Such slogans clearly indicate the politically colored position, which is the opposition to the unilateral election and government and the anti-American fight, moving a few steps further than the position that it will fight against the tyranny of the police and Seobuk Young Men’s Association. This is a sign of a head-on collision between the domestic unilateral election supporters and the American military administration, which wanted to build an anti-communist nation in the area south of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel through the 5 · 10 General Election.

## 2) Attack on 12 Police Boxes

On April 3, around 2 a.m., the armed rebels simultaneously attacked 12 out of 24 provincial police boxes including Samyang, Hamdeok, Sehwa, Sineom, Aewol, Oedo, Jocheon, Hanrim, and Hwabuk stations within the jurisdiction of the Area 1 (Jeju) police station and Namwon, Daejeong, Seongsan stations within the jurisdiction of the Area 2 (Seogwipo) police station.

Government sources from the military and the police,<sup>5)</sup> however, made many errors in describing the Jeju 4 · 3 Uprising. As for the April 3 situation, there are many errors in locations. Those sources describe that 13~14 police boxes were attacked on that day. Moseolpo Police Station, which was established nine months after the armed uprising occurred, appears in the situation record of April 3 and Gosan and Jeoji police boxes are described as being attacked even though they had never been attacked. Such errors had been repeated without correction from 1952 when they first appeared in *Korea Police Battle History* published by the National Police Agency of the Ministry

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5) National Police Agency of the Ministry of Home Affairs, *Korea Police Battle History: The Vanguard of People*, Vol. 1, Heungguk-yeonmun Association, 1952; Army Headquarters, *The History of Suppression on Red Guerrillas*, Department of Publishing Military History at Army Headquarters, 1954; Criminal Investigation Agency of the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office, *The Record of the Left-related Affairs*, Vol. 1, the same agency, 1965.

of Home Affairs to Jejudoji published in 1982.

*Korea Police Battle History* describes the day of April 3 as follows: “the leaders of the riot immobilized the entire Jeju Police forces by raiding and occupying the Jeju Police Inspection Office and the Jeju Police Station at the same time, and also attempted an abominable riot to take possession of Jeju Island in the communist world. . . .<sup>6)</sup> This is the ground for the errors that have been repeated until recently. A passage from *Park Heon-yeong*, written by Park Gapdong, says, “At 2 a.m. on April 3, Mun Sanggil tricked soldiers into being armed to the teeth and gave a ride in three trucks in order to raid and occupy the Jeju Police Inspection Office and the Jeju Police Station, which was the start of the attack for the 14 provincial police boxes.”<sup>7)</sup> Park, however, later said that this was not his writing. Indeed, Jeju Police Inspection Office and the Jeju Police Station had never been raided or occupied on April 3 or until the Jeju 4 · 3 Uprising ended.

The exaggerated statements are also found in *The 4 · 3 Armed Uprising History of Jeju People*, which was written from a left-wing viewpoint. This book says that 14 police boxes, offices of Seobuk Young Men’s Association, National Association, National Congress for Promoting Independence, and Daedong Young Men’s Association were attacked and the houses of 41 reactionary elements including Jeju Governor Yoo Hae-jin and chief of the Jeju Inspection Office were also raided and destroyed, disclosing the list of the reactionary elements.<sup>8)</sup> But the actual number of rightists who were attacked was much less.

The following are the real situations of each police boxes, in Korean alphabetical order, on April 3.

Samyang police box within the jurisdiction of the Area 1 police station was attacked by the armed rebels without casualties. A police report says about the situation of Samyang, “20 red guerrillas invaded but all of them were

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6) National Police Agency of the Ministry of Home Affairs, *Korea Police Battle History: The Vanguard of People*, Vol. I, Heungguk-yeonmun Association, 1952, p.100.

7) Park Gapdong, *Park Heon-yeong*, Ingansa Publishing Co., 1983, pp.198-199.

8) Kim Bong-hyeon · Kim Min-saeng, Op. cit. p.84.

completely repulsed without any damage.’<sup>9)</sup> According to the *Jeju Island Guerrilla Unit Fight Report* published by the armed rebels, when Samyang police box was attacked on April 3, ‘there were six police officers and 16 friendly crew members. Possessed arms include a Type 99 Arisaka Rifle, two sticks of dynamite and four incendiaries. Both parties engaged in a close fight, carrying the fighting to the front gate of the police box. Glass was destroyed by bamboo spears but we retreated because of the severe fire from the enemy and for fear of the supporters that may come. Both parties had no injuries.’<sup>10)</sup>

Sehwa Police Box in Gujwa-myeon was attacked and occupied for a while by the armed rebels on the day. About ten police officers who worked at the station escaped death but two of them got stabbed by a Japanese sword and were injured.<sup>11)</sup> However, the sources from the armed rebels describe that rebels killed one police officer who belonged to Seobuk Young Men’s Association and captured two rifles.<sup>12)</sup>

The worst hit area was Gueom-ri in Aewol-myeon, Bukjeju-gun, under the jurisdiction of Sineom Police Box, where the right-wing prevailed. According to the sources from the armed rebels, 120 people were mobilized in the attack on Gueom-ri and the arms included four rifles, five sticks of dynamite, and bamboo spears. When 40 people were deployed around the police box to attack, a team for an attack on Aewol Police Box took action 30 minutes prior to scheduled time so their plan was revealed in advance. Hence Aewol Police Box fought back and the plot to occupy failed.<sup>13)</sup> A police constable, Song Won-hwa, was attacked at a billet and got stabbed in 14 places, but ran to the station and had a narrow escape.<sup>14)</sup> The armed rebels attacked the rightists

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9) National Police Agency of the Ministry of Home Affairs, op. cit., 1952, p.101

10) The Report on the Protest of the Jeju Island People's Guerrilla Units, Moon Chang-song, *Mt. Hallasan Knows - The Buried Truth of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident*, 1995, p.62.

11) Jo Tae-ryong (former head of the Organizing Department of Gujwa-myeon Daedong Youth Corps), Testimony, The 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4 · 3 Incident Speaks*, Vol. II, Jeonyewon, 1994, p.35.

12) The Report on the Protest of the Jeju Island People's Guerrilla Units, Moon Chang-song, *Mt. Hallasan Knows - The Buried Truth of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident*, p.60.

13) The Report on the Protest of the Jeju Island People's Guerrilla Units, Moon Chang-song, *Mt. Hallasan Knows - The Buried Truth of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident*, p.41.

and even their families. They killed two teenage daughters of Moon Yeong-baek, who had engaged in right-wing activity. In Gueom-ri five rightists and their families were killed and a dozen people were injured. One police officer was severely wounded and two members of the armed rebels were shot dead during the battle.

An explosive substance was dropped in the yard of the Aewol Police Box but it didn't go off, causing no casualties. Due to the rain on the previous day, the yard was puddled, which helped the home-made bomb fail to explode. Eighty (80) rebels were mobilized in the Aewol Police Box attack.<sup>15)</sup>

At the Oedo Police Box in Jeju-eup, a police constable, Seonu Jung-tae, from North Korea was killed by shots fired by the armed resistance. Fourteen (14) rebels with one Type 99 Arisaka Rifle were mobilized in the Oedo Police Box attack.<sup>16)</sup>

Although the Jocheon Police Box was put in an unfavorable situation as most of its police officers were replaced when a rebel died of torture on March 6, no one was killed or injured. Jeong Do-il, who worked at the Jocheon Police Box, testified "A police officer stumbled across a group of people approaching secretly, so he fired a blank shot. After that, the situation was over."<sup>17)</sup> According to the armed resistance, forty (40) people with two Type 99 Arisaka Rifles succeeded in surrounding the station but soon retreated because they were discovered in advance.<sup>18)</sup>

When the Hallim Police box was attacked, the police officers did not fight back, but only tried to protect the box. There was no damage in the station as the resistance did not attack fiercely. A police officer, Kim Rok-man, was killed in a barracks by the resistance. Two other police officers were injured in the attack while sleeping in the billet. Meanwhile, the armed resistance

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14) Song Won-hwa (a police officer at the Sineom Police Box at the time), Testimony recorded on June 1, 2002.

15) "The Report on the Protest of the Jeju Island People's Guerrilla Units," in Moon Chang-song, ed., *Mt. Hallasan Knows – the Buried Truth of the 4 · 3 Incident*, (1995), p.42.

16) *Ibid.* p.35.

17) Jeong Do-il (a police officer at the Jocheon Police Box at the time), Testimony as quoted in the 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4 · 3 Incident Speaks*, Vol. II, p.34.

18) "The Report on the Protest of the Jeju Island People's Guerrilla Units," in Moon Chang-song, ed., *Mt. Hallasan Knows – the Buried Truth of the 4 · 3 Incident*, (1995), p.62.

group tied police officers in the police box and also attacked the houses of the rightists known to them. Hyeon Ju-seon, who was chief of Jeju Police Inspection Office of National Congress for Promoting Independence, and also the chief of Hallim-myeon, was injured. One police officer was killed and two police officers were injured. Six right-wing members of National Association, Seobuk Young Men's Association were injured.<sup>19)</sup>

The Hwabuk Police Box was completely destroyed by an arson attack of the resistance group and a clerk, who was on night duty at the station, was burned to death. In addition, a police officer Kim Jang-ha and his wife, who rented a private house, were killed by the armed rebels. In sum, three people including a police officer, a family member of a police officer, and a clerk were killed and the Hwabuk Police Station was entirely destroyed by fire. Fourteen (14) armed rebels and one Type 99 Arisaka Rifle were mobilized for the attack.<sup>20)</sup>

The Namwon Police Box within the jurisdiction of the Area 2 police station was attacked by ten armed rebels with two Type 99 Arisaka Rifles, a Japanese sword, and bamboo spear.<sup>21)</sup> The members of the Daedong Youth Corps, who had helped guard the police box, were the first victims of the attack. When the armed rebels ran into the station shooting a rifle, an assistant, Bang Seong-hwa, was shot in the stomach and died. The other assistant, Kim Seok-hun was hit by sword and wooden pole, but he managed to escape. The armed rebels seized a police officer, Ko Il-su, and stabbed him to death. Then, the rebels broke into the armory of the station and ran away with American carbine rifles, air rifles, and bullets. As a result, one police officer and one assistant were killed, and two assistants were injured at the Namwon Police Box.<sup>22)</sup>

The Daejeong Police Box located in Daejeonggol<sup>23)</sup> was attacked by the

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19) Hyeon Yeo-gyeong (Son of Hyeon Ju-seon), Testimony as quoted in the 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4 · 3 Incident Speaks*, Vol. II, pp.30-32.

20) "The Report on the Protest of the Jeju Island People's Guerrilla Units," in Moon Chang-song, ed., *ibid.*, p.35.

21) *Ibid*, p.58.

22) Kim Seok-hun, Testimony as quoted in the 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4 · 3 Incident Speaks*, Vol. II, pp.23-26.

23) Name of a place for the region of Inseong-ri, Boseong-ri, Anseong-ri in Daejeong-myeon

armed rebels and one police officer was severely injured. The Daejeong Police Box was a small scale station with three police officers using a shrine in Boseong-ri as its office. Of two police officers who were on guard, Lee Mu-ung was severely wounded by a bullet.<sup>24)</sup> According to the sources from the armed rebels, however, seven rebels participated in the attack and one police officer was killed instantly by two gunshots.<sup>25)</sup>

Moseolpo, site of the Moseolpo Police Box, was also a military post of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment of the Korea Constabulary, which is why the station was not a target of attack. However, the armed rebels threw a bomb at a house of Kang Pil-saeng who was in charge of the Daejeong-myeon branch of the Daedong Youth Corps. Kang Pil-saeng suffered shrapnel wounds, but managed to survive.<sup>26)</sup> He dedicated himself to the police after the incident.

Only three police officers out of 14 were on night duty at Seongsanpo Police Box. Forty (40) armed rebels with two Type 99 Arisaka Rifles attempted to attack, but they ran away when the police fired a gun, with no damage occurring. According to the sources from the armed rebels, the rebels had to retreat because the two rifles failed to function.<sup>27)</sup>

Meanwhile, Hamdeok Police Box was not directly attacked, but two police officers were lost. It has been suggested that a police officer, who had ties with the armed rebels, kidnapped the other police officer and joined the resistance group. The sources from the armed rebels describe the same.<sup>28)</sup>

According to the result of the on-site investigation, the casualties of April 3 are as follows: △ The Police: four killed, six injured, two missing △ Civilians including the rightists: eight killed, 19 injured △ Armed resistance

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24) Ko Hyeong-won, (a police officer of the Daejeong Police Box at the time), Testimony as quoted in the 4·3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4·3 Incident Speaks*, Vol. II, p.38.

25) “The Report on the Protest of the Jeju Island People’s Guerrilla Units,” in Moon Chang-song, ed., *ibid.*, p.51.

26) “The Report on the Protest of the Jeju Island People’s Guerrilla Units,” in Moon Chang-song, ed., *ibid.*, p.51.

27) “The Report on the Protest of the Jeju Island People’s Guerrilla Units,” in Moon Chang-song, ed., *ibid.*, p.50.

28) “The Report on the Protest of the Jeju Island People’s Guerrilla Units,” in Moon Chang-song, ed., *ibid.*, p.62.

group: two killed, one captured.

The situation by regions is as follows:

- △ Hwabuk: One police officer was killed, two civilians were killed, and the police box was completely destroyed by fire.
- △ Sineom, Gueom: One police officer was injured, five civilians were killed and ten were injured, two armed rebels were killed, and fires broke out at four private houses.
- △ Namwon: One police officer was killed, one civilian was killed and two were injured.
- △ Hallim: One police officer was killed and two were injured, six civilians were injured, and one armed rebel was captured.
- △ Oedo: One police officer was killed.
- △ Hamdeok: Two police officers were lost.
- △ Sehwa: Two police officers were injured.
- △ Daejeong: One police officer was injured and one civilian was injured.

However, those figures are different from the sources of the armed rebels. According to the sources from the armed resistance group, the attack on April 3 caused the death of ten police officers. But even if one of two people, who were kidnapped at Hamdeok Police Box, was killed, the death toll is still different from the above. In the cases of Sehwa and Daejeong Police Box, for example, it seems that the armed rebels reported to the superior authority as instantaneous death when a police officer fell from a gunshot of the armed rebels outside of the station, but some testified that the police officers had not died but were injured. The sources from the armed rebels say seven members of Seobuk Young Men's Association were killed, but it is difficult to ascertain the facts.<sup>29)</sup>

There are memorials to police officers who died on duty in every village. Following policy, these police officers were promoted two ranks, from a constable to a lieutenant, from a sergeant to an inspector. All police officers who died on duty during the period of Jeju 4 · 3 Uprising, were promoted two ranks.<sup>30)</sup>

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29) "The Report on the Protest of the Jeju Island People's Guerrilla Units," in Moon Chang-song, ed., *ibid.*, p.31.

30) *Dong-A Ilbo*, May 15, 1948; *Gukje Shinmun*, October 7, 1948; *Hanseong Ilbo*, November 19, 1948.

## **B. The Organization and the Armed Power of the Armed Resistance Group**

### 1) Members of the Armed Resistance Group

When the armed uprising started on April 3, a pressing matter of the military and the police was the organization and training system of the armed rebels, as well as the scale of its strength and arms. This is also related with questions, for example, of how systematic and premeditated the armed uprising was, whether it is true that the armed uprising was connected with Central Committee of South Korea Labor Party, North Korea, and the Soviet Union and whether the Jeju armed rebels were supplied with arms and military strength from the outside as government sources assert. According to *History of Korean War* published by the Ministry of National Defense in 1967, the military strength and arms are described as follows.

At the time of the Pacific War of the Second World War, the Japanese army deployed 60,668 of military forces in Jeju, preparing for a decisive war on the mainland. After defeat, the Japanese army buried the fortified military camp and a vast volume of arms and ammunition in Mt. Halla, and withdrew. . . . Jeju People's Liberation Unit gathered those arms and they armed themselves with the weapons. Former members of the Eighth Route Army trained the armed rebels so that they started a guerrilla in very high spirits. The number of armed rebels reached 500 and 1,000 followed them blindly, recording a total of 1,500.<sup>31)</sup>

The above, included in writing on the subject of the military background of the Jeju riot, can be summarized as follows: first, the rebels armed themselves with a vast volume of weapons and ammunition buried in Mt. Halla by the defeated Japanese army; second, the number of armed rioters reached 500 and that of unarmed rioters were 1,000; third, military training was led by former members of the Eighth Route Army whose members participated in a guerrilla

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31) The Institute for Military History Compilation of the Ministry of National Defense, *History of the Korean War - Liberation and Foundation of National Forces*, Vol. 1, 1967, p.437

war in China. This can be described as a strong scale of arms, which has been followed in most other government sources, in order to justify a hard-line policy. However, the arguments about 500 rebels armed with Japanese guns and ranger training directed by former members of Eighth Route Army is quite different from the actual situation at the early stage of the armed uprising.

The sources from the rightists also exaggerate the armed rebels. Noryeokinmin, the organ of Central Committee of the South Korean Labor Party, wrote about the military strength and weapons of the armed rebels when reporting on the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident as follows.

- △ Organization: The armed resistance group consists of thousands of the democratic camp leaders who had to escape, being interrogated by the reactionary police due to pro-democracy movement and 2 · 7 Anti-UN movement. Most rebels are young adults including members of Joseon Democracy Patriotic Youth Alliance, who served as student soldiers. It is unusual that students of Jeju Agricultural School and Jeju Middle School, who went on a strike on April 3, lined up for battle with an iron will.
- △ Arms: The arms include the arms and ammunition that had been concealed and stored by the Japanese Empire for a large military force of 200,000 during the war, and the weapons that had been buried in the sea after the landing of the US armed forces. There are bamboo spears, helmets, Japanese swords, guns, rifles, machine guns as well as artillery. In addition, bullets and hand grenades are abundant.<sup>32)</sup>

According to *The 4 · 3 Armed Uprising History of Jeju People*, written from a left-wing viewpoint, the number of armed resistance group was 3,000.<sup>33)</sup> It is the same as government sources in saying that the rebels armed themselves with the weapons buried by the Japanese army. However, this book exaggerated facts more than government sources, saying that there are thousands of armed rebels with machine guns, artillery as well as a large number of bullets and hand grenades. While the government sources exaggerated facts in order to justify the government's hard-line policy, the South Korean Labor Party did

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32) *Noryeok Inmin*, May 25, 1948.

33) Kim Bong-hyeon and Kim Min-ju, *ibid.*, p.83.

the same for making a good fight and inciting people in other regions such as Seoul, where they failed to stop the 5 · 10 General Election.

John Merrill, who tried to be objective in describing facts through analyzing the existing documents and the confidential documents of the US Army, wrote in his paper, “A half of the 500 of the main strength armed themselves with guns and the rest of the strength armed themselves with swords, scythes, bamboo spears, privately made hand grenades and explosives, pickaxes, shovels, etc.”<sup>34)</sup>

Let’s look into how strong the armed resistance group was and how it was organized. The number of armed rebels at the early stage of armed uprising is considered to be 300. According to *Jeju Island Guerrilla Unit Fight Report*, before the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident, a total of 320 people including 100 guerrillas, 200 of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, and 20 of the Special Police Troop made up the resistance group and 350 rebels were mobilized for the attack on police boxes on April 3.<sup>35)</sup>

The police, however, increased and reduced the figures according to their convenience. The number of armed rebels was first stated as from 300 to 400 in a report which was submitted to the National Police Agency on April 15.<sup>36)</sup> However, Kim Jeong-ho, who was a chief of public security department of the National Police Agency and dispatched to Jeju as a commander of Jeju Emergency Defense Headquarters, increased the number to 2,000 at a meeting with journalists on April 29,<sup>37)</sup> while Kim Dae-bong, a chief of public affairs of the Ministry of Police Affairs, said the number of armed rebels is from 500 to 600.<sup>38)</sup> A few days later, he reduced the number, saying “the number of rebels who can be considered rioters is just from 200 to 300.”<sup>39)</sup> Then a few days later, he said, “The actual number of rioters is estimated from 500

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34) John Merrill. “The Cheju-Do Rebellion”. *Journal of Korean Studies*. vol. 2, 1980. pp.166-167.

35) “The Report on the Protest of the Jeju Island People’s Guerrilla Units,” in Moon Chang-song, ed., *ibid.*, p.19, 30.

36) *Dong-A Ilbo*, April 17, 1948; *Woori Shinmun*, April 17, 1948.

37) *Dong-A Ilbo*, April 30, 1948.

38) *Donggwang Shinmun*, May 4, 1948.

39) *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, May 6, 1948.

to 600 plus 15 to 16 ringleaders.”<sup>40)</sup> Kim Ik-ryeol, who was a commander of the 9th Regiment of the Korea Constabulary deployed in Jeju, stated the number of the armed rebels is 300.<sup>41)</sup>

The confusion in numbers of armed rebels is entirely attributed to the convenience of the police. The investigators, who returned to their post in Seoul after being specially dispatched to Jeju, reported, “The police arrested about 500 rioters and seized their arms in 30 battles” and the investigators said that the number of armed rebels amounted to 2,000.<sup>42)</sup> They could not state it as from 500 to 600 as reported before, as they had already said that they arrested about 500 rioters. What was worse, according to the statistics disclosed by the Jeju provincial police after the end of the situation, “The number of red guerrillas reached 16,900 and 7,893 of them were killed by punitive forces, 2,004 defected to South Korea and about 7,000 were captured.”<sup>43)</sup> On August, 1948, a magazine criticized the number of armed rebels, which easily stretched and contracted like a rubber band, as follows.

The authorities have consistently stated that the number of People’s Liberation Unit rebels, which was a name used by the Korean Constabulary, is 500. The number of the rebels, however, is still 500 despite several mop-up operations. Then, is this figure 500 a mystery? One of two things, either the results of mop-up operations, or the 500, should be false, and then the other will turn out to be truth.<sup>44)</sup>

Meanwhile, the police insisted that the armed resistance group consisted of people from outside of Jeju. Shortly after the armed uprising, Kim Jeong-ho, a commander of Jeju Emergency Defense Headquarters, said, “We agree with the fact that riots were not led by Jeju people but by the wicked mob of

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40) *Dong A Ilbo*, May 18, 1948.

41) Kim Ik-ryeol, Posthumous Records *The Truth of the Jeju 4·3 Incident*, The 4·3 News Team of of Jemin Ilbo, *ibid*, p.299.

42) *Jayu Shinmun*, May 15, 1948.

43) *Jeju Shinbo*, April 3, 1957.

44) Hong Han-pyo, *Various Aspects of Jeju Island in Riots, Sincheonji*, August issue, 1948, p.108.

rioters, who invaded from the mainland and intimidated Jeju people into joining the riots.”<sup>45)</sup> A few days later, Kim Jeong-ho argued, “When we arrested and questioned rebels, most of them turned out to be butchers. The rightists gathered butchers throughout the nation in order to murder them and use those people as a tool at the first line for killing police officers and their family and members of the election committee.”<sup>46)</sup> Kim Dae-bong, a chief of public affairs of the Ministry of Police Affairs, said, “It was discovered that the rightists bribed butchers with money and made a contract killing.”<sup>47)</sup>

The argument that the armed rebels were gathered from outside of Jeju was reported in the press and utilized in propagating the brutality of armed rebels. Some argued that the former members of the Eighth Route Army were involved with the rebels. Although Kim Daebong, a chief of public affairs of the Ministry of Police Affairs, explained that the rumor about Eighth Route Army was not true and said that most rioters were Jeju people,<sup>48)</sup> there was still a report that the top leadership of the Ministry of the Military had a trained officer from Eighth Route Army.<sup>49)</sup> The rumor that the rebels were from outside of Jeju even led to a rumor that the rebels were from North Korea. This rumor first came from Major General Dean, the US Military Governor. On May 6, General Dean said as follows after the inspection of Jeju:

A spy of the North Korean Red Army landed in Jeju island to command guerrillas who engaged in a terrorist act against the 5 · 10 General Election. An investigation which was separately conducted by me and South Korean authorities came to a conclusion that the spy from outside of Jeju has been instigating young people to kill assenters to the election and burn their families alive. There was a two-way attack on a village by two troops. Those troops withdrew and rejoined to fall back in the mountains. In the light of the situation, this attack seems to be commanded by a North Korean soldier in Jeju.<sup>50)</sup>

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45) *Jayu Shinmun*, April 8, 1948.

46) *Dong-A Ilbo*, April 30, 1948.

47) *Donggwang Shinmun*, May 4, 1948.

48) *Chosun Ilbo*, May 6, 1948.

49) *Dong-A Ilbo*, May 8, 1948.

50) *Woori Shinmun*, May 8, 1948.

However, *Sincheonji*, a magazine published as the July issue in 1948, denied the rumor that the rebels were from outside of Jeju, saying, “There has been a lot of speculation on the rioters in Mt. Halla: the Communist Chinese Army infiltrated Jeju, the members of the Japanese Communist Party involved with the rebels, executive members of the North Korean People’s Army are commanding by using a two-way radio. But no one has verified whether the rumors are true and the clever strategies not only became a subject of conversation but also caused a stir.”<sup>51)</sup> The August issue of *Sincheonji* also said, “The earlier rumors that the rebels were commanded and supported by North Korea and the Eighth Route Army have been considered false.<sup>52)</sup> On July of 1948, when journalists said, “It is reported that many soldiers from the Eighth Route Army and the North Korean People’s Army engaged in the incident and there are prisoners of war as well. . . .”, Choe Gyeong-rok, a commander of the 11th Regiment stationed in Jeju, answered “Nothing like that has ever happened.”<sup>53)</sup>

Although the rumor about the armed rebels soon turned out to be false, it had a big influence on the media at that time. The rumor that North Korean soldiers engaged in the incident, in particular, was soon followed by other rumors about the appearance of a North Korean vessel and a Soviet submarine in the same context. All those rumors turned out to be false, but the rumors were justification for a hard-line policy at that time.

## 2) The Possession of Arms

As mentioned earlier, there are different speculations about the weapons of the armed rebels as follows: Most rebels armed with themselves swords and bamboo spears and they had a few Japanese Type 99 Arisaka Rifles. The rebels had machine guns and artillery as well as a lot of bullets and hand grenades. At the end of April, 1948, Kim Jeong-ho, a commander of the Jeju

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51) Jo Deok-song, *Bloodshedding Jeju Island, Sincheonji*, July issue, 1948.

52) Hong Han-pyo, *ibid*, p.110.

53) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, July 21, 1948.

Emergency Defense Headquarters, insisted that the armed rebels stored ammunition and food for three months, and that he saw a rebel possessing a machine gun.<sup>54)</sup> But Kim Daebong, the chief of public affairs of the Ministry of Police Affairs, said the rumor that the rebels had machine guns was false.<sup>55)</sup>

The armed resistance rebels were actually very lacking in firearms when the Jeju 4·3 Incident occurred. About 40 rebels, who surrounded Seongsanpo Police Box on April 3, had only two Japanese Type 99 Arisaka Rifles and most of the arms were hooks, bamboo spears, sticks, etc.<sup>56)</sup> Lee Un-bang, who was in charge of Daejeong-myeon region as a member of the South Korea Labor Party, testified “According to the status of arms procurement at the early stage of the uprising, there were about 30 rifles, and Daejeong-myeon had only three rifles.<sup>57)</sup>

The fact that the armed rebels were lacking in arms can be proven through the loot of the Korea Constabulary. On June of 1948, Yoo Dong-yeol, the chief of the Department of Interior Security, announced a statement about the activities of the Korea Constabulary stationed in Jeju. This statement includes the military achievements gained by the guard for a month from April 27 to May 27. They captured 3,126 of prisoners of war and defectors, killed seven, and found an abandoned corpse. In addition, what they plundered were three (3) Type 99 Arisaka Rifles, 15 hand grenades, five (5) old Chinese broadswords, 17 helmets, and 12 bamboo spears.<sup>58)</sup> According to the field report made by Jo Deok-song, who went out to cover the news in Jeju as a correspondent for the Joseon Central News Agency in June of 1948, the arms that the punitive forces seized when they attacked the headquarters of the People’s Army in Daejeong-myeon were cudgels, old-fashioned shotguns, Japanese swords, bamboo spears, and iron spears. The correspondent added, “They are so poor

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54) *Seoul Shinmun*, April 30, 1948

55) *Chosun Ilbo*, May 6, 1948

56) Kim Yang-su, (a police officer of the Seongsanpo Police Box at the time), Testimony as quoted in the 4·3 News Team of *Jemin Ilbo*, *ibid.*, p.96.

57) Jeju 4·3 Research Institute, *Now I Can Speak*, Vol. I, Hanul, 1989, p.225.

58) *Dong-A Ilbo*, June 5, 1948

in arms. What is the reason for them to fight against the newest type of weapons at the risk of their life?"<sup>59)</sup> Colonel Brown, the US commander, announced, "About ten percent of the rebels armed themselves with rifles and the rest of the rebels armed themselves with Japanese swords and conventional spears."<sup>60)</sup>

The poor state of the weapons of the armed rebels gradually improved, as the rebels stole firearms when they attacked the police boxes on April 3 and some members of the Korea Constabulary engaged in the armed resistance as rebels. According to a report from the US Army, rioters captured six US carbines, one Japanese Type 99 Arisaka Rifle and 199 rounds of ammunition on April 3.<sup>61)</sup> On May 20, 1948, 41 constabulary-men from the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment deserted with their weapons, equipment and 5600 rounds of ammunition.<sup>62)</sup> On May 22, 20 constabulary-men of the original 41 deserters on Jeju were apprehended, 19 rifles and 3,500 rounds of ammunition were recovered,<sup>63)</sup> but the armed resistance group could improve its arms because of the other 21 deserters who were not arrested. On February 4, 1949, the armed rebels attacked a troop that was carrying weapons, and stole 150 Type 99 Arisaka Rifles.<sup>64)</sup>

The armed rebels, however, still lacked bullets despite stealing firearms, which were not enough to fight against the military and the police that were supplied with the newest arms from the US Army. There was a rumor that

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59) Jo Deok-song, *ibid.*, p.91.

60) "Report of Activities on Cheju-Do Island from 22 May 1948 to 30 June 1948," July 1, 1948, The Rothwell H. Brown Papers, Box 3, US Army Military History Institute, Pennsylvania, U. S. A.

61) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 801, April 5, 1948.

62) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 842, May 24, 1948. It was on the night of May [20] when the soldiers ran away, even though the report says that occurred on May 21. The fact can be proven by the testimony given by a soldier of the ninth regiment and a police officer of the Daejeong Police Box, and the date of death of police officer and clerk. The deserters attacked the Daejeong Police Box and disappeared on the night of May 20. The armed rebels who were around the station burned the building on the morning of May 21. The report from the US Army seems to record those two incidents as one that happened on May 21. The Jeju 4 · 3 Incident News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *ibid.*, 1995, pp.106-137.

63) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 844, May 26, 1948.

64) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 1058, February 8, 1949.

the armed rebels were supplied with weapons from North Korea or the mainland, but that turned out to be a false rumor. The US Armed Forces in Korea recorded conditions of the rebels in a confidential document that analyzed the situation in Jeju on April 1, 1949:

The most pressing problem of the rebels at the present time is lack of ammunition. Captured and foraged food stocks are ample, and caves left behind by Japanese divisions make security and housing no great problem, but there is no ready source of ammunition. Three light machine guns and a mortar captured from KA troops have been buried because of the supply shortage, and present ammunition stocks, as assessed by captured rebels, consist of 800 rounds of M-1, 90 rounds of carbine and 400 rounds of Japanese 99 ammunition. The only source of supply for captured American-type weapons is those captured from Security Forces, but it is believed that the rebels possess reloading facilities for 2,000 rounds of 99 ammunition. There have been rumors that rebels have received logistic support by water from the mainland and from North Korea, but there is no evidence to substantiate those reports. Constant patrolling by ships of the Korean Navy, aerial reconnaissance flights and the tight ring of police in villages on the coastal plain preclude the possibility of outside support.<sup>65)</sup>

As stated above, the number of armed rebels was only about 300 when the armed uprising occurred. In addition, with about 30 Japanese Type 99 Arisaka Rifles at the early stage of the uprising, the rebels were very poor in arms, although that situation improved later. Those facts are proven by the *Jeju Island Guerrilla Unit Fight Report*, a captured document of the armed rebels. According to this report, 350 armed rebels were mobilized at the armed uprising on April 3 and their weapons included 27 Type 99 Arisaka Rifles, three pistols, 25 hand grenades (or dynamite), seven smoke bombs, and bamboo spears.<sup>66)</sup>

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65) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 1097, April 1, 1949.

66) "The Report on the Protest of the Jeju Island People's Guerrilla Units," in Moon Chang-song, ed., *ibid.*, p.19.

### 3) The Organization of the Armed Resistance Group

It is not easy to know about the organization of the armed resistance group, as there are no leading members of the group who can give testimony. But a small part of the organization can be seen in the book published by the leftists, the documents captured from the rebels, and the materials of the US Army.

#### ① A Report from the Material of the Leftists

*Jeju Island Guerrilla Unit Fight Report* contains the transition process of the organization of the armed resistance group according to the period of time. The report says that when the Torture Resulting In Death incident occurred before the armed uprising, self-defense units were organized in every myeon and ri, and guerrilla units were also organized in the area of mountains and jungle such as Mt. Halla based on the desires and supports of the public.<sup>67)</sup> According to this book, shortly after the armed uprising on April 3, the self-defense units were disbanded and People's Guerrilla Units (known as People's Liberation Units) were organized by selecting 30 people, who had an enthusiastic revolutionary spirit and battle experience, from every myeon in order to reinforce the armed resistance group. The People's Guerrilla Unit was divided into regiments and platoons to guarantee its mobility and alacrity. In addition, regiments were divided as follows: △ The first regiment = Jocheon, Jeju, Gujwa-myeon — 3 · 1 area (Lee Deok-gu) △ The 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment = Aewol, Hallim, Daejeong, Andeok, Jungmun-myeon — 2 · 7 area (Kim Bong-cheon) △ The 3<sup>rd</sup> Regiment = Seogwi, Namwon, Seongsan, Pyoseon-myeon — 4 · 3 area (not sure).

In addition, a Commando Unit for reconnoitering, and a Special Police Troop for surveillance on the movements of reactionary elements and the negative practices of local self-defense units were organized as separate battalions. Political assistants were also assigned to each battalion and small unit in order

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67) Kim Bong-hyeon and Kim Min-ju, *ibid.*, pp.77-81.

to educate the guerrilla unit in ideology. The report also says that in addition to the reorganization of the units, a strong self-defense unit, consisting of ten soldiers, was organized at each eup and myeon in order for ordinary people to lead the resistance movement.<sup>68)</sup>

The status of the organization right after the armed uprising can be briefly summarized as follows. △ People's Guerrilla Unit which is the elite unit in mountains (30 person-team from every myeon) △ Self-Defense Unit in each administrative district (ten person-team) △ Commando Unit that undertakes reconnaissance mission △ Special Police Troop for surveillance on the situation of each district △ Political Assistants who educate ideology to the guerrilla unit.

*Jeju Island Guerrilla Unit Fight Report* also recorded a list of the executive members of South Korea Labor Party's Jeju branch as follows:

- △ People in charge of the provincial party: An Yo-gum, Jo Mong-gu, Kim Yu-hwan, Kang Gi-chan, Kim Yong-gwan
- △ People in charge of the military department of provincial party: Kim Dal-sam (real name is Lee Seung-jin), Kim Dae-jin, Lee Deok-gu
- △ General affairs department: Lee Jwa-gu, Kim Du-bong
- △ Organization department: Lee Jong-u, Ko Chil-jong, Kim Min-saeng, Kim Yang-geun
- △ Agrarian department: Kim Wan-bae
- △ Accounting department: Hyeon Bok-yu
- △ Publicity department: Kim Eun-han, Kim Seok-hwan
- △ Quartermaster department: Kim Gwi-han
- △ Intelligence department: Kim Dae-jin
- △ Women's affairs department: Ko Jin-hui<sup>69)</sup>

Considering that there were several people who were in charge of the provincial party and the military department, the organization chart above seems to list people who were all in charge of the same affairs.

Meanwhile, a person, who was one of the armed rebels, testified that there

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68) Kim Bong-hyeon and Kim Min-ju, *ibid.*, pp.88-89.

69) Kim Bong-hyeon and Kim Min-ju, *ibid.*, p.89.

were myeon headquarters under the provincial headquarters, and that three people at provincial headquarters including Ke (captain), a chief organizer, and a head of the military department formed the Struggle Committee for Fight and made all decisions.<sup>70)</sup>

According to other testimonies, the organization structures of myeon headquarters are different. For example, Daejeong-myeon headquarters consisted of Ke (captain), organization department, self-defense department (military department), general affairs department, and publicity department. Ke (captain), chief organizer, and head of the self-defense department made decisions for major issues. Under the head of the self-defense department, there were Special Police Troop (3 platoons) and self-defense units in every village.<sup>71)</sup> In addition, three departments including an organization department (directed by O), a publicity department (directed by A), and a general affairs department belonged to the person in charge of Gujwa-myeon headquarters (comrade K). A Special Action Unit was also organized separately under the chief organizer.<sup>72)</sup>

## ② The Investigative Report of the US Army Forces in Korea

An investigative report on the Jeju branch of the South Korean Labor Party, documented by the order of Colonel Brown, the US commander stationed in Jeju, records the organization of the armed resistance group in detail. This report was made on June 20, 1948 with the information given by prisoners of war who had contact with members of People's Liberation Units and Self-Defense Units. The report contains the information about the status of affairs, organization, and command structures of both the provincial party and the military department, which can be summarized as follows:

First of all, the South Korea Labor Party consists of Jeollanam-do Committee, Jeju-do Committee, Jeju-eup Committee, Myeon Committee, Village Committee, and People's Committee.

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70) Jeju 4 · 3 Research Institute, *The Long Journey of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident*, Vol. 6, 1993, p.76.

71) Jeju 4 · 3 Research Institute, *ibid.*, pp.76-77.

72) The Jeju 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *ibid.*, p.100.

Jeollanam-do Committee is the superior office that commands the Jeju-do Committee.

Jeju-do Committee is the superior office that commands all left-wing groups in Jeju. The executive members of Jeju-do Committee are as follows: Chairperson Kim Yu-hwan, Vice-chairperson Jo Mong-gu, head of the executives Hyeon Dugil (who mediates and controls other departments' heads), head of organization department Kim Dal-sam, head of publicity department Kim Yong-gwan, head of agrarian department Lee Jongu, head of youth department Kim Gwang-jin, head of women's department Kim Geum-sun, head of finance department Kim Gwang-jin.

Jeju-eup Committee was organized differently from myeon's organization. It established a general committee and special committee as independent committees, which are commanded by Jeju-do Committee. △ Jeju-eup Committee (general committee) has judicial power for legal activities of eup's party. This committee has the same base and organization as other myeons'. The members of the committee are as follows: Chairperson Kang Gyu-chan, Vice-chairperson, head of organization department, and general affairs department Ko Gap-su, head of the executives Kang Dae-seok, head of publicity department Ko Chil-jong, and head of youth department Lim Tae-seong. △ Jeju-eup Special Committee commands party's underground organizations in Jeju-eup area. It is directed by the Jeju-do Committee. Its mission is to plant agents in strategic listening posts such as the Military Government Office, National Police, Korea Constabulary, schools, and right-wing organizations. It also increases small scale secret cells within the organizations mentioned above in order to promote the party's work. Those secret cells continuously provide the chairperson of Jeju-eup Special Committee with information. A shocking case that shows reckless and harsh effectiveness of the organization is that it killed the commander of the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment of the Korea Constabulary. Although South Korea Labor Party declares the Special Committee illegal, it can work as Jeju-do Committee without any obstruction. Therefore, Jeju-eup Special Committee will not only expand its missions but also become the supreme committee of underground organizations in Jeju. Jeju-eup Special Committee consists of Chairperson Kim Eung-hwan, head of organization department Kang Dae-seok, head of publicity department Lee Chang-su, head of students' department Han Guk-seop, and head of finance department Lee Chang-uk.

Myeon committees are divided into many departments like the supreme committee of Jeju-do, and formed like all inferior military and paramilitary organizations. One member is in charge of each committee.

In a Village Committee, one member serves in many departments. According

to the report of the interrogation team, however, a Village Committee consists of at least three members: chairperson, head of the publicity department, and head of the organization department.

The Chairperson of the People's Committee is selected by rioters appointing one of the village people. In this case, a person, who consecutively served as chairperson of People's Committee, which was formed after the surrender of Japan in 1945, was elected. Such election was conducted while armed rioters were watching. The chairperson of the People's Committee, who is now in a civilian prison camp, said that the rioters appointed him as a head of the publicity and organization department and left the village.

Second, although the military department of South Korea Labor Party was changed to Save-the-Nation Struggle Committee in early April, 1948, the term, military department, is still used here. The armed unit consists of the People's Liberation Unit and Self-Defense Unit. The members of the People's Liberation Unit are rioters and they are the first-line combat unit. The Self-Defense Unit recruits rioters and takes charge of liaison between village and rioters' unit. Besides, it serves as a quartermaster department for general units. The military department also includes the cells and the related organizations.

Each myeon supplies enough manpower for a company of rioters in People's Liberation Unit. The companies and battalions use the name of their own village. The scale of the military strength depends on the circumstances.

With respect to the People's Liberation Unit's order of battle, there is evidence that a commander of battalion has an intelligence department, weapon department, quartermaster department, medical department, etc. One battalion, consisting of 80 people, is divided into two companies and one maneuver unit. The maneuver unit is operated by the direct order of a commander of rioters. Commissioned officers are identified through their Japanese swords, guns, and helmets. The organization and the average number of members are as follows. △ Battalion (60-80 people): More than one is formed in every myeon. △ Company (25-35 people): Two companies belong to one battalion. △ Platoon (13-15 people): Two platoons belong to one company. △ Squad (5-7 people): Two squads belong to one platoon.

The military training of the People's Liberation Unit varies with the reports. According to a report, people are called out three times a day, lining up in pairs in front of barracks so that a commander can check the number of them, and after the morning roll call, they receive intensive training such as running for an hour. According to a report on the other unit, people just do chores while in the unit such as collecting wood, making charcoal, and carrying food from storage. People are on sentry duty (Bitgae in Korean) at the unit's entrance, and

two checkpoints are located about 100 yards from the entrance. All people living in a building are strictly isolated from new people, and ordered not to leave the barracks. In addition, all buildings of this unit are about 100 yards away from each other, and there is no private contact between people in adjacent buildings. People in the buildings muster in double columns only for the attack, and after a roll call, they are provided with arms and bullets.

Political instructors are in charge of teaching politics to members of the People's Liberation Unit. The instructors constantly educate the purpose of South Korea Labor Party, emphasizing before the attack that all people in a certain village are worthless so that they deserve death, and they are traitors of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The instructors teach the members not to leak the location of unit and the number of unit, and also instruct them how to mislead the enemy or tell a lie when captured. The executives are addressed as "commander", not by their name.

Most arms and bullets of People's Liberation Unit are made in Japan and they are mainly the Japanese Type 99 Arisaka Rifles. As of now, American carbines and M1 rifles are confirmed. According to a report, a maneuvering unit, consisted of about 25 people, armed themselves with ten American carbines and 15 Japanese Type 99 Arisaka Rifles. From 20 to 50 live cartridges are provided when the real attack is planned. Rioters armed with guns return the unused live cartridges after the attack. Other arms are Japanese commander's swords, bayonets, sticks, clubs, bamboo spears, and daggers. No Soviet equipment was found for the last three weeks.

South Korea Labor Party in villages of myeon recruits members of People's Liberation Unit. It not only supplements personnel but also provides food, clothes, funds, orders, and information.

The Self-Defense Unit was formed with a village as a unit all over the island in February, 1948. The name was changed to the People's Self-Defense Unit in early May, 1948.

The Self-Defense Unit was organized to protect a village ostensibly, but practically it is a village base as well as a temporary supply depot for the sly rioters' units. A chairperson of South Korea Labor Party's Village Committee gives orders to the village's Self-Defense Unit.

Unlike its name, the Self-Defense Unit's mission is to actively engage in a terrorist attack on a village by joining a certain rioters' unit, not to protect a village. This unit also serves as a quartermaster. Food and money are regularly collected and the collected food and money is handed over to the chairperson of the village's South Korea Labor Party Committee before being passed to a liaison agent of the rioters' unit. The rioter's unit of myeon is in very close

touch with the South Korea Labor Party's village committee.

Besides, there are cells and related organizations. The related organizations such as Joseon Democracy Patriotic Youth Alliance, Democratic Women's Union, and National Council of Joseon Labor Union are nominally independent organizations but support the policies of South Korea Labor Party. In addition, many of those organizations have double membership.<sup>73)</sup>

The above investigative report was documented by master sergeant R. Hunger at the staff for intelligence and operations of the US 24<sup>th</sup> corps. Hunger, who seems to have specialized in intelligence analysis, specified that he used the interrogation report written by Jeju interrogation translator team and referred to other sources such as documents and printed materials seized from the US Counterintelligence corps stationed in Jeju, the police, the Korea Constabulary, and prisoners of war while he documented this report.<sup>74)</sup> It means that the intelligence power of the US Army was exerted widely.

### ③ The Captured Document from an Armed Resistance Unit

*Jeju Island Guerrilla Unit Fight Report*, which was captured from an armed resistance unit, contains information about organization, military strength, and arms according to the period of time. It can be rearranged as follows.

△ Just prior to the armed uprising

1. Organization Structure: One platoon consists of ten people. Two platoons form one company. Two companies form one battalion.
2. Organization: ① Guerrilla Units were formed in Jeju-eup and seven myeon including Jocheon, Aewol, Hallim, Daejeong, Jungmun, Namwon, Pyoseon and five myeon including Gujwa, Seongsan, Seogwi, Andeok, Chuja was excepted.  
② The Special Police Troop is under direct control of Jeju Military Committee.
3. The number of members: 320 (Guerrilla Unit: 100, Self-Defense Unit: 200, Special Police Troop: 20)

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73) "Report on South Korea Labor Party, Cheju-Do," June 20, 1948, RG 338: Records of US Army Command (1942-), US Army Forces in Korea 1945-1949, Entry No. 11071, Box No. 2, NARA, Washington, D.C.

74) Ibid.

4. Arms: 27 Type 99 Arisaka Rifles, three shotguns, 25 hand grenades (dynamites), seven smoke bombs, and the bamboo spears
- △ The first arrangement of organization (Just after the armed uprising)
1. Alignment of military strength: The number of members of Guerrilla Unit was arranged to 250 because when the first armed uprising started, there were difficulties for both Guerrilla Unit which was the first-line unit and Self-Defense Unit which was the follow unit to live together in mountain, and there were also problems in supplying goods. But the number of members expanded to about 400 due to the needs of reinforcing the military strength.
- △ The second arrangement of organization (Just prior to the 5 · 10 General Election)
1. Grounds: Each Guerrilla Unit under the direct control of the military department of each myeon's Struggle Committee was moved to a position under the direct control of the provincial headquarters because of strategic needs for guaranteeing the strict discipline, elaborately securing secret information, and a prompt action.
  2. The arrangement in structures: One squad consists of three people. One platoon consists of three squads (ten people in total). One company consists of two platoons (23 people in total). One battalion consists of two companies (49 people in total). One regiment consists of two battalions (110 people in total).
  3. The military strength: A total of 370 people including 20 special service men belong to three regiments. The Special Police Troop was disbanded and all of its members were deployed in each department of the headquarters.
- △ The third arrangement of organization (At the end of May)
1. Grounds: On account of the mass exodus of the Korea Constabulary to Jeju (4,000 people) and the punitive expeditions to seize the guards, the number of the members was drastically cut in order to avoid the collision and strengthen the illegal posture.
  2. The arrangement in structures: One squad consists of five people. One platoon consists of three squads (16 people in total), and the third squad worked for a dining service.
  3. The number of members was cut from 370 to 240.
- △ The fourth arrangement of organization (This started on June 18.)
1. Grounds: There was an urgent need to arrange and strengthen the organization to prepare new fights.
  2. The arrangement in structures: (Illegible)
  3. The military strength: Three platoons form one element. One element consists of ten people. In total, there are 266 people including four units with 240

people and 26 people in the provincial headquarters.

- △ The fifth arrangement of organization (This was concluded in July 15.)
1. The number of members was 501 including 35 of the leadership, 34 of a signal corps, 120 of a guerrilla unit, and 312 of a special service unit.
  2. Arms: ① 147 rifles (six M1 rifles, 19 carbines, 117 Type 99 Arisaka Rifles, four Type 44 Carbines, and two Type 30 Rifles)  
② 7,740 shots for rifle (1,396 shot for M1 rifle, 1,912 shots for carbine, 3,711 shots for Type 99 Arisaka Rifle, 721 shots for Type 44 Carbine and Type 30 Rifle)  
③ One light machine gun made in Japan  
④ Two grenade dischargers with eight shots  
⑤ 43 hand grenades  
⑥ 69 sticks of dynamite  
⑦ Two flares  
⑧ 16 sabers  
⑨ Eight shotguns (one six-shooter, six eight-shooters, one ten-shooter), 119 shots  
⑩ 103 detonators, eight mine detonators, four field artillery shots
  3. Principle: ① Every political staff person belongs to their superior political department. The top political staff belongs to a person who is in charge of the provincial party.  
② The special service unit belongs to the element's intelligence department. The mission of this unit is to collect intelligence, commit a terrorist act to individuals, respond to the military activities, and support the supply. Each myeon has one head of the special service unit with several liaison officers. Three people form one squad and one platoon consists of ten people. A village should have one or two platoon members. The members of special service unit are except from the cell organization.  
③ In the headquarters of each area, the top leadership consists of a commander who is leader of an element, a political staff, and a general staff in charge of operation and training.  
④ Members of the special service units station in each myeon and village. The major staff should be concentrated on the headquarters. Guerrilla unit's platoons live close to the element's leadership.<sup>75)</sup>

The above fight report written by the armed rebels also recorded the

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75) "The Report on the Protest of the Jeju Island People's Guerrilla Units," in Moon Chang-song, ed., *ibid.*, pp.17-29.

situation in detail. The original copy of this document was obtained when a SWAT team killed Lee Deok-gu in June 7, 1949, kept by Jeju Provincial Police Agency and the manuscript was possessed by the executives of the police whose rank is above the section head.<sup>76)</sup>

According to this report on the organization of Guerrilla Unit and Self-Defense Unit documented until July, 1948, the number of armed rebels was cut from 320 just prior to the Jeju 4 · 3 Uprising to 240 and this number increased to 501 in July. But only 120 members of Guerrilla Unit armed with firearms. Therefore, the existing documents that record the number of armed rebels as thousands should be modified.

### **C. The US Army Military Government's Response**

#### **1) The Establishment of the Jeju Emergency Defense Headquarters**

The US Army Military Government considered this uprising a problem of public peace at the early stage of the uprising. Prior to the 5 · 10 general election, the armed conflicts occurred very often nationwide due to the confrontation between the pro-unilateral election and the anti-unilateral election. According to the US Army's secret report, 55 police officers were killed and 144 young leftists were shot dead across the nation because of the armed conflicts in February and March, 1948 at a time when the armed uprising occurred in Jeju.<sup>77)</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Baek Seon-yeop, the Chief of Staff of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade of the Korea Constabulary, inspected the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment stationed in Moseolpo on April 2 and stayed in Jeju-eup in April 3 when the armed uprising occurred. Although he received the uprising report, he left Jeju right away, considering it a matter of public security.<sup>78)</sup>

As the armed uprising occurred, the US Army Military Government rushed

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76) Moon Chang-song (former manager at the Hwabuk Police Station at the time), Testimony recorded on November 11, 2001.

77) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Weekly Summary, No. 133, April 2, 1948.

78) Baek Seon-yeop, *The Annals of Mt. Jirisan*, Koreaone., 1992, pp.107-108.

about 100 police officers from Jeollanam-do for support to Jeju in the morning on April 5. The Jeju Emergency Defense Headquarters was established in the Jeju Provincial Police Agency and Kim Jeong-ho, the chief of the public security department of the Ministry of Police Affairs, was dispatched.<sup>79)</sup> The US Army Military Government announced the provincial ordinance of Jeju-do to block off the marine transportation and closed the coast, mobilizing the US Army vessels.<sup>80)</sup> One hundred (100) military cadets of the Korean National Police College were added to strengthen the police force.<sup>81)</sup>

In addition, the members of the Seobuk Young Men's Association were also dispatched. Moon Bong-je, who was in charge of the chief of the Seobuk Young Men's Association's central headquarters, testified in an interview with the magazine, *North Korea*, "When the Jeju 4·3 Incident broke out, Jo Byeong-ok, the chief of National Police Agency, asked me to send 500 anticommunists, so I sent people."<sup>82)</sup> The headquarters of Daedong Youth Corps also dispatched its members.<sup>83)</sup>

Directly after the uprising, Kim Jeong-ho, a commander of the Jeju Emergency Defense Headquarters, insisted, "The riot was caused by the wicked mob of rioters, who invaded from the mainland and intimidated Jeju people into joining the riots." Jo Byeong-ok, the chief of the National Police Agency, announced a placatory statement called *Announcement to the Jeju People* as of April 14, defining the uprising as, "You were deceived by a felonious conspiracy and plot of communists who are trying to sell Koreans into slavery to the Soviet Union."<sup>84)</sup>

But a repressive measure that was taken by mobilizing the Police Support Unit and right-wing young men's association without inquiring into the cause of the uprising had resulted in worsening the situation, as the measure sparked the people's opposition. Seobuk Young Men's Association, with a deep-rooted

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79) *Dokrip Shinbo*, April 7, 1948; *Jeju Shinbo*, April 10, 1948.

80) *Chosun Ilbo*, April 17, 1948.

81) *Donggwang Shinmun*, April 13, 1948.

82) North Korea Research Institute, *North Korea* April Issue, 1989, p.127.

83) *Daedong Shinmun*, April 13, 1948.

84) *Jeju Shinbo*, April 8 and 18, 1948.

hatred of communism after being expelled from North Korea, had aroused criticism a year ago when it clamped down on the Jeju people, as the leading members of National Police Agency concluded that 90 percent of the Jeju people were rightists.<sup>85)</sup> Kim Hui-ju, the public prosecutor of Gwangju District Prosecutor's Office, inspected Jeju in early May, 1948. He indicated that the opposition to the 5 · 10 General Election mainly caused the uprising, but the uprising was indirectly caused by the resistance of Jeju people who were outraged at the excessive use of force by police officers from the Seobuk Young Men's Association.<sup>86)</sup>

The Police Reserves also came into conflict with Jeju people because the unit was rushed in without any instructions for a mission. As the situation had worsened, General Dean explained in an interview with journalists on May 6, "Half of the police dispatched to Jeju received training only for five days, resulting in excessive behavior. Two police officers, who committed an atrocity, will be court-martialed in the US Army."<sup>87)</sup>

But Kim Jeong-ho, who had planned to put down the situation by mobilizing strong police forces, launched a hard-line operation by imposing a curfew after 8 p.m. throughout the province and by ordering to shoot the violators.<sup>88)</sup> Around 9 p.m. on April 24, two residents were shot by the police while walking on the street in Jocheon-ri, Jocheon-myeon. Of two residents, Moon Hong-mok at the age of 21 was killed on the spot.<sup>89)</sup>

Meanwhile, the police complained that the Korea Constabulary did not actively take action on putting down the uprising. The police even set a mountain village on fire to make the Korea Constabulary move out and insisted that it was done by the armed rebels. *History of Korean War*, published by the Ministry of National Defense, described conflicts between the military and the police as follows.

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85) *Hanseong Ilbo*, March 13, 1947.

86) *Hanseong Ilbo*, May 22, 1947.

87) *Woori Shinmun*, May 8, 1948.

88) *Seoul Shinmun*, April 30, 1948.

89) *Dokrip Shinbo*, May 4, 1948.

The police tried to find out the Korea Constabulary's real intention. They set a mountain village on fire to block the base of rioters and reported to the Korea Constabulary that the residents set their village on fire. While major Oh Il-gyun, a battalion commander, did not give an order to moving, some noncommissioned officers moved out secretly. According to the report of the police, rioters attacked and set fire to the village, causing a number of casualties during a battle. But it turned out to be a plot of the police to mobilize the Korea Constabulary, resulting in a more unfavorable atmosphere between the military and the police.<sup>90)</sup>

## 2) Peace Negotiation

### ① “Open Arms” Program of the Military Governor

When the armed uprising first occurred, the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment of the Korea Constabulary regarded the uprising as a clash between the Jeju people, the police, and the Seobuk Young Men's Association. The leading members of the Korea Constabulary in Seoul also considered the uprising a matter of public security and expressed their position that the uprising should be put down by the police not by the military.<sup>91)</sup> The Korea Constabulary hesitated to move out due to conflicts that existed between the police and the military. Soldiers thought that the Korea Constabulary was the parent body of the South Korean Army which would soon be established, while the police looked down on the Korea Constabulary because its name in Korean originally means Police Reserve Squad. There was a constant conflict between the members of the Korea Constabulary and the police nationwide, causing casualties due to an armed clash.<sup>92)</sup>

As the situation worsened, the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment of the Korea Constabulary stationed at Moseolpo dispatched a Special Police Troop (Commanding Officer: Captain Kim Yong-sun) to Jeju-eup on April 13. This, however, was not to put down the uprising but to maintain public security. Moreover, the Special

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90) The Institute for Military History Compilation of the Ministry of National Defense, *History of the Korean War* Vol. 1, p.439.

91) Jang Chang-guk, *A Graduate of the Korea Military Academy, Joongang Ilbo*, 1984, pp.115-116.

92) Han Yong-won, *Foundation of National Forces*, Bakyongsas, 1984, p.134.

Police Troop consisted of less than ten people. The 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment Commander Kim Ik-ryeol and second lieutenant Lee Yun-rak, who was the intelligence manager, also announced the statements that the military forces were mobilized in order to protect the South Korean government's property and the people's life and property.<sup>93)</sup>

The leading members of the US Army Military Government had become aware of the limits of the police force, so they commanded the 9th Regiment of the Korea Constabulary to participate in a repression operation on April 17 through Lieutenant Colonel John S. Mansfield, commander of the 59<sup>th</sup> US Military Government Company stationed in Jeju. One battalion of the 5<sup>th</sup> regiment that had been stationed in Jinhae, Busan was ordered to be dispatched to Jeju as of April 20, and Captain Clarence Dog De Reus, a US Army advisor, at the 3<sup>rd</sup> Regiment in Busan also joined the repression operation.<sup>94)</sup> Military Governor Dean gave an order to Lieutenant Colonel Mansfield on April 18 as follows.

1. You are well-versed in conditions of Jeju.
2. Two L-5 liaison aircrafts that arrived at Jeju on April 18 are under your control.
3. Additional troops from the South Korean Defense Force's will arrive at Jeju on April 20. The additional troops will be under your operational control just like the other South Korean Defense Forces on arrival.
4. You may utilize the military troops in putting down the rioters in Jeju and reinstating law and order.
5. Make contact with a leader of rioters and make your best efforts to give them an opportunity to surrender before you push forward a full-scale attack.
6. Do not transfer prisoners of war, who were captured during an operation of the Korea Constabulary, to the police. Keep them in barracks that were prepared and protected by the Korea Constabulary, and send them to the mainland as soon as possible.
7. Report the daily situation to headquarters through radio communications.<sup>95)</sup>

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93) *Jeju Ilbo*, April 16 and 18, 1948.

94) "Message," April 17, RG 338: *Records of US Army Command (1942-)*, US Army Forces in Korea, 1945-49, Bulk Declass E. O. Misc. Series, Box No. 119, NARA, Washington, D.C.

95) "Cheju-Do Operation," April 18, 1948, RG 338: *Records of US Army Command (1942-)*, US Army Forces in Korea, 1945-49, Entry No. 11071, Box No. 68, NARA, Washington,

The above command of Military Governor Dean contains some important facts. First, the Military Governor ordered NAME- Mansfield-to control the existing 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment and one battalion of the 5<sup>th</sup> regiment that was scheduled to be dispatched on April 20. Second, instead of the police, the Korea Constabulary was designated as a troop that will engage in a repression operation with the US Army. It is in the same context that he ordered not to transfer prisoners of war to the police. Third, he ordered contact with a leader of armed rebels before the repression operation, which has become a useful clue for finding out the meaning of a Peace Negotiation between the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment commander Kim Ik-ryeol and the organization department head of armed resistance group Kim Dal-sam.

According to confidential documents of the US Army, the Korean Constabulary first moved out to a punitive expedition in the night on April 22. The daily report of the 6<sup>th</sup> Division of US Army wrote, “During the night of 22-23 April, 1948, 60 leftists, suspected of participation in recent disturbances, were picked up through the combined efforts of the police and constabulary. The police proceeded to raid houses suspected of harboring members of raiding parties, while the constabulary served to block off certain areas of the town.”<sup>96)</sup> As the report says, what the Korea Constabulary did during the joint operation was not directly confronting the armed rebels but indirectly supporting a house search of the police.

The Peace Negotiation between the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment commander Kim Ik-ryeol and the organization department head of armed resistance group Kim Dal-sam was held on April 28. The negotiation was a turning point of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident. The failure of the Peace Negotiation caused bloodshed, and Regimental Commander Kim Ik-ryeol suffered a bitter insult. The Peace Negotiation, however, was not held by a unilateral decision of Kim Ik-ryeol. As mentioned earlier, on April 18, Military Governor Dean had already ordered Lieutenant Colonel Mansfield to “Contact a leader of rioters and make your best efforts to give them an opportunity to surrender before you push

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96) Hq. 6<sup>th</sup> Inf Div, USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 918, April 24, 1948.

forward with a full-scale attack.”

This is proven in a testimony given by Regimental Commander Kim Ik-ryeol. According to Kim Ik-ryeol’s memoirs,<sup>97)</sup> the process of the Peace Negotiation is as follows. Although Lieutenant Colonel Mansfield, who received an order of Military Governor Dean, asked [in turn] Jeju Governor Yoo Hae-jin, Jeju Emergency Defense Headquarters commander Kim Jeong-ho, Jeju Police Inspection Office director Choi Cheon, and a leader of Joseon People’s Youth League’ Jeju branch to be the person in charge in pushing forward an “open arms” program, these people did not appear on the appointed day, making excuses of illness or going on a business trip without notice. Thus, for the fifth attempt, Lieutenant Colonel Mansfield ordered Kim Ik-ryeol to negotiate directly with the armed rebels.

Ordered by Lieutenant Colonel Mansfield, Regimental Commander Kim Ik-ryeol distributed flyers by airplane on April 22, asking the armed rebels for a Peace Negotiation. A news agency covered the flyer as follows:

As a life and death struggle in Jeju against unilateral election and government has been expanded every day, Jeju-do, the island of peace, has changed into a bloody battlefield. Lieutenant Colonel Kim Ik-ryeol, a commander of the 9th Regiment of the Korea Constabulary that is now being sent to Jeju, distributed flyers by airplane on April 22, describing a fierce battle.

“Ladies and gentlemen: We have seen your struggle for the last half a month. We understand your ardent love of country, your indomitable resolve for complete independence and reunification, and your real intention that is free from life and death. I admit that a deplorable fratricidal war and an internecine struggle does more harm than good. Our Korea Constabulary is not a tool of politics. I am willing to shake hands with you in order not to expand this fratricidal war any more. I am looking forward to your reply. Please suggest to us when and where we can meet in any way.<sup>98)</sup>

The armed rebels replied, “The regimental commander should come to a meeting accompanied by no more than two assistants. A meeting place should

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97) Kim Ik-ryeol, Posthumous Records *The Truth of the Jeju 4·3 Incident* (The 4·3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4·3 Incident Speaks*, Vol. 2, Jeonyewon, 1994).

98) *Dokrip Shinbo*, April 30, 1948.

be in the camp of the armed resistance group, and the specific meeting place and time will be notified later.”

Having accepted the conditions of the armed rebels, Regimental Commander Kim Ik-ryeol reported the conditions to Lieutenant Colonel Mansfield and Captain De Reus, a military advisor, asking for detailed instructions. Lieutenant Colonel Mansfield instructed the regimental commander in authority granted and how to deal with a meeting as follows. ① The 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment commander Kim Ik-ryeol acts on behalf of Major General Dean, the US Military Governor, in the exercise of authority for Peace Negotiation with rioters. The regimental commander is authorized with the promise of pardon to allow the avoidance of the death penalty for the trial of offenders who committed murder or arson, and for the promise to pass over other crimes. Major General Dean, the US Military Governor, is responsible for the implementation of any agreement joined in writing. ② The desired terms include immediate cessation of battle, disarmament, surrender of offenders, and submission of the list of crimes, including place, date, and offenders' names.<sup>99)</sup>

Meanwhile, according to sources in the military, Kim Dal-sam once asked, through a commanding officer in Jeju, to meet Lee Hyeong-geun, the Chief of Staff at the Department of Interior Security. This information is included in a statement of the inducement of defection which Brigadier General Lee Hyeong-geun, who was a commander of Donghae Division, sent to Kim Dal-sam, who led North Korean partisans to the South, on March 20, 1950. Lee Hyeong-geun said, “I remember that you asked to meet me through a commanding officer in Jeju when I was in charge as the Chief of Staff at the Department of Interior Security.”<sup>100)</sup> But it is uncertain if ‘commanding officer in Jeju’ means Kim Ik-ryeol, regimental commander. Even though this is true, it cannot be confirmed whether Kim Dal-sam asked to meet Lee Hyeong-geun before or after the 4·28 Peace Negotiation. However, it is certain that Kim Dal-sam doubted the effect of the authority when he went to the

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99) Kim Ik-ryeol, *ibid.* The Jeju 4·3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *ibid.*, pp.315-317.

100) The Institute for Military History Compilation of the Ministry of National Defense, *Unconventional Warfare History*, 1988, p.129.

Peace Negotiation. This is also proven in the fact that when starting Peace Negotiation, Kim Dal-sam asked Kim Ik-ryeol, “How much authority do you have on the implementation of an agreement?” So, the reason Kim Dal-sam asked to meet the Chief of Staff Lee Hyeong-geun seems to be that he wanted assurance of the effect of Peace Negotiation.

## ② Intervention of Commander John R. Hodge

The leading members of the US Military Government worked closely as the date of the negotiation approached. Ordered by US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps G-3 A. C. Tychsen, Lieutenant Colonel M. W. Schewe arrived at Jeju on April 27, a day before the negotiation with the armed rebels. The missions and activities of Lieutenant Colonel Schewe are documented in detail on his report<sup>101)</sup> that he sent to Colonel Tychsen. According to the report, “the mission of Lieutenant Colonel Schewe was to meet Lieutenant Colonel Mansfield, commander of the 59<sup>th</sup> US Military Government Company stationed in Jeju, in order to review the situation of Jeju, observe activities, and to check a plan that Lieutenant Colonel Mansfield suggested for controlling civilians in Jeju and weakening guerrilla activities. The results of the mission will be rendered to the headquarters.” The most important mission that Lieutenant Colonel Schewe had to do was to check the progress of the plan (pacification work) that was suggested by Lieutenant Colonel Mansfield.

There are, however, important facts that should be pointed out here. First, although the Peace Negotiation was initially ordered by Major General Dean, the US Military Governor, the US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps Headquarters intervened just before the negotiation started. Considering that command of the US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps G-3 is equal to the command of the US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps Commander John R. Hodge, who was also the United States Armed Forces Commander in Korea, General Hodge had directly intervened in the Peace Negotiation. Second, Lieutenant Colonel John S. Mansfield, commander of the 59<sup>th</sup> US Military

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101) “Disposition Form, Report of Activities at Cheju-Do Island,” April 29, 1948, RG 338: *Records of US Army Command* (1942-), US Army Forces in Korea, 1945-49, Entry No. 11071, Box No. 68, NARA, Washington, D. C.

Government Company stationed in Jeju, had initially prepared for the negotiation based on his own decision, having discussions with Captain De Reus, a military advisor, and the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment Commander Kim Ik-ryeol; but now he has to take actions according to the orders of the 24<sup>th</sup> Corps Headquarters because the 24<sup>th</sup> Corps Headquarters was in charge of military work, US Army Military Government is in charge of nonmilitary work, and the US Army Military Government was under the umbrella of US Armed Forces in Korea. In addition, while General Dean of the US Army Military Government could give military orders partially at the local level besides nonmilitary work through the 59<sup>th</sup> US Military Government Company stationed in Jeju, USFK Commander still had the authority to issue a military command.

How General Hodge dealt with the Peace Negotiation is documented in detail in the report of Lieutenant Colonel Schewe, who was dispatched from the US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps. According to the report, on arriving at Jeju on April 27, Lieutenant Colonel Schewe met Lieutenant Colonel John S. Mansfield, commander of the 59<sup>th</sup> US Military Government Company, Colonel Rothwell H. Brown, commander of the US 20<sup>th</sup> Regiment, Major Geist, in charge of the military strength of the US 20<sup>th</sup> Regiment dispatched in Jeju, and Captain De Reus, an advisor of the 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment of the Korea Constabulary, to discuss the situation of Jeju.

This means some part of US military strength including Regimental Commander Brown of the US 20<sup>th</sup> Regiment, which was stationed in Gwangju, had already arrived at Jeju before Lieutenant Colonel Schewe. In the meeting, Colonel Brown served Lieutenant Colonel Mansfield with an order of USFK commander General Hodge. The order is as follows: ① The Korea Constabulary shall immediately carry out its mission. ② All kinds of disorder of people shall be ended. ③ The Korea Constabulary and the police shall strengthen unity in order to weaken the armed rebels' activities. ④ The US Army shall not intervene in the mission. Also, Colonel Brown asked Lieutenant Colonel Mansfield whether the available Korea Constabulary's military strength could seize control of the situation. Mansfield said yes.<sup>102)</sup>

As shown in the order of General Hodge, however, he did not mention the

Peace Negotiation, though he ordered the Korean Constabulary to mobilise and quell the uprising. This implies that General Hodge did not fully recognize the policy of Military Governor Dean. Of course, the Peace Negotiation that was suggested by Military Governor Dean did not require coexistence with the armed resistance group. Military Governor Dean designed the negotiation as an “open arms” program in order to counsel submission prior to armed repression that would cause massive bloodshed. While the 9<sup>th</sup> Regimental Commander Kim Ik-ryeol also used the term “Peace Negotiation” in his memoirs, the details were actually about the “open arms” program. It seems General Hodge, however, did not simply want the repression of the uprising, but the immediate end of it.

Lieutenant Colonel Schewe launched a massive operation within 30 minutes of his arrival at Jeju on April 27. One battalion of the 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment, dispatched from Busan to Jeju a week earlier, searched villages. All wharfs and roads were blocked to find arms, shovels, pickaxes, axes and wire cutting machines during a house search. The police were also mobilized to hunt down the suspects, group organizers and communists but the house search ended with few gains. There were few young people in any village, and when asked where their husbands are, women answered that they had died or gone to Japan. US soldiers judged that that was false and asked the women for more details, but the women answered they don’t know.<sup>103)</sup>

The US Army kept track of operations by using reconnaissance aircraft. While Lieutenant Colonel Schewe accepted the advice of Mansfield that it was not desirable to be seen and did not go to the site of operations, he did direct operations and receive reports.

The operation was carried out on April 28. Prior to the operation, Lieutenant Colonel Schewe thrashed out the operational scheme out with commissioned officers of the 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment of the Korea Constabulary, military advisor Captain De Reus, and Merritt of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID). Lieutenant Colonel Schewe delivered a message from Commander Hodge

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102) Ibid.

103) Ibid.

[saying], “the operation must succeed in Jeju, and the South Koreans are paying attention to whether the military and the police will succeed in the operation in Jeju or not.” The operation began at 10 a.m. on April 28, as Lieutenant Colonel Schewe observed from the airborne L-5 reconnaissance aircraft. The 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment entered four villages in trucks and on foot, gathering people in the village. Lieutenant Colonel Schewe returned to the headquarters of the 59<sup>th</sup> US Military Government Company at 11:50 a.m., and left Jeju at 12:40 p.m. without reporting on the results of the operation, and returned to USFK in Seoul.<sup>104)</sup>

The above is how Lieutenant Colonel Schewe carried out the operation in Jeju on April 27 and 28. It may be asked why he launched a massive operation before the Peace Negotiation, which was scheduled for April 28. It is also unclear why the 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment dispatched from Busan was mobilized, excluding the existing 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment.

That seems to be because General Hodge pursued two objects regarding the repression of the uprising in Jeju. On one hand, General Hodge checked and supervised the “open arms” program that was suggested by Military Governor Dean. On the other hand, he ordered Lieutenant Colonel Schewe to carry out an operation to explore the military strength of the armed rebels in the preparation of an armed repression operation. That is why General Hodge excluded the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment from the operation – for regimental commander Kim Ik-ryeol to hold Negotiations – and mobilized the 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment.

The operation, which was launched from April 27 for two days, was not an armed conflict that might have disturbed the Peace Negotiation but a reconnoitering sortie or show of force. This is confirmed in the daily report<sup>105)</sup> of the US 6<sup>th</sup> Division and the US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps regarding the operation of the Korea Constabulary on April 27 and 28. Lieutenant Colonel Schewe mobilized the US 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment and the US 20<sup>th</sup> Regiment that were stationed in Jeju

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104) Ibid.

105) Higher level of commands of the 59<sup>th</sup> US Military Government Company stationed in Jeju is the US 20<sup>th</sup> Regiment, the US 6<sup>th</sup> Division, and the US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps in order. Daily report of the US 6<sup>th</sup> Division and the US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps contains daily situations of Jeju.

to search around Jeju-eup area. The following report is exactly the same as the operational details from Lieutenant Colonel Schewe:

- On April 27, 1948, the road into Yeongpyeong-ri, Jeju-eup was ditched to prevent entrance.<sup>106)</sup>
- During the 24-hour period ending 12 p.m. on April 28, 1948 a constabulary patrol discovered new road blocks and that Korean telephone lines had been destroyed in villages of Oedo-ri and Hagwi-ri (three to five miles west of Jeju Air strip).<sup>107)</sup>
- On April 28, 1948, 20<sup>th</sup> Infantry patrols picked up handbills in Nohyeong-ri, Jeju-eup, demanding the death of Kim Gu and Rhee Syng-man, in order that a “free, united Korea may be established”.<sup>108)</sup>

According to the report on a future operation plan, Lieutenant Colonel Schewe planned to continue implementing operations on April 29 and 30, but he might not depending on results of the previous operations. Considering that the daily report of the US 6<sup>th</sup> Regiment and the US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps doesn't contain records of operations on April 29 and 30, it seems that there were no more operations of the US Army after noon on April 28 when Lieutenant Colonel Schewe left Jeju.

### ③ Peace Negotiation between Kim Ik-ryeol and Kim Dal-sam

Shortly after the US Army finished a house search in Jeju-eup, Peace Negotiation between Kim Ik-ryeol, commander of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment and Kim Dal-sam, the organizer of the armed resistance group, in Gueok-ri, Daejeong-myeon located in southwestern Jeju. According to Kim Ik-ryeol's memoirs, the whole story of the negotiation is as follows: Regimental Commander Kim Ik-ryeol left the regimental headquarters in Moseolpo, Daejeong-myeon at noon on April 28, 1948 to meet Kim Dal-sam at a meeting place in Gueok-ri, Daejeong-myeon. Kim Ik-ryeol said to Kim Dal-sam that if the negotiation broke down, a battle would be started soon, saying “Although the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment

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106) Hq. 6<sup>th</sup> Inf Div, USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 922, April 28, 1949.

107) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 823, May 1, 1948.

108) Hq. 6<sup>th</sup> Inf Div, USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 923, April 29, 1948.

did not initiate combat so far, the military will obey an order and begin combat regardless of the individuals' will."

Kim Dal-sam asked, "You are under control of the US Military Government; then how much authority do you have on the implementation of an agreement, regarding the result of this negotiation?" Kim Ik-ryeol replied, "I came here because I was ordered by the US Military Governor. I act for the US Military Governor General Dean, therefore, my decision is same as that of the Military Governor." As Kim Dal-sam said, "Jeju people also invested me with full authority," the Peace Negotiation began.

After many twists and turns, Kim Ik-ryeol and Kim Dal-sam came to an agreement as follows: ① Battles should completely cease within 72 hours; sporadic conflicts are considered due to communication problems, but battles that occur after five days from today will be regarded as a breach of faith. ② Disarmament shall be conducted gradually. If either side violates the agreement, however, battle will be resumed immediately. ③ If people disarm and descend from the mountain peacefully, the safety of leaders of the uprising will be guaranteed. In addition, they agreed to establish defector camps in Moseolpo regimental headquarters and an airfield in Jeju-eup on the day following the negotiation, and to build to camps, in Seogwipo and Seongsanpo, afterwards. They also agreed that the military manages the camps and the police would not be allowed access to the camps.

According to the memoirs of Regimental Commander Kim Ik-ryeol, when he returned to Jeju-eup and reported the agreement to Mansfield after successfully concluding a four hour long negotiation, Mansfield was highly pleased and commanded him to forbid the police from going out of police boxes, as he requested.<sup>109)</sup>

On May 1, only three days after Peace Negotiation, however, the so-called Arson of Ora-ri occurred, as right-wing youth association set Ora-ri, Jeju-eup on fire. On May 3, the negotiation broke down when the US Army ordered an all-out attack by the Korea Constabulary. The Jeju 4 · 3 Incident had

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109) Kim Ik-ryeol, *ibid.*, The Jeju 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *ibid.*, pp.319-331.

become an uncontrollable bloody clash.

### 3) The Adoption of Repressive Measures

#### ① Arson of Ora-ri

The arson of Ora-ri occurred on May 1, only three days after the Peace Negotiation, and had a decisive effect on the annulment of the agreement. The incident started when members of the right-wing youth association stormed into Yeonmi Village, Ora-ri, about two kilometers away from the center of Jeju-eup, in broad daylight and set ten houses on fire.

Since the armed uprising on April 3, several people had been killed by the armed rebels and the police in Ora-ri. On April 29, vice-president and a member of Daedong Young Men's Association's Ora-ri branch were kidnapped and lost. On April 30, two wives of the brothers, who were members of Daedong Youth Corps, were kidnapped. One of the two women was beaten to death, and the other managed to escape and reported the facts to the police.<sup>110)</sup>

The Arson of Ora-ri occurred on May 1. Around 9 a.m., a funeral was held for a woman who was killed by armed rebels the day before. The funeral, held near the village, was attended by three to four police officers and 30 members of the Seobuk Young Men's Association and Daedong Youth Corps. After the burial of the corpse, police officers returned by truck and members of the association and the youth corps remained. Some of the members of Daedong Youth Corps were from Ora-ri. They looked for the houses of people who were known as leftists in Ora-ri and set fire to 12 private houses of five households.

Around 1 p.m. when the young rightists left the village after the arson attack, about 20 armed rebels with guns and bamboo spears chased them. Although it caused [them] no casualties because the young people fled from the rebels, the mother of a police officer, who was from the village, was killed

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110) Testimony of Lim Gap-saeng (wife of a member of the Daedong Youth Corps who escaped from abduction), (The 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4 · 3 Speaks* vol. 2, pp.152-53); Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 819, April 27, 1948.

at the village entrance around that time.

Around 2 p.m., the Police Riot Squad went to Ora-ri in two trucks, after learning about the news of the appearance of armed rebels from the members of Seobuk Young Men's Association and Daedong Youth Corps. When the police arrived, the armed rebels had already left the village and the residents were putting out the fire. But as the police advanced shooting guns from the entrance of the village, the residents scattered and escaped into the mountain. Ko Mu-saeng was then shot to death by the police. Park Gi-ha, who lost her mother at that time, testified, "When my mother was shot to death, there was an airplane hovering overhead."<sup>111)</sup>

The police left the village in a hurry when jeeps and trucks of the Korea Constabulary appeared. After hearing the news of the incident, Regimental Commander Kim Ik-ryeol, who was directly involved in the Peace Negotiation, rushed from Moseolpo to investigate the site. Although he reported to the US Military Government that young rightists of Seobuk Young Men's Association and Daedong Youth Corps committed an arson attack with the support of the police, his report was ignored, as the police reported that the armed rebels carried out the arson. First Lieutenant Lee Yun-rak, who was then an intelligence manager of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, testified, "When Regimental Commander Kim Ik-ryeol and I reported to Lieutenant Colonel Mansfield, he told us to meet the executives of the US Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) and G-2, who were at Donhwa inn, wearing a troubled look unlike the other day when he was pleased to hear the result of the Peace Negotiation. We met a Lieutenant Colonel from G-2 and a Major from CIC, but returned feeling dejected, as they said that our report is different from that of the police and [that] rioters committed the arson."<sup>112)</sup>

Regimental Commander Kim Ik-ryeol, however, did not give up carrying out an investigation on the Arson of Ora-ri and arrested Mr. Park, who was

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111) Park Gi-ha (daughter of Ko Mu-saeng), Testimony as quoted in the 4·3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *ibid.*, p.164.

112) Lee Yun-rak (former intelligence manager of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment), Testimony as quoted in the 4·3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *ibid.*, pp.167-168.

a Daedong Youth Corps member from the village and was pointed out as the leader of the arson attack by Ora-ri residents, in Jeju-eup on May 2, detaining him in the barracks of Moseolpo. Mr. Park was soon released by the newly-appointed Regimental Commander Park Jin-gyeong after the dismissal of Kim Ik-ryeol and devoted himself to the police.<sup>113)</sup> This disaffected soldiers of the Korea Constabulary, and the criminals who killed Regimental Commander Park Jin-gyeong mentioned it in court as the fault of the dead person.<sup>114)</sup>

The situation of the Arson of Ora-ri was filmed by a US Army film team. There are aerial images of Ora-ri village burning, taken from the US Army's airplane. The Police Riot Squad that was entering the village was also filmed on the ground. The fact that the urgent situation was filmed shows the US Army had been preparing.

The silent film, kept in the US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), is known as the only documentary that shows the early situation of the Jeju 4·3 Incident. The title of the film is *May Day on Cheju-Do*. John Merrill also wrote about it in his paper, *The Cheju-do Rebellion*.<sup>115)</sup>

The US Army edited the scenes in the film as if the armed rebels committed the arson attack on Ora-ri. Therefore, it seems that the US Army produced the film to justify its hard repression. It also implies that the US Army had determined to push forward a hard-line policy.

## ② Attack Order of the US Army Forces in Korea

On May 3, 1948, the executives of US Army including Military Governor Dean ordered the General Headquarters of the Korea Constabulary to start an all-out attack on the armed rebels to settle the situation of Jeju in a short time. They decided to take strong repressive measure, as the “open arms” program that was to settle the situation peacefully by giving an opportunity to the armed rebels broke down.

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113) Mr. Park (former member of the Daedong Youth Corps), Testimony as quoted in the 4·3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *ibid.*, pp.168-169.

114) *Hanseong Ilbo*, August 14, 1948.

115) John Merrill, “The Cheju-do Rebellion,” *Journal of Korean Studies*, Vol. 2, 1980, p.169.

On the same day, the Peace Negotiation broke down because people who were going down from mountain as defectors, according to the agreement between Kim Ik-ryeol and Kim Dal-sam, were shot by unidentified people. Kim Ik-ryeol testified that the strangers turned out to be police officers and they confessed they were a Commando Unit for obstructing the submission of rioters by killing the rioters, according to the order from the superior office.

Kim Ik-ryeol added, “The police did not intend to quell the riot but to aggravate and expand it in order to conceal their fault and guilt. They disguised themselves as rioters and set fire to private houses, spreading a rumor that the rioters committed the arson. As the rioters went down from a mountain to attack police boxes, battles that had ceased started again. When the battles recurred, Lieutenant Colonel Mansfield lost his temper.<sup>116)</sup>

The annulment of agreements at the Peace Negotiation, however, was expected to happen regardless of the shooting attack of the police, as while Lieutenant Colonel Mansfield and Regimental Commander Kim Ik-ryeol tried to carry out the negotiation in Jeju, the executives of the US Army had already adopted a hard-line policy and ordered it to the General Headquarters of the Korea Constabulary. General staff department head of the general headquarters, of the Korea Constabulary, Colonel Jeong Il-gwon, testified: “After May 3, we executed offensive operations as a quick-fix solution, according to an order of the executives of the headquarters, Colonel Brown and Military Governor Dean.”<sup>117)</sup>

It was Military Governor Dean who provided the initiative for the Peace Negotiation between Kim Ik-ryeol and Kim Dal-sam because on April 18, he ordered Lieutenant Colonel Mansfield to “Contact a leader of the rioters and make your best efforts to give them an opportunity to surrender before you push forward a full-scale attack.” It seems that General Dean changed his attitude because of a decision by General Hodge, who was the commander of the US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps and USFK.

As stated above, General Hodge dispatched Lieutenant Colonel Schewe to

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116) Kim Ik-ryeol, *ibid.* The Jeju 4 · 3 Incident Task Force of Jemin Ilbo, *ibid.*, pp.334-335.

117) *Hanseong Ilbo*, August 14, 1948; *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, August 14, 1948.

Jeju to check and supervise the Peace Negotiation, as the “open arms” program had been actualizing thanks to the negotiation between Kim Ik-ryeol and Kim Dal-sam that had been started by his order to Lieutenant Colonel Mansfield, who was the commander of the 59<sup>th</sup> US Military Government Company stationed in Jeju. Lieutenant Colonel Schewe carried out a massive search operation by mobilizing the Korea Constabulary for two days from April 27, and returned to Seoul at noon on April 28. The search operation on April 27 and 28 was the first operation that was led by the Korea Constabulary, not by the police. This can be proven in a statement of the chief of Department of Interior Security Yoo Dong-yeol, “On April 27, a suppression of rioters has begun.”<sup>118)</sup>

Then, on April 28, the Peace Negotiation was held, and Military Governor Dean visited Jeju on April 29.<sup>119)</sup> There is no information on why General Dean visited Jeju and how he responded to results of the Peace Negotiation as the person who initially suggested the negotiation (“open arms” program). Considering the testimony of First Lieutenant Lee Yun-rak that when the Arson of Ora-ri occurred, the executives from US CIC and G-2 ignored a report of Regimental Commander Kim Ik-ryeol, forcing a hard suppression, it seems that the executives of the US Army had already planned an armed crackdown.

General Hodge, who was in charge of USFK, dispatched Lieutenant Colonel Schewe to Jeju on April 27 in order to examine two policies of suppression. In other words, he checked and supervised the “open arms” program, and he also checked the military strength of the armed rebels by carrying out a massive search operation in preparation for an armed crackdown. General Hodge had focused on an early suppression of the uprising, due to the coming 5 · 10 General Election, but he finally adopted the second policy, the armed crackdown.

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118) *Seoul Shinmun*, June 3, 1948.

119) *Seoul Shinmun*, According to a report on May 7, 1948, Military Governor Dean said to journalists on May 6, “I have been to Jeju last Thursday and this Wednesday.” In his words, “this Wednesday” means May 5 and “last Thursday” means April 29.

Such policy is implied in the report on April 29 of Lieutenant Colonel Schewe who returned to Seoul after his operation in Jeju. He wrote in the report: “If the commander of the 59<sup>th</sup> US Military Government Company directs the troops in Jeju now, the existing troops will be able to settle the situation. As communists and guerrillas are in Oreums, a prompt and active operation is necessary to suppress them.”<sup>120)</sup> It seems that this report encouraged General Hodge to decide to launch the armed crackdown.

### ③ The Replacement of Regimental Commander

On May 5, 1948, Military Governor Dean visited Jeju to hold a closed meeting with Civil Administrator Ahn Jae-hong, National Police Agency Chief Jo Byeong-ok and National Defense Commander Song Ho-seong. This meeting was attended by nine people of the executives of the military and the police including Lieutenant Colonel Mansfield, Jeju Governor Yoo Hae-jin, Lieutenant Colonel Kim Ik-ryeol, Jeju Police Inspection Office Director Choi Cheon and interpreters for General Dean.

The memoirs of Regimental Commander Kim Ik-ryeol show what those people discussed in the meeting. According to the memoirs, Lieutenant Colonel Mansfield presided over the meeting and announced, “Anyone who is attending this meeting can make their comments but the comments must be kept absolutely secret. Those who divulge a secret will be court-martialed.”

Jeju Police Inspection Office Director Choi Cheon stated that the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident was premeditated by the Communist International and emphasized that only a joint operation of the military and the police by mobilizing a large scale of forces could quell the uprising.

Regimental Commander Kim Ik-ryeol pointed that the riot resulted from multiple causes, insisting that the increasing number of those going into the mountains was caused by the missteps of the police. He added, “The rioters who are hostile must be isolated from the ordinary people of Jeju,” and

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120) “Disposition Form, Report of Activities at Cheju Do Island,” April 29, 1948, RG 338 Records of US Army Command (1942-), US Army Forces in Korea, 1945-49, Entry No. 11071, Box No. 68, NARA, Washington, D.C.

proposed to give him the reins of the police in Jeju in order to unite the operations. Kim Ik-ryeol presented material evidence and a photo album that raised doubts about the actions of the police.

General Dean reprimanded National Police Agency Chief Jo Byeong-ok for his different report about the situation of Jeju. Jo Byeong-ok, however, insisted that the Kim Ik-ryeol was wrong, that the evidence and photo album were fabricated pointing to Kim Ik-ryeol saying, “That person is a Communist”. Jo Byeong-ok said that Kim Ik-ryeol’s father, a member of the Communist International was playing an active role in North Korea after being educated in the Soviet Union, and Kim Ik-ryeol was acting upon orders of his father. Kim Ik-ryeol was outraged at Jo Byeong-ok’s comment and pounced upon him causing the meeting to fall into complete disorder.<sup>121)</sup>

As the fight continued, General Dean brought the meeting to an end and went to the airport to leave for Seoul. That is how Military Governor Dean and his party went to Jeju at 7 a.m. and returned to Seoul at 5 p.m. right after the meeting.<sup>122)</sup> General Dean, however, said to journalists on May 6, as follows.

On arriving in Jeju on May 5, we investigated the incident independently in the morning. Then we gathered at 1 p.m. to exchange the findings of the investigation. According to the findings, the riot was caused by a few communists who came from outside of Jeju and the communists instigated Jeju people to go into a mountain and kill supporters of the current administration. Actually, only a small number of rebellious elements went into a mountain and Jeju was peaceful in general. I believe this incident will soon be settled by the efforts of the police and the Korea Constabulary.<sup>123)</sup>

The press conference can be analyzed as follows: first, the General’s party investigated the incident independently, which implies that each person had a different view on the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident; second, communist elements that

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121) Kim Ik-ryeol, *ibid.*, The 4 · 3 News Team of *Jemin Ilbo*, *ibid.*, pp.338-342.

122) *Chosun Ilbo*, May 6, 1948.

123) *Daedong Shinmun*, May 7, 1948.

came from outside of Jeju were pointed to as the instigators of the incident. It was the first time that a mention of the outside communists was made; third, General Dean was optimistic about the situation of Jeju.

On May 6, meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Kim Ik-ryeol was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Park Jin-gyeong as Commander of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment.<sup>124)</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Kim Ik-ryeol described it as an embarrassing moment in his memoirs: “Lieutenant Colonel Park Jin-gyeong, the adjutant general of the General Headquarters of the Korea Constabulary, arrived at 11 a.m. I thought he came as a senior staff officer but he said he was appointed as the replacement Regimental Commander this morning.”<sup>125)</sup>

Considering that General Dean replaced the Regimental Commander on the same day as he held a press conference, it seems that the General had already determined to implement an armed suppression policy before the meeting on May 5. The meeting was, therefore, a process to persuade those who held a different view of the policy (National Defense Commander Song Ho-seong and Civil Administrator Ahn Jae-hong), and to obtain their consent.

This is because since its beginning, the Korea Constabulary had been in confrontation with the police due to the status of the Korea Constabulary. In addition, soldiers of the Korea Constabulary, which would soon become the parent body of the South Korean Army, in general agreed not to launch the first operation against their own people. On June 2, the chief of Department of Interior Security gave a statement, explaining the reason why the Korea Constabulary had not joined the armed suppression, saying: “The army and the navy of the Korea Constabulary have acted carefully in order not to cause a tragedy of fratricidal war in the early years of the holy independence.”<sup>126)</sup>

There is a noteworthy part with respect to the above in Kim Ik-ryeol’s memoirs: On May 5, when Kim Ik-ryeol pounced upon Jo Byeong-ok who accused him of being a Communist, National Defense Commander Song Ho-seong and Civil Administrator Ahn Jae-hong did not try to stop their fight.

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124) *The 52<sup>nd</sup> Special Command from the Department of Interior Security*, May 6, 1948.

125) Kim Ik-ryeol, *ibid.*, The 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *ibid.*, p.343.

126) *Chosun Ilbo*, June 5, 1948.

According to Kim Ik-ryeol's testimony, Commander in chief Song Ho-seong shouted, "Hey there! Hey!" but it was not clear which person he was shouting at and Kim Ik-ryeol felt the Commander in chief was shouting at Jo Byeong-ok. When Kim Ik-ryeol went to Seoul after his dismissal to report the situation of Jeju to Commander in chief Song Ho-seong, the Commander in chief worried, saying "Jeju people will be trouble," and the officers of Korea Constabulary in Seoul praised and supported what Kim Ik-ryeol did. As the fight continued, Ahn Jae-hong cried out rapping a table, "How sad! Have patience, Regimental Commander! We are being treated unfairly because our people were liberated not by ourselves but by others' help. Have patience, Regimental Commander!"<sup>127)</sup>

Above all, the most important thing is that the Jeju meeting on May 5 and the replacement of Regimental Commander on May 6 were actions taken by the executives of the US Army Military Government to quell the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident at an early stage, before the 5 · 10 General Election.

#### **D. The Breakdown of the 5 · 10 General Election in Jeju**

##### **1) Attack on Members and Offices of the National Election Committee**

As the Election Day scheduled for May 10, 1948 approached, the entire nation fell into a state of confusion. The attacks on police stations and election offices by opponents of the 5 · 10 General Election continued, nationwide. Military Governor Dean organized Corps of Protection of People on April 16 to support the police at the request of National Police Agency Chief Jo Byeong-ok, who claimed that the police force of 35,000 could not protect approximately 13,800 election offices in South Korea.

At that time the right wing led by Kim Gu, that had been receiving public support, and the middle-of-the-roaders led by Kim Gyu-sik, as well as the left wing, strongly opposed the 5 · 10 General Election, arguing the election was

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127) Kim Ik-ryeol, *ibid.*, The 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *ibid.*, pp.342-347.

a plot for unilateral election and a government that would split the Korean peninsula for good. Opposing the election, Kim Gu and Kim Gyu-sik went to North Korea to attend the Joint Meeting of Political Parties and Society Organizations in South and North Korea, held in Pyongyang from April 19, raising tensions with the US Army Military Government.

Because a major slogan of the armed rebels who caused the Jeju 4·3 Incident was “anti-unilateral election and government,” the US Army Military Government focused on quelling the uprising in order to hold the 5·10 General Election. Before the election, therefore, the US Army Military Government established countermeasures such as △ replacement of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regimental Commander of the Korea Constabulary, △ strengthening the military force of the Korea Constabulary, △ dispatch of the Police Reserves, △ organization and dispatch of the Corps of Protection of People and △ on-site inspection of the leading members of the US Army Military Government. The voter registration rate of Jeju recorded the lowest percentage in the country at 64.9%, while the national average rate was 91.7 percent.

Around the middle of April, attacks on election offices began. At dawn on April 18, the voting place in Dopyeong-ri, Jeju-eup was raided and the election records stolen. On April 19, a voting place at Sinchon-ri, Jocheon-myeon was raided and destroyed by fire. All records were lost.<sup>128)</sup> The attacks on polling stations were followed by the murders of members of the National Election Committee. A report of the US Army documented incidents that started from the night of April 21 as follows:

- Iho-ri – During the night of 21-22 April, 1948, a district registration office was raided by an unknown number of persons and all election records stolen. (C-3)
- Naedo-ri – During the night of 21-22 April, 1948, all registration records were stolen from a local district office. (C-2)
- Dongil-ri – At 10:30 p.m. on April 21, 1948, a registration office was raided by unknown persons who shot and killed the district committeeman and stole all election records. (C-2)

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128) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 815, April 22, 1948.

- Moseolpo - At 11 p.m. on April 21, 1948, a crowd of unknown size dressed in police uniforms attacked a police box and the Myeon office. The attackers were dispersed by Korean Constabulary from a nearby camp. One rightist civilian was killed. (C-2)
- Daejeong - On April 22, 1948, a group of men dressed in police uniforms, presumably the same group who perpetrated the incident in Moseolpo, above, attacked and killed an election official and stole registration records.<sup>129)</sup>

As a result of numerous attacks on the Registration Offices, following the registration period, election officials refused to make deliveries of ballots and ballot boxes to voting places. They requested that U.S. Army personnel and transportation be utilized to accomplish the task.<sup>130)</sup> At dawn on April 30, an election committeeman was killed at Sinpyeong-ri, Daejeong-myeon.<sup>131)</sup> In May, there were attacks on the workers who engaged in the 5 · 10 General Election. On May 1, the Chairperson of an Election Committee was stabbed to death by unknown assailants in Dopyeong-ri, Jeju-eup.<sup>132)</sup> On May 5, the chairperson of the Hwabuk-ri branch election committee was killed.<sup>133)</sup> As a result of terroristic activities, voting district committeemen who lived between the mountains and the island highway were leaving their homes and believed to be living in coastal towns.<sup>134)</sup> A number of members of the election committee resigned from their positions. On May 3, the entire election committee resigned stating as the reason that conditions were “too dangerous” for them to continue in their duties.<sup>135)</sup> The Korean Constabulary was engaged in the distribution of election ballots in many districts due to the failure of the election committee to assume the responsibility.<sup>136)</sup>

The US government prohibited US soldiers from entering polling stations in order to show that it wasn't intervening in the election, even though it was

129) Hq. 6<sup>th</sup> Inf Div, USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 916, April 22, 1948.

130) Hq. 6<sup>th</sup> Inf Div, USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 918, April 24, 1948.

131) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 823, May 1, 1948.

132) Hq. 6<sup>th</sup> Inf Div, USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 925, May 1, 1948.

133) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 827, May 6, 1948.

134) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 826, May 5, 1948.

135) Hq. 6<sup>th</sup> Inf Div, USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 927, May 3, 1948.

136) Hq. 6<sup>th</sup> Inf Div, USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 109, May 10, 1948.

very worried about the nationwide movement against the 5 · 10 General Election.<sup>137)</sup> In Jeju, however, the US soldiers were present at the polling stations to encourage people to vote. They thought that the situation was serious. A report of the US Army describes the atmosphere of Jeju where the Military Government officers rolled up their sleeves for electoral work:

Difficulty developed in holding the election on Jeju because of the reluctance of election officials to open polls or to handle any election material because of fear of communist reprisals. Approximately fifty percent of the district committees resigned in the Jocheon area. In all, 65 district polls failed to function on Election Day. Military government officials assisted in the distribution and collection of election materials in approximately 50 percent of the northern guns. (MG report)<sup>138)</sup>

The US soldiers took the head of Jocheon-myeon because they were angry about Jocheon-myeon making slow progress in transporting the ballot boxes. The then head of Jocheon-myeon Kim Min-gyu testified, “An American soldier armed with a rifle and an interpreter visited Jocheon-myeon office a few days before the 5 · 10 General Election. The soldier lost his temper when checking the arrangement of ballot boxes. Although I told him that we were having difficulties in preparing the election, the soldier made me ride on a jeep against my will, saying “You are not cooperating with us.” I managed to get out after arguing through the interpreter.”<sup>139)</sup>

In Andeok-myeon, the US soldiers went to a mountain village to hold an election by themselves. Kim Bong-seok, who went to the village carrying ballot boxes with the US soldiers at that time, testified, “When we were in trouble because the ballot boxes were stolen twice, one American soldier said he would deliver the boxes by a three-quarter truck. Although we dissuaded him, saying it is dangerous, we had to go to Gwangpyeong-ri to set the ballot

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137) Special Edition, G-2, GHQ, FEC Daily Intelligence Summary, Report on Recent Korean Tour,” May 30, 1948, RG 6: Records of General Headquarters, Far East Command (FECOM), reel 647, MacArthur Memorial Library, Virginia, U.S.A.

138) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 831, May 11, 1948.

139) Kim Min-gyu (former chief of Jocheon-myeon), Testimony as quoted in the 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *ibid.*, p.211.

boxes in the Gwangpyeong-ri office. Eventually the election was held in Gwangpyeong-ri under the eye of the American soldier and me.”<sup>140)</sup>

In the uncontrolled situation, some people voted by proxy. In Sangcheon-ri, Andeok-myeon, Namjeju-gun, three people including the head of Sangcheon-ri and a clerk gathered at the head’s home to vote for a certain candidate on behalf of about 100 voters on the Election Day.<sup>141)</sup>

The police also launched a counterattack. According to sources of the US Army, 29 people died in Jeju during the four days from May 7 to 10. The details are as follows: △ Police officers: Killed (1), Wounded (9), Missing (4) △ Rightists: Killed (7), Wounded (3) △ Communists: Killed (21)<sup>142)</sup>

The report of the US Army is a collection of information reported by the headquarters of the Military Government, the US 20<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment and the US Counterintelligence Corps that had been dispatched to Jeju. The information also includes reports of local police officers and the Korea Constabulary. Thus, the report of the US Army gives an impression that it describes facts in accord with the interests of the United States and that it omits and conceals the facts that are unfavorable for their own country. According to the above figures of victims from May 7 to 10, 21 out of 29 dead people are defined as rioters. The report of the US Army documented in the same period, however, states: “On May 10, 1948 the Constabulary killed one man, who attempted to escape while being held for questioning.”<sup>143)</sup>

Meanwhile, the armed rebels made the residents go to a mountain in order to boycott the 5 · 10 General Election. The residents began to climb up a mountain from May 5. They stayed in an Oreum and a forest near their village until the election ended. On Election Day, there were a very small number of people in the village including families of police officers, the executives of Daedong Youth Corps, and members of the election committee. The daily

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140) Kim Bong-seok (former vice-chief of Andeok-myeon), Testimony as quoted in the 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *ibid.*, pp.211-212.

141) The 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *ibid.*, p.236.

142) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 830, May 10, 1948.

143) Hq. 6<sup>th</sup> Inf Div, USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 935, May 11, 1948.

report of the US 6<sup>th</sup> Division described a tense situation of May 10 as follows.

- △ Jungmun-myeon: On May 10, 1948, a polling booth was raided and all ballots were destroyed.
- △ Seongsan-myeon: On May 10, 1948, a voting booth was burned by a group of sixty men.
- △ Jeju-eup: On May 10, 1948, two dynamite charges were exploded near the Jeju-eup office. No casualties were reported.
- △ Jeju Airport: At 11:40 a.m. on May 10, 1948, Two groups of approximately 250 and 50 men respectively were engaged in a fire fight 200 yards south of the airstrip. The larger group was carrying plain white flags. A platoon of constabulary was dispatched to the scene but the larger group had disappeared in the vicinity of coordinates. No casualties were reported.
- △ Pyoseon-myeon: On May 10, 1948, one polling station was raided. Two persons were killed and all ballots were destroyed.
- △ Songdang-ri, Gujwa-myeon: At 11 a.m. on May 10, 1948, two persons were killed, one was wounded and seven homes burned. Details are being sought.
- △ Jocheon-myeon: On May 10, 1948, 14 district polls failed to function on Election Day.
- △ Bukchon-ri, Jocheon-myeon: At 4 p.m. on May 10, 1948, a polling booth was raided and all ballots were destroyed.
- △ Gasi-ri, Pyoseon-myeon: On May 10, 1948, the head of Gasi-ri and the principal of the school were shot to death during the polling station attack. The wife of the principal was injured.
- △ Seongsan-myeon: On May 10, 1948, four people were shot to death during the polling station attack. Details are being sought.
- △ Jocheon-ri, Jocheon-myeon: On May 10, 1948, the Constabulary killed one man, who attempted to escape while being held for questioning. (B-2)
- △ Sineum-ri, Aewol-myeon: At 6 p.m. on May 10, 1948, five Constabulary-men were met by a Military Government Officer at a suburb of Sineum-ri. The Constabulary-men stated that they had been driven out of Sineum-ri by a group of sixteen raiders. Later in the evening, investigation disclosed that no such incident had occurred, that no raiders were present in the town, and that the five Constabulary-men had left their posts. The U.S. Advisor to this Constabulary reported that the men will be tried for deserting their posts.<sup>144)</sup>

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144) Hq. 6<sup>th</sup> Inf Div, USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 934, May 10, 1948; No. 935, May 11, 1948.

## 2) Invalidity of Two Electoral Districts

Although the US Military Government encouraged the election by mobilizing the US Army, Korea Constabulary and Corps for Protection of People, the election was not held properly, except in the center of Jeju-eup where security was tight.

The National Election Committee announced a 95.9 percent of turnout in the 5 · 10 General Election that was held in 200 electoral districts, which means 7,487,649 out of 7,840,871 voters casted their vote. In Jeju, 53,698 out of 85,517 voters of three electoral districts casted their vote, recording 62.8 percent of turnout, the lowest in the country. Namjeju-gun showed an 86.6 percent turnout (32,062 out of 37,040 voters gave their vote.), resulting in an independent candidate, Oh Yong-guk, winning the election. But district ‘A’ and district ‘B’ of Bukjeju-gun showed 43 percent (11,912 out of 27,560 voted) and 46.5 percent (9,724 out of 20,917 voted) turnouts respectively, failing to reach a majority.<sup>145)</sup> A member of the National Election Committee Hong Sun-jae, who came up to Seoul to report the results of the 5 · 10 General Election to the National Assembly Election Committee described the situation of Jeju as follows:

- △ ‘A’ district of Bukjeju-gun: Of 73 voting districts only 32 ballot boxes including two empty boxes from 33 voting districts were collected. 43 voting districts, therefore, failed to hold an election. While Yang Gwi-jin gained the highest with 3,000 votes, it did not reach a majority of votes of 37,040 registered voters. Yang Byeong-jik in ‘B’ district of Bukjeju-gun is placed in the same situation. So the two candidates are waiting for a decision from the National Assembly Election Committee.
- △ ‘B’ district of Bukjeju-gun: Only 31 out of 61 voting districts held an election.
- △ Namjeju-gun: 86 out of 87 voting districts held an election. The present lawmaker Oh Yong-guk won the election with about 16,000 votes.<sup>146)</sup>

As a result of the 5 · 10 General Election in Jeju, 31 of 73 voting districts

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145) *Chosun Ilbo*, May 20, 1948.

146) *Chosun Ilbo*, May 19, 1948.

in 'A' district of Bukjeju-gun and 32 of 61 voting districts in 'B' district of Bukjeju-gun carried out the election. On May 18, the National Assembly Election Committee considered the election of Yang Gwi-jin and Yang Byeong-jik null and void in accordance with Article 44 of the election law, and suggested on May 19 to Military Governor to declare an invalid election of the two voting districts in Jeju.<sup>147)</sup>

On May 26, Military Governor Dean made a proclamation as of May 24 that the election of two voting districts in Jeju as invalidated and a reelection would be held on June 23 under the supervision of the chairperson of the National Assembly Election Committee, in accordance with Article 44 of the election law.<sup>148)</sup>

The situation of Jeju, however, was not likely to be settled. In early June, the Jeju Provincial Election Committee requested a delay of the reelection, scheduled to be held on June 23, stating their reasons as follows:

The reelection of lawmakers in A and B districts of Bukjeju-gun that was scheduled to be held on June 23 is not possible to be carried out yet. Jeju Provincial Election Committee requests a delay of the reelection for following reasons.

- (1) Of 1,206 members of the election committee in 12 myeon, one eup, two gun, 15 were killed and five were severely injured. Most of members in Nanjeju-gun fled for safety, but they are reluctant to come out for fear of possible troubles.
- (2) More than half of voting rolls of 133 polling stations in Bukjeju-gun were stolen or burned out. It is very hard to make new lists.
- (3) Four candidates of A district and four candidates of B district in Bukjeju-gun who ran for the 5 · 10 General Election would not yield to none, so the reelection cannot be held without voting.<sup>149)</sup>

On June 10, Military Governor Dean, who wanted to enforce the reelection, was obliged to give the executive order of an indefinite postponement of the

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147) *Woori Shinmun*, May 21, 1948.

148) *Chosun Ilbo*, May 27, 1948.

149) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, June 10, 1948.

reelection:

BY-ELECTION ON ISLAND OF JEJU-DO INDEFINITELY POSTPONED

SECTION I. By virtue of the power vested in me by Section 44, Law for the Election of Representatives of the Korean People, of 17 March 1948, acting on recommendation of the National Election Committee, I declared on 24 May 1948 the election held on 10 May 1948 in Electoral District A and Electoral District B of North JEJU DO null and void because voting was held in less than 50 percent of the voting districts of these two electoral districts due to activities and violence of subversive elements. Simultaneously, I ordered that a new election take place in these two electoral districts on 23 June 1948. In view of the continuing efforts of subversive elements to disturb public peace and order on JEJU DO Island, motivated by the desire to guarantee to the voting population of Electoral District A and Electoral District B of North JEJU DO a peaceful and undisturbed election which truly represents the will of the people of these districts, I herewith order that the by-election in these two electoral districts is postponed for an indefinite period.

SECTION II. This Executive Order shall be effective on the date appearing hereon.<sup>150)</sup>

Jeju Island, therefore, went down in history as the only region that rejected the 5 · 10 General Election in South Korea. A year later, the by-election was held on May 10, 1949.

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150) *The 22<sup>nd</sup> Administrative Order of the South Korea Interim Government*, June 10, 1948.

## 2. The Early Period of Armed Conflict

(May 11, 1948 – October 10, 1948)

### A. The Suppression under the Direction of the US Commander

#### 1) Dispatch of the US 20<sup>th</sup> Regimental Commander

After the 5·10 General Election failed in Jeju, the US Army Military Government dispatched<sup>1)</sup> Colonel Rothwell H. Brown, Commander of the 20<sup>th</sup> Regiment under the command of the US 6<sup>th</sup> Division stationed in Gwangju, as the US commander of Jeju area for directing and leading all repression operations on May 20. Colonel Brown had once visited Jeju right before the 4·28 Peace Negotiation to check a repression operation with Lieutenant Colonel Mansfield of the 59<sup>th</sup> US Military Government Company stationed in Jeju. This time the Colonel was dispatched on a special mission of Military Governor Dean who ordered him to suppress the situation in Jeju in the early stage, as the reelection was scheduled to be held on June 23.<sup>2)</sup>

Lim Seon-ha, the commander of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Regiment of the Korea Constabulary in Jeollabuk-do under the jurisdiction of Colonel Brown, testified about the status and personality of the Colonel and the meaning of his dispatch as follows:

Colonel Brown was commander of the 20<sup>th</sup> Regiment of the US Army 6<sup>th</sup> Division at that time. The headquarters of the 20<sup>th</sup> Regiment was located in Gwangju and Jeollanam-do, Jeollabuk-do and Jeju were under his control. As a

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- 1) It is not certain when Colonel Brown arrived at Jeju. But considering a letter (The Rothwell H. Brown Papers, Box 3, US Army Military History Institute, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.) written on May 19, 1948 by the 6<sup>th</sup> Division Commander to Colonel Brown, a news article of *Hyeondae Ilbo* on June 3, 1948 reported a statement, “I was assigned about 10 days ago,” and the fact that the first report of Colonel Brown starts from May 22 (Hq. USAMGIK, Major General William Dean to Major Edgar Noel, July 17, 1948), it is estimated that Brown arrived at Jeju on May 20.
  - 2) “Letter from Brown to Ward,” July 2, 1948, The Rothwell H. Brown Papers, Box 3, US Army Military History Institute, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.

commander of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Regiment stationed in Gwangju, I received his operational command. He looked like a typical professional soldier and he had a lot of experience in war. There were two US officers in command in Gwangju, Colonel Brown and Colonel Price. Price had not directed a tactical unit but was Military Governor in charge of administrative services in the provincial government, while Colonel Brown had led a combat unit affiliated with the 20<sup>th</sup> Regiment in Sangmudae Military Base, Gwangju. The police and Korea Constabulary had to take orders from Colonel Brown in the operations area of the 20<sup>th</sup> Regiment. The reason Colonel Brown, who was in such a high position, was dispatched to Jeju is that the US Army Military Government took the Jeju 4 · 3 Uprising seriously. I have no idea about his activities in Jeju because I was in Jeonju at that time.<sup>3)</sup>

Colonel Brown's role and activities in Jeju are described in detail in an account that Jo Deok-song (Joseon Central News Agency Correspondent) wrote in June, 1948. That account was published in the July issue of *Sincheonji* in 1948 as follows:

There are not only police officers who were dispatched from the mainland but also members of private groups who are assigned as temporary police officers in Jeju. Corps for Protection of People, an organization that cooperates with the police, continues to exist under the control of the police, keeping guard over villages near police boxes day and night. The US supreme commander Colonel Brown directs the Korea Constabulary that would lead a battle in a dangerous mountainous area and Coast Guard that is dealing with an increasing number of dispatched units coming from the mainland. The supreme commander said, "The Land and Coast Korea Constabulary and the police are working together since I came here. If things go as planned, the situation will be quelled in about two weeks." (But it has been over a month since the Colonel Brown predicted the two weeks.) He added, "I'm not interested in the cause of the incident. If the uprising occurs again after I suppress the situation, it is not me but the Korean authorities who would be responsible for that."<sup>4)</sup>

Jo Deok-song also emphasized in his writing, "The supreme commander

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3) Lim Seon-ha (former commander of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Regiment), Testimony as quoted in the 4 · 3 News Team of *Jemin Ilbo*, *The 4 · 3 Incident Speaks*, Vol. 2, Jeonyewon, 1994, p.253.

4) Jo Deok-song, *Bloodshedding Jeju Island*, *Sincheonji*, July issue, 1948, p.89.

Colonel Brown, who was dispatched to Jeju on a special mission of Military Governor Dean for recovering public security, declared that he was not interested in the cause of the uprising and that his mission is suppression of the situation,” expressing his own feelings as, “It might be no wonder for him as a foreigner to think like that, but I don’t know why I’m disappointed.”<sup>5)</sup>

At that time, people from various circles including members in the legal profession, the press and Jeju people living in Seoul claimed, “The Jeju 4 · 3 Incident was caused by a mixed public sentiment because people have been so oppressed. It is important to find a root cause to heal the people’s hurt.” The short statement of Colonel Brown, however, shows that the US Army Military Government took a hard-line policy without considering the solution by finding the cause.

Colonel Brown launched a strong operation from the beginning as if to demonstrate his announcement: “If things go as I planned, the situation will be quelled in about two weeks.” Jo Deok-song described the operations of the army, navy and air forces under the command of Colonel Brown: “In Jeju, the American reconnaissance planes are flying in the sky, the American cruisers are on guard, turning searchlights on the sea, and the American officers are directing at the front line, riding a horse or a jeep.”<sup>6)</sup>

While he was influenced by the assassination of the Regimental Commander Park Jin-gyeong after his appointment, the reason Colonel Brown executed a strong operation was because of his personality and his impression of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident. When Colonel Brown was appointed to go to Jeju for a repression operation, the 6<sup>th</sup> Division Commander Major General Orlando Ward sent a letter on May 19 as follows:

I want to call attention to one thing, but I am not sure whether it is appropriate or not. I cannot help recalling the time when a massive scale of riots and revolutions that have nothing to do with incitement to communism occurred in South America and other regions. It doesn’t mean there is no incitement to

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5) Jo Deok-song, *ibid.*, pp.94-95.

6) Jo Deok-song, *ibid.*, p.96.

communism. In addition, I think that the uprising was caused by people's hatred of the police. The riots will continue until provocative causes are removed by replacing officers who people don't trust and by considering proper measures.<sup>7)</sup>

Major General Ward indirectly advised not to consider the Jeju 4·3 Incident a matter of incitement to communism. He also advised to settle the situation by stopping tyranny of the police to handle the public sentiment, pointing out that tyranny of the police is the main cause of the uprising. Taking that advice, Colonel Brown took measures to stop the tyranny of the police as soon as he was dispatched.

Colonel Brown, however, sent a letter on July 2 to refute the advice of Major General Ward. Brown stated his intention to continue a strong operation, saying: "One thing is absolutely certain – that the Island was organized as a Communist base. The evidence was irrefutable once we really began to dig into the matter. Police brutality and inefficient government were but incidental to the Communist designs on this Island. It is so obvious that Jeju has become a base for communists."<sup>8)</sup>

Colonel Brown also stated in his report: "Infiltration of Communist sympathizers into the Korean constabulary resulted in two successive regimental commanders of the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment conducting negotiation with the Communist agitators and adopting stalling tactics where vigorous action was required. The Korean Constabulary could have been immediately effective, if the Chief Civil Affairs Officer had been forceful and positive in his actions."<sup>9)</sup> He thought that he was used by the armed rebels on the 4·28 Peace Negotiation between Regimental Commander Kim Ik-ryeol and Kim Dal-sam, an organizer of the armed resistance group and that he had to take more strong action.

Colonel Brown's personality and his impression of the Jeju 4·3 Incident resulted in the strong repression operation. He explained his operations through

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7) "Letter from Ward to Brown," May 19, 1948, The Rothwell H. Brown Papers, Box 3, US Army Military History Institute, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.

8) "Letter from Brown to Ward," July 2, 1948, *ibid.*

9) "Report of Activities on Cheju-Do Island from May 22, 1948 to June 30, 1948," July 1, 1948, *ibid.*

media reports about ten days after his appointment as the US Army Commander of Jeju area. Brown emphasized his status and role of commanding the military and the police stationed at Jeju, saying, “I heard that the police and Army and Navy didn’t cooperate with each other, but that doesn’t happen since I arrived here.” In addition, Colonel Brown explained his operational plans that he had assigned to the police, Korea Constabulary and Coast Guard: △The police is carrying out the mission to keep the public security in the area within four kilometers from roads around Mt. Halla. △ The Korea Constabulary is carrying out an operation to take control of the area of Jeju Island from the west to the east. △ The Coast Guard is on patrol near the coast of Jeju twice a day.<sup>10)</sup> But the subsequent process will show that the operation to take control of the area of Jeju Island from the west to the east failed to help settle the situation, causing side effects.

## 2) The Repression Operation of Regimental Commander Park Jin-gyeong

On May 6, the day after Military Governor Dean left Jeju after holding a top-level meeting with the executives of Military Government, the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment Commander was replaced. Lieutenant Colonel Kim Ik-ryeol, who had promoted a peace policy, was dismissed and Lieutenant Colonel Park Jin-gyeong, who was a personnel department director of the General Headquarters of Korea Constabulary, was appointed as his successor. It is known that Lieutenant Colonel Park Jin-gyeong was selected because he was not only proficient in English, as he had graduated from the School of Foreign Affairs in Osaka (the former Osaka University of Foreign Affairs) in the Japanese colonial period, but he was also well-versed in topography and the [former] positioning of the Japanese Army, as he had served as a Japanese soldier in Jeju at the end of the Japanese colonial period.<sup>11)</sup>

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10) *Hyeondae Ilbo*, June 3, 1948.

11) The Institute for Military History Compilation of the Ministry of National Defense, *History of the Korean War*, Vol. 1, p.440; Baek Seon-yeop, *The Annals of Mt. Jirisan*, Koreaone., 1992, p.125.

The General Headquarters of Korea Constabulary moved the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment that was established in Suwon on May 4, 1948 to Jeju on May 15, incorporating the existing 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment into the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment. In addition, it appointed Lieutenant Colonel Park Jin-gyeong as the first Regimental Commander of the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment.<sup>12)</sup> Major Park Jin-gyeong, who went to Jeju on May 6 as the 9<sup>th</sup> Regimental Commander, became the 11<sup>th</sup> Regimental Commander as of May 15. He directed repression operations for about 40 days in Jeju until he was assassinated by his subordinates on June 18.

After May 15, the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment under the command of Regimental Commander Park Jin-gyeong comprised one battalion of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, one battalion transferred from the 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment in Busan, one battalion transferred from the 6<sup>th</sup> Regiment in Daegu, one battalion that was established in Suwon, key members of the Regiments, and Regimental staff. According to the testimony of Kim Jong-myeon, who went to Jeju to help organize the staff of the Regiment, Major Choi Gap-jung, Lieutenant Colonel Kim Jong-pyeong, Captain Lim Bu-taek and Major Baek Seon-jin were assigned to S-1 (Personnel), S-2 (Intelligence), S-3 (Operations) and S-4 (Logistics) respectively at the end of May. Kim Jong-myeon also said, “Considering the ranks, we were not Regiment staff but advisors. When Regimental Commander Park Jin-gyeong died, all officers left Jeju except Captain Lim Bu-taek who was in charge of an operation.”<sup>13)</sup>

On May 20, 41 soldiers of the Korea Constabulary deserted their barracks and joined the armed resistance group. The soldiers were mostly from Jeju. This incident led to an even stronger repression operation. The soldiers from Jeju, therefore, were excluded from the repression operation, which aggravated the situation.

A person of Jeju birth who joined the third class of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment and who was then affiliated with the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment testified, “90 percent of deserters were born in Jeju, so we were treated like an illegitimate child or the Reds.

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12) Department of Publishing Military History at Army Headquarters, *Daily Record of the Army*, Vol. 1, May 15, 1948.

13) Kim Jong-myeon (age 80, Gyeonggi Province) Testimony recorded on January 22, 2002.

We were told that all Jeju people are the Reds. At that time soldiers from Jeju formed one battalion under the name of Moseolpo Battalion. After the desertion, the Moseolpo Battalion was isolated in a tent located in Odeung-ri, Jeju-eup and not allowed to join the repression operation.”<sup>14)</sup> A person from the first class of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment said, “After the 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment and the 6<sup>th</sup> Regiment came to Jeju, operations started, but the soldiers of those regiments were troublemakers. They were bad people.”<sup>15)</sup> The situation was further aggravated because operations were carried out by soldiers from other regions who did not know the circumstances of Jeju.

The operations launched by Regimental Commander Park Jin-gyeong have received extreme reviews. Some said, “The Regimental Commander ordered leaders of each unit to conduct a pacification activity in order to win public sentiment.”<sup>16)</sup> Chae Myeong-sin who worked as a platoon leader under the command of Regimental Commander Park Jin-gyeong testified as follows:

Critics say that Colonel Park Jin-gyeong slaughtered civilians, but he didn't. He tried to save the civilians. Many residents went to a mountain because of the police's fault at the early stage of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident. Colonel Park focused on making the residents go down from a mountain rather than on suppressing rioters. Such operation for protecting civilians is a humanitarian and strategic action.<sup>17)</sup>

There are also negative reviews: “The Colonel launched a ruthless offensive operation. An argument that Regimental Commander Park Jin-gyeong launched a forced attack has been amplified because of a former Regimental Commander's testimony.<sup>18)</sup> According to the former Regimental Commander, Park Jin-gyeong stated in his inauguration, “In order to suppress a riot, it is fine if 300,000

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14) Kang Deok-yun (former soldier of the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment), Testimony recorded on February 1, 2002.

15) Yun Tae-jun (former soldier of the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment), Testimony recorded on May 2, 2001.

16) Department of Publishing Military History at Army Headquarters, *ibid.*, p.440.

17) Chae Myeong-sin (former platoon leader of the [Combined] 9<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> Regiments), Testimony.

18) Kim Ik-ryeol, Posthumous Records *The Truth of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident*, The 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *ibid.*, p.345.

Jeju people are victimized. Son Seon-ho who shot Regimental Commander Park Jin-gyeong criticized the Regimental Commander in a courtroom as follows:

Considering a pacification operation of the former Regimental Commander Kim Ik-ryeol, I cannot help being discontented with Colonel Park's ruthless offensive operation against 300,000 Jeju people, which resulted in the following. When we went a village called Hwabuk, we killed a 15-year-old boy holding his dead father. . . . We shot at livestock of the village for a target practice. While a resident guided us to a place where rioters stay, there were no rioters so we shot the resident to death. In addition, the Colonel did not care about his subordinates, for example, he said one soldier had to arrest one rioter every day. I could have escaped after assassinating Colonel Park, but I did not have to do that, because I killed him for the sake of 300,000 Jeju people. I will submit punishment not only for Jeju people but also for 30 million South Korean people.<sup>19)</sup>

The above argument is similar to that of a testimony of Captain Lim Bu-taek who was an advisor of Regimental Commander Park Jin-gyeong. Captain Lim testified to orders of Park Jin-gyeong in a courtroom as: ① For the sake of all Korean people, it is okay if 300,000 Jeju people are victimized. ② Regardless of whether he or she is a civilian or not, those who try to escape despite three times of order to stop must be shot.<sup>20)</sup> The report of Colonel Brown, the USFK Commander stationed in Jeju, contains some parts of Park Jin-gyeong's operation. This is because the operation of Regimental Commander Park Jin-gyeong was included in the operations of Colonel Brown, as Colonel Brown was at the top of the repression operation in Jeju. A confidential report of US Army written on June 16 described the repression operation that was launched in those days as follows:

Colonel Rothwell Brown is carrying out an operation as follows:

a) Four battalions of the Korea Constabulary are stationed in the north, south,

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19) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, August 15, 1948.

20) *Hanseong Ilbo*, August 19, 1948.

east and west of Jeju respectively. These battalions form two companies under the command of combat areas. The police are in charge of public security of the coastal area. The Korea Constabulary takes care of all the areas except the coastal area.

b) The search in mountainous area, which is common goal of all battalions, is expected be completed. Soldiers will return to their units. (June 16)

c) About 3,000 people were arrested and interrogated through this operation. 575 people including two women are now at prisoner's camp in Jeju, being questioned by four interrogation teams.<sup>21)</sup>

A new agency reported, "Those who have been arrested by the Korea Constabulary and the police reach a whopping 6,000."<sup>22)</sup> Colonel Brown launched an operation to search the whole area of mountain villages in Jeju and arrested a large number of residents, which was the operation to take control of the area of Jeju Island from the west to the east he earlier announced to journalists. *Army History Daily Record* described the operation: "The repression operation has continued without a break since the Army was stationed in Jeju. The Army succeeded in taking control of Jeju through the second all-out attack on Mt. Halla."<sup>23)</sup> But the operation did not lead to the arrest of rebels because the armed resistance group dealt with the police and avoided the Korea Constabulary, resulting in victimizing the innocent residents.

According to the military achievements from the beginning of the operation to May 27 that were announced by Department of Interior Security, 3,126 prisoners of war and defectors were arrested and eight were killed, three Type 99 Arisaka Rifles, 15 hand grenades, 12 bamboo spears, five old Chinese broadswords and 17 helmets were captured, and five soldiers of the Korea Constabulary were injured.<sup>24)</sup> A commander who was dispatched to Namjeju-gun said, "670 people without arms were arrested and sent to regimental headquarters."<sup>25)</sup> A US Army report stated, "The 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment arrested about

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21) "Disturbances on Cheju Island," Despatch No. 199, dated July 2, 1948, from American Political Advisor Joseph Jacobs to State Department.

22) *Chosun Ilbo*, June 12, 1948.

23) Department of Publishing Military History at Army Headquarters, *Daily Record of the Army*, Vol. 1, June 14, 1948.

24) *Dong-A Ilbo*, June 4, 1948.

4,000 people during six weeks of operation and sent about 500 to prison. Among soldiers of the Korea Constabulary, three were killed and two were injured during the operation.”<sup>26)</sup>

The number of casualties during Regimental Commander Park Jin-gyeong’s service is smaller than that of massive murder caused by hard-line repression operations in the winter of that year. This is because the armed rebels avoided the Korea Constabulary, dealing only with the police. An officer who participated in the operation on June 1948 said, “The so-called People’s Army that fights desperately against the police runs away when the Korea Constabulary appears. The Korea Constabulary that is trying not to fire indiscriminately has difficulty in distinguishing civilians from rioters.”<sup>27)</sup>

The Korea Constabulary unconditionally arrested residents in mountain villages due to the difficulty in distinguishing civilians from rioters. While young people who are quick in action were not arrested, the old and the infirm were captured. Jo Deok-song, who covered the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident as a war correspondent on June 1948, described the prisoners of war as follows:

Prisoners of war are coming. A number of young people are being carried on cars. Men and Women of all ages are being hauled in a line. The rain has not stopped yet. The people are being hauled with their heads bent, in silence. Their complexion looks like just their clothes. They don’t look like rioters in any way. Why are teenage boys, the elderly over 60 and women pointed out as rioters? I tried to talk to them, but they turned their heads. They might think I am a soldier of the Korea Constabulary because I’m wearing a helmet and rain gear of the military. When can we hear the piping sound of peace in this village?<sup>28)</sup>

Regimental Commander Park Jin-gyeong was promoted to Colonel on June 1 in recognition of his achievements in operation under the command of Colonel Brown.<sup>29)</sup> Commander Park received a special promotion earlier than

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25) *Seoul Shinmun*, June 4, 1948.

26) Weekly Summary, No.27, July 2, 1948, RG-9: Radiograms (Messages), 24<sup>th</sup> Corps, Jan-Aug 1948, reel 274.

27) *Chosun Ilbo*, June 9, 1948.

28) Jo Deok-song, *ibid.*, p.91.

his predecessor thanks to General Dean's consideration.<sup>30)</sup> Although the operation was to arrest people indiscriminately, General Dean considered it a successful operation. Commander Park, who was specially promoted in less than a month after he went to Jeju, was assassinated on June 18 by his subordinates, who felt a strong dissatisfaction with his operation policy.

Commander Park Jin-gyeong's operation in mountain villages produced thousands of prisoners of war in a month, making a number of residents escape to a mountain. Moreover, the Commander was assassinated. His operation not only failed to settle the situation in Jeju but also aggravated it.

### 3) Reinforcement of Police Reserves

Jo Byeong-ok, the chief of the National Police Agency, dispatched 450 members of Police Reserves officers recruited from each police precinct, and a police team under the command of Inspector Choi Nan-su of the Metropolitan Police Agency, to Jeju. The Police Reserves consisted of 350 Railroad Police officers and 100 officers recruited from the 6<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> police precincts. These police officers took a special train from Seoul at dawn on May 18, passed through Mokpo and headed for Jeju on the morning of May 19<sup>th</sup>.<sup>31)</sup> On May 20<sup>th</sup>, dozens of Police Reserves officers left Seoul to go to Jeju.<sup>32)</sup>

The dispatch of Police Reserves increased the number of police officers to nearly 2,000 as of July 1948. (Existing police in Jeju: 500, Police Reserves: 1,500).<sup>33)</sup> A large number of Police Reserves members, however perceived Jeju as an island of Reds without understanding the circumstances of Jeju, which produced side effects. A news agency reported the executions of civilians carried out by the police before and after the 5 · 10 General Election as follows:

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29) The Institute for Military History Compilation of the Ministry of National Defense, *ibid.*, p.441.

30) Baek Seon-yeop, *ibid.*, p.125.

31) *Chosun Ilbo*, May 18, 1948; *Dokrip Shinmun*, May 19, 1948; *Seoul Shinmun*, May 21, 1948.

32) *Jayu Shinmun*, May 21, 1948.

33) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, July 30, 1948.

A journalist group, in the face of danger, visited Hagwi-ri, Aewol-myeon where both parties had a fierce battle, to listen about the situation of that time from a teacher and a student of middle school in the village. They said, “I shudder at the mere mention of the scenes that are still vivid in my memory. One month after the Incident, Police Reserves came to sweep rioters and killed 18 residents including a 70-year-old man and an elementary school student. It was an indiscriminate attack even though there were some people who supported the ideology of the police among the murder victims. Two young students of our school were brutally killed brutally at that time.”<sup>34)</sup>

Colonel Brown realized to some degree that atrocities of the police contributed to expanding the Incident. Colonel Brown reported to the superior office that excessive brutality and terrorism were practiced by police reserves sent to the Island, and that procedure was adopted on May 22, 1948 to break up the revolt: the police were assigned the definite mission to stop the killing and terrorizing of innocent citizens.<sup>35)</sup> This is because Colonel Brown judged that the atrocities of the police created discontent, hindering suppression of the Incident.

Colonel Brown also stated in a press conference around the middle of June, “A police officer who participated in quelling the Incident killed civilians, which brought on public criticism. We will crack down on such police officers and five to six officers are currently being imprisoned and questioned on suspicion of murder. We are also trying to settle the Incident democratically by receiving a written pledge not to torture from all police officers in Jeju.”<sup>36)</sup>

The atrocities of the police didn’t stop, however. On June 7<sup>th</sup>, police officers of Jeoji Police Box arrested a disabled boy, an old man and seven women in Geumak-ri. While taking them to the station, they shot five of them to death.<sup>37)</sup> When police officers of Geoji Police Box including 40 Police Reserves officers raided Geumak-ri, a mountain village, most residents fled,

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34) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, July 23, 1948.

35) “Report of Activities on Cheju-Do Island from May 22, 1948 to 30 June 1948,” July 1, 1948, The Rothwell H. Brown Papers, Box 3, US Army Military History Institute, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.

36) *Jayu Shinmun*, June 18, 1948.

37) Hq. 6<sup>th</sup> Inf Div, USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 966, June 11, 1948.

but a disabled person and an old man and women, who couldn't move well, were caught while in their houses. According to testimony of the residents, the murder victims included Kim Jeong-saeng who was 80 years old, Park Du-ok who was disabled, Park Gyeong-saeng who was pregnant, and a woman whose family name was Yang.<sup>38)</sup> This incident was known to the general public later and the US CIC undertook an investigation, arresting 31 police officers of Geoji Police Box.<sup>39)</sup>

Meanwhile, Choi Cheon, the Director of Jeju Police Inspection Agency, was suspended from office as of June 11<sup>th</sup>. It is assumed that Choi Cheon was reprimanded because of his role causing public criticism as a result of torture and murder by the Police Reserves. A news agency reported, "It is said that Mr. Choi took responsibility for lack of control of subordinates in dealing with the incident."<sup>40)</sup>

The reason civilians were victimized by the police is that members of private groups such as Seobuk Young Men's Association were recruited as temporary police officers as well as that Police Reserves was assigned to the repression operation without being aware of the circumstances in Jeju. In addition, the police authorities recruited young people whose family members were victimized by armed rebels before anyone else,<sup>41)</sup> which encouraged acts of retaliation. Some police officers, who were on leave, lynched family and relatives of armed uprising suspects.<sup>42)</sup> Lester Chorpening, a police advisor stationed in Jeju, said, "Police Reserves officers decided to avenge themselves for the murders of their colleagues and families, which resulted in the atrocities."<sup>43)</sup>

As a hard-line repression operation aggravated the situation, the US Army Military Government attempted to remediate the police through personnel

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38) Park Byeong-saeng, (Hallim-eup), Testimony as quoted in the 4·3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *ibid.*, p.263.

39) Hq. 6<sup>th</sup> Inf Div, USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 968, June 13, 1948.

40) *Hanseong Ilbo*, June 18, 1948.

41) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, July 24, 1948.

42) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, July 17, 1948.

43) USAFIK, HUSAFIK, part III, chapter IV, "Police and Public Security," pp.420-421.

changes. The Military Government had already replaced Jeju Governor Yoo Hae-jin, who had promoted an anti-communist hard-line policy, by Lim Gwan-ho, who was from Jeju, as a new governor on May 28<sup>th</sup>. The Military government appointed Kim Bong-ho, who was also from Jeju and was then Deputy Director of the 8<sup>th</sup> police precinct Police Agency, as Director of Jeju Police Inspection Agency on June 17<sup>th</sup>.<sup>44)</sup>

Before starting for his new post, Director Kim Bong-ho said he heard from Jo Byeong-ok, the chief of National Policy Agency that there is no one but himself who can settle the situation. He implied that he would carry out an appeasement policy saying, “As a native of Jeju, I will appeal to local patriotism to rectify any fault of both the police and civilians, but I cannot help shedding bitter tears upon hearing the facts of the incidents.”<sup>45)</sup>

Although he was appointed on June 24<sup>th</sup> at an unsettled time due to the assassination of Commander Park Jin-gyeong, Kim Bong-ho announced in a meeting on July 1 that was attended by a newly appointed Regimental Commander Choi Gyeong-rok and heads of eup and myeon from all over the island: “First, I will eradicate and purge illegality and dishonesty from the police. A blockade will be lifted, while transportation of supplies will not be interfered with or disturbed. Those who followed others blindly won’t be punished and defectors will be recognized as civilians.”<sup>46)</sup> He actually lifted a restriction on fishing and abolished the Travel Certificate System within Jeju as of July 1<sup>st</sup> to carry out an appeasement policy.<sup>47)</sup> On July 5<sup>th</sup>, he abolished the Travel Certificate System that was applied to travelers who used the Mokpo-Jeju regular ferry.<sup>48)</sup>

Jo Byeong-ok, the chief of National Policy Agency, however, announced a statement on June 23<sup>rd</sup>, that it was a mistake to find the cause of Incident in undemocratic actions. He also said, “The fundamental policy in settling the

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44) *Dong-A Ilbo*, June 19, 1948.

45) *Donggwang Shinmun*, June 20, 1948.

46) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, July 11, 1948.

47) *Daedong Shinmun*, July 6, 1948.

48) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, July 17, 1948.

Jeju 4 · 3 Incident is as it was before,” which meant that the efforts of Director Kim, who tried to settle the situation by winning public sentiment, ended in failure.<sup>49)</sup>

## **B. The Assassination of Regimental Commander Park Jin-gyeong and Reorganization of the Korea Constabulary**

### 1) The Murder of Colonel Park Jin-gyeong

At dawn on June 18<sup>th</sup>, 1948, Colonel Park Jin-gyeong, the Commander of the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment, was assassinated in the barracks by his subordinates. After drinking at a party in celebration of his promotion on June 17<sup>th</sup>, Commander Park was shot with a bullet from an M-1 rifle around 3:15 a.m. the next day, while sleeping.

The US Army was immensely shocked by his death because it had full confidence in the Commander, who had taken the lead in carrying out repression operations under the command of Colonel Brown. The comment of urgent news of the US Army says, “Colonel Park was rated one of the finest commanders and combat leaders in Korea,”<sup>50)</sup> showing how much the US Army trusted him and regretted his death.

Military Governor Dean, who had selected Park as a new regimental commander for a repression operation, came down to Jeju on June 1<sup>st</sup> to pin the insignia of colonel on Commander Park, was said to have been outraged at the report of Park’s death. According to a testimony of Charles L. Wesolowsky who was the US Army advisor, William L. Roberts, the then advisor of Department of Interior Security, also attended the promotion ceremony and came down to Jeju when Park died.<sup>51)</sup> General Dean left for Jeju with two gun experts at noon on June 18.<sup>52)</sup> Dean made an on-site investigation and

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49) *Hyeondae Ilbo*, June 24, 1948.

50) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 863, June 18, 1948.

51) Charles L. Wesolowsky (age 80, former Advisor of the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment), Testimony recorded on October 28, 2001.

returned to Seoul with the body of Park in the evening of that day.<sup>53)</sup> The unit funeral of Commander Park was held with the chief of Department of Interior Security, soldiers, family of the deceased, Military Governor Dean, and Civil Administrator Ahn Jae-hong in attendance, in the General Headquarters of the Korea Constabulary located in Namsan-dong, Seoul at 2 p.m. on June 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1948.<sup>54)</sup>

Soon after the assassination, the military, the police, the US CIC and CID were mobilized for the investigation.<sup>55)</sup> All soldiers who worked at the headquarters of the regiment assembled in the military training ground to be investigated. The military police checked magazines and guns one by one and gathered soldiers who possessed bullets and had not cleaned their guns for an investigation. The gun experts who accompanied General Dean carried out a thorough gun investigation of soldiers of the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment.

Lieutenant Colonel Kim Jong-myeon was in charge of G-2 in the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment in Jeju as an executive member of the Department of the Interior Security Intelligence Bureau. When Commander Park Jin-gyeong was assassinated, the Lieutenant Colonel was sleeping next to him with a partition between them. Kim Jong-myeon said, “The US Army took notice that different guns have different abrasion because of friction between a bullet and rifling. So they carried out a thorough investigation, comparing bullets shot by every M-1 rifle.”<sup>56)</sup> Kim also testified, “I was so upset because Colonel Brown looked at me with suspicion saying, ‘how could you not be aware of that in the next room?’ He thought I was dissatisfied with not being promoted because I was Lieutenant Colonel like Commander Park as well.”<sup>57)</sup>

It is said that an anonymous letter helped the investigation. The letter said

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52) *Chosun Ilbo*, June 19, 1948.

53) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, June 20, 1948.

54) *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, June 23, 1948.

55) Hq. 6<sup>th</sup> Inf Div, USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 973, June 18, 1948.

56) Kim Jong-myeon, Testimony as quoted in *The Annals of Mt. Jirisan*, Baek Seon-yeop, Koreaone., 1992, pp.123-124.

57) Kim Jong-myeon, Testimony as quoted in the 4·3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4·3 Incident Speaks* Vol. 3, Jeonyewon, 1995, p.201.

that First Lieutenant Moon Sang-gil and First Sergeant of the regiment's intelligence department would give the entire picture of the assassination.<sup>58)</sup> First Lieutenant Moon Sang-gil, who graduated from the 3<sup>rd</sup> class of the Korea Military Academy, was a Company Commander after working as a Platoon Commander at the beginning of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment in Moseolpo. All people involved in the death were ordered arrested. The accomplices of the assassin were First Lieutenant Moon Sang-gil, Staff Sergeant Son Seon-ho, Staff Sergeant Bae Gyeong-yong, Second Master Sergeant Yang Hoe-cheon, Staff Sergeant Lee Jeong-u (not arrested), Staff Sergeant Shin Sang-u, Staff Sergeant Kang Seung-gyu, Staff Sergeant Hwang Ju-bok, and Staff Sergeant Kim Jeong-do.<sup>59)</sup> According to the sources of the armed resistance group, Lee Jeong-wu fled to a mountain to join the resistance group with an M-1 rifle.<sup>60)</sup>

It was revealed that Staff Sergeant Son Seon-ho from the 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment in Busan shot Commander Park Jin-gyeong to death. Considering the importance of the case, the General Headquarters of Korea Constabulary sent him and the accomplices to Seoul on July 12<sup>th</sup> in order to put them on trial in a general court-martial.<sup>61)</sup> As the funeral of Commander Park was the first military funeral of a high-ranking officer, it attracted a lot of public attention. The press also gave major coverage to the process of the trial.

The General court-martial was held by Colonel Lee Eung-jun, the presiding judge, at the court-martial room of Department of Interior Security on August 9<sup>th</sup>. The trial focused on uncovering the motive and the truth behind the assassination. Lieutenant Colonel Lee Ji-hyeong, the public prosecutor of the general court-martial, read an indictment that First Lieutenant Moon Sang-gil planned the assassination instigated by Kim Dal-sam, and Staff Sergeant Son Seon-ho fired the gun.<sup>62)</sup>

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58) The Institute for Military History Compilation of the Ministry of National Defense, *ibid.*, p.441.

59) *Gukje Shinmun*, August 20, 1948; *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, August 15, 1948; *Hanseong Ilbo*, August 15, 1948.

60) *History of Armed Uprising of Jeju People* as quoted in *Mt. Halla Knows - The Truth of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident*, Moon Chang-song, 1995, p.82.

61) *Jayu Shinmun*, July 13, 1948.

First Lieutenant Moon, however, denied at court the accusation that Kim Dal-sam instigated him to commit the murder. He said that he had met Kim Dal-sam to promote the negotiation because he agreed with the former Regimental Commander Kim Ik-ryeol who did not want a fratricidal war, but that he had never received an order of assassination from Kim. Moon added, “I signed and sealed a confession by force because my eyes were covered after electrical torture. So what I said in this court is the truth.”<sup>63)</sup>

The other defendants said they participated in the assassination in order to stop a ruthless repression by comparing the operation of Kim Ik-ryeol with that of Park Jin-gyeong. Staff Sergeant Sin Sang-wu stated, “Colonel Park slaughtered our own people and gained promotion. An American soldier personally pinned the insignia.” Staff Sergeant Son Seon-ho, who shot Commander Park, stated, “Colonel Park ordered us to kill innocent people, arguing that it is fine if 300,000 Jeju people are killed for the sake of 30 million Koreans and that a fratricidal war is inevitable. I thought that Colonel Park must be murdered in order to save our own people and to build a virtuous South Korea Defense Squad.”<sup>64)</sup>

Lieutenant Colonel Kim Ik-ryeol was taken to the police station on suspicion of involvement in the assassination plan, as he had held the Peace Negotiation with Kim Dal-sam on April 28<sup>th</sup>. A news agency reported, “According to those close to Department of Interior Security, Lieutenant Colonel Kim’s detention had nothing to do with the assassination case. It is assumed that Lieutenant Colonel Kim was detained because of a direct meeting which is alleged to have been held between the Lieutenant Colonel and Kim Dal-sam, the so-called Commander of People’s Liberation Unit.”<sup>65)</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Kim was suspected of holding negotiations with the armed resistance group instead of carrying out a hard-line repression operation in the first place.

Lieutenant Colonel Kim stated in court, “All military operations were under

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62) *Gukje Shinmun*, August 10, 1948.

63) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, August 14, 1948.

64) *Hanseong Ilbo*, August 14, 1948.

65) *Gukje Shinmun*, July 23, 1948.

the direction of the American Captain De Reus, who was then a military advisor of operational meeting. I don't know about the assassination of Colonel Park," which means that all military operations including the Peace Negotiation were carried out under the direction of the US Army. As Colonel Jeong Il-gwon, the chief of staff of Korea Constabulary General Headquarters, agreed with that statement, Lieutenant Colonel Kim was able to prove his innocence.<sup>66)</sup>

The defense counsel focused on the motive of the assassins. Major Kim Heung-su, the public defender, said, "First Lieutenant Moon and the others had never received any order from a person at a mountain and there was no ideological background. These people committed the murder because of their love for our people and a sense of justice. So please give this careful consideration." Kim Yang, the defender elected by popular vote, argued as follows:

It has already been pointed out by each person in charge that the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident was directly caused by misdeeds of some wicked police officers and corrupt officials. Seeing all pains of Jeju people and the tragedy of fratricidal war in the liberated country, these young people were foolish enough to take daring action with a firm determination that they would sacrifice themselves in order to stop the tragedy and save 300,000 Jeju people. They are of course guilty of killing Colonel Park. But society that is falling into confusion is also responsible for the crime. As the August 15<sup>th</sup> handover of power is just around the corner, which means the full independence of the country, foreign powers are watching for a chance to invade again. So please give these brave young people an opportunity to die for their country and to fight for their people.<sup>67)</sup>

Lieutenant Colonel Lee Ji-hyeong, however, demanded the death penalty for the defendants, defining their crime as a serious criminal offense that broke military discipline based on misdirected nationalism.<sup>68)</sup> The final trial was

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66) *Gukje Shinmun*, August 14, 1948; *Hanseong Ilbo*, August 14, 1948.

67) *Hanseong Ilbo*, August 15, 1948.

68) Jeong Dong-ung, *A New Tragedy of Jeju during Disturbances – Trial Record on Murder of Colonel Park*, *Saehan Minbo*, early October in 1948.

held on August 14<sup>th</sup>, a day before the establishment of the government of the Republic of Korea. First Lieutenant Moon Sang-gil, Staff Sergeant Sin Sang-wu, Son Seon-ho and Bae Gyeong-yong were sentenced to death by firing squad by the Department of Justice. Yang Hoe-cheon was sentenced to life imprisonment and Kang Seung-gyu was sentenced to five years' imprisonment. Hwang Ju-bok and Kim Jeong-do were found not guilty due to lack of evidence.<sup>69)</sup>

The ruling made by Colonel Lee Eung-jun, the presiding judge and the inspector general of Department of Interior Security, was supposed to be approved by Yoo Dong-yeol, the chief of Department of Interior Security, and Military Governor Dean.<sup>70)</sup> The defense counsel presented a petition asking for a reduced sentence and people from various circles announced statements for a commutation. Thanks to such public sentiments against the ruling, the execution by firing squad that was sentenced to Sin Sang-wu and Bae Gyeong-yong was reduced to imprisonment for life on a special pardon just before their scheduled execution.<sup>71)</sup>

First Lieutenant Moon Sang-gil and Staff Sergeant Son Seon-ho were eventually executed by firing squad at the foot of a mountain in Susaek, Gyeonggi-do on September 23<sup>th</sup>. Before the execution Moon Sang-gil willed, "I die at the age of 23. You are the Army of South Korea. Hopefully the South Korean Army will not serve some people (He actually mentioned names of some people) but serve its country and people only." Son Sang-ho was shot dead after singing a martial song that starts with 'patriotic flag waves in our blood . . .' and offering as a prayer, "Oh God, please help the Korean Army fight for our people."<sup>72)</sup>

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69) *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, August 15, 1948.

70) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, August 15, 1948.

71) *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, September 25, 1948.

72) *Jayu Shinmun*, September 25, 1948; *Seoul Shinmun*, September 26, 1948.

## 2) The Latter Period of the Repression Operation of the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment

Soon after the death of Commander Park Jin-gyeong, the US armed forces in Korea appointed Lieutenant Colonel Choi Gyeong-rok and Major Song Yo-chan as Commander and Deputy Commander of the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment on June 21<sup>st</sup>.<sup>73)</sup> Those two had served as warrant officers of the Japanese Army in the Japanese colonial period, and had a lot of battle experience. They also went to Military English School in the period of the US Military Government.<sup>74)</sup>

Commander Choi and Deputy Commander Song focused on tracking down assassins as soon as they started their new positions in Jeju, and continued to carry out the repression operation of the former Regimental Commander. According to the daily record of the US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps around that time, the Korea Constabulary launched a massive search operation from the day when the new Regimental Commander was assigned to Jeju. During the 24-hour period ending at 18:00 on June 22<sup>nd</sup>, the Constabulary captured 48 raiders in the vicinity of Songdang-ri, Gujwa-myeon. One carbine was recovered. During the same period 29 raiders were captured in Samyang-ri, Jeju-eup.<sup>75)</sup> During the 24-hour period ending at 18:00 on June 26<sup>th</sup> the Constabulary captured 176 suspected raiders on Jeju. Approximately 30,000 Won and sufficient mess equipment to feed 50 men was confiscated.<sup>76)</sup>

The Korea Constabulary succeeded in arresting 253 rioters during search operation on June 21<sup>st</sup>, 22<sup>nd</sup>, 25<sup>th</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup>, according to the report, but they were able to capture only one gun. Even though they arrested 176 rioters, what they captured from the rioters on June 25<sup>th</sup> was just money and food. A news agency reported on the operation on June 26<sup>th</sup> that succeeded in arresting 200 rioters with no arms, as follows:

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73) "Memorandum to Colonel Brown," June 21, 1948, RG 338: *Records of US Army Commands*, Entry: Provisional Military Advisory Group (1948-1949) and Korean Military Advisory Group (1949-1953), Box 4, NARA, Washington, D.C.

74) Han Yong-won, *Foundation of National Forces*, Bakyeongsa, 1984, p.58.

75) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 868, June 24, 1948.

76) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 871, June 28, 1948.

The South Korea Defense Squad that had focused on public security in mountain villages surrounded the villages by using force around Bukjeju area from dawn on June 26<sup>th</sup> to arrest suspects of the Incident. As a massive action, this operation was carried out even around coastal area. Nearly 200 people were arrested in Gujwa-myeon, Jocheon-myeon and Jeju-eup as of this afternoon. It is said that there are two leaders of rioters, though most of the arrested people are farmers, and that no arms were found.<sup>77)</sup>

Regimental Commander Choi Gyeong-rok also said, “The crack unit that actually engaged in battles has not been arrested yet,” in a press conference on July 14<sup>th</sup>, which was 20 days after he arrived in Jeju.<sup>78)</sup> On July 15<sup>th</sup>, the last day of his repression operation, Commander Choi said to journalists, “We have suppressed four times in Mt. Halla so far but we could not arrest residents in mountain. There were all ages of people from 12 to 60. Most of the residents were young people followed by middle-aged people, teenagers and the elderly.”<sup>79)</sup>

The armed rebels were not active around that time. On June 22<sup>nd</sup>, after a trip around Jeju led by him, Colonel Brown said to journalists, “As you have seen today, we travelled the road which was very dangerous about a month ago. As there have been no incidents recently, roads and electric wires are under repair. I believe that public security has become stable.”<sup>80)</sup> Yoo Dong-yeol, the chief of Department of Interior Security, said on June 23<sup>rd</sup>, “Rioters seem to be losing their strength.”<sup>81)</sup>

The armed resistance group must have stopped their activities, slackening the reins on attacks in order to seek countermeasures, as the Korea Constabulary started to launch operations. Inspector Choi Nan-su of National Police Agency said, “After May 20<sup>th</sup> the rioters changed their struggle policy. Some of them disguised themselves as defectors and one crack unit was divided into several units in arms, hiding in the mountains. They seem to have started a long-term

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77) *Chosun Ilbo*, July 4, 1948.

78) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, July 21, 1948.

79) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, July 29, 1948.

80) *Hyeondae Ilbo*, July 3, 1948.

81) *Donggwang Ilbo*, June 23, 1948.

resistance.”<sup>82)</sup> A news report carried the situation as follows: “It is said that rioters are still fighting against the police. They disappear when the Korean Constabulary shows up, while they are spreading flyers that say, ‘Dear Korea Constabulary, overthrow the black dog (which is what they call the police).’”<sup>83)</sup>

As a hard-line repression operation continued groups of Jeju natives petitioned nationwide for a peaceful settlement of the situation. Jeju People’s Association in Gwangju filed a petition to the Jeju Police authorities on June 19<sup>th</sup> for calling for: △ restricting possession of arms and stopping the use of force and taking peaceful ways, △ securing Jeju people’s livelihoods, △ dissolving private terrorist groups, △ abolishing Jeju-Mokpo Travel Certificate System, and △ punishing those who use torture and violence.<sup>84)</sup>

On July 1<sup>st</sup> the Jeju People’s Association in Seoul submitted a recommendation to about 40 political parties and civic groups to call for △ a countermeasure meeting that includes every patriotic and political organization, △ seeking proper ways to send an on-site investigation team that includes every patriotic and political organization, △ organizing a task force consisting of leading figures from various circles to negotiate with people in charge at Military Government about a political solution to the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident.<sup>85)</sup>

According to these recommendations, about 40 political and civic groups discussed the organization of a task force in the conference room of Democratic Independence Party on July 6<sup>th</sup>.<sup>86)</sup> The Jeju People’s Association in Busan with a membership of 50,000 Jeju people pointed out on July 5<sup>th</sup> that, “It is clear that Jeju people rose in arms as a last resort for peace.” The association also sent a petition to Lieutenant General Hodge, Military Governor Dean, the chief of Department of Interior Security, the chief of Department of Justice, and UN Temporary Commission on Korea to call for an immediate and peaceful settlement, saying the use of armed force is wrong. The association left for

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82) *Dong-A Ilbo*, June 24, 1948.

83) *Hanseong Ilbo*, July 21, 1948.

84) *Chosun Ilbo*, July 2, 1948.

85) *Hanseong Ilbo*, July 3, 1948.

86) *Hanseong Ilbo*, July 7, 1948.

Jeju on July 6<sup>th</sup> with journalists from news agencies in Busan to find out the actual circumstances.<sup>87)</sup>

The Korea Constabulary announced postponement of operational work, as the armed rebels showed no response despite massive search operations and arrests of people. There had also been pressure from various circles to settle the situation peacefully. Commander Choi Gyeong-rok lifted the traffic blockade and restriction of fishing and reduced the curfew. Commander Choi also announced in a statement: “Operational work will be postponed except in particular cases, while efforts to restore public security will be accelerated in cooperation with the police and administrative organs.<sup>88)</sup> This brought at lull to the situation of Jeju.

Jeju people however, had to suffer from the aftermath of the operations of the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment of Korea Constabulary. According to a report by a news agency, there were people ranging in age from 20 to 60 years old in the camp under the supervision of the South Korea Defense Squad. Those people were arrested while working in their villages, and not in the mountain regions. The report also carried the people’s complaint that “We have been here for about three months.”<sup>89)</sup>

Jeju people not only kept the police but also Korea Constabulary at a respectful distance, which made it difficult for the authorities to settle the situation. A correspondent in Jeju wrote the reality of a village as follows:

Utility poles have fallen down on the farms and on the ridges, while barricades are set up high around a Police Box that dauntlessly remained. Forty to fifty residents are coming for security telephone wire repair and stone wall construction around the police box construction work. As one of our party who was from Jeju talks to the residents, they burst into tears, surrounding us. Someone wails while beating a rock with a hoe, saying, “I can’t die and I can’t live.” A 60-year-old woman filled with fear and resentment taps her chest, pointing to a doorplate. It is said that all residents were taken to the police box

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87) *Hanseong Ilbo*, July 9, 1948.

88) *Daedong Shinmun*, July 8, 1948.

89) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, July 29, 1948.

and that they are being beaten and abused since doorplates of every house have disappeared overnight. Are rioters guilty? Or are the residents guilty? While gunshots have become calm, people are wearing a worried look. When a journalist asked, “How do you feel these days?” a resident cried, “We are afraid not of guns far away but of guns close to us.”<sup>90)</sup>

Indiscriminate arrests encouraged young people to join the armed rebels. A newspaper carried a report as, “It is hard to see young people in villages all across the island. They are said to devote themselves to the so-called People’s Liberation Unit to avoid the indiscriminate arrests.” At the question about the most difficult thing, a resident answered, “I can’t stand being asked to go get daughters and sons who do not even exist in the family register.”<sup>91)</sup>

### 3) The Reorganization of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment

As of July 15, The General Headquarters of the Korean Constabulary restored the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, appointing Major Song Yo-chan, who was Deputy Commander of the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment, and Captain Seo Jong-cheol, who was Battalion Commander of the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment, as Commander and Deputy Commander respectively.<sup>92)</sup> On July 24, the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment, led by Commander Choi Gyeong-rok, returned to Suwon, Gyeonggi-do where it was first established, relieving the original 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment strength of Jeju people who had been attached.<sup>93)</sup> Prior to withdrawal of the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment, two battalions of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade, attached to the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment had moved from Busan to Jeju on July 21<sup>st</sup>.<sup>94)</sup> This means that the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment that had been attached to the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment since May 15<sup>th</sup> and was reorganized in two months. The person in charge of troops stationed in Jeju was also changed, from Choi Gyeong-rok to Song Yo-chan.

The reason that the troops stationed in Jeju were reorganized through such

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90) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, July 11, 1948.

91) *Seoul Shinmun*, July 13, 1948.

92) The 88<sup>th</sup> Special Command from the General Headquarters, July 6, 1948.

93) Department of Publishing Military History at Army Headquarters, *Daily Record of the Army*, Vol. 1, July 24, 1948.

94) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Weekly Summary, No. 149, July 23, 1948.

a complicated process might be the fact that the situation on Jeju had become more settled. On July 12<sup>th</sup>, just before the reorganization of the Korea Constabulary, Chief of Staff Lee Hyeong-geun announced at a press conference, “The Jeju 4 · 3 Incident is settled for the time being.”<sup>95)</sup> But if that were true, the Korean Constabulary should have completed its operations on Jeju instead of transferring troops.

The real intention of the reorganization was to end the situation of Jeju before the establishment of the government of the Republic of Korea. When sending command units for the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment, Brigadier General William L. Roberts, then advisor to the Department of Interior Security, said to Colonel Brown on June 21<sup>st</sup> as follows:

It just occurs to me that you should be informed of the duties we expect of the Officers we are sending in view of your request on Sunday. Today, we sent Lt. Col Choi to be Regimental Commander of the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment and Major Song to be the Exec. Col Choi was chosen by all the heads here, and I like his appearance: his background seems to be excellent. I understand that Song is a strong man and has a record of being ruthless. We are not sending an Inspector because this boy, Song, is the best we have and you can use him as such.<sup>96)</sup>

The US Army highly rated Deputy Commander Song as a strong man with a record of being ruthless, while considering Commander Choi gentle, although he had gained people’s confidence.

According to the US Army’s confidential document of July 12 which was right before the original reorganization of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, a commander of the South Korea Defense Squad said, “The repression has become visible. The reason the operation is slowing in progress is that Korea Constabulary is reluctant to quell the Incident only by means of slaughter.”<sup>97)</sup> Commander Choi had eased up on indiscriminate arrests, compared to the operations

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95) *Dong-A Ilbo*, July 13, 1948.

96) “Memorandum to Colonel Brown,” June 21, 1948, RG 338: Records of US Army Commands, Entry: Provisional Military Advisory Group (1948-1949) and Korean Military Advisory Group (1949-1953), Box 4, NARA, Washington, D.C.

97) Political Advisor, USAMGIK, to Secretary of State, July 12, 1948.

before. The point is that the US Army analyzed the situation as slow in progress because Commander Choi was unwilling to slaughter.

Meanwhile, Song Yo-chan, who was appointed as the 9<sup>th</sup> Regimental Commander after serving as Deputy Commander of the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment in Jeju, had a different character from Choi Gyeong-rok. Brigadier General Roberts called Song a tough and gallant person. Harold S. Fischgrund, the then advisor of the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment, testified that Song Yo-chan was a very tough guy.<sup>98)</sup> Kim Jeong-mu, who served as assistant chief of staff for logistics (G-4) from July 15<sup>th</sup> to December 15<sup>th</sup> that same year, testified about Song Yo-chan as follows:

I went to Jeju to serve as G-4 of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment. At that time Choi Se-in was G-1, Tak Seong-rok was G-2, and Han Yeong-ju was G-3. One day not long after I went to Jeju, Kang Ui-won (4<sup>th</sup> class graduate of the Korea Military Academy), who was one of the subordinates under my control, disappeared. It is said that he was executed by an order of Commander Song.

I was promoted to the rank of captain as of September 1<sup>st</sup>, and a few days later the Commander said to me, “You should be a judge. I must kill this man!” He forced me to sentence a person who I didn’t even know to death on a charge of a crime that I’d never heard about. I actually learned about a court-martial for a few hours in the Korean Military Academy, but I didn’t know what to do because I’d never held court. When I arrived at the courtroom, a man was half dead from torture. The defendant was Park Gyeong-hun, the former Jeju governor. He was suspected of a fact that 18 liters of rice of the governor’s official residence was given to red guerrillas. The 18 liters of rice imperiled the man’s life. Remembering that my grandmother always kept a key of rice store when I was a child, I asked the defendant, “Did you give rice in person?” Governor Park at the age of 57 or 58 back then answered, “No, I found the fact during an inquiry after being imprisoned. I heard that rice was given to a relative of my wife who visited to ask for help, saying he or she was starving of hunger.” I thought he was not guilty because he cannot be responsible for what his wife did, even though the rice was given from the governor’s official residence. I discussed with several people including a judge advocate. One of them said, “Commander Song ordered us to sentence the defendant to death. Why don’t we sentence him to 20 years in prison?” Someone suggested 15 years, and the other

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98) Harold Fischgrund (a former advisor of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment), Testimony recorded on October 20, 2001.

suggested 10 years. After serious consideration I suggested to judges, “He is not guilty and we can’t execute his wife. So how about sentencing three years?” and I got their agreement. But I still feel guilty about sentencing an innocent person to three years in prison.

When I reported the verdict to the Regimental Commander, he hit me on my head with a helmet saying, “You communist!” My head was beaten so badly that it was swollen up quite large. G-1 Choi Se-in who attended the trial was beaten as well. Provost Marshal Song Hyo-sun, who was in the same class with me, drank heavily and was tormented by something, but he didn’t tell me about his problem. People said that the military police took dozens of people to a cave to beat them. I think that’s what he was worried about, because he was a very nice person. He finally took some measures and left Jeju. G-3 Han Yeong-ju was beaten by Commander Song day and night.<sup>99)</sup>

Meanwhile, another report of the US Army also shows why the regiments were changed. Surprisingly, the military strength was changed because of training. The reorganization of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment was completed as two battalions of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade in Busan went to Jeju on July 21 and the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment left Jeju on July 24. A week later, Military Governor Dean told Jo Byeong-ok, the head of National Police Agency, “I plan to replace regiments of Korea Constabulary in Jeju for field training. One regiment will be stationed at Jeju for four to six weeks. The regimental training will be continually carried out in a mountainous area.”<sup>100)</sup> Dean intended to utilize the situation of Jeju for field training of the Korea Constabulary.

## **C. The 8 · 25 Secret Election and the Reorganization of Armed Resistance Group**

### **1) South Korean Representative Election**

From around the middle of July in 1948, the Secret Election was held

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99) Kim Jeong-mu (assistant chief of staff for logistics of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment), Testimony recorded on September 25, 2002.

100) “A Summary Report on the Jeju Police,” from Military Governor Major General William Dean to Korean National Police Director, July 30, 1948.

across the entire area of South Korea, followed by the establishment of the North Korean government. North Korea made the best use of the South-North negotiations for the establishment of its government. The first Joint Meeting of Political Parties and Society Organizations in South and North Korea were held in Pyeongyang on April 19<sup>th</sup>, 1948 in order to establish a unified government. The meeting was attended by key figures such as Kim Gu. A joint statement was issued in the meeting, saying: “Although the South Korea-led unilateral election has been held, the result will not be accepted. We will hold an election for a unified legislative body to enact the Constitution of Korea and to establish a unified government.”<sup>101)</sup>

Since the establishment of the government of Republic of Korea had become visualized after the 5 · 10 General Election, the second Joint Meeting was held in Pyeongyang from June 29 to July 5, 1948. North Korean representatives of 15 political parties and society organizations such as the North Korea Labor Party and South Korean representatives of 20 political parties and society organizations who had remained in North Korea after the first meeting, and who crossed the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel again secretly, attended the meeting. Kim Gu and Kim Gyu-sik did not attend the meeting saying, “It was agreed in the meeting in April that we should work together to stop splitting our land and people. But our people are being divided because North Korea is trying to establish a unilateral government, like South Korea.”

The second Joint Meeting focused on the point that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea which was soon to be established should be a unified government. It was agreed to hold an election not only in North Korea but in South Korea. In reality it was impossible to hold an election openly in South Korea, so it was decided to hold a double election in South. This means 1,080 representatives selected in each city would hold a Representative Gathering of South Korean People in Haeju on August 21 and elect 360 representatives of the Supreme People’s Assembly on August 25. The Secret Election that stirred all of South Korea was to elect 1,080 South Korean

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101) Kim Nam-sik, *Study on the South Korea Labor Party*, Dolbegae, 1984, p.335.

representatives who would attend the Representative Gathering of South Korean People to be held in Haeju. One who was a top executive of the South Korea Labor Party testified as follows:

In regions that are dominated by the Left at night while being under the US Army Military Government's control in the daytime, the election was held semi-publicly. The regions include remote villages in Gyeongsangnam-do, Gyeongsangbuk-do, Jeollanam-do, Gangwon-do and so on. In those regions, residents were gathered in one place at night and plenipotentiaries explained about the election and various sides of people's representative candidates to the residents. After members of the region's South Korea Labor Party and leftists spoke in support of candidates, the election was conducted. In some regions that could not hold the semi-public elections, people's signatures were collected on a list. The list made of thin rice paper carried a statement to support the implementation of the Korea People's Republic Constitution, the election for the Supreme People's Assembly representative, and the candidates of the region. People were supposed to write their names and set a seal but many signed with their thumbprint. When gathering residents, heads of villages and the left-wing sympathizers were asked to gather people without being heard about the election. This means that the Secret Election was held unexpectedly. In regions where residents were unable to be gathered, plenipotentiaries visited every house in the region to get signatures and seals by force. It is said that when residents refused to sign on the list the plenipotentiaries browbeat the residents to sign and seal.<sup>102)</sup>

In Jeju-do where the Jeju 4·3 Incident occurred at that time, the Secret Election was carried out by collecting names and thumbprints on a blank paper. The situation in Jeju did not allow for plenipotentiaries to gather people in order to explain the election's purpose and introduce the people's representative candidates. Therefore, most ordinary people understood that they participated in signing to support the rebels in mountains, not in the Secret Election.

The Secret Election in Jeju was conducted in mountain villages and rural areas. Many people were unwilling to put their signatures, but they could not refuse because the armed rebels forced them to sign. Some people reluctantly

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102) Task Force Team of Joongang Ilbo, *Secret Memoir of Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Joongang Ilbo*, 1993, pp.377-378.

wrote false names and sealed with their thumbprint.<sup>103)</sup> A US Army's report of August in 1948 described the situation on Jeju as follows:

On August 19<sup>th</sup>, 40 raiders, 20 of whom were armed, invaded the village of Sehwa-ri and attempted to force the residents to place their names on blank ballots, indicating their support of the North Korean election. The police attacked the raiders and drove them off with no casualties reported to either side. Raider groups reportedly have been visiting villages in practically every myeon on Jeju, forcing the residents to place their names on blank forms and to contribute money and food to support the People's Army. Two alternatives are allegedly given the villagers by the raiders: Those who help the raiders will, at the worst, be arrested by the police, kept in custody for a few days, and then released; those who refuse to help the raiders will be killed and their homes burned. It is reported that on August 18<sup>th</sup>, five people in Seogwi-myeon, located in south central Jeju, were stabbed by raiders because they refused to sign petitions supporting the North Korean government and the election.<sup>104)</sup>

Before the Secret Election, the police were put on a state of high alert until late August by extending curfew hours and reviving the Jeju-Mokpo Travel Certificate System.<sup>105)</sup> Jeju, which had been in a state of lull for a while, began to see the situation degrade again because of conflicts between the armed rebels who tried to hold the Secret Election, and the police that tried to stop the election, resulting in casualties. A report of the US Army recorded: "On August 2<sup>nd</sup> a skirmish developed between 50 raiders, 20 of whom were armed, and the police in the vicinity of Seogwang-ri. Two raiders were killed and 1 police officer was wounded during the fight. The police confiscated 1 hand grenade, 3 Japanese rifles and 60 rounds of ammunition."<sup>106)</sup> According to the testimony of a resident of the village, the battle started as the police officers of Andeok Police Box ran to the village at the news that armed rebels were collecting signatures on blank paper.<sup>107)</sup> At dawn on August 19, members

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103) Jeju 4 · 3 Research Institute, *Jeju Uprising*, Silcheon-Munhaksa, 1991, p.263.

104) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 920, August 20, 1948.

105) *Chosun Joonang Ilbo*, August 15, 1948.

106) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 907, August 10, 1948.

107) Ko Bo-hwa (a resident of Seogwang-ri, Andeok-myeon), Testimony recorded on July 12,

of the Hallim Police Box engaged a group of raiders in a firefight at Hyeopjae-ri, Hallim-myeon. During the fight, one police officer was killed.<sup>108)</sup>

Jeju people did not know what the election was about and there were no ballot papers. The election was conducted by collecting thumbprints on blank paper. People understood it as supporting the armed rebels. Therefore, most Jeju people call the incident that occurred in all parts of the island in the summer of 1948 as the “Signing and Sealing on Blank Paper Incident”. A resident testified as follows:

The rebels came down from the mountain to collect thumbprints in the summer. The shrill chirrup of a cicada and the sound of quacking meant that the rebels had come. When the rebels told people to put their thumbprint, people had to do it, out of fear. The rebels marked with a stone on the wall of houses where they got a seal. And they told us to put our thumbprints to support their group.<sup>109)</sup>

As mentioned above, most people participated in the Signing and Sealing on Blank Paper under pressure. Moreover, millions of people in the entire region of South Korea participated in the Signing and Sealing on Blank Paper. However, this later became an excuse for killing a large number of people in Jeju. One who was then a prison officer at a police station testified about a woman he got to know in the jail, as follows:

A woman named Lee Ok was executed by firing squad after being in jail. When I asked her why she was put in prison, she said that she was taken into custody and charged with signing and sealing on blank paper. She said that she was forced by rebels to seal with her thumbprint on a blank paper. I knew her, so I tried to save her life, though all the efforts came to nothing.<sup>110)</sup>

In Jeju, people who had participated in the Signing and Sealing on blank

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2002.

108) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 923, August 28, 1948.

109) Jang Su-jin (a resident of Hyeopjae-ri, Hallim-eup), Testimony recorded on December 12, 2001.

110) Kim Si-hun (a police officer, and former member of the Seobuk Young Men’s Association at the time), Testimony recorded on February 26, 2002.

paper were targeted for execution by firing squad. A researcher of the South Korean Labor Party pointed out, “If the pretext that people can be killed because of signing and sealing was accepted, it is also translated as millions of people in South Korea could have been killed because they signed and sealed as well.”<sup>111)</sup>

## 2) Kim Dal-sam Defected to North Korea

The Representative Gathering of South Korean People with 1,080 attendees from each region in South Korea was scheduled to be held in Haeju on August 21. In early August many people lined up to go to North Korea on this account. Although 78 failed to attend the gathering for various reasons such as arrest and traffic conditions, the Representative Gathering of South Korean People was held as scheduled. Of 1,002 attendees six representatives from Jeju were included.

Kim Dal-sam, the organizer of the armed resistance group, left Jeju in August, 1948 to visit the gathering held in Haeju. It is not certain when he left Jeju. The report of the US Army recorded, “On August 2 five Communists reportedly left Jeju by boat for Mokpo presumably enroute to Pyongyang to participate in the North Korean election,”<sup>112)</sup> and it is thought that Kim Dal-sam left Jeju on August 2<sup>nd</sup> with four people. According to materials of the Left-wing, six Jeju people including Ahn Se-hun, Kim Dal-sam, Kang Gyu-chan, Lee Jeong-suk, Ko Jin-hui and Moon Deung-yong attended the gathering held in Haeju.<sup>113)</sup> Moon Deung-yong, the unfamiliar name, seems like a false name.

On August 21<sup>st</sup>, the first day of Haeju gathering, Kim Dal-sam in his mid-20s was elected as one of 35 ruling elites along with the left-wing important figures such as Huh Heon, Park Heon-yeong and Hong Myeong-hui.<sup>114)</sup> The election for representative of the Supreme People’s Assembly,

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111) An interview with Kim Nam-sik, *Jeju Shinmun*, December 5, 1989.

112) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 907, August 10, 1948.

113) Kim Bong-hyeon and Kim Min-ju, *ibid.*, p.154.

which is equivalent to the member of the National Assembly in South Korea, was held on August 25. This was to elect 212 North Korean representatives and 360 South Korean representatives at the same time. While 360 South Korean representative candidates were already announced, yeas and nays were carried out as a formality. Ahn Se-hun, Kim Dal-sam, Kang Gyu-chan, Lee Jeong-suk and Ko Jin-hui from Jeju were included among the 360 representatives of the Supreme People's Assembly on that day.<sup>115)</sup>

Kim Dal-sam gave a speech about the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident at the candidates' debate before the election on August 25<sup>th</sup>. After giving Park Heon-yeong support, Kim argued that the armed Incident occurred spontaneously as people burst into a rage against restraint and unilateral election. He also explained the achievements of armed rebels in boycotting the 5 · 10 General Election, and closed his speech shouting out; "Hurrah for a full independence of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea! Hurrah for the great Soviet army, our liberation army, and Generalissimo Stalin, the talented leader!"<sup>116)</sup>

Kim Dal-sam, who led the armed Incident, defected to North Korea; nonetheless, it does not change how the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident started. Since the leadership of the armed rebels from Jeju supported the North Korean government in the process of the establishment of two governments in the divided country, Jeju had to undergo hard-line measures from the South Korean government.

After Kim Dal-sam left Jeju, the armed resistance group was reorganized and Lee Deok-gu succeeded as the organizer of the group.

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114) Kim Nam-sik, *ibid.*, p.344.

115) Kim Nam-sik, *ibid.*, pp.530-531.

116) *Collection of Records on Representative Gathering of South Korean People*, Seoul, Inmin Publishing Co., 1948, pp.102-109.

### **3. The Massacre of Residents**

(October 11, 1948 - March 1, 1949)

#### **A. The Adoption of a Strong Repressive Measure**

##### **1) The Domestic and International Political Situation**

Around the middle of November in 1948, a large-scale strong repression operation was launched. Repression units set fire to mountain villages and killed residents en masse for four months from mid-November in 1948 to March in 1949. This phase killed the largest number of people, during the development process of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident. Most of the mountain villages were literally burnt to the ground.

It is believed that these events were the responsibility of the government of the day and the Provisional Military Advisory Group (PMAG) because Rhee Syng-man, then president, was the Commander in chief of South Korea's forces and the US Army had operational control of South Korea's armed forces. In order to find out why the large-scale strong repression operation was launched, it is necessary to look into the political situation of South Korea and of the United States. The following table is based on the results of research at home and abroad in looking for clues to these events.

First, according to the table, the middle of November in 1948 was a time when two governments were established in the South and the North, making division of the country permanent. In such circumstances, Kim Gu and Kim Gyu-sik still led a unification movement.

Second, South Korea was in a state of confusion at that time. The National Assembly passed an Anti-national Activist Punishment Law, even though former President Rhee Syng-man was against it. This legislation resulted in major conflict between political leaders. Soldiers of the 14<sup>th</sup> Regiment in Yeosu and the 6<sup>th</sup> Regiment in Daegu rose in revolt. In addition, a National Security Law was enacted after a dispute.

Third, as the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union intensified,

there were controversies over withdrawing the US Army and the Soviet Army. The US armed forces began to withdraw partially from South Korea.

The Domestic and International Political Situation

Date	Jeju-do	South Korea	The US • The Soviet Union • North Korea
12-Mar-47			Truman Doctrine caused the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union.
3-Apr-48	The armed incident broke out in Jeju.		
8-Apr-48			The US provisionally decided to withdraw the US Armed Forces in Korea by the end of December, 1948.
15-Aug-48	The establishment of the government of the Republic of Korea was proclaimed.		
24-Aug-48	The right to command the South Korean Army was vested in the US Army in accordance with Executive Agreement between Korea and US Concerning Interim Military and Security Matters.		
26-Aug-48	Provisional Military Advisory Group (PMAG) was established.		
9-Sep-48			The government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was established.
15-Sep-48	The US Army started to withdraw from South Korea.		
19-Sep-48			The Soviet Union announced withdrawal its army from North Korea by the end of the year, according to the United Nations Resolution.
22-Sep-48		Anti-national Activist Punishment Law was proclaimed.	
8-Oct-48	A rumor came out that a submarine of the Soviet Union appeared on the coast of Jeju-do.	Rhee Syng-man called for a postponement of withdrawal of the US Army from South Korea.	
11-Oct-48	Jeju Defense Headquarters were established.		
17-Oct-48	A decree not to go more than 5km from the coast was issued.		

19-Oct-48		Rebellion of Yeosu 14 <sup>th</sup> Regiment	
2-Nov-48		Rebellion of Daegu 6 <sup>th</sup> Regiment	
mid-November, 1948	A strong repression operation started. Mountain villages were set on fire and the residents were killed.		
17-Nov-48	Martial Law was declared.		
1-Dec-48		The National Security Law was proclaimed.	
12-Dec-48			The United Nations approved the government of Republic of Korea, calling for an immediate withdrawal of the US Army and the Soviet Army.
17-Dec-48			The US Department of State asked for reconsidering withdrawal of US Armed Forces in Korea that was scheduled for the end of December.
25-Dec-48			The Soviet Union completely withdrew its army from North Korea.
29-Dec-48	The 9th Regiment was replaced with the 2 <sup>nd</sup> Regiment under the control of Commander Ham Byeong-seon.		
2-Mar-49	Jeju Command Post under the control of Commander Yoo Jae-hong was established.		
23-Mar-49			The withdrawal of the US Armed Forces in Korea was decided to be postponed until the end of June, 1949.
10-May-49	Reelection for the National Assembly was held.		
15-May-49	Jeju Command Post was disbanded.		
6-Jun-49		Attack on the Special Committee for Investigating Anti-national Activities	

21-Jun-49		Fraction Incident at The National Assembly	
26-Jun-49		Kim Gu was assassinated by Ahn Du-hui.	
29-Jun-49	The US Armed Forces in Korea were completely withdrawn, leaving 500 military advisors.		

### ① The Domestic Political Situation

President Rhee Syng-man faced a political crisis at the beginning of the establishment of the government of the Republic of Korea, due to a conflict between the presidential system and the parliamentary cabinet system. Rhee Syng-man was elected president on July 20<sup>th</sup>, 1948, abandoning the Korean Democratic Party that had previously been his political affiliation, expecting to take power through the parliamentary cabinet system. As the Korean Democratic Party members were excluded from the cabinet in an announcement on August 4<sup>th</sup>, the conflict between the party and the president intensified. Prior to this, the National Assembly declined to approve Lee Yun-yeong, who was selected as the first prime minister by the president.<sup>1)</sup>

What is worse, the president came under fire because of the Anti-national Activist Punishment Law. It was a major task of the times to establish national spirit by punishing pro-Japanese groups that drove the Korean people into war and even tortured and killed independence activists in cooperation with the Japanese Empire. After Korea was liberated from Japanese colonial rule, however, the pro-Japanese groups put down roots in every corner of the country such as in the police, and in the political circles as anti-communists. Rhee Syng-man protected the pro-Japanese groups because that group provided the biggest political backing for him, while he had weak domestic political support.

As the Interim Legislative Assembly of South Korea passed the Special Law on Punishing Traitor, Pro-Japanese Cooperator, War Criminal and Dishonest Merchant on July 20<sup>th</sup>, 1947 when South Korea was under the US Army

1) Park Myeong-rim, *The Outbreak and the Beginning of the Korean War II*, Nanam Publishing Co., 1996, pp.396-397.

Military Government, attempts to punish pro-Japanese groups began. Military Governor Dean refused to announce the law,<sup>2)</sup> but this was brought out again around the establishment of the government. Although threatening letters that carried the slogan, “Those who insist on punishing pro-Japanese groups are Reds,” were spread in the Assembly plenary session hall, an Anti-national Activist Punishment Law was finally passed by the National Assembly on September 1, 1948.<sup>3)</sup> Rhee Syng-man first avoided proclaiming the law, but he had to, otherwise other bills would not be passed. Accordingly, a Special Committee for Investigating Anti-national Activities was formed.

It was unacceptable for Rhee to punish pro-Japanese groups because it was directly connected with his political career, as he left the Korean Democratic Party. President Rhee Syng-man and pro-Japanese groups started to fight back on September 23, a day after the law was proclaimed. Lee Jong-hyeong led an Anticommunist Rally held at Seoul Stadium (the former Dongdaemun Stadium). Lee, a typical pro-Japanese anti-communist, took a leading part in killing patriots during the Japanese colonial period and made far-right comments when managing *Daedong Shinmun* and *Daehan Ilbo* after liberation. In the morning of the rally, the police encouraged the residents to participate in the event saying, “Those who don’t come to the Stadium today are Reds.”<sup>4)</sup> Lawmaker Kim Ung-jin criticized the rally at the interpellation session saying, “I think that the situation of Jeju that accuses the Jeju people of being Reds will break the public security of the country in the future.”<sup>5)</sup>

Rhee Syng-man and pro-Japanese groups continued to commit sabotage by plotting assassinations of members of the Special Committee for Investigating Anti-national Activities and by carrying out government-inspired demonstration. Even at the Cabinet meeting on February 11<sup>th</sup>, 1949, Rhee was furious about

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2) Seo Jung-seok, *Research on Korean Contemporary National Movements 2*, Yeoksabipyeongsa, 1996, pp.118-120.

3) Oh Ik-hwan, *Activities and Collapse of Special Committee for Investigating Anti-National Activities, in Understanding of History Around Liberation 1*, Hangilsa Publishing Co., 1980, p.110.

4) Seo Jung-seok, *ibid.*, p.128.

5) *National Assembly Stenographic Records*, the 1<sup>st</sup> National Assembly, No. 75, September 27, 1948.

the fact that Roh Deok-sul, the pro-Japanese police officer, was arrested by an investigator of the Special Committee and ordered to deal with the investigator and director of the Special Committee in accordance with the law.<sup>6)</sup> After being attacked by the police on June 6<sup>th</sup>, 1949, the Special Committee for Investigating Anti-national Activities rapidly weakened. As only seven people were punished by Anti-national Activists Punishment Law, and the seven were released because their sentences were commuted; then a stay of execution of the sentence was granted and the punishment law failed to produce actual results.<sup>7)</sup>

After the establishment of the government, Rhee Syng-man had the task of stabilizing the government by defeating the opposition's forces, while also securing the legitimacy of the country by gaining recognition as a nation from the UN. Furthermore Rhee was pressing to receive military and economic aid from the United States. He also had to face key political issues such as pro-Japanese groups, reunification and land reform; especially the reunification issue which was closely related to withdrawal of the US Army. All those issues were very important to Rhee because they were connected with legitimacy and the existence of the country.

At that time, the international status of the Republic of Korea was still insecure and it was uncertain if South Korea could obtain the UN's approval during the session of the UN General Assembly.<sup>8)</sup> Moreover, Kim Gu and Kim Gyu-sik sent a letter calling for a general election in both South and North Korea to the UN General Assembly held in Paris, France on September 15, 1948, putting Rhee in more trouble.<sup>9)</sup>

On October 13<sup>th</sup>, 47 lawmakers led by a younger group of the National Assembly submitted an emergency agreement for withdrawal of foreign troops.<sup>10)</sup> The US Army, however, had already started to withdraw a part of its forces

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6) 18<sup>th</sup> Minutes of the Cabinet Council, February 11, 1949.

7) Oh Ik-hwan, *ibid.*, pp.124-138.

8) John Merrill, *Invasion or Resistance for Liberation*, Science and Thought Publishing Co., 1988, p.183.

9) Seo Jung-seok, *ibid.*, p.190.

10) Seo Jung-seok, *ibid.*, p.154.

since September 15<sup>th</sup>. President Rhee thought that the US Army was negligent in supporting organization, armament and military drills of the South Korean Army, which was stipulated in the Executive Agreement between Korea and US Concerning Interim Military and Security Matters. Therefore, President Rhee, who was trying to postpone withdrawal of the US Armed Forces in Korea, asked for military drills and equipment for 50,000 of the so-called South Korean Defense Squad on November 2<sup>nd</sup>,<sup>11)</sup> while the US did not recognize the existence of the South Korean Defense Squad.<sup>12)</sup> Military and economic aid that had been promised was very slow in coming and moreover, the US Army had decided to completely withdraw from South Korea by the end of December. President Rhee was so aware of the issue, that he even said at the Cabinet council held on May 27<sup>th</sup>, 1949, “It seems there is public opinion in the States that it is impossible to withdraw the US Army, so I will arouse public opinion in South Korea and ask the US Army to be stationed in Korea until the defense of South Korea is guaranteed, in order to make the US implement its responsibility and goal.”<sup>13)</sup>

While President Rhee was in trouble domestically and internationally, the Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion broke out. The rebellion ended in eight days as Yeosu was recaptured under the operational control of the US Army on October 27<sup>th</sup>. On one hand, the incident was a crisis for President Rhee, but on the other hand, it was a chance to defeat his opposition forces with a single stroke. Rhee Syng-man’s government should have reported the facts as they were or minimized the facts in order to settle the public sentiment. Instead, it overstated the facts.<sup>14)</sup> In addition, a rumor that Kim Gu was behind the Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion was circulated. Ahn Du-hui, who was killed in revenge in 1996, wrote the motive for assassinating Kim Gu in his memoirs as follows: “I could not control my anger when I heard a rumor that Mr. Kim

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11) Kim Cheol-beom, *The Korean War and the United States*, Pyeongminsa Publishing Co., 1995, p.172.

12) Hausman, Jeong Il-hwa, *US Captain who moved the mind of Korean President*, Hanguk Munwon, 1995, p.169.

13) 53<sup>rd</sup> *Minutes of the National Assembly*, May 27, 1949.

14) Seo Jung-seok, *ibid.*, p.168.

was involved in South Korean Soldiers' Defection to North Korea and Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion."<sup>15)</sup> The incident was a golden opportunity for President Rhee to not only defeat the opposition forces, but to also drive Kim Gu into a corner.

As shown in the period around the establishment of the Republic of Korea, President Rhee had emphasized anticommunism to pass through a crisis. The right-wing Korean Democratic Party that had broken with the president due to a power struggle also agreed with him when it comes to anti-communism. Meanwhile, there was a great purge in the army. The Rebellion of Daegu 6<sup>th</sup> Regiment occurred on November 2<sup>nd</sup>, but it did nothing but intensify the purge.

In such circumstances, the National Assembly passed a National Security Law on November 20 (the law was proclaimed on December 1). A day before, on November 19, The National Assembly passed a resolution asking for continued stationing of USFIK.<sup>16)</sup> The political focus rapidly changed from pro-Japanese and reunification issues to anticommunism. Critics, including a younger group of lawmakers were against the National Security Law saying, "It is repeating the Maintenance of Public Order Act," and "Nobody will be able to avoid being caught if the law is proclaimed." A majority, however, passed the law, insisting, "Weeding can hurt flowers, but we cannot stop weeding."<sup>17)</sup>

The so-called Fraction Incident at the National Assembly showed that the National Security Law could be abused as a means of eliminating political opponents. The younger group of The National Assemblymen became the scapegoats for promoting the Anti-national Activist Punishment Law and Special Committee for Investigating Anti-national Activities and for opposing the National Security Law.<sup>18)</sup> The Fraction Incident at the National Assembly,

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15) An Du-hui, *The Reason Why I killed Mr. Baek Beom, Worries of Murderer*, Hakyesa, 1955, (as quoted in *The Outbreak and the Beginning of the Korean War II*, Park Myeong-rim, p.470).

16) Seo Jung-seok, *ibid.*, p.154.

17) Park Myeong-rim, *ibid.*, p.434.

18) Park Myeong-rim, *ibid.*, pp.464-465.

Attack on the Special Committee for Investigating Anti-national Activities by the police, and Assassination of Kim Gu occurred in June, 1949. At the end of June, the US Armed Forces completely withdrew from South Korea.

## ② United States Policy toward South Korea

After the Second World War, the United States global strategy took a new turn with the Truman Doctrine announced on March 12<sup>th</sup>, 1947. The doctrine stated a policy of containment of Soviet expansion. It was to prevent the United States from falling into a crisis during the post-war period of demobilization and war, boom and bust. Therefore, the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union had begun, and since then withdrawal of USFIK has become the most important pending US policy issue regarding South Korea. The reason withdrawal of the US Army from South Korea was promoted when the Cold War began is that the policy of containment of Soviet expansion focused on Europe; the Korean peninsula was a secondary area.

This however was soon followed by a long dispute between the US State Department that argued a long-term stationing of the military on one side, and the Department of Defense, Department of the Army and so on that argued for an immediate withdrawal.<sup>19)</sup> The US State Department emphasized the importance of the Korean peninsula as a hard-fought battlefield of ideology. As national prestige could be affected if the US were defeated by the Soviet Union, the State Department argued for the long-term stationing of the armed forces. On the contrary, the military put a low value on the Korean peninsula. It argued that it could not station armed forces there any longer because of reduction of military strength and arms cuts, after the release of soldiers from WWII mobilization. The Far East Command – under the control of Douglas MacArthur in Japan – also agreed with the military. In spite of the dispute, the United States had to chase two hares at once: building a barrier to communism in South Korea and withdrawing the armed forces.

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19) Refer to *The Korean War and the United States* written by Kim Cheol-beom (Pyeongminsa Publishing Co., 1990) for changes of the United States' policy towards Korea on the withdrawal of US Armed Forces in Korea.

The long dispute was finally concluded at the National Security Council (NSC) attended by the US president. After prolonged negotiations, NSC-8 and NSC-8/2 which are the final guidelines for a policy toward South Korea were announced. The daily record of withdrawal of the US Army is as follows:

- △ April 8, 1948: The US president approved NSC-8 and tentatively decided to withdraw the US Armed Forces by the end of December 1948.
- △ September 15, 1948: US Armed Forces in Korea started to withdraw secretly.
- △ September 19, 1948: The Soviet Union announced that according to the UN Resolution it will withdraw its armed forces from North Korea by the end of the year.
- △ November 12, 1948: John J. Muccio, the US special envoy, called for postponement of withdrawal of the US Army, arguing that South Korea fell into uncontrolled confusion due to the Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion.
- △ December 12, 1948: The UN General Assembly recognized the Republic of Korea as a nation and called for an immediate withdrawal of armed forces by the US and the Soviet Union.
- △ December 17, 1948: The US Department of State asked for reconsidering NSC-8 that was to withdraw the US Armed Forces in Korea by the end of December.
- △ December 25, 1948: The Soviet Union announced that it had completely withdrawn its armed forces from North Korea.
- △ March 23, 1949: The US president approved NSC-8/2, the guideline for a policy toward South Korea, that was to postpone withdrawal of the US Armed Forces in Korea until June, 1949.
- △ June 29, 1949: The US Armed Forces in Korea were withdrawn, leaving the military advisory group.

As stated above, the chaotic state of South Korea influenced postponing withdrawal of the US Armed Forces in Korea, and when a dispute over the time of withdrawal began again because the US State Department raised objections against NSC-8, strong repression operations were launched in Jeju. In November, 1948, the point of dispute in the US over withdrawal of the armed forces was whether the South Korean government was strong enough to become a barrier to communism or not. The military was also asked to prove that, in order to persuade the State Department.

The US official document that was made in preparation for the offensive of the Soviet Union prior to the UN General Assembly held in December, 1948 in Paris shows how seriously the US took the boycott of the 5 · 10 General Election in Jeju. The document carries seven expected questions that the Soviet Union was likely to raise at the UN General Assembly regarding the 5 · 10 General Election in South Korea and 8 · 25 Election for North Korea:

① The 8 · 25 Election is the only election which can be considered a national election since it was held in both zones. Suppression by U.S. and Korean authorities in South Korea forced the election underground in that area.

② All geographic, economic, social and political segments of the population participated in the election.

③ The 8 · 25 Election was not accompanied by the coercion and bloodshed which occurred during May 10. Two seats are still vacant in the so-called The National Assembly because of the objection of the people of Jeju to the 5 · 10 election.

④ The majority of the people in South Korea did not support the 5 · 10 Election. All patriots opposed it. Only the capitalistic, traitorous pro-Japanese elements favored this scheme for dividing the nation because it meant the perpetuation of their authority in the American zone.

⑤ Election statistics: In North Korea, 4,529,938 or 97.97 per cent of the registered voters cast ballots; in South Korea, 6,735,407 or 77.48 per cent of the eligible electorate cast ballots.

⑥ The Supreme People's Council contains representation of the Korean people at the ratio of 50,000 to 1 – twice the representation allowed in the so-called The National Assembly. The South Koreans with 360 representatives have a greater voice in the Government than the North Koreans with 212.

⑦ All essential positions in both North and South Korea have been filled. The central government is ready to function.<sup>20)</sup> This means that the US had been worried about the offensive of the Soviet Union even though the UN General Assembly recognized the government of the Republic of Korea on

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20) Enclosures to Dispatch No. 51 from Seoul, Korea, October 22, 1948.

December 12.

## 2) Command and Control of the US Armed Forces in Korea

### ① **Executive Agreement between Korea and US Concerning Interim Military and Security Matters.**

The establishment of the government of the Republic of Korea was announced on August 15<sup>th</sup>, 1948 when the US Military Government ended, but the operational control of the South Korean Army was still the responsibility of the US Army, in accordance with the Executive Agreement between Korea and US Concerning Interim Military and Security Matters, concluded by President Rhee Syng-man and Commanding General John R. Hodge on August 24<sup>th</sup>, 1948. The key points of the agreement are as follows:

Article 1. The Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea, agrees that, pursuant to directives from his government and within his capabilities, he will continue to organize, train and equip the Security Forces of the Republic of Korea now in being, provided that his obligation shall cease upon the completion of withdrawal from Korea of forces under command.

Article 2. . . . It is further agreed that the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea, shall retain until completion of withdrawal of United States Army Forces . . . the authority to exercise such over-all operational control of Security Forces of the Republic of Korea (including the Constabulary and Coast Guard and such National Police detachments as may be stationed in critical areas) as he deems necessary in the interests of common security, or to facilitate the organization, training and equipping of the Security Forces of the Republic of Korea.<sup>21)</sup>

The agreement conveys that until completion of the withdrawal of the United States Army Forces, the Commanding General shall retain the authority to exercise such over-all operational control of Security Forces of the Republic of Korea, including bases and installations, as he deems necessary. The actual

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21) The Institute for Military History Compilation of the Ministry of National Defense, *Collection of National Defense Pacts*, Vol. 1, 1981, pp.34-36.

authority over the South Korean Army was still under the control of the US Army, even after the establishment of the government of the Republic of Korea. William L. Roberts, the chief of the military advisory group, stated this fact to Lee Beom-seok, the Minister of National Defense; and Minister Lee reported to the National Assembly on October 28, 1948 as follows:

. . . Even though the Military is handed over to us, we cannot take actions on our own as we do with other administrative areas according to the necessity of the common security because we did not establish the army. In addition, the arms are not completely handed over. . . . I, the Minister of National Defense, am to deal with military administration, but an Act on the Organization of National Armed Forces is not yet laid. . . . I cannot direct operations on my own. . . .<sup>22)</sup>

The Provisional Military Advisory Group (PMAG) of the US Armed Forces in Korea led command and control of the South Korean Army. The PMAG held legal basis for General Order Number 31 as of August 15<sup>th</sup>, 1948 and officially launched after the Executive Agreement between Korea and the US Concerning Interim Military and Security Matters. Brigadier General William L. Roberts was appointed as chief of the advisory group.<sup>23)</sup> Roberts was appointed as chief of PMAG from May 20<sup>th</sup>, 1948 while serving as an advisor of the Department of Interior Security, which was under the control of the US Military Government.<sup>24)</sup> Captain F. V. Burgess, who served in Jeju, was appointed as an advisor of PMAG.<sup>25)</sup>

General Roberts—in his mid fifties at that time—graduated from the United

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22) *National Assembly Stenographic Records*, the 1<sup>st</sup> National Assembly, No. 90, October 28, 1948.

23) An Jeong-ae, *Research on the Advisory Group at the US Armed Forces in Korea* (Doctoral Thesis, Department of Political Science and Diplomacy, Inha University, 1996), p.70.

24) “Extension of Notes Data on Korean Security Forces for Mr. Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of the Army, Section A, Korea Army, Annex 1, History of the Korean Constabulary,” February 7, 1949, RG 319: *Records of the Army Staff*, Entry 154, Box 603.

25) “Major and Minor Matters Concerning Korean Constabulary,” August 10, 1948, RG 338: *Records of US Army Commands*, Entry: Provisional Military Advisory Group (1948-1949) and Korean Military Advisory Group (1949-1953), Box 4.

States Military Academy and became known for his bravery during the First and Second World Wars. It is said that he volunteered to be stationed in South Korea because he expected to be promoted after the war.<sup>26)</sup> Brigadier General Roberts was the very person who sent Song Yo-chan to Jeju as Deputy Commander of the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment when it replaced the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment. At that time Roberts had introduced Song Yo-chan to Colonel Brown, the US Commander in Jeju, as a tough and gallant man.

General Hodge, who took the high command of the US Armed Forces in Korea, left South Korea on August 27 soon after conclusion of the Executive Agreement between Korea and US Concerning Interim Military and Security Matters, and General John B. Coulter was newly appointed as Commander for both the USFK and the 24<sup>th</sup> Corps.<sup>27)</sup> The 24<sup>th</sup> Corps, however, left for Japan on January 15, 1949 to be demobilized due to withdrawal of the USFK; accordingly, Roberts also assumed the role of USFK Commander.<sup>28)</sup> In addition, Roberts took over the reins of the 5<sup>th</sup> Battle Regiment that was established when the 24<sup>th</sup> Corps withdrew.<sup>29)</sup> The number of advisors to PMAG increased from 100 in August, 1948 to 241 at the end of the year.<sup>30)</sup>

The Provisional Military Advisory Group wielded potent authority over the South Korean Army. As stated in the Executive Agreement between Korea and the US Concerning Interim Military and Security Matters, the South Korean Army was controlled by the US military advisors not only in the organization, training and equipping but also in operations. Captain James H. Hausman, who served as an advisor to the Commander in Chief of the South Korean Army, testified in his memoirs that after the establishment of the government of the Republic of Korea, six people including President Rhee, Minister of National Defense, Chief of the General Staff, Chief of PMAG Roberts and himself attended the Military Security Committee, which met

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26) Hausman and Jeong Ilhwa, *ibid.*, pp.165-156.

27) Han Yong-won, *ibid.*, p.167.

28) Han Yong-won, *ibid.*, p.166-168.

29) An Jeong-ae, the thesis above, p.72.

30) Han Yong-won, *ibid.*, p.167.

every week.<sup>31)</sup> When the Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion occurred, Chief of PMAG Roberts sent eight senior advisors, including Captain Hausman and Colonel Fuller to the place, and they played an important role in settling the incident.<sup>32)</sup>

## ② The Activities of the Provisional Military Advisory Group

As stated earlier, the US Armed Forces in Korea took the authority to exercise such over-all operational control of the South Korean Army even after the establishment of the government of the Republic of Korea. Brigadier General Roberts sent a letter to Lee Beom-seok, the Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense, on September 29<sup>th</sup>, 1948, to clarify the subject of operational control and its influence saying, “Operational control of the Korean Constabulary still rests with the Commanding General, USAFIK, and it is of paramount importance, therefore, that all orders pertaining to operational control of the Constabulary be cleared with the appropriate American Advisor, prior to publication.”<sup>33)</sup> This has something in common with the report of Lee Beom-seok on October 28<sup>th</sup>, 1948 at the National Assembly.

The authority to exercise operational control was not a symbolic one but a specific and direct one. On October 9<sup>th</sup>, Chief of PMAG Roberts sent an official document to Captain Treadwell who was an advisor of the 5<sup>th</sup> Brigade in Gwangju, as follows:

The highlighting of the recent Jeju Do operations has brought certain deficiencies to light, which – it is felt – should have previously been corrected by the American Advisors. Past operations on Jeju Do generally have been under the control of DIS Headquarters. Present operations, however, are – in the opinion of a Corps Commander – entirely a Korean responsibility. It is felt that the entire mounting and support of present and projected operations should be handled by Koreans through proper command channels, with minimum American

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31) Hausman and Jeong Il-hwa, *ibid.*, p.164.

32) Han Yong-won, *ibid.*, p.168; Hausman and Jeong Il-hwa, *ibid.*, pp.171-186.

33) “Letter from Roberts to Lee Bum Suk,” September 29, 1948, RG 338: *Records of US Army Commands, Entry: Provisional Military Advisory Group (1948-1949) and Korean Military Advisory Group (1949-1953)*, Box 4.

interference. It therefore devolves upon the 5<sup>th</sup> Brigade to supply the entire tactical and logistical support of current operations of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment. As pointed out above, it is felt that the 5<sup>th</sup> Brigade has failed to provide proper support, and that immediate corrective action is indicated on the part of the American Advisors through Korean channels.<sup>34)</sup>

The report above is summarized as, “Since Jeju operation’s fault has been exposed, immediately take measures through the Korean chief of command (5<sup>th</sup> Brigade), exposing the US Army as little as possible.” Major Edgar A. Noel, the Commander of the 59<sup>th</sup> Military Government Company stationed in Jeju, sent an official document on October 6<sup>th</sup> to Chief of PMAG Roberts to call for an immediate shipment of two-way radios, arms and ammunition.<sup>35)</sup>

The request of the US commanding officer in Jeju and an order that Roberts sent to a US advisor of Gwangju 5<sup>th</sup> Brigade were soon realized. In other words, Jeju Defense Headquarters was established under the command of Colonel Kim Sang-gyeom, the Commander of Gwangju 5<sup>th</sup> Brigade, on October 11<sup>th</sup>.

Chief of PMAG Roberts received all reports of Jeju operations from Burgess, the advisor dispatched to Jeju, and reported it to the Commanding General of USFK every week. He also had a part in military operations of Prime Minister Lee Beom-seok and National Defense Minister Sin Seong-mo.

He utilized the CIA, Song Yo-chan, the Commander of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, and the Seobuk Young Men’s Association as key forces in the strong repression operation. On the report of November 8<sup>th</sup>, 1948 to the Commanding General of USFK, he said, “The Central Intelligence Agency is working very well. Major Song, Commander of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, is strong and active.”<sup>36)</sup> On the report of November 15<sup>th</sup>, he also said, “The Central Intelligence Agency is excellent.” and added, “I am planning to reinforce three Korean battalions mainly with members of the Seobuk Young Men’s Association.”<sup>37)</sup> He also praised Song Yo-chan in a letter on December 18<sup>th</sup> to President Rhee Syng-

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34) “American Advisor Capacity in the 5<sup>th</sup> Brigade,” October 9, 1948, *ibid.*

35) “Incoming Message,” October 6, 1948, *ibid.*, Box 1.

36) “Weekly Activities of PMAG,” November 8, 1948, *ibid.*, Box 4.

37) “Weekly Activities of PMAG,” November 15, 1948, *ibid.*

man, National Defense Minister Lee Beom-seok, Chief of the General Staff Chae Byeong-deok and so on, as follows: “Lt Col Song Yo-chan is to be highly commended on his accomplishment in changing the islanders’ initial attitude of belligerency to one of wholehearted trust and cooperation.” He added, “I recommend that this be given great publicity be it press or radio, as well as by Presidential proclamation.”<sup>38)</sup> Chief of the General Staff Chae Byeong-deok replied on December 21<sup>st</sup>, “The activities of Song Yo-chan will be presented via formal statement and I will recommend this to the president.” Chae Byeong-deok also promised in the reply that he would award a medal to Song Yo-chan.<sup>39)</sup> The activities of the CIA are not clearly stated in the reports, while Chief of PMAG Roberts encouraged severe operation by praising Commander Song Yo-chan who had been launching indiscriminate repression operations and by recruiting a large number of The Seobuk Youth Association members whom the US regarded as extreme anticommunists.

When President Rhee Syng-man declared Martial Law on November 17, 1948 even though the Martial Law Act did not exist, Korean commanding officers were so flustered that they did not know what to do. Chief of PMAG Roberts, therefore, sent a document about Martial Law to the Chief of the General Staff at Ministry of National Defense on December 1<sup>st</sup> to enforce the law.<sup>40)</sup>

On February 7<sup>th</sup>, 1949, He reported to Kenneth C. Royall, the Secretary of US Department of the Army, the notes of Captain John P. Reed, the advisor, “Many innocent civilians have died on the island. The majority were killed in attacks by guerrillas, some undoubtedly by the Korean Army.”<sup>41)</sup> Even though he admitted that South Korean soldiers killed civilians, it is not true that the majority were killed in attacks by guerrillas.

When the brains of the armed forces in the United States accepted

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38) “Operation on Cheju Do,” December 18, 1948, *ibid.*

39) “From Supreme C/S to Chief, PMAG,” December 21, 1948, *ibid.*

40) “Martial Law,” December 1, 1948, *ibid.*

41) “Extension of notes Data on Korean Security Forces for Mr. Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of the Army, Section A, Korean Army, Annex 3, G-2,” February 7, 1949, RG 319: *Records of the Army Staff*, Entry 154, Box 603.

withdrawal of the USFK, Chief of PMAG Roberts said, “I confess I do not know the answer to the problem of whether to take troops out of here or not. This I do feel however – if the American troops are removed, it will be no time until North absorbs or attacks South or vice versa.”<sup>42)</sup>

On March 11<sup>th</sup>, 1949, Brigadier General Roberts, who also took over as Commanding General of USFK after the US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps left for Japan on January 15<sup>th</sup>, 1949, said to Everett Drumright, the counselor to the US embassy, “I ordered to establish the CIA in Jeju.”<sup>43)</sup>

He explained to Major General Charles L. Bolte, who was chief of strategy and the operation division at the Department of the Army, the reason for the advisory group to remain even after the withdrawal of the USFK, as follows:

I want to point out that the sincerity and honesty of the Advisors in their advice and work is getting results. The Koreans are smart and, even now, cannot figure out why we work so hard for (as they see it) no selfish purpose; they think we should be after money, promotion, loot or something and since we are not getting any of the above, they appear puzzled. They cannot figure out that we are doing a job as ordered. They do not realize that we are training a group of people to shoot for America and to take the losses in Korean blood before American blood is shed.<sup>44)</sup>

### ③ The Spread of Rumors of an Unidentified Ship

The so-called Rumors of an Unidentified Ship or Rumors of a Soviet Submarine that started to come out around October in 1948 had justified a strong repression operation. The rumor first became known through the US Army’s reports and was spread widely through South Korean media.

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42) “Letter from Roberts to Wedemeyer,” March 25, 1949, RG 338: *Records of US Army Commands*, Entry: Provisional Military Advisory Group (1949-1953), Box 8.

43) “Conditions on Cheju Island,” March 11, 1949, Enclosure No. 1 to Dispatch No. 145 dated March 14, 1949 from American Mission in Korea, RG 263: *Records of the Central Intelligence Agency*, Entry: Murphy Papers: The Murphy Collection on International Communism, 1917-1958, Korea, Box 69.

44) “Letter from Roberts to Bolte,” August 19, 1949, RG 338: *Records of US Army Commands*, Entry: Provisional Military Advisory Group (1948-1949) and Korean Military Advisory Group (1949-1953), Box 8.

Most news agencies expressed their concern about fratricidal war, opposing settling the situation in Jeju by force. Moreover, statements of key governmental officials who inspected Jeju had put the authorities in charge of the repression in an awkward situation. Public Prosecutor Park Geun-yeong said, “The Jeju 4 · 3 Incident was caused by police officers’ misdeeds done to Jeju people.”<sup>45)</sup> Public Prosecutor General Lee In pointed out, “The behavior of wicked officers was the major cause of the Incident.”<sup>46)</sup> It was much better to send one competent officer than 100 police officers in order to settle the public sentiment.<sup>47)</sup>

On July 18<sup>th</sup>, 22 political parties and civic groups including the Korean Independence Party gathered to organize the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident Task Force, arguing for peaceful settlement of the Incident.<sup>48)</sup> As 800 Police Reserves officers were sent to Jeju around August 20<sup>th</sup>, a news agency reported, “It has become common opinion that the use of armed force will aggravate the situation.”<sup>49)</sup> On September 6<sup>th</sup>, 12 political parties and civic groups announced a joint statement that called for ceasing a fratricidal war.<sup>50)</sup> This shows that the public was worried about massive bloodshed and thought the authorities should refrain from using armed force.

It was shocking news that an unidentified submarine with a Korean People’s Republic ensign appeared when there were two governments on the Korean peninsula which were hostile to each other. Major news agencies simultaneously reported that a submarine was found in the sea around Jeju on October 8<sup>th</sup>, 1948, based on the following report of the US Army:

At 17:10, October 8, 1948, a submarine was sighted by the pilot of a U.S. Courier plane at 126° 48’ E - 33° 56’ N. The submarine flying a flag, bearing a star superimposed upon a red field, was proceeding East at a speed of 10-12

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45) *Seoul Shinmun*, June 1 5, 1948.

46) *Daedong Shinmun*, June 16, 1948.

47) *Jayu Shinmun*, June 16, 1948.

48) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, July 24, 1948.

49) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, September 1, 1948.

50) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, September 7, 1948.

knots. The vessel, while not identified, was neither U.S. nor British.<sup>51)</sup>

The US Army reported it as soon as they found the submarine. While the report said the submarine was not identified, it implied that the submarine might have come from the Soviet Union or North Korea, mentioning a red ensign with a star.

A few days later the news began to be spread through the media. *The Dong-A Ilbo* quoted a statement of Colonel Kim Seong-sam, who was one of the top Navy executives, “Around 9 a.m. on October 8<sup>th</sup>, a US Army aircraft found an identified submarine in the sea near Jeju and at noon a submarine of unknown nationality also appeared on the surface of the sea eight miles north of Jeju Island.”<sup>52)</sup> The news became more exaggerated as time went by, making a red ensign with a star into a flag of the Korean People’s Republic by the next day:

Lieutenant Commander Nowell, the US Director of Civil Affairs stationed in Jeju, found an American submarine floating in the sea five miles from Seongsanpo around 11:50 a.m. on October 8<sup>th</sup> while on a reconnaissance aircraft. He also found a submarine going toward Busan in the sea 20 miles from Seongsanpo around 1 p.m. on the same day. He said that the number of the unidentified submarine was C 53 and that there was a flag of the Korean People’s Republic at the stern of the submarine.<sup>53)</sup>

Those records cannot prove the Rumors of an Unidentified Ship were true. The point is, however, that the rumors had come out several times before, especially when the Jeju 4 • 3 Incident occurred at a critical moment. The Rumors of an Unidentified Ship first came out on July 11<sup>th</sup>, 1948. The US Army urgently reported, “A North Korean ship, flying a red flag, was taken into custody by the Korean Coast Guard Cutter “TANCHUN” near Jeju-Do at 11:00 on July 11<sup>th</sup>,”<sup>54)</sup> but two days later the US Army corrected the report

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51) Hq. 6<sup>th</sup> Inf Div, USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1085, October 8, 1948.

52) *Dong-A Ilbo*, October 13, 1948.

53) *Seoul Shinmun*, October 14, 1948.

54) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 882, July 12, 1948.

as, “The small boat detained by the “TANCHUN” was inside the Jeju Harbor. The brass was intended for the market,”<sup>55)</sup> bringing the incident to an end.

On August 17<sup>th</sup>, however, the Rumors of an Unidentified Ship came out again a month later. This time, the unidentified ship was declared to be a Soviet ship. The US Army carried the following report saying it is an urgent report from CIC.

A K.C.G. patrol ship ‘Gwagju’ spotted a 500 ton-class Russian vessel. The Russian vessel was ordered to stop but it ignored the order and fired machine guns mounted on the deck at the patrol ship. No damage or casualties are reported.<sup>56)</sup>

The point here is that the US Army wrote the details about the Soviet ship and machine gun fire, while marking the report F-6, which means the lowest level of confidence. It was intelligence from the Coast Guard, but a few days later, news agencies reported the above as follows:

According to the US Army, around 4 a.m. on August 17<sup>th</sup>, a Coast Guard patrol ship found an unidentified ship on patrol in the sea near Biyangdo islet, Hallim-myeong, Jeju. It is said that when Coast Guard ordered it to halt, the unidentified ship tried to rush into the patrol ship, and began threatening the patrol ship with two machine guns and escaped to the North. The patrol ship immediately contacted its base and the US Army received the report and took emergency action. It seems that the US Army aircraft mobilized from Gimpo Airport searched the sea near Biyangdo islet for a long time, but there has been no news since then. According to what we have learned, the unidentified ship was a high speed ship putting up one blue flag and one white flag with two red stars.<sup>57)</sup>

Therefore, the Rumors of an Unidentified Ship began with reports of the US Army and spread widely through the media. Some news agencies pointed out that the rumor was false, saying: “It is said that after the incident the US

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55) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 884, July 14, 1948.

56) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 913, August 17, 1948.

57) *Hanseong Ilbo*, August 21, 1948; *Seoul Shinmun*, August 21, 1948.

Army rented some aircraft to the Coast Guard to distribute flyers. Since the excellent US Navy patrols the sea and the sky, no one but the security authorities can access Jeju.”<sup>58)</sup> However, the Rumors of the Soviet or North Korean Ship justified strong repression operations.

On August 25<sup>th</sup>, 1948, soon after the Rumors of an Unidentified Ship came out, the Jeju Emergency Defense Headquarters gave advance notice that it would carry out a massive punitive expedition to end the situation on Jeju promptly, stating four reasons for the strong repression operation. One reason was the appearance of an unidentified ship in the sea near Jeju.<sup>59)</sup> In these circumstances, the rumor of a submarine on October 8 mentioned earlier came out again after just two months. On October 11<sup>th</sup>, three days after that, the Jeju Defense Headquarters were established under the command of Colonel Kim Sang-gyeom.

There was even a rumor of an unidentified fighter plane fueled by the unidentified ship. On November 17, 1948 when Martial Law was declared in Jeju, the US Army reported as follows:

Six unidentified fighter type aircraft in formation, one four-engine bomber sighted over Jeju Island; fighters break formation at 10,000 feet altitude, depart in various directions. South Korean Constabulary pilot deserts with liaison plane; heads for North Korea.<sup>60)</sup>

While the unidentified fighter plane was corrected to be a U.S. plane by the US Army<sup>61)</sup> after ten days, the rumors of the Soviet or North Korean ship continuously came out. On January 4<sup>th</sup>, 1949, Lieutenant Colonel Ham Byeong-seon, the Commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment stationed in Jeju, asked Jeju Defense Headquarters to cancel the lifting of Martial Law, saying that

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58) Hong Han-pyo, *Various Aspects of Jeju Island in Riots, Sincheonji*, August issue, 1948, p.110.

59) *Seoul Shinmun*, September 3, 1948.

60) “Intelligence Summary,” No. 2262, November 17, 1948, RG-6: *Records of General Headquarters, Far East Command (FECOM)*, reel 651, MacArthur Memorial Library, Virginia, U.S.A.

61) *Ibid.*

it could cause a setback for operations. Lieutenant Colonel Ham added the following, to explain why Martial Law should be declared again on Jeju:

Two ships of the 3,000-ton class vessel with Soviet markings were observed approximately 5 miles off Samyang-ri, Jeju-Do by the Korean Coast Guard at 14:00, January 3. Coast Guard vessels gave chase but, high seas prevented interception. When last seen at 14:30, January 4, the unidentified ships were moving toward Busan.

Comment: Korean security forces hold the opinion that the ships sighted were vessels with supplies from North Korea intended for raider forces on Jeju-Do. This opinion has been voiced previously by the same sources, but is unconfirmed.<sup>62)</sup>

Although the US Army remarked that it is uncertain whether the rumor is true, *The Dong-A Ilbo* made it public.<sup>63)</sup> Meanwhile, as rumors of the Soviet submarine continued to spread, the Soviet Union refuted them as follows.

[MOSCOW-AFP dated Jan. 19<sup>th</sup>] On January 18, the Soviet Navy organ reported that no Soviet submarine has ever appeared in the sea around Jeju saying, “The recent statement of the South Korean spokesperson is false. The South Korean government made the statement in order to maintain Martial Law in Jeju which was declared two months ago and was supposed to be lifted in December last year. The US Army is still stationed in South Korea, which accords with American monopolists’ plan on South Korea.”<sup>64)</sup>

In March, 1949 the rumors of the Soviet ship came out again during the last operation period when the Jeju Command Post, under the direction of Commander Yoo Jae-heung, was established. Prime Minister Lee Beom-seok and Home Minister Shin Seong-mo, who investigated Jeju on March 10, 1949, emphasized the last repression reporting, “The Soviet ships have appeared several times and North Korean ships also appeared exchanging light signals with rioters in Mt. Halla.”<sup>65)</sup>

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62) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1029, January 5, 1949.

63) *Dong-A Ilbo*, January 6, 1949.

64) *Donggwang Shinmun*, January 22, 1949.

65) *Chosun Ilbo*, March 17, 1949; *Seoul Shinmun*, March 17, 1949.

Rumors of an Unidentified Ship came out when forces were carrying out a strong repression operation, justifying the massive bloodshed. The US Army admitted that the continued rumors were based on uncertain intelligence, but they verified and corrected the rumors as follows in April, 1949 when the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident almost ended by destroying the armed rebels:

There have been rumors that rebels have received logistic support by water from the mainland and from North Korea, but there is no evidence to substantiate those reports. Constant patrolling by ships of the Korean Navy, aerial reconnaissance flights and the tight ring of police in villages on the coastal plain preclude the possibility of outside support.<sup>66)</sup>

It seems that the US Army reported as above because they judged that the Rumors of The Unidentified Ship were not necessary anymore as the Incident had almost been settled by destroying the armed rebels. Supporting the US Army's stance, Rear Admiral Son Won-il, the Chief of the General Staff of Navy, said to journalists on April 14<sup>th</sup>, 1949, "The rumors of foreign ships in the sea around Jeju are nothing but strategic propaganda of communists who insist that the Soviet ships have been supporting us. There are Soviet ships at sea four miles from the coast of Jeju, but they are passing the internationally approved course to go to Vladivostok."<sup>67)</sup> The Commander of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Special Navy Vessel Unit, who was in charge of closing the Jeju coast said, "There are rumors of a Soviet submarine, but these have been spread by civilians who saw our boats because, in the troubled sea around Jeju, they can only see the masts of our boats. So, they mistake them for unidentified ships and spread the false rumors. However, these rumors actually hinder soothing the public sentiment."<sup>68)</sup>

The rumors in Jeju finally turned out to be groundless when the Incident came to an end. There is doubt, however, that the rumors were manufactured to calm down those who were against strong repression operations, because

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66) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1097, April 1, 1949.

67) *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, April 15, 1949.

68) *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, May 17, 1949.

the rumors worked as an important excuse for the strong repression operations. It is also suspicious that the Jeju Defense Headquarters were established on October 11, soon after the Rumors of The Unidentified Ship came out on October 8<sup>th</sup>.

### 3) The Establishment of the Jeju Defense Headquarters

#### ① Reinforcement of Military and Police Strength

In September, 1948, signs appeared that the Jeju 4·3 Incident would aggravate breaking a lull that had lasted for a while. After 800 officers of Police Reserves, transferred from each police region nationwide were sent to Jeju on August 29,<sup>69)</sup> a large number of Police Reserves were dispatched again. The armed resistance group had reduced attacks for a while, as its leaders including Kim Dal-sam left Jeju to prepare the 8·25 Secret Election and to attend the Representative Gathering of South Korean People held in Haeju. Punitive forces also delayed repression operations because of the establishment of the government of the Republic of Korea and the rainy season. In early September, Kim Bong-ho, the Director of the Jeju Police Inspection Agency, made clear that the Incident would flare up again:

[Chosun Ilbo, Jeju] According to Kim Bong-ho, the Director of the Jeju Police Inspection Agency, who returned to Jeju from Seoul after attending a directors meeting, a Police Reserves numbering tens of thousands is coming to Jeju to settle the Incident. It is not just to reinforce the police strength but to settle the Incident in a short time. The director said the top executives such as Military Governor Dean had already planned it before he went to Seoul. He also said that the authorities planned a gradual suppression by adding 300 to the existing 500 police officers of Metropolitan Police Agency at the early stage of the Incident but it had to send more Police Reserves as the Incident aggravated rapidly. The situation has maintained a lull since then, but it began to aggravate again recently, which is why the authorities sent a large number of Police Reserves, according to the director.<sup>70)</sup>

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69) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, September 1, 1948.

70) *Seoul Shinmun*, September 3, 1948.

Director Kim Bong-ho added that the authorities took strong action on the Incident in light of objective facts: appearance of the Unidentified Ship in the sea near Jeju, reappearance of armed rebels, murder of the Chief of the Hallim Police Box, and Kim Dal-sam's report about the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident at the Representative Gathering of South Korean People held on Jeju.

As mentioned earlier, the Rumors of The Unidentified Ship were groundless intelligence. The reappearance of the armed rebels and the murder of the Chief of Hallim Police Box were not more serious incidents than the previous ones. The Incident even could have settled after Kim Dal-sam and other leaders of the armed resistance group left for Haeju. Moreover, since the authorities appointed a Jeju person as the Director of the Jeju Police Inspection Agency to meet the public opinion favoring a peaceful settlement, the lull in the Incident continued for a while, raising hopes the Incident would soon be settled peacefully.

The news that a large number of members of the Police Reserves were coming to Jeju to settle the Incident in a short time raised doubts and tensions at the same time. A news agency expressed a doubt on the intention of the authorities saying, "What on earth is a new reason for us to see a fratricidal war again? Can the objective facts be the only reasons for that?"<sup>71)</sup>

A massive repression operation on Jeju was already planned when the unilateral government was established in South Korea on August 15, 1948 as Director Kim Bong-ho said. A scholar analyzed the strong repression operation, which was launched just after the establishment of the government of the Republic of Korea and led by the US Army and the South Korean government, as follows:

Internal resistance on one side was recognized not just as resistance to the government but as a challenge intended to destroy their own side in collusion with the other side. This applied to the US Army and the South Korean government that established the system. The establishment of two hostile nations produced an ideological tool to attack any resistance for conspiracy connected

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71) *Chosun Ilbo*, September 3, 1948.

with the other side to destroy their own nation even though the resistance is reasonable (even though it is against corruption, oppression and exploitation). This tool was the most useful resource for the repression authorities to mobilize regardless of whether what they were doing was right or wrong. . . .

Repression in Jeju was justified by the fact that the US Army and the South Korean government forces could take action against the challenge of North Korea and remove communists who were connected with the Soviet Union and North Korea, thus the reason also justified any act of cruelty during the repression.<sup>72)</sup>

For the South Korean government, the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident was not just a regional problem but a strong challenge to the legitimacy of the government, For the United States, that planned to withdraw the US Armed Forces in Korea, it was the biggest obstacle to setting the world order at the early stage of the Cold War. At the end of August, soon after the establishment of the unilateral government in South Korea, serious symptoms started to appear. The central authorities actually planned mop-up operations and sent additional Police Reserves to Jeju.

On August 25<sup>th</sup> Jeju Emergency Defense Headquarters<sup>73)</sup> declared that it would carry out a massive punitive expedition<sup>74)</sup> and 800 police officers affiliated with Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency left Seoul Station for Jeju on August 28.<sup>75)</sup> At that time Kim Bong-ho, the Director of the Jeju Police Inspection Agency, returned from a directors meeting in Seoul and said, “Tens of thousands of Police Reserves are coming to Jeju to settle the Incident.”<sup>76)</sup> On August 30 Lieutenant Colonel Oh Deok-jun, the Chief of Staff of Gwangju 5<sup>th</sup> Brigade which had Jeju’s 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment under its command, inspected Jeju

72) Park Myeong-rim, *A Study on the Jeju 4 · 3 Resistance*, master’s thesis, Korea University, 1988, pp.143-144.

73) Jeju Emergency Defense Headquarters was a police organization that was established under Jeju Police Inspection Agency on April 5, 1948, just after the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident, while Jeju Defense Headquarters, established under the command of Commander Kim Sang-gyeom on October 11, 1948, and Jeju Command Post, established under the command of Colonel Yoo Jae-heung on March 2, 1949, were military organizations.

74) *Seoul Shinmun*, September 3, 1948.

75) *Dong-A Ilbo*, August 29, 1948.

76) *Chosun Ilbo*, September 3, 1948.

to settle the Incident in a short time in place of the Brigade Commander.<sup>77)</sup> A lull that had lasted for a while was like a preparatory period for the coming massive repression operation and the calm before the storm.

The strong repression operation had taken shape after the replacement of Director of the Jeju Police Inspection Agency and the establishment of the Jeju Defense Headquarters in October. The central government dismissed Director Kim Bong-ho, who was a Jeju person and had promoted moderate policies, as of October 5 and appointed Hong Sun-bong, who came from Pyeongannam-do and was the chief of public peace department of the National Police Agency, as a new Director of Jeju Provincial Police Agency.<sup>78)</sup>

This means that the central government had changed its policy from settling chaotic public sentiment by appointing Jeju people as major officials. Albert Philipson, the chief of Jeju branch of the US Information Service, said, “The Jeju 4·3 Incident was caused by the violence of wicked police officers. After Director Kim Bong-ho’s appointment, however, that does not happen anymore.”<sup>79)</sup> Since Director Kim’s moderate policies played an important role in settling the public sentiment, the replacement was to show that the government would again take a hard-line policy.

A large number of the Seobuk Young Men’s Association members, the biggest enemy for Jeju people, were also sent to Jeju. Director Hong, who launched attacks in force, supporting the Seobuk Young Men’s Association, was later at the center of the biggest bloodshed, which lasted for ten months, from his appointment on October 6<sup>th</sup>, 1948 to July 28<sup>th</sup>, 1949.<sup>80)</sup>

The General Headquarters of the Korean Constabulary ordered establishment of the Jeju Defense Headquarters on October 11. As Jeju 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment that was under the command of Busan 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade was attached to Gwangju 5<sup>th</sup> Brigade as of June 1,<sup>81)</sup> Colonel Kim Sang-gyeom, the Commander of Gwangju

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77) *Dong-A Ilbo*, September 7, 1948.

78) *Chosun Ilbo*, October 6, 1948.

79) *Seoul Shinmun*, September 26, 1948.

80) Jeju Police Agency, *History of Jeju Police*, 1990, p.489.

81) Department of Publishing Military History at Army Headquarters, *Daily Record of the Army*, Vol. 1, June 1, 1948.

5<sup>th</sup> Brigade, was appointed as Commander of Jeju Defense Headquarters. Major Song Yo-chan, the Commander of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, was appointed as Deputy Commander. This means that the level of repression commander was upgraded from that of Regimental Commander to that of Brigade Commander. Colonel Kim Sang-gyeom, then a 65-year-old veteran, had held various posts such as Lieutenant Colonel of the Russian Army and Colonel of the Polish Army in 1920s, principal of Transit Police Academy (Senior Superintendent) and Chief of the General Staff of the Korean Constabulary after liberation.<sup>82)</sup>

Colonel Kim was authorized to command the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, one battalion from Busan 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment, one battalion from Daegu 6<sup>th</sup> Regiment, Naval ships of a unit under the control of Lieutenant Commander Choi Yong-nam and Jeju Police Squad under the control of Hong Sun-bong, Director of Jeju Provincial Police Agency. In addition, the General Headquarters of the Korean Constabulary were ordered to send one battalion of Yeosu 14<sup>th</sup> Regiment under the command of the 5<sup>th</sup> Brigade.<sup>83)</sup>

The fundamental background of a massive bloodshed in Jeju was not just that military and police strength were reinforced, but that the strength was used in a different way. A daily report on August 5<sup>th</sup> written by US advisor of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment recorded that, “S-2 section is being reorganized.” Men in S-2 section who were natives of Jeju-do were transferred to 1<sup>st</sup> Bn. Liaison between police, constabulary, and C.I.C. on intelligence matters was improved.”<sup>84)</sup> A daily report written on August 12 says, “Arrangements made to transfer troops who are natives of Jeju Do out of S-3 section.”<sup>85)</sup> This shows that officers of Jeju birth were completely excluded from the intelligence sector (S-2) and the operation sector (S-3) which were the most important sectors for the repression operation. Those actions, taken on the premise that officers of Jeju birth would not carry out the repression operation because they knew about

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82) Han Yong-won, *Foundation of the Armed Force*, Bakyongsong Publishing Co., 1984, p.97.

83) Department of Publishing Military History at Army Headquarters, *Daily Record of the Army*, Vol. 2, October 11, 1948.

84) Charles L. Wesolowsky, Advisor to 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, Korean Constabulary, Cheju-Do, *Daily Report*, August 5, 1948.

85) *Ibid.*, August 12, 1948.

actual circumstances of Jeju and Jeju residents were their friends and relatives, were notice of a massive punitive expedition which resulted in a large-scale massacre.

The repression authorities blocked traffic between the mainland and Jeju Island. As the Travel Certificate System, which was lifted on July 5<sup>th</sup>, was revived on August 13<sup>th</sup>, people found it difficult to take a ferry leaving for Mokpo.<sup>86)</sup> The Jeju 4 · 3 Incident Task Force which consisted of 22 political parties and civic groups organized to promote a peaceful settlement of the Incident sent a Jeju on-site investigation team, though the team failed to arrive on Jeju because it was refused boarding at Mokpo harbor on August 28<sup>th</sup>.<sup>87)</sup> Jeju Island thus became isolated and helpless.

## ② A Declaration of the Strong Repression Operation

Major Song Yo-chan, the Commander of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, issued the following declaration on October 17<sup>th</sup>, 1948, six days after the establishment of the Jeju Defense Headquarters:

In order to maintain the peace of Jeju Island and keep the wealth and safety of the people, we are going to purge impure elements that broke the peace of Jeju Island and threatened the residents to try to violate national sovereignty according to the supreme order of the government. We therefore request the Jeju people to actively cooperate with us. We impose quarantine on the area further inland than 5km from the coastline of Jeju Island and in the mountainous area from October 20 to the end of military action to sweep the unpatriotic extremists who committed unpardonable atrocities hiding in Mt. Halla. Those who defy the quarantine, no matter what the reason is, will be recognized as rioters and be shot to death, provided that people who need to pass mountainous area for exceptional reasons can receive a special pass to be assured of safety.<sup>88)</sup>

The declaration was a notice the repression authorities would finally launch a strong repression operation because it had completed organization of internal

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86) *Donggwang Shinmun*, August 25, 1948.

87) *Chosun Ilbo*, September 5, 1948.

88) *Chosun Ilbo*, October 20, 1948.

system by replacing the Director of the Jeju Police Inspection Agency on October 5 and established the Jeju Defense Headquarters on October 11<sup>th</sup>. By being issued publicly, the declaration also attracted attention from the media.

However there are some parts in the declaration that should be pointed out here. Considering topographic factors of Jeju, areas further than 5km inland from the coastline, which was set for repression area, applies not only to mountainous area including Mt. Halla but also to the whole area of mountain villages<sup>89)</sup> except the seaside. The curfew on villages where the residents actually lived, therefore, meant prohibiting the residents from living in their villages. According to the declaration, anyone who is found in mountain villages no matter the reason would be recognized as a rioter and shot to death. Though it is doubtful how summary jurisdiction was exercised in wartime. Harold S. Fischgrund, an American advisor, testified, “The 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment regarded anyone who was in the area close to Mt. Halla as their enemy.”<sup>90)</sup>

The point is that the declaration was issued according to the supreme order of the government. Generally, only the president or the top executives of the military can give a supreme order to the army, but it is not certain who gave the supreme order at that time.

The US Army, however, had already planned the strong repression operation in the early stages of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident. General Kim Ik-ryeol, who was the Commander of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment and promoted the Peace Negotiation with armed resistance groups shortly after the Incident, wrote in his memoirs, “Military Governor Dean emphasized that the only way to settle the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident quickly was a scorched earth strategy. As I refused to do that, he tempted me saying he would help me go to the United States and give me a hundred thousand dollars if I carried out the operation.”<sup>91)</sup> Lee Yun-rak, the

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89) Villages of Jeju are divided into seaside villages and mid-mountainous villages. In administrative terms, mid-mountainous area is defined as the area from contour of 200m in altitude to contour of 600m in altitude (Article 2 of *Special Act on Jeju Province Development*). Villages 5km from the seaside in general are called mid-mountainous villages. If a village is closer to Mt. Hallasan than a village near coastal roads, the village is called mid-mountainous village even though it is located in the area within 5km from the seaside.

90) Harold Fischgrund (A former advisor of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment), Testimony recorded on October 20, 2001.

intelligence manager of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, also testified, “The Major of CIC ordered me to suppress mountainous areas 5km inland from the coastline by regarding the area as a hostile area.”<sup>92)</sup> The operation that the CIC Major presented to Regimental Commander Kim in May, 1948 thus took shape in five months.

On October 18<sup>th</sup>, the Jeju coast was immediately blocked. The Navy blocked the coast by mobilizing seven vessels and 203 seamen.<sup>93)</sup> In addition, one battalion of Yeosu’s 14<sup>th</sup> Regiment was scheduled to be sent to Jeju. As the 14<sup>th</sup> Regiment rose in rebellion on October 19<sup>th</sup>, the strength of the operation was intensified. Some insist that the authorities launched the strong repression operation with anxiety due to the Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion, but the operation had already been announced through a declaration of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regimental Commander Song Yo-chan on October 17<sup>th</sup>. The Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion did not cause the strong repression operations, but accelerated them.

Meanwhile, Colonel Kim Sang-gyeom, who had served not only as the 5<sup>th</sup> Brigade Commander but also as Commander of the Jeju Defense Headquarters, was dismissed because Yeosu’s 14<sup>th</sup> Regiment under the command of the 5<sup>th</sup> Brigade rose in revolt within eight days of his appointment as Commander.<sup>94)</sup> Accordingly, the 9<sup>th</sup> Regimental Commander Song was selected as Commander of the Jeju Defense Headquarters, becoming the person in charge of the repression forces as well as the police and naval vessels stationed on Jeju.

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91) Kim Ik-ryeol, Posthumous Records *The Truth of the Jeju 4 • 3 Incident*, The 4 • 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4 • 3 Incident Speaks*, Vol. 2, 1994, pp.312-313.

92) The 4 • 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *ibid.*, p.168.

93) “Report on the Internal Insurrections after April, 1948, made by Minister of National Defense, Lee Beom-seok,” December 14, 1948, RG 338: *Records of US Army Commands*, Entry: Provisional Military Advisory Group (1948-1949) and Korean Military Advisory Group (1949-1953), Box 11; *National Assembly Stenographic Records*, the 1<sup>st</sup> National Assembly, No. 124, December 9, 1948.

94) Department of Publishing Military History at Army Headquarters, *Unconventional Warfare History*, 1988, p.61.

### ③ The Mobilization of the Seobuk Young Men's Association

The repression authorities made full use of private organizations for carrying out their operations. The Seobuk Young Men's Association and the Daedong Young Men's Association played important roles on the frontline as much as the military and the police. The authorities assigned the bereaved, whose family members were killed by armed rebels, to police units, encouraging a retaliatory act. In addition, the authorities made Jeju people organize Corps for the Protection of People to guard villages, and young members of the Corps for the Protection of People were organized as Commando Units to lead the repression operation. The Korean Students' Federation was also mobilized for the repression operation.

The mobilization of private organizations, however, produced side effects, deepening distrust and conflict between Jeju people. Although the Seobuk Young Men's Association was pointed to as one of the causes of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident, because it was in conflict with Jeju people before the Incident, President Rhee Syng-man and the US Army assigned members of The Seobuk Young Men's Association to the military and the police. As a result, the situation was further aggravated and a greater number of residents were killed. A large number of members of The Seobuk Young Men's Association were assigned to the police, and The Seobuk Young Men's Association Special Company was separately organized in the army.

The Seobuk Young Men's Association came to Jeju in three phases. Members of the Seobuk Young Men's Association were first mobilized to guard Yoo Hae-jin, a person of Jeollabuk-do birth, who was appointed as Jeju Governor right after the 3 · 1 Incident.<sup>95)</sup> It is estimated that approximately 500 to 700 members of the association came to Jeju before the outbreak of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident. Without a regular income, the members gained their subsistence by forcing people to buy the flag of South Korea and pictures of Rhee Syng-man. The white terror was often committed by the members, disturbing public sentiment, which is pointed out as one of the causes of the Incident.

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95) The 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4 · 3 Incident Speaks*, Vol. 1, Jeonyewon, 1994, pp.434-437.

Secondly, more members came to Jeju en masse just after the Incident. According to the testimony of Moon Bong-je, then chief of Seobuk Young Men's Association, 500 members of the association were dispatched to Jeju for repression on the request of Jo Byeong-ok, the chief of the National Police Agency. The 500 members scattered to each region of Jeju to participate in repression operations with other members who had come to Jeju earlier.

Thirdly, in November and December, 1948 – just after the Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion – more than 1,000 members of the association participated in the repression operation in the uniforms of police officers or Korean Constabulary soldiers. Jeju Island was indeed the land of the Seobuk Youth Association. Even though they committed horrible atrocities, there were no organizations to punish them. Fischgrund, the American advisor, said, “In the United States police officers work in their hometown, but I didn't understand why members of The Seobuk Young Men's Association defecting from North Korea worked as police officers in Jeju.”<sup>96)</sup> There were, however, the US Army and Rhee Syng-man behind the Seobuk Young Men's Association. The fact that the US Army supported the association is proved by an intelligence report of the US Army.<sup>97)</sup> Another intelligence report of the US Army recorded: “On October 24 members of the Northwest(Seobuk) Young Men's Association, acting as temporary police officers, were dispatched to the scene and drove off the raiders,”<sup>98)</sup> recognizing the members as police officers. The other intelligence document recorded that members of the association were sent to Jeju through ‘secret induction’.<sup>99)</sup>

Rhee Syng-man also took the lead in placing members of the association as soldiers and police officers. This fact is proved by a confidential document of the US Army and testimony of a member of the association. An intelligence report of the US Army under the title of ‘Young Men's Association strengthened

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96) Harold Fischgrund (a former advisor of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment), Testimony recorded on October 20, 2001.

97) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 951, October 1, 1948.

98) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 977, November 1, 1948.

99) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1023, December 28, 1948.

the military and the police' recorded as follows:

It has been reported that following a recent agreement with the President and the Minister of Home Affairs the NORTHWEST(Seobuk) YOUNG MEN'S ASSOCIATION is to furnish approximately 6,500 men for the Korean Army and approximately 1700 men for the National Police force. These men will be integrated into approximately 9 Constabulary units throughout South Korea and into each Police Division. By mutual agreement between all parties concerned, the NORTHWEST YOUNG MEN'S ASSOCIATION is to be represented in the police non-commissioned and commissioned officer personnel in the ratio of 1 Sergeant for every 20 men, 1 Lieutenant for every 50 men and 1 Captain for every 200 men provided by the NWYMA.<sup>100)</sup>

Park Hyeong-yo, a member of the Seobuk Young Men's Association, came to Jeju with 250 members on December 19, 1948 and became a police officer. Park testified that he ended up coming to Jeju after listening to President Rhee Syng-man's speech that focused on recruiting at a general meeting of the Seobuk Young Men's Association.

I sold electronics stuff in North Korea, but I defected to South Korea in May, 1948 because I hated Kim Il-seong. In Seoul, I worked as a member of the culture department of the Seobuk Young Men's Association. As I remember, it was December 10, 1948 when the general meeting was held at Seoul public hall in Myeongdong. President Rhee attended the meeting. He said at the meeting, "South Korea is in a state of emergency due to the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident and Yeosu- Suncheon Rebellion. In order to settle the national crisis, I will assign the Seobuk Young Men's Association members with strong anticommunism sentiments all across the country." A general meeting of Geumho-dong branch of the Seobuk Young Men's Association was held the next day. When Branch Chief Lim Seung-hyeon—he was appointed as sergeant and soon promoted to police lieutenant, serving as manager of Pyoseon Police Box and as intelligence manager of the Jeju Police Agency—suggested, "Mr. President ordered to send the Seobuk Young Men's Association members on account of the Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion and the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident, so let's volunteer for it," I decided to do that. With two hundred and fifty (250) members, I arrived in Jeju on December 19<sup>th</sup>. Twenty-five (25) educated members became police officers and the rest of

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100) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1005, December 6, 1948.

225 members became soldiers. Many people were illiterate at that time. When I arrived in Jeju, a Two-Hundred-Man Unit, dressed as police officers, was already in Jeju. Most of the Seobuk Young Men's Association members became soldiers.<sup>101)</sup>

Park Hyeon-gyo added, “Who could have had the authority to kill civilians indiscriminately without permission of President Rhee? With a cause that communists should be killed, Rhee Syng-man used a large number of members who did not know about the actual circumstances of Jeju.”

Assigning a large number of the Seobuk Young Men's Association members to the Korean Constabulary and the police meant not only that the military strength was reinforced, but also that soldiers and police officers who came from Jeju were pushed out. It seems that the repression authorities concluded that the soldiers and police officers of Jeju birth would disturb operations because they knew the actual circumstances of Jeju very well and they would be generous to the residents.

Let's look in detail at how a great number of members of the Seobuk Young Men's Association in the uniforms of police officers and soldiers came to Jeju in November, 1948. As stated earlier, President Rhee Syng-man, the then sovereign ruler, intervened in sending numerous members of the association to governmental forces by dishonest means. Around the middle of November of the same year, 200 of the Seobuk Young Men's Association members were attached to the Jeju Police in the first place. The members disguised themselves hastily as police officers in Seoul. Many more were also sent to Jeju as soldiers. The police unit which mainly consisted of about 200 members of the Seobuk Young Men's Association was called the ‘Two-Hundred Man’ Unit. Kim Si-hun, who came to Jeju as a member of that unit, testified about recruiting of members as follows:

I was a member of the Jinyong Association which was affiliated with the Seobuk Young Men's Association. As the association consisted of people who defected from Jinnampo and Yonggang-gun in North Korea, we named it by

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101) Park Hyeon-gyo (a former member of the Seobuk Young Men's Association), The 4 • 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4 • 3 Incident Speaks*, Vol. 4, Jeonyewon, 1997, p.151.

combining the first syllables of the name of each region. When I went to the association office, all of my friends were in a commotion, saying they will become police officers to go to Jeju. As it turned out, in order to repress the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident, people with strong anticommunism sentiment were needed, but it was hard to distinguish leftists from rightist in Seoul, so the authorities decided to select police officers among the Seobuk Young Men's Association with strong anticommunism sentiment. I just followed my friends and took a police exam. I did an interview at Police Academy which was then located in front of Gwanghwamun in Seoul. Don't you think police officers need to be at least literate for interrogation? Those who were literate became police officers and those who were not became army privates. As 200 people passed the police exam, they were called the Two-Hundred Man Unit. Many more than 200 people became soldiers.<sup>102)</sup>

Kim Si-hun said that when recruiting police officers and soldiers from members of the Seobuk Young Men's Association, Jeju Provincial Police Agency Director Hong Sun-bong, who came from Pyeongannam-do and Kim Jaeneung, Jeju Branch Chief of The Seobuk Young Men's Association came to Seoul from Jeju to encourage volunteering. The Two-Hundred Man Unit entered the Police Academy and came to Jeju after a brief 14 days of training. Kim Si-hun added as follows:

After three days since training had started, Jeong Yong-cheol, chairperson of the Jinyong Association, who became police lieutenant through special employment and was later appointed as manager of Samyang Police Box, said poking my ribs, "It is said that if we go to Jeju now with Kim Jae-neung, we could be police officers." So, eleven members including myself came to Jeju with Branch Chief Kim Jae-neung after only three days of training in Seoul. In Jeju, however, we were told that we should receive police training again. That is why 189 members, who received the training for 14 days in Seoul as planned, became the 9<sup>th</sup> class of Jeju Police and eleven members including me became the 10<sup>th</sup> class of Jeju Police.<sup>103)</sup>

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102) Kim Si-hun (a former police officer, and a former member of the Seobuk Young Men's Association), Testimony recorded on February 26, 2002.

103) Kim S-hun, Testimony.

According to the *History of Jeju Police*, however, the 9<sup>th</sup> class of Jeju Police consisted of 59 cadets who were trained from November 18 to December 2, 1948.<sup>104)</sup> It seems that the Two-Hundred Men Unit was regarded as a different group from the 9<sup>th</sup> class of the Jeju Police. The reports of the US Army also recorded facts about the recruitment:

Approximately 620 volunteers from the Northwest Young Men's Association have recently undergone a 12-day training period under supervision of the SEOUL Metropolitan Police. After the completion of the training these men were placed on regular police status and assigned to Yeosu, Jeju-do and Gangwon-do. The present plan is that these personnel will complete a month's tour of duty in these areas in which disturbances have occurred and will then be replaced and returned to SEOUL for duty. According to the chief of Administration of the Metropolitan Police, members of no other youth groups have yet offered their services. Members of the United Youth Men's Party and the Nsaki Youth Corps have stated that their organizations have been given the opportunity to join the police force, but as yet there have been no volunteers.<sup>105)</sup>

Members of the Seobuk Young Men's Association became not only police officers but also soldiers. Regimental Commander Song Yo-chan assigned members to the military forces to form the Seobuk Young Men's Association Special Company. Even though the members had no rank insignia, they had absolute power so that military police and military officers of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment could not interfere with them. This is because Commander Song empowered the members. Roh Yun-bok, a civilian who became a member of the Special Company, testified as follows:

I came to Jeju with 20 members of the Enlightenment Theater Troupe in July, 1948. As nobody visited a theater and our plan came to nothing, Commander Song Yo-chan had us arm ourselves to form a Special Company. One company consisted of 80 people in four platoons. The Company Commander was promoted to captain, while the rest of us had no rank. When Commander Song said to military police and military officers of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, "Do not touch the

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104) Jeju Police Agency, *History of Jeju Police*, 1990, p.182.

105) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1011, December 13, 1948.

Special Company, or you guys will be beaten very badly,” we were pleased. We had been stationed in Hallim, Woljeong, Seongsan and so on. After the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment was replaced with the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment, 88 people of Special Company stationed in Woljeong-ri were attached to the 11<sup>th</sup> Company under the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment. When carrying out executions, I volunteered my rifle. In Gwideok-ri, Hallim-myeon, a bullet missed one person, saving the person’s life. I did that on purpose because I was just ordered to shoot people whose faults I did not know and I didn’t want to be suspected by not shooting.<sup>106)</sup>

Jeju Island in November and December, 1948 was truly a place of bloodshed. What does ‘duty’ in the reports of the US Army mean? The reports prove that the US Army executives agreed either with carrying out a massacre on Jeju or at least overlooking it.

While the Rhee Syng-man administration sent members of The Seobuk Youth Association as police officers and soldiers, it did not provide them with salary or supplies. Park Hyeong-yo, who came to Jeju followed by the Two-Hundred-Man Unit, testified that when he was assigned to a police box at the front, Director of the Jeju Provincial Police Agency Hong Sun-bong said, “Food and salary will not be provided due to poor conditions, so ask for food at villages when carrying out repression.” Although Police Supporters’ Associations were organized in each police box at the front, it soon reached its limit, causing harm to the people.

To make things worse, even the central government made an ideological matter a black and white issue. The government aggravated the bloodshed by instilling an idea that Jeju people are ideologically unsound because they were infected by the Reds, so the Seobuk Young Men’s Association with sound ideology should repress Jeju people.

Moon Bong-je, the chief of the Seobuk Young Men’s Association’s central headquarters, explained in an interview: “We just sent the Seobuk Young Men’s Association when we were told there were leftists in some regions. When a political leader in a region, Jeju in particular, pointed out his or her political rival as a communist, we executed the person because we did not

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106) Testimony of Roh Yun-bok (then a special member of Seobuk Young Men’s Association).

know anything.” He asked back, “Do you think we had objective grounds?”<sup>107)</sup>

At the front of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident, the Seobuk Young Men’s Association wielded absolute power in the military and the police under support of Rhee Syng-man and the US Army. Ko Chi-don, who was a resident of Gwangryeong-ri, Aewol-myeon, moved to Gaesu-dong, Hagwi-ri, but he was shocked by the indiscriminate shooting of the residents and moved again to Oedo-ri, Jeju-eup. Having a relative by marriage who was Oedo-ri Branch Chief of Corps for Protection of People, Ko Chi-don gained a certificate of citizenship relatively easily and barely survived thanks to being assigned to the Commando Unit. Ko Chi-don testified to the atrocities of police officers from the Seobuk Youth Association, as follows:

I can never forget the slaughter led by Lee Yun-do, a police officer of the Seobuk Young Men’s Association, when I worked in a Commando Unit at Oedo Police Box. One day the so-called fugitive families were dragged to the police box and tortured severely. When they were dragged to be executed, they could barely walk because they were already completely exhausted. Lee Yun-do forced members of the Commando Unit to stab the fugitive families and he also stabbed people in the back one by one with his sword. The people fell with their eyes bulged. About 80 people were killed at that time and most of them were women. Some women were with their babies. As a baby wriggled in front of the dead mother, Lee Yun-do stabbed the baby with his sword and lifted it up, making a display of his power. Babies in Dopyeong-ri were killed at that time. Lee Yun-do was not a human. I could not eat for a few days after I saw that.<sup>108)</sup>

On November 9, 1948, Kim Du-hyeon (53), Director of the Jeju General Affairs Department, was tortured to death, which shows the power of the Seobuk Young Men’s Association. The second-in-command of the Jeju administration was killed by members of the Seobuk Young Men’s Association discontented with supply matters. Being beaten so badly by Kim Jae-neung, Jeju Branch Chief of the Seobuk Young Men’s Association, Kim Du-hyeon passed out.

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107) North Korea Research Institute, *North Korea*, April issue, 1989, p.127.

108) Ko Chi-don (former commando of the Oedo Police Box), Testimony as quoted in the 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, the 442<sup>nd</sup> article of *The 4 · 3 Incident Speaks*, April 23, 1999.

Although Kim Du-hyeon was still alive, Kim Jae-neung threw Kim Du-hyeon out of his office, causing death. The US Army reported the incident as follows:

On November 9<sup>th</sup>, members of the NORTHWEST(Seobuk) YOUNG MEN'S ASSOCIATION beat Kim Du-hyeon, the Chief of General Affairs Section, of Jeju Do to death. The NWYMA members responsible for Kim's death stated that he was a known communist but that they had only intended to interrogate him, not to kill him.<sup>109)</sup>

The US Army intelligence agency and the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment investigative agency that had absolute authority regarding the illegal massacre took a lukewarm measure. At that time, killing was allowed when it came to the execution of communists. The police also gave a lukewarm response. The authorities enlisted members of the Seobuk Young Men's Association involved in the killing, instead of punishing them.

When Director of Jeju General Affairs Department died, the police should have arrested the criminals, but they didn't. Director Hong Sun-bong let Jeju Branch Chief Kim Jae-neung off. Director Hong covered the incident up by sending the criminals to the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment. The criminals became soldiers.<sup>110)</sup>

The Korean Students' Federation once sent an enlightenment squad<sup>111)</sup> and the Jeju branch of the Korean Students' Federation became an associate repression organization affiliated with the repression authorities.

The Hyangbodan (Community Protective Corps) was an extra-police organization which was formerly the Minbodan (Peoples Protective Corps). The Hyangbodan was announced by Military Governor Dean on April 16, 1948. The Hyangbodan was formed under the following conditions: first, men aged from 18 to 55 are obligated to become members of the Hyangbodan; second,

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109) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 987, November 13, 1948.

110) Kim Ho-gyeom (former chief of the Seogwipo Police Station), Testimony as quoted in the 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *ibid.*, p.163.

111) *Dokrip Shinmun*, November 18, 1948.

people aged from 15 to 65 shall share responsibility for regional defense; third, the expenses that are needed in managing the Hyangbodan shall be covered by contributions of the residents.<sup>112)</sup>

The Hyangbodan was organized as Jo Byeong-ok, the chief of the National Police Agency, suggested that the police alone could not repress riots against the 5 · 10 General Election that had broken out nationwide. Some, however, opposed the organization saying that the Hyangbodan was formed under coercion like organizations such as the Security Defense Agency and the Korean Volunteer Corps organized by the Japanese during the Japanese colonial rule. The Hyangbodan continued its duty of patrolling the regions under its control after the 5 · 10 General Election, but was disbanded on May 22, 1948, as it caused too much trouble.

A news agency that covered the situation in Jeju in early June reported, “The Hyangbodan, which was organized with the support of the police, are on guard all night.”<sup>113)</sup> This shows that the Hyangbodan was maintained longer in Jeju. It is assumed that the Hyangbodan was revived as the Minbodan around late October, 1948. The Director of the Metropolitan Police Agency announced, in a statement on October 29, 1948, that the Minbodan had already been organized.<sup>114)</sup> In Jeju, however, the Minbodan was organized much earlier. According to data related to the Minbodan, the Jeju branch of the Minbodan was established on August 11<sup>th</sup>, 1948. This means that provincial branches were first established and later regional branches were established.

Guard Activities of the Minbodan’s Hwasun-ri Branch,<sup>115)</sup> documented by Ju Yeon-bu, who was battalion commander of the Minbodan’s Hwasun-ri branch in Andeok-myeon, shows the organization and activities of the Minbodan as it was at that time. According to this document, the Minbodan’s Hwasun-ri branch in Andeok-myeon was organized in August, 1948. The branch had a

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112) *Jeju Shinbo*, April 8, 1948.

113) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, June 6, 1948.

114) *Hanseong Ilbo*, November 2, 1948.

115) The 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4 · 3 Incident Speaks*, Vol. 3, Jeonyewon, 1995, pp.268-270.

captain (Jang Haeng-gyu), vice-captain (Ji Hui-on, Yang Mun-il), general affairs department (Ji Bong-il), country guard department (Ji Yeon-bu), mobilization department (Ahn Chang-hyeon), liaison department (Lee Jeong-man), and women's department (Oh Tae-jeong).

The country guard department was soon renamed as the country guard corps, strengthening its structure. Men aged from 18 to 65 were assigned to guard their villages. The country guard corps was reorganized into battalion, company, platoon and squad. Ji Yeon-bu, Kang Mun-pal, and Yang Tae-hui were appointed as battalion commanders of the 1<sup>st</sup> Company and 2<sup>nd</sup> Company, respectively. The Minbodan, for the first time, built a protective stone wall around the police box. The residents were mobilized to build the wall which was five meters high and 3.5 meters thick and established seven watchtowers, spaced every 15 meters.

In the winter of that year, the Minbodan started to fortify against mountainous areas. The walls ranged 1,500 meters starting from the so-called slaughterhouse in the east of the village, a shrine site in the north of Hwasun Elementary School, the so-called Memareu in the west of the village to the so-called Dongtae Hill in the south of the village. The walls were 2.5 meters thick and 3.5 meters high, and 17 watchtowers were established every 50 meters. Residents of the village had to go through all sorts of hardships. Due to labor shortage, even children and old women were mobilized in the construction. The residents did forced labor in spite of cold weather and hunger.

Members of the Minbodan stood guard holding bamboo spears and iron spears day and night. The 1<sup>st</sup> Company and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Company worked every other day. The password changed every day and it was directly connected with life. In the middle of the night, in particular, it was very dangerous to go outside without knowing the password.

Every day, 177 members were mobilized as a night guard team of the Minbodan's Hwasun branch. The disposition of the 177 members was as follows: △ 30 at six watchtowers around the police box and front gate, △ 125 at 17 watchtowers of the village, △ five gates and three key places, △ eight for patrolling the watchtowers, △ six for patrolling an embankment

around the end of a field, △ eight for checking other members' work. Fifty (50) members were assigned for a day guard team. Disposition of the 50 members was as follows: △ 30 at five gates of the village, △ 12 for guarding outside of the village, △ four for guarding the police box, △ four waiting at headquarters office. This means that approximately 222 members were mobilized to protect one village every day and night.

There was a siren at the police box. When the siren sounded, members of the Minbodan had to gather in minutes, and did not want to arrive late. In addition, the residents were also responsible for the expenses that were needed in managing the Minbodan. Women were busy preparing meals for punitive forces and guard teams.

Members of the Minbodan were often mobilized in repression operations of the military and the police. The members holding poor arms such as bamboo spears were forced to go to the front lines before soldiers and police officers. Many of the members were killed by armed rebel attacks while participating in the repression operation or while on guard. In some cases, the members were killed by the military and the police for causing misunderstanding that they communicated secretly with the armed rebels, or because they were negligent in their duty.

*Jeju-do Report*, a confidential document made by G-2 of the US Armed Forces in Korea as of April 1, 1949, says that the number of the Minbodan members in Jeju reached 50,000. The confidential document also contains some incomprehensible intelligence analysis such as, "Jeju men prefer being on guard or going to punitive expedition to working on their farms." The following is a part of that document:

Backing both the police and Army is the MIN BO DAN, which is made up of most of the adult male population of the island who are armed with crude bamboo spears. Estimated to number approximately 50,000, they appear to prefer guard duty and anti-guerrilla operations to labor in the field, and, since they are used directly in the line by the Army in its combined operations, casualties have been comparatively heavy among the civilian combatants.<sup>116)</sup>

In most of the villages in Jeju, it was hard to see young people, because most of them went into the mountain or hid in other places. For that reason, men and women of all ages were obligated to defend their villages under the name of the Minbodan. Even people aged 65 and wives, therefore, had to build walls to prevent guerillas from entering the village and keep the walls by turns at night.

Young people, under the name of the Commando Unit, were mobilized in repression operations as human shields. The number of the Commando Unit members is estimated at about 3,000. An AP correspondent to Seoul reported, “Approximately 3,000 citizens with spears have supported the government in mop-up operations.”<sup>117)</sup> Chief of the General Staff Chae Byeong-deok also said in his statement on November 30<sup>th</sup>, 1948, “In the operation in Jeju, 3,000 armed citizens were sent to support a small number of soldiers.”<sup>118)</sup>

## **B. The Proclamation of Martial Law**

### **1) The Reality of Martial Law**

On November 17, 1948 President Rhee Syng-man proclaimed Martial Law on Jeju. It is uncertain whether Martial Law was proclaimed by an order of the US Army that had operational control of the South Korean Army, or it was confirmed afterwards. Brigadier General Roberts, the chief of the military advisory group, was deeply involved in the enforcement of Martial Law.

After the proclamation of Martial Law, Jeju people had to undergo the most terrifying ordeal in the development process of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident. Young men mostly became victimized before Martial Law, while men and women of all ages from three to 80 were shot to death during a strong repression operation that started after Martial Law was proclaimed in the middle of November. Jeju people recognized Martial Law as the grounds for the execution

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116) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1097, April 1, 1949.

117) *Daedong Shinmun*, December 17, 1948.

118) *Daedong Shinmun*, December 31, 1948.

of a large number of people without a trial.

The term, Martial Law, therefore, has still remained in Jeju people's mind. Old women who even can't read Hangeul, the Korean alphabet, testified without missing the word, Martial Law. They emphasized that their innocent husbands, sons and grandsons were victimized by punitive forces, while blaming the situation in the past, saying "Since it was the Martial Law period. . ." or "Because of Martial Law. . ." They just accepted the situation with resignation and considered Martial Law a reason for deaths of their family. Old villagers regarded Martial Law even as the absolute power for killing people indiscriminately.

Until recently, it was not clear what Martial Law really was. Although most documents related to the Jeju 4·3 Incident state Martial Law, it was uncertain what the contents of Martial Law were, when it was proclaimed and lifted, and even whether it was really proclaimed. No one has raised a question concerning Martial Law and people argue the date of proclamation differently. It was still doubtful when Martial Law was proclaimed, whether the strong repressive operation carried out under Martial Law was justifiable, and whether Martial Law was legal.

First, according to existing documents, there are three suppositions about the date of the proclamation of Martial Law: October 8, November 17 (or 16), and November 21. Documents of the army, the primary action agency of Martial Law, mostly recorded it as October 8. The *History of Counter-Unconventional Warfare* published by the War History Publication Committee of the Ministry of National Defense briefly recorded, "On October 8, 1948 Martial Law was proclaimed on Jeju."<sup>119)</sup> The *History of Jeju Police*, the data of the police, also recorded, "On October 8 Martial Law was proclaimed throughout the province."<sup>120)</sup> In addition, *Jeju Yearbook*, *Jeju-do Record (Vol. 1)*, *500 Years of Jeju Chronicles*, *30 Years of Jeju after Independence of the Country*, and other local history recorded it as October 8.<sup>121)</sup> Academic theses

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119) Department of Publishing Military History at Army Headquarters, *Unconventional Warfare History*, 1988, p.60.

120) Jeju Police Agency, *History of Jeju Police*, 1990, p.312.

also quoted *Jeju-do Record (Vol.1)* and *30 Years of Jeju After Independence of the Country*, writing, “As of October 8, Martial Law was proclaimed throughout the province.”<sup>122)</sup>

It is generally agreed that Martial Law was lifted on December 31, 1948. The *History of the Korean War* published by the Ministry of National Defense recorded, “On December 31, 1948 Martial Law on Jeju-do district was lifted.”<sup>123)</sup> It did not state the date of proclamation of Martial Law. Most of materials including *History of Counter-Unconventional Warfare*, which was mostly taken from *History of the Korean War*, also recorded December 31 as the date when Martial Law was lifted.<sup>124)</sup> According to the above, it seems probable that Martial Law was proclaimed on October 8, 1948 and lifted on December 31 in the same year. (But it is strange that *Gimnyeong-ri Local History* recorded that Martial Law was proclaimed on October 1, 1948 and that *Jeju Year Book* recorded the date when Martial Law was lifted on October 12 1949, even if it is not clear what they were based on.<sup>125)</sup>)

Things turn out to be different in the sources of the US Army and media coverage, however. An intelligence report of USAFIK recorded that a state of emergency was declared on November 17.<sup>126)</sup> Lee Beom-seok, the Minister of National Defense, mentioned Martial Law for the first time in the report on the National Assembly, held on December 8, 1948, saying that On November

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121) *The Yearbook of Jeju Province*, Jeju Yearbook Publishing Co., 1969; Jeju Province, *History of Jeju Province*, Vol. 1, 1982, p.622; KangYong-sam, Lee Gyeong-su, *Annals of Jeju*, Taegwang-Munhwasa, 1984, p.640; Boo Man-geun, *Liberation - 30 Years' History of Jeju*, Munjosa, 1975, p.457.

122) Yang Hang-won, *Study on the background of the Jeju 4 • 3 Incident*, Master's thesis, Seoul National University, 1988, p.16; Park Myeong-rim, *A Study on the Jeju 4 • 3 Resistance*, master's thesis, Korea University, 1988, p.150.

123) The Institute for Military History Compilation of the Ministry of National Defense, *History of the Korean War*, Vol. 1 -*Liberation and Foundation of National Forces*, 1967, p.445.

124) The Institute for Military History Compilation of the Ministry of National Defense, *Unconventional Warfare History*, 1988, p.65; Song Hyo-sun, *30 years of Provocation of North Korean Puppets*, North Korea Research Institute, 1978, p.75; *The 30-year History of the Liberation*, Semunsa, 1977.

125) Park Su-yang, *Local History of Gimnyeong-ri*, 1986, p.270; *The Yearbook of Jeju Province*, Jeju Yearbook Publishing Co., 1969.

126) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1056, February 5, 1949.

16, 1948 Martial Law was proclaimed on Jeju.<sup>127)</sup> A national newspaper reported that Martial Law was proclaimed on November 21.<sup>128)</sup> There are three or four dates of proclamation according to the existing materials, but it is hard to verify which original historical records the materials were based on, because they did not indicate their sources.

While looking carefully into the documents related to Martial Law, leaving the confusing dates aside, it is doubtful if Martial Law was really proclaimed. According to *The Foundation of the Armed Forces*, that recorded history of the army at the early stage based on massive military materials, on October 22, 1948 Martial Law was proclaimed on Yeosu and Suncheon area, but there is no record about Martial Law on Jeju.<sup>129)</sup> *The Daily Record of the Army*, that organized records of the army, also does not mention Martial Law on Jeju. The US Army reported on Martial Law on Jeju continuously, but later it recorded as follows:

Kim Dongseong, Korean Minister of Public Relations on February 5 announced that the state of emergency, declared on October 25, 1948 in the YEOSU-SUNCHEON area, JEOLLA-NAMDO Province and in the JIRISAN area was now lifted. He further said that the state of emergency on Jeju-do, beginning on November 17, 1948 was ended a month ago but that no previous public statement to that effect had been made. The Korean Government has no intention of declaring an emergency area in the vicinity of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel, Kim pointed out, and any reports, press or otherwise, to the contrary are completely unfounded.

<Comment> The state of emergency has frequently been called martial law by both Americans and Koreans. This is erroneous, since martial law, as such, has never been declared by the present Korean Government.<sup>130)</sup>

The problems about the reality of Martial Law and the time of its proclamation were solved through the following Presidential Decree No. 31

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127) *National Assembly Stenographic Records*, the 1<sup>st</sup> National Assembly, No. 124, December 8, 1948

128) *Chosun Ilbo*, November 30, 1948.

129) Han Yong-won, *Foundation of National Forces*, Bakyeongsa, Supplement – *Chronicle of the History of National Defense*.

130) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1056, February 5, 1949.

which is kept at the National Archives of Korea affiliated with the Ministry of Public Administration and Security:

Proclamation of Martial Law on Jeju Island District with the approval of the Cabinet Meeting

President Rhee Syng-man

November 17, 1948

Cabinet Member Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense Lee Beom-seok

Cabinet Member Minister of Home Affairs Yoon Chi-yeong

Cabinet Member Minister of Foreign Affairs Jang Taek-sang

Cabinet Member Minister of Finance Kim Do-yeon

Cabinet Member Minister of Justice Lee In

Cabinet Member Minister of Education Affairs Ahn Ho-sang

Cabinet Member Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Jo Bong-am

Cabinet Member Minister of Commerce and Industry Lim Yeong-sin

Cabinet Member Minister of Social Affairs Jeon Jin-han

Cabinet Member Minister of Transport Huh Jeong

Cabinet Member Minister of Communication Yoon Seok-gu

Cabinet Member Lee Yun-yeong

Presidential Decree No.31

Re: Proclamation of Martial Law on Jeju Island District

In order to quickly suppress the revolt on the island, Jeju Island shall be under Martial Law from the date of the proclamation. Entering to and leaving from the island shall be strictly prohibited. The Martial Law commander shall be the commander of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment stationed on Jeju.<sup>131)</sup>

This document, signed in handwritings of the president and all cabinet members, clarifies that Martial Law was proclaimed as of November 17, 1948. A document on lifting Martial Law is the Presidential Decree No. 43, which stipulates, “Martial Law on Jeju Island District shall be lifted as of December 31, 1948.”<sup>132)</sup> It turned out, therefore, only the report of the US Army has the exact date of proclamation of Martial Law, even though it wrote it as a “state

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131) *Official Gazette* No. 14, November 17, 1948.

132) *Official Gazette* No. 26, December 31, 1948.

of emergency,” not as Martial Law. It is still doubtful, however, why documents of the army, the primary action agency of Martial Law, do not have records about Martial Law or recorded the date October 8 out of nowhere.

The following two articles reported from the same newspaper at intervals of ten days show the chaotic situation of those days:

There is a rumor going around lately that Martial Law was proclaimed on Jeju. The press department of the Ministry of National Defense stated on 19<sup>th</sup> that is a groundless rumor as follows. △ Report from the press department of Ministry of National Defense: It is not true that Martial Law was proclaimed on Jeju Island District as newspapers reported lately. It seems that people misunderstood the army’s strict precautions that were made strategically because of riots starting in every corner of the country.<sup>133)</sup>

After Martial Law was enforced throughout the province on November 21, the initial proclamation of Martial Law was issued on November 23 with seven regulations to restrict traffic, censor mail, communication, newspapers and magazines, disperse residents, and impose restrictions on educational institutions, (Ministry of National Defense, November 29, article censored)<sup>134)</sup>

It has been criticized that Martial Law was proclaimed secretly because it was only posted on official gazette after passing the Cabinet meeting, without being released to the media.

Although it was said that Martial Law was proclaimed, nobody knew what Martial Law exactly meant. Rhee Syng-man appointed the 9<sup>th</sup> Regimental Commander Song Yo-chan as martial law commander, while Commander Song did not know about Martial Law. Kim Jeong-mu who worked as G-4 under Commander Song testified, “I did not clearly understand the concept of Martial Law.”<sup>135)</sup> Kim Ho-gyeom who served as a police officer in Jeju during the Jeju 4 • 3 Incident period testified as follows:

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133) *Chosun Ilbo*, November 20, 1948.

134) *Chosun Ilbo*, November 30, 1948.

135) Kim Jeong-mu (assistant chief of staff for logistics of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment), Testimony recorded on September 25, 2002.

At that time Martial Law was ambiguous and had no legal ground, and even Song Yo-chan, the martial law commander, did not know about Martial Law. One day, when I was with Hong Sun-bong, Director of the Jeju Provincial Police Agency, Song came to us. The three of us had worked together in the Manchukuo Army and Japanese Army during the Japanese colonial rule and at the Police Academy after liberation, so we knew each other well. Song asked to Hong, “I was ordered to proclaim Martial Law. What should I do?” Song was so worried because the Martial Law had no grounds or detailed guidelines. In addition Song was a kind of ignorant person, while Hong was a man of ability because he was the only person who took the top post among his Korean colleagues when working in Manchuria as a Japanese police officer. Anyway, Hong wrote Martial Law and a decree for Song. It is unreasonable to kill all people in mountainous area no matter how strong the Martial Law is, though. Something like that actually happened in Manchuria during the Japanese colonial rule. It was just shooting people in a certain area.<sup>136)</sup>

As stated above, it turned out that Martial Law on Jeju was proclaimed on November 17, 1948 and it lasted for but a month and a half until it was lifted on December 31.

It is still doubtful, however, why Rhee Syng-man made a secret of Martial Law even though it passed the Cabinet meeting, why even the martial law commander did not know about the Martial Law, and why the US Army, that held the operational control of the South Korean Army, denied the Martial Law after a while.

The doubts were resolved through the US Army’s data found recently. Brigadier General Roberts, the chief of the military advisory group, wrote to the Chief of the General Staff of Ministry of National Defense on December 1, 1948 as follows:

Herewith is a paper on “Martial Law” which should be published to all your command, so that they may know what martial law is, when martial law may be declared, who declares it and its effect.<sup>137)</sup>

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136) Kim Ho-gyeom (a former chief of the Seogwipo Police Station), Testimony as quoted in the 4·3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *ibid.*, pp.377-378.

137) “Martial Law,” December 1, 1948, RG 338: *Records of US Army Commands*, Entry:

Some important facts are confirmed through this document sent to the Chief of the General Staff 14 days after Martial Law was proclaimed on November 17. First, a Martial Law Act had not existed in South Korea when Martial Law was proclaimed. Second, the top executives of the South Korean Army did not know about the Martial Law in detail because it had not existed. Third, the South Korean Army learned about the Martial Law after receiving the document from the US Army.

It is not certain whether the US Army directly ordered Rhee Syng-man to proclaim Martial Law or confirmed it afterwards. It is also unclear what was in the document. Considering that the US Army enclosed the document to let South Korean officers know about how to enforce Martial Law, one thing is clear: that the US Army was closely related with the Martial Law. After a long time since the Martial Law had been lifted, the US Army recorded, “The state of emergency has been called Martial Law by both Koreans and Americans, but this is wrong because Martial Law has never been proclaimed by the current government of the Republic of Korea.” It seems that the US Army tried to get out of its relationship with Martial Law by the absence of a Martial Law Act.

## 2) The Dispute over the Illegality of Martial Law

### ① Martial Law Trial

Although Article 64 of the Constitution (right to proclaim Martial Law) states, “The president shall proclaim Martial Law as prescribed by the Act,” the Martial Law Act did not exist when Martial Law was proclaimed on November 17, 1948. The Martial Law Act was enacted and proclaimed as Act No. 69 on November 24, 1949, about a year after Martial Law was lifted.<sup>138)</sup> This caused dispute over whether the latest proclamation of Martial Law was lawful. Under the headline, *4 · 3 Martial Law was unlawful*, *JeminIlbo* reported

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Provisional Military Advisory Group (1948-1949) and Korean Military Advisory Group (1949-1953), Box 4.

138) *Extra Official Gazette*, November 24, 1949.

in 1997, “Martial Law that has been known as a legal basis for the massacre of Jeju people during the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident turned out to be proclaimed illegally by President Rhee Syng-man.”<sup>139)</sup>

In order to prove the report, *Jemin Ilbo* provided △ the Presidential Decree No.31 which was issued by the former president Rhee Syng-man for proclamation of Martial Law on Jeju-do district, △ emphasized that despite Article 64 of the Constitution, Martial Law was proclaimed a year earlier than Martial Law Act was actually enacted on November 24, 1949; presented Article 99 of the Constitution, “Regulations that cannot be implemented without enactment of act shall take effect from the time of the act coming into force;” and △ provided a confidential document of the USAFIK that reported that the state of emergency was being misused as Martial Law. The newspaper added that Song Yo-chan, who was the martial law commander of Jeju-do district, did not know about Martial Law by providing a testimony of Kim Ho-gyeom, who worked then as chief of the Seogwipo Police Station.

Some set forth a counterargument that 4 · 3 Martial Law was lawful and there was no massacre of innocent people. They argued that the Martial Law of the Japanese colonial rule was still valid because △ Martial Law of Japan was enforced in Korea by Japanese imperial order during Japanese colonial rule; △ the Martial Law has been valid because it was not included in acts that were pointed to be abolished by the US Military Government ordinance No. 11 after liberation; △ as the US Military Government ordinance No. 21 retained all acts and orders except what had been abolished after liberation, the Japanese Martial Law was still valid, △ as Article 100 of the Constitution, after the establishment of the government of the Republic of Korea, states, “Acts, decrees, ordinances, and treaties in force at the time this Constitution enters into force, shall remain valid unless they are contrary to this Constitution,” the old laws enacted before the Constitution such as ordinances of Japanese imperialism should be acknowledged. They argued that the report that Martial Law was proclaimed without legal grounds was wrong because the Martial Law

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139) *Jemin Ilbo*, April 1, 1997.

of Japanese colonial rule had remained valid even though the South Korean Martial Law Act was not enacted at the time of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident.<sup>140)</sup> Arguing the above, the former president Rhee Syng-man's adopted son requested a correction on a news report and claimed 300 million won for damages from *Jemin Ilbo*.

A Martial Law trial went on for about a year and eight months starting from the ruling of the first trial on July 20, 2000, the ruling of appeals trial on December 22, and to the ruling of the final trial in the Supreme Court on April 27, 2001. The Supreme Court (Justice of the Supreme Court: Lee Gyu-hong) acknowledged the massacre of the innocent people in the ruling:<sup>141)</sup> "It is fact that during the time around the proclamation of Martial Law, mountain villages in Jeju were burnt to the ground by repression operation of the military and the police and a large number of residents who were not directly connected to armed rebels were killed without trial."

The justice rejected plaintiff's claims, regarding the illegality of the 4 · 3 Martial Law, premising that it is hard to conclude that the act of the proclamation of Martial Law itself was a groundless illegal action. The justice added, "Considering that the 4 · 3 Martial Law was proclaimed before the Martial Law Act was enacted based on the Constitution, the Constitutional Assembly had disputes over whether the Martial Law was illegal, scholars still argue there should be a high level of legal decision on the relevant articles of Military Government ordinance and the Constitution in order to verify whether Martial Law of Japanese colonial rule had remained valid until the proclamation of the 4 · 3 Martial Law, and that some lawmakers have argued the proclamation was illegal, promoting Special Law for Investigation of Jeju 4 · 3 Incident and Honoring Victims, the defendant is considered to have reason to believe that the proclamation was illegal because the defendant reported based on reasonable data and evidence gained through investigation, not on fragmentary data, even though the defendant concluded the 4 · 3 Martial Law was lawful without

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140) Refer to *The 4 · 3 Incident Speaks* vol. 5, The 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, pp.365-392 for controversies over the Martial Law Trial.

141) Supreme Court, Sentence, Trial No. 2001C 7216, April 27, 2001.

suggesting other opinions.” The Supreme Court postponed making a clear decision on whether the 4 · 3 Martial Law was illegal.

Meanwhile, around the time of the Martial Law trial, some jurists including Professor Kim Sun-tae (Law Department of Korea National Open University) and Professor Kim Chang-rok (Law Department of Pusan National University) wrote academic theses on the illegality of the 4 · 3 Martial Law.<sup>142)</sup>

## ② The Disputes at the National Assembly

A decision on the question of legality of the 4 · 3 Martial Law was left for the academic circles. Aside from legal aspects, however, there is a historical problem about whether Rhee Syng-man proclaimed the 4 · 3 Martial Law based on Martial Law of Japanese colonial rule.

The problem can be resolved by comparing Martial Laws before and after the enactment of South Korea’s Martial Law Act. The Martial Law that was proclaimed after the Martial Law Act was enacted on November 24, 1949 states, “The president of the Republic of Korea shall proclaim Martial Law in accordance with Article 1 of the Martial Law Act,”<sup>143)</sup> following Article 64 of the Constitution that states, “The president shall proclaim Martial Law as prescribed by Act.” If the 4 · 3 Martial Law was proclaimed based on Japanese Martial Law, the law should have stated, “Martial Law shall be proclaimed on Jeju district as prescribed by Article O of the Japanese Martial Law”. Before the enactment of Martial Law Act, however, the 4 · 3 Martial Law declared by the president and Martial Law on Yeosu-Suncheon district, declared 20 days earlier than the Jeju one stated, “Martial Law (on Jeju Island district) enacted after passing the Cabinet meeting, shall be proclaimed.”<sup>144)</sup> This means the Martial Law was decided and enacted by the Cabinet meeting instead of being proposed by the Cabinet meeting.

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142) Kim Sun-tae, *Illegality of the Martial Law during the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident*, Research on the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident, Yeoksa-Bipyongsas, 1999; Kim Chang-rok, *Efficacy of Japanese Law Considering the 4 · 3 Martial Law – the 100<sup>th</sup> Article of the Constitution in 1948*, *Research on Law*, Vol. 39, No.1. Pusan National University, 1998.

143) *Official Gazette* No. 383, July 8, 1950.

144) *Official Gazette* No.7, October 25, 1948; *Official Gazette* No.10, November 17, 1948.

*Parliamentary Records* proves that the 4 · 3 Martial Law and the Martial Law on Yeosu-Suncheon district were not proclaimed based on Japanese Martial Law. After October 25, 1948 when the first Martial Law<sup>145)</sup> was declared due to the Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion, the National Assembly had its first discussion on Martial Law on October 27, 1948 and Jo Heon-yeong questioned why the proclamation of Martial Law was not officially reported to the National Assembly, even though it had been announced to the public.<sup>146)</sup> A day later, Defense Minister Lee Beom-seok admitted the proclamation of Martial Law, saying “Martial Law was declared in order to settle the incident in Yeosu and Suncheon district easily through issuing the President Decree. It was decided that the military authorities deal with the incident and direct the military and the police.”<sup>147)</sup>

The disputes on Martial Law intensified around October 30. After ascertaining the truth of the Martial Law by Minister Lee, members of the National Assembly began to raise more questions. Lawmaker Jo Heon-yeong and Kim Yak-su repeatedly reproached that Martial Law did not receive the approval of the National Assembly.<sup>148)</sup>

While Jo and Kim pointed out the official process, Yoo Seong-gap raised a material question about a legal basis of the proclamation of Martial Law. Yoo said that unlike Article 64 of the Constitution, “The president shall proclaim Martial Law as prescribed by Act,” there was no Martial Law Act.<sup>149)</sup> Other

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145) Martial Law on Yeosu-Suncheon district was declared on October 25, 1948 as Presidential Decree No. 13 (*Official Gazette* No. 10, October 25, 1948), while it had already been known to the public through declaration of commander in the region and reports by the media. Refer to *Recognition of Rhee Syng-man about Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion and Damage on People, Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion Source Book* written by Kim Deuk-jung (Yeosu Area Research Institute, 1999).

146) *National Assembly Stenographic Records*, the 1<sup>st</sup> National Assembly, No. 90, October 27, 1948.

147) *National Assembly Stenographic Records*, the 1<sup>st</sup> National Assembly, No. 92, October 28, 1948.

148) *National Assembly Stenographic Records*, the 1<sup>st</sup> National Assembly, No. 92, October 30, 1948.

149) *National Assembly Stenographic Records*, the 1<sup>st</sup> National Assembly, No. 92, October 30, 1948.

members also pointed out the matter on November 2. Choi Guk-hyeon asked Justice Minister Lee In, “I heard Martial Law was declared. Then, which article of the Constitution was it based on? If it was based on Article 57 or 62, it is just like the Japanese emperor’s Martial Law.” Minister Lee was so embarrassed that he gave the irrelevant answer, “The President does not proclaim Martial Law. The military commander in the region does.”<sup>150)</sup>

As mentioned earlier, Martial Law on Yeosu-Suncheon district was proclaimed by the president on October 25, 1948 and all Cabinet Members including the Justice Minister Lee In signed it in their own handwriting. In addition, Defense Minister Lee Beom-seok admitted at the National Assembly that Martial Law was declared by Presidential Decree. Minister Lee In, however, said that the Martial Law was declared by the military commander in the region. He was so flustered, because he knew law very well, that he lied in a moment. Kim Byeong-hoe pointed out Martial Law Act was not enacted yet, refuting that Martial Law declared by military commander in the region was constitutional. As Kim kept mentioning Article 64 of the Constitution, the Justice Minister Lee In clearly admitted the absence of Martial Law, saying, “I’m really sorry to say that Martial Law has not been enacted yet in Korea.”<sup>151)</sup> He retracted his statement at the same place in the same day, but he lied again after that. Minister Lee said, “Martial Law is proclaimed by the military commander in emergency and it is just an emergency measure to stop disturbances regardless of administrative power and judicial power.”<sup>152)</sup> He shifted the responsibility to the military commander in the region and reduced the meaning of Martial Law because he knew that Martial Law proclaimed by the president without the Martial Law Act was unconstitutional.

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150) *National Assembly Stenographic Records*, the 1<sup>st</sup> National Assembly, No. 94, November 2, 1948.

151) *National Assembly Stenographic Records*, the 1<sup>st</sup> National Assembly, No. 94, November 2, 1948.

152) *National Assembly Stenographic Records*, the 1<sup>st</sup> National Assembly, No. 94, November 2, 1948.

## **C. Devastation of Mid-mountainous Villages**

### **1) Background of the Devastation**

After establishing Jeju Defense Headquarters on October 11, 1948 and proclaiming Martial Law on November 17, repression forces launched a strong repression operation, setting fire to mid-mountainous villages whose residents were evacuated and killing people of all ages who remained there.

The Martial Law, however, was so ambiguous that Song Yo-chan, who was the martial law commander, asked, “What should I do with Martial Law?” Moreover, Justice Minister Lee In said at the National Assembly that only a military commander in the region can exercise the Martial Law thus the Presidential decree and judicial power will not be suspended.

This was a natural result because the Martial Law Act had not been enacted. Martial Law, which was proclaimed by Presidential decree No. 31, has nothing but vague sentences as, “In order to quickly suppress the revolt on the island, Jeju Island shall be under Martial Law from the date of the proclamation. Entering to and leaving from the island shall be strictly prohibited. The Martial Law commander shall be the commander of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment stationing on Jeju.”

The US Army gave information about Martial Law to the Chief of the Staff at Ministry of National Defense 14 days after the proclamation, but it seems the details about Martial Law, which have not been discovered yet, were not delivered well, considering the incidents that occurred in Jeju during Martial Law. No civilized countries can have an article in Martial Law to indiscriminately shoot unarmed civilians including babies and people aged over 80.

Some soldiers, who served in the Japanese Army and the Manchukuo Army, had experiences of massacre in China. When a court-martial on the assassination of Commander Park Jin-gyeong was held in September, 1948, a newspaper reported a statement of an accused soldier that Commander Park Jin-gyeong killed a number of innocent people, worrying, “We know well that the Japanese Army committed an atrocious massacre of Chinese civilians during the Sino-Japanese War. We also can assume how badly that massacre will affect the relationship

between China and Japan in the future; then, how bad would it be for a fratricidal massacre?”<sup>153)</sup> The 9<sup>th</sup> Regimental Commander Song Yo-chan and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regimental Commander Ham Byeong-seon who led a strong repression operation had been warrant officers in the Japanese volunteer army.

Although they had experienced the massacre in China, the commanders had no right to set fire to mountain villages and shoot Korean people of all ages at their discretion, without holding any trials. This is proved by government documents such as Cabinet meeting records. The Cabinet meeting records,<sup>154)</sup> which have been unknown to the public, are collected by the National Archives of Korea, affiliated with the Ministry of Public Administration and Security. President Rhee Syng-man showed his will at the Cabinet meeting on January 21, 1949.

President’s administrative policy message: Although the United States recognized the importance of South Korea, expressing sympathy, they will increase aid only if we eradicate the aftermath of incidents in Jeju Island and Jeollanam-do. It is demanded to show the dignity of law by repressing extorters and insurgents harshly.<sup>155)</sup>

The president’s order for harsh repression to settle the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident in a short time was immediately delivered to the lowest level of the police and implemented. On January 26 the Justice Minister sent an official document of the presidential message to the Public Prosecutor General.<sup>156)</sup> On January 27, the Public Prosecutor General sent it to directors of High Public Prosecutors’ Offices, directors of district public prosecutor’s offices and directors of branches of district public prosecutor’s offices respectively,<sup>157)</sup> and to directors of

153) *Chosun Ilbo*, September 9, 1948.

154) Unfortunately, the National Archives of Korea do not have the minutes of the Cabinet Council in 1948 but it has the minutes of the Cabinet Council from 1949.

155) *Minutes of the Cabinet Council*, January 21, 1949.

156) Restricted Document No. 439 (January 26, 1949), “Regarding Presidential Instruction”, Document No. 41 *Relations between Home Affairs and Judicial Affairs, Records on the Established Regulations*.

157) Restricted Document No. 23 (January 27, 1949), “Regarding Presidential Instruction”, *Records on the Established Regulations*.

Public Prosecutors' Offices' branches on February 21.<sup>158)</sup> On February 23 the Public Prosecutor General sent an official document to each Public Prosecutor's Office to reproach them for being too generous to left-wing cases, ordering them to punish the leftists severely.<sup>159)</sup>

The National Security Law could not be grounds for the harsh repression because it is not possible to shoot unarmed civilians indiscriminately without holding a trial, even in wartime. President Rhee Syng-man, therefore, utilized Martial Law. Although the effect of Martial Law was unclear since the Martial Law Act was not enacted, Martial Law was considered as giving absolute power to the military, the police and civilians. Prime Minister Lee Beom-seok, who also was in charge as Minister of National Defense, reported at the National Assembly on December 8, 1948: "The uprising has been rapidly settled thanks to the enforcement of Martial Law."<sup>160)</sup> The Martial Law was lifted as of December 31, 1948, but it was not known to the general public.

Kim Dong-seong, Korean Minister of Public Relations on February 5 announced that the state of emergency, declared on October 25, 1948 in the Yeosu-Suncheon area, Jeolla-Namdo Province and in the Jirisan area was now lifted. He further said that the state of emergency on Jeju-do, beginning on November 17, 1948 was ended a month ago but that no previous public statement to that effect had been made.<sup>161)</sup>

According to testimonies of military officers, the Rhee government tried to maintain Martial Law, while it lifted Martial Law on Jeju Island District. Jeon Bu-il, the Battalion Commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment stationed in Jeju in 1949, testified, "I thought Jeju Island was still under Martial Law."<sup>162)</sup> Kim Yong-ju,

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158) District Prosecutor's Office Document No. 18 (February 21, 1949), "Regarding Presidential Instruction", *Records on the Established Regulations*

159) Restricted Document No. 114 (February 23, 1949), "Regarding Handling Left-Wing Cases", *Documents on the Ministry of Justice*.

160) *National Assembly Stenographic Records*, the 1<sup>st</sup> National Assembly, No. 124, December 8, 1948.

161) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 1056, February 5, 1949.

162) Jeon Bu-il (former Battalion Commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment), Testimony recorded on September 24, 2002.

the Separate Battalion Commander, who was stationed in Jeju from July 1949 testified, “I was appointed as martial law commander of Jeju Island District.”<sup>163)</sup> A member of the National Assembly who went to Jeju for investigation after Martial Law was lifted said, “I heard that Martial Law was enforced again when I returned to Seoul.”<sup>164)</sup> This means that Martial Law continued secretly.

The presidential message that only if the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident was settled even by using harsh operation, the United States that recognized the importance of South Korea will give aid, implies that the president planned the strong repression operation with the United States. Critics say that the operation reflects the United States’ intention to build a bulwark in Asia against communism as the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union had worsened.

Prime Minister Lee Beom-seok, in his welcoming speech to the police force that returned after the repression operation launched for successful holding of the 5 · 10 Reelection in 1949 said, “Your efforts in the complete repression in Jeju mean not only loyalty to the country but also a big contribution to protect Southeast Asia and the Pacific from communism.”<sup>165)</sup> Although saying the repression contributed to Southeast Asia and the Pacific seems like an exaggerated statement, the following Cabinet meeting record shows the US’s policy towards South Korea in connection with the president’s request for aid:

President’s administrative policy message: It would be desirable for the Minister of Foreign Affairs to express appreciation to a US Senator for suggesting a bill of aid to South Korea under the condition of anticommunism.

Minutes of the 63<sup>rd</sup> Cabinet Council: The US Foreign Affairs Committee passed the bill for aid of \$150 million US under the condition of anticommunism.”<sup>166)</sup>

The media in those days agreed that the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union brought about the tragedy of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident. A newspaper

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163) Kim Yong-ju (former Commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> Separate Battalion) Testimony as quoted in *Collection of Veterans’ Testimonies* which is kept by the Institute for Military History Compilation of the Ministry of National Defense.

164) *Chosun Ilbo*, January 12, 1949.

165) *Jayu Shinmun*, May 19, 1949.

166) *Minutes of the 63<sup>rd</sup> Cabinet Council*, July 1, 1949.

reported about the devastated Jeju, pointing out, “Foreign correspondents described Jeju as a testing ground of Marshall and Molotov, the arena of competition between the US and the Soviet Union, and a reduced version of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel as if the situation of Jeju is an interesting event. Jeju has become a new testing ground as the bastion of anticommunism in the Far East.”<sup>167)</sup> Another newspaper analyzed the situation of Jeju as, “Jeju is like a testing ground, not an outpost for anticommunism.”<sup>168)</sup>

## 2) Control of the Press and Blockade of the Coast

Before launching a strong repression operation, the military authorities controlled the Press and blocked the coast to isolate Jeju from the mainland. Since nobody knew what was happening in Jeju from the outside, the indiscriminate repression operation could not be controlled.

The coast of Jeju had already been blocked since October 18, a month before Jeju came under Martial Law. The Navy blocked the coast, mobilizing seven vessels and 203 seamen.<sup>169)</sup> Jeju Island became isolated and helpless since then.

Meanwhile, a conflict between the Press and the repression authorities was an inevitable consequence of a continued repression operation. Kim Gi-o, who was then a journalist of Jeju Shinbo, testified about his experience as follows:

When Choi Cheon was in charge as director of the Jeju Police Inspection Office, I went out to cover a suppression district of the police. I went to the district with Commander Song Yo-chan and Captain Lee, an American-born Korean, who worked at G-2. I was shocked to know that a blind person was executed as a rioter. I wrote an article about that for a newspaper, but then

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167) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, September 1, 1949.

168) *Seoul Shinmun*, September 1, 1949.

169) “Report on the International Insurrections after April, 1948, made by Minister of National Defence, Lee Beom-seok,” December 14, 1948, RG 338: *Records of US Army Commands*, Entry: Provisional Military Advisory Group (1948-1949) and Korean Military Advisory Group (1949-1953), Box 11; *The 12<sup>th</sup> Shorthand Report on the 1<sup>st</sup> National Assembly*, December 8, 1948; *Gukje Shinmun*, December 9, 1948.

Director Choi complained, “How could you write a false article that drives a wedge between civilians and the police?” Moreover, Investigation Manager Dong Tae-un, who was from North Korea, put me in jail, threatening: “What do the rioters in Mt. Halla have to do with you? I suspect your ideology.” I kept complaining to get out of prison, but another case happened the next day. A resident, who was taken by an officer of Police Support Unit at Oedo Police Box, was found dead on the street. I also wrote an article about that, and I heard that the police held a conference and decided to eliminate me. Sergeant Park Un-bong, who was a friend at Aewol Elementary School and Jeju Agriculture School, was so worried about me that he told me to take care of myself. I left for Seoul right away in fear of my life. This all happened around July, 1948.<sup>170)</sup>

Kim Gi-o was saved from disaster because he hurried off, while the suppression continued on Jeju Shinbo, which was the only newspaper published in Jeju. On July 22, 1948 the Special Crime Investigation Unit of Jeju Provincial Police Agency arrested a journalist of Jeju Shinbo for organizing a save-the-nation movement committee and carrying out a secret struggle. The journalist was released and fined, but Jeju Shinbo had to suspend publication for a while due to the arrests of journalists and employees.<sup>171)</sup>

Other newspapers in Seoul also gave prominent coverage of the situation in Jeju. Many newspapers in Seoul reported as follows on September 15, 1948:

[Seoul Shinmun, Chosun Ilbo, Chosun Joongang Ilbo, Hansung Ilbo] A horrible incident occurred. A 13-year-old boy was tortured as a rioter, resulting in death. Jin In-su (13), who lived in Samyang-ri, Jeju-eup, was pointed out as a rioter in mountain and taken to Samyang Police Box on 7<sup>th</sup>. He was beaten by Sergeant Min Yong-gi and two police constables, and finally died at 1 a.m. the next day. Jeju Prosecutor’s Office sent prosecutors to the region for an autopsy and arrested two police constables who cooperated with the torture, searching strictly the director of the Police Box, who made a quick getaway.<sup>172)</sup>

As central newspapers carried shocking news that a 13-year-old boy was

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170) Kim Gi-o (former Journalist of Jeju Shinbo), Testimony recorded on February 1, 2002.

171) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, August 8, 11 and 18, 1948.

172) *Seoul Shinmun*, *Chosun Ilbo*, *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, *Hansung Ilbo*, September 15, 1948.

tortured to death, the repression authorities began to more firmly control the Press. Around October, 1948, journalists in Jeju-eup were taken to the military base. Among them was Hyeon In-ha, the chairperson of the Jeju branch of the Kyunghyang Shinmun. It is said that he had been a student soldier and also a police officer after liberation. It seems that the newspaper, which established a branch in Jeju in December, 1947 with residing journalists, was quite influential in Jeju.<sup>173)</sup> A person testified, “Hyeon In-ha was an intellectual good at English and very skilled in doing business, so the Kyunghyang Shinmun sold well. There was almost nothing but the Kyunghyang Shinmun.”<sup>174)</sup> Another person who testified about the reason Hyeon In-ha was taken to the military force said, “When the military police tried to inspect the Kyunghyang Shinmun, Hyeon In-ha yelled at them and threw them out. Having a grudge against him, the military police took him and executed him as the situation of Jeju worsened.”<sup>175)</sup> Lee Sang-hui, the chairperson of the Jeju branch of the Seoul Shinmun, was also soon taken to be executed.

In November, 1948, when an indiscriminate repression operation started, pre-censorship was carried out to control the Press. The Ministry of National Defense declared the pre-censorship for articles related to the military as of November 20 giving as reasons, to protect the military operations and discipline and to ensure the accuracy of news reports.<sup>176)</sup> Even though the public claimed pre-censorship was the suppression of the press, the Ministry repeated on November 22: “The pre-censorship is to ensure the unity and the accuracy of reports, not to suppress or check the press which is supposed to be free.”<sup>177)</sup> Since then, articles related to the military were issued on the condition of ‘censored’ or ‘released by censorship’.

As the coast of Jeju was blocked and the press was controlled, Jeju Island

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173) *Jeju Shinmun*, December 6, 1947.

174) Choi Gil-du (former public officer), Testimony as quoted in the 4·3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4·3 Incident Speaking*, Vol. 4, Jeonyewon, 1997, p.16.

175) Kang Sun-hyeon (former public officer), Testimony as quoted in the 4·3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *ibid.*, p.154.

176) *Gukje Shinmun*, November 21, 1948.

177) *Gukje Shinmun*, November 23, 1948.

became isolated and helpless literally. The discussions of the National Assembly show how much Jeju was shut off from the outside and how much people were indifferent to Jeju.

The Jeju 4 · 3 Incident was first discussed at the National Assembly on June 11, 1948 when six members of the National Assembly including Oh Yong-guk from Jeju submitted an urgent motion calling for the establishment of a provisional special committee to plead for the Jeju incident. The urgent motion failed even to be considered due to the small number of supporters. Congressman Choi Guk-hyeon opposed the urgent motion itself, saying, “The situation of Jeju that Congressman Oh just said is very important, but if the issue is accepted today, other important issues such as electricity and delivery of barley will also be proposed.”<sup>178)</sup> He treated the Jeju uprising the same as the electricity issue in Seoul because he did not realize how serious it was.

On September 27, Congressman Kim Ung-jin expressed concern, saying, “People living in Jeju are driven to the Reds due to the Jeju uprising happening south of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel. I think this will disturb the public security of South Korea in the future.”<sup>179)</sup> It was not a real discussion about the Jeju uprising, but a mere mention about the uprising when inquiring into whether the government obstructed Anti-national Activist Punishment Law.

Congressman Jo Guk-hyeon insisted at the first discussion stage for Local Government Organization Act on October 7 that Jeju province, whose status was elevated from being an island to a province in August, 1946, should revert to being an island.<sup>180)</sup> This became serious at the second discussion stage on October 13. Congressman Jo took the lead in the dispute saying, “If Jeju-do Island is elevated to being a province, Ulleongdo Island and other islands also should be elevated to provinces regardless of their size.”<sup>181)</sup>

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178) *National Assembly Stenographic Records*, the 1<sup>st</sup> National Assembly, No. 8, June 11, 1948.

179) *National Assembly Stenographic Records*, the 1<sup>st</sup> National Assembly, No. 75, September 27, 1948.

180) *National Assembly Stenographic Records*, the 1<sup>st</sup> National Assembly, No. 84, October 7, 1948.

181) *National Assembly Stenographic Records*, the 1<sup>st</sup> National Assembly, No. 87, October 13, 1948.

Congressmen argued for and against the matter at the second discussion stage and Jeju Island eventually maintained the status of a province by only one vote. The heated discussion over the status of Jeju Island at the National Assembly while Jeju Defense Headquarters was established on October 11, which led to further bloodshed in Jeju, implies Jeju was isolated from the outside.

### 3) Arson Attack and Evacuation in Mid-mountainous Villages

A strong repression operation began in the middle of November in 1948. Although there were indiscriminate shootings in many places of Jeju, after mid-November the operation further intensified, causing many more casualties in all parts of the island. This was the time when Jeju Martial Law was declared. For about four months from November, 1948 to February, 1949, the strong repression operation burned Jeju to the ground, reducing most mid-mountainous villages to ashes. Young men were mostly sacrificed until the middle of November, but punitive forces shot residents of all ages during the strong repression. Most victims of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident were killed during that period. According to the statistics on victims that were reported to the Special Committee for Investigation of Jeju 4 · 3 Incident and Honoring Victims, out of the total number of victims aged under 15, 76.5 percent were killed from November, 1948 to February, 1949, and 76.6 percent of victims aged over 61 were killed during the same period.

Kim Jeong-mu, who did not participate in the strong repression operation but was in the operation as G-4 of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, testified, “Operation Scorched Earth, because the residents in mid-mountainous villages could help armed rebels in the mountains. People in mid-mountainous villages were accepted as enemies at that time.”<sup>182)</sup> This means that the operation authority burned those villages to the ground in order to remove a base for the armed rebels. Yun Tae-jun, the first sergeant of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, testified,

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182) Kim Jeong-mu (assistant chief of staff for logistics of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment), Testimony recorded on September 25, 2002.

“Commander Song Yo-chan launched Operation Scorched Earth. He ordered to remove or burn places which the armed rebels could live in, which I had never heard in the mainland. I don’t know whether the operation was ordered from the superior authority or just unilaterally decided by Commander Song. The Commander, who had served as a Japanese soldier, killed people mercilessly.”<sup>183)</sup>

After the situation in Jeju was almost settled, the US Provisional Military Advisory Group sent a letter to Major General C. L. Mullins Jr., the Commander of the Second Headquarters in Maryland, USA, on July 28, 1949, describing the indiscriminate operation: “The extended resistance of the rebels on Jeju Island was due, in part, to poor commanders in the Police and Army. They were equally as ruthless in killing villagers and burning towns as the Communists.”<sup>184)</sup>

According to the sources of the military and the police, however, the shootings of the unarmed civilians were completely disregarded and it seems that the military and the police achieved a brilliant success in battle with the armed rebels during the operation period. The following record is full of suggestions:

Regimental Commander stationed in Jeju reported that 122 rebels were captured and 576 were killed during a period from November 20 to 27. It was reported that 1,625 rebels were killed and 1,383 were captured during a period from October 1 to November 20. Many items were seized, but some Japanese rifles were the only arms. 60 rifles were seized during the two months.<sup>185)</sup>

According to the daily report of US Armed Forces in Korea, “Constabulary action on November 13 on Jeju Island resulted in 115 raiders killed in Haengwon-ri,”<sup>186)</sup> and “on November 24 Constabulary forces killed 79 raiders in a firefight near Nohyeong-ri,”<sup>187)</sup> but there were no casualties among

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183) Testimony of Yun Tae-jun (Then first sergeant of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment).

184) “Letter from Roberts to Mullins,” July 28, 1949, RG 338: *Records of US Army Commands*, Entry: Provisional Military Advisory Group (1949-1949) and Korean Military Advisory Group (1949-1953), Box 8.

185) “Report from PMAG to USAFIK,” December 1, 1948, *ibid.*, Box 4.

186) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 989, November 16, 1948.

187) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 998, November 27, 1948.

repression forces.

Such records were reported by the Korean media several times: 88 rioters were killed by sweeping the whole area of the base of Mt. Halla near Jungmunmyeon, Namjeju-gun for two days from November 21, with no casualties among South Korean soldiers<sup>188</sup>); 79 rioters were killed in Nohyeong-ri on November 14, with no casualties among South Korean soldiers.<sup>189</sup>) All media reports after pre-censorship by the Ministry of National Defense carried that a number of the enemy were killed, with no casualties among South Korean soldiers.

The unbalanced and unconvincing military achievements were clearly shown in the National Assembly report of Prime Minister Lee Beom-seok on December 8, 1948. According to his report about military achievements, for nine months from April to December in 1948, the number of abandoned corpses was 421 and that of prisoners of war was 5,719 while the South Korean army had only three dead soldiers and eight injured.<sup>190</sup>)

It is common that repression forces suffer more losses at a guerrilla war. The reports that National Defense Force killed and arrested a number of rebels without seizing any arms and that only rebels were killed at many battles prove that civilians were shot to death and not in battles between punitive forces and armed rebels.

It becomes obvious that the punitive forces changed unarmed civilians to armed rebels when comparing the number of rioters, which was reported by the military and the police, and the military achievements.

△ As of April, 1948: The number of rioters is about from 300 to 400. (Chief of public affairs at National Police Agency)<sup>191</sup>)

△ As of April, 1948: The number of rioters throughout the island is less than 300. (The 9<sup>th</sup> Regimental Commander Kim Ikryeol)<sup>192</sup>)

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188) *Chosun Ilbo*, November 26, 1948.

189) *Dokrip Shinmun*, November 27, 1948.

190) *National Assembly Stenographic Records*, the 1<sup>st</sup> National Assembly, No. 124, December 8, 1948; *Hanseong Ilbo*, December 10, 1948.

191) *Chosun Ilbo*, May 6, 1948.

192) Kim Ik-ryeol, *The Truth of the Jeju 4·3 Incident*, as quoted in the 4·3 News Team of *Jemin Ilbo*, *ibid.*, 1994, p.299.

- △ As of December, 1948: The number of armed rioters is only from 50 to 60. (Report by Prime Minister)<sup>193)</sup>
- △ As of January, 1949: The number of armed rioters might be about from 150 to 400. (Report by Minister of Home Affairs)<sup>194)</sup>
- △ As of March, 1949: The number of armed rioters is about 200. (Report by Prime Minister)<sup>195)</sup>
- △ As of March, 1949: The number of armed rioters is from 150 to 600. (Report by Minister of Home Affairs)<sup>196)</sup>

Military achievements of the punitive forces had been continuously reported since April 3, 1948, but the number of rioters in the report did not decrease. The media, therefore, once criticized: “The authorities have consistently stated that the number of People’s Liberation Unit (rebels) is 500. The number of the rebels, however, is still 500 despite several mop-up operations. Then, is this figure 500 a mystery?”

Meanwhile, the repression forces, consisting of the military, the police and the top executives of the government, denied that they had launched strong repression operation and did not put the fact on record. The reports of the US Army, that otherwise had recorded every little detail, have only a few records during the strong repression operation. The following reports of the US Army provide rare records related to the operation:

Sancheondan - At 12:45, November 19, 1948 approximately 10 Constabulary-men burned four houses. (F-1) At 13:00 U.S. L-5 air observer saw the Constabularymen at the time the village was burning. (A-2)<sup>197)</sup>

There is a report about shootings, besides the arson attack.

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193) *National Assembly Stenographic Records*, the 1<sup>st</sup> National Assembly, No. 124, December 8, 1948.

194) *Minutes of the 10<sup>th</sup> Cabinet Council*, January 17, 1949.

195) *Minutes of the 30<sup>th</sup> Cabinet Council*, March 16, 1949.

196) *National Assembly Stenographic Records*, the 2<sup>nd</sup> National Assembly, No. 59, March 21, 1949.

197) Hq. 6<sup>th</sup> Inf Div, USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1102, November 19, 1948.

January 25, 1949, Ora-ri, Jeju-Do. American advisers of the 2<sup>nd</sup> KA Regiment saw 97 bodies, men women and children. Each had been shot 5 or 6 times. Empty shells and clips at the scene indicated that M-1 rifles had been used, but both police and KA denied participation in the incident.<sup>198)</sup>

There is a report of eyewitness accounts as follows:

A delayed report indicates that on February 20, 76 rebels from Dodu-ri were executed by the MIN BO DAN (Peoples Protective Corps), who used spears in the performance of these executions. Five women and numerous children of middle school age were included in the group. National Police and the Korean Army Military Police supervised the operation.

<Comment> Four members of KMAG witnessed, by chance, the execution of 38 of the rebels and counted 38 already dead when they arrived.<sup>199)</sup>

As shown in the US Army's reports, the strong repression operation was carried out by setting fire to mountain villages and by shooting men and women of all ages. The original plan for the operation was to evacuate residents of mountain villages to seaside villages and to remove a base for armed rebels by ordering the residents to watch in the seaside villages. Prime Minister Lee Beom-seok, who was also the Minister of National Defense, said as follows regarding the operation at the National Assembly report:

A. The enemy's movement: Due to the fierce annihilation operation led by the South Korean Army, shortage of food, insufficient supply of arms and ammunition, and diminution of cooperators, there are only from 50 to 60 armed rioters remaining, but it is regrettable that the majority of the Jeju people have given moral support to the armed rioters.

B. Soldiers of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment secured main points in Jeju Island and evacuated residents of mountain villages to seaside villages in order to implement the Village Joint Responsibility System. The soldiers are striving only for reconstruction of Jeju by cutting down bushes on both sides of the road to prepare for a sudden attack and to block supply lines for rioters and by punishing cooperators of the rioters.<sup>200)</sup>

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198) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1055, February 4, 1949.

199) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1077, March 3, 1949.

The Evacuation Order was to evacuate residents as a group on the premise that the majority of the Jeju people were moral supporters of rioters and to build the Village Joint Responsibility System, which orders the residents to watch, in order to block ordinary residents and rioters. Lee Gi-bong, the first sergeant at the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, testified, “People in mountainous area were ordered to come down to coastal areas, and those who did not come down were all regarded as red guerrillas.”<sup>201)</sup>

The repression forces, however, attacked some mid-mountainous villages that had not yet received the Evacuation Order, setting fire and shooting residents. In addition, when a member of a family disappeared during evacuation, the forces shot all the family, calling them evaders’ family. Boo Seong-bang, who lost 12 family members including his mother and children because he escaped when evacuating, lamented, “It is so unfair and heartbreaking that my innocent daughters were killed. They were aged only twelve, ten, eight, and six.”<sup>202)</sup>

Contrary to expectations, the operation made residents escape to the mountains, thus causing a large number of victims and prolonging the situation in Jeju, which would bring shame to Prime Minister Lee, who said there were from 50 to 60 armed rioters. An American advisor pointed out the fact that the indiscriminate shootings made residents join the armed resistance group:

- (1) Liaison planes dropping propaganda leaflets, hand grenades and mortar shells rather indiscriminately.
- (2) The superiority attitude of the KA soldier and local police to the native populace is believed to be unnecessarily harassing and driving peaceful citizens to rebel activities.
- (3) KMAG personnel are believed to be unnecessarily subjected to hazards due to meager numbers, lack of communications, dependence entirely on KA soldiers for guard, inferior facilities and continually stirred-up local villages

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200) *National Assembly Stenographic Records*, the 1<sup>st</sup> National Assembly, No. 124, December 8, 1948.

201) Lee Gi-bong (former Sergeant of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment), Testimony quoted in *Collection of Veterans’ Testimonies* which is kept by the Institute for Military History Compilation of the Ministry of National Defense.

202) Boo Seong-bang (age 86, Jocheon-ri), Testimony recorded on December 12, 2002.

through executions apparently without trial, and encroachment on civilians' rights by soldiers not believed to be too well controlled or disciplined.<sup>203)</sup>

The punitive forces considered people hiding in mountainous areas after the Evacuation Order as the enemy and shot the people to death as soon as they found them. Faces of people who defected after a long and hard life of escaping show how reckless the strong repression operation was.

Around the middle of December in 1948, many people were victimized as the original plan for repression operation changed. The original plan for the operation which was to cut links between residents in mountain villages and armed rebels by evacuating the residents to seaside villages, thus destroying the armed rebels, turned into making military achievements. A US Army report on December 17, 1948 stated: "The recent actions of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment against the raiders has been successful," and pointed out, "This can be attributed to the desire to set a high standard of operations and a good record of achievements for its successor, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment, to attempt to equal."<sup>204)</sup>

The 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment was then scheduled to be replaced with the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment in Daejeon that contributed to the suppression of the Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion as of end of December, 1948. That is why the US Army pointed out that the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment's desire to gain great achievements comparable with the suppression of the Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion led to the successful repression. In fact, the military achievements of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment around the middle of December, 1948 show that the regiment was busy increasing the death toll. Typical examples are Substitute for Execution, Self-Denunciation Incident, Trap Suppression, and shootings of men and women of all ages hiding in mountain areas.

First, under the name of Substitute for Execution, the punitive forces gathered people evacuated from mountain villages and the residents in the seaside village and shot people whose family members—young men—disappeared,

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203) Report of Ordnance Advisor's Trip to 2<sup>nd</sup> Regt-Cheju," February 10, 1949, RG 338: *Records of US Army Commands*, Entry: Provisional Military Advisory Group (1948-1949) and Korean Military Advisory Group (1949-1953), Box 13.

204) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1015, December 17, 1948.

calling them families of evaders. The incident is also called the Sightseeing Execution because the residents were gathered to see the execution. There was a 73-year-old lady among the victims.<sup>205)</sup>

In the Self-Surrender Incident, the punitive forces shot people who confessed their past crimes. The forces gathered residents and threatened, “Those who had ever committed a crime in the past, surrender yourselves. If you surrender now, we will spare your lives, but if you are discovered later, you won’t be able to avoid execution. We already have a list of the people concerned.” The fact that the forces told the residents to surrender themselves actually proved that they didn’t have the list of the people concerned, but many residents who were frightened surrendered themselves. The residents confessed that they worked at the Committee for Preparation of Korean Independence and the People’s Committee after liberation, protested against Police Officers’ Shootings in Independence Movement Day in 1947, and participated in protests and supplied food at request of armed rebels who had seized hegemony of the village. Contrary to the promise, however, the repression forces executed the people who surrendered themselves by firing squad. The Bakseongnae Stream Incident is a typical case of the Self-Surrender Incident. Two hundred (200) people who surrendered themselves in the jurisdiction of Jocheon-myeon were deceived into going there on December 21, 1948. One hundred and fifty (150) of them who followed the repression forces were killed as a group near Bakseongnae Stream in Jeju-eup.<sup>206)</sup>

Trap Suppression was the most reckless repression operation of the punitive forces that were intent on gaining military achievements. Soldiers of punitive forces dressed like armed rebels and visited private houses to ask for cooperation. People who agreed to the request, they shot to death. People experiencing the incidents said with one voice, “We were afraid of bears as well as tigers.” This means they were afraid of punitive forces as well as armed rebels. By day, the punitive forces seized control of villages and shot residents to death, calling them rioters; by night, the armed rebels purged

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205) The 4 • 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *ibid.*, Vol. 5, pp.321-322.

206) The 4 • 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *ibid.*, Vol. 4, pp.405-408.

residents, calling them reactionary elements. Knowing that the residents could not refuse the armed rebels' demand, the punitive forces continued to set traps to find people who volunteered for the armed resistance group.

Trap Suppression was carried out all over the island. The massacre of residents of Dopyeong-ri, Jeju-eup was a typical example of the Trap Suppression. In the early morning on January 3, 1949, a group of people with guns who were dressed in shabby Galjungui pants<sup>207)</sup> stormed into Dopyeong-ri, Jeju-eup. They extended their hands for a handshake to the residents on the street, saying, "Hey, Comrade." Some of them were holding the North Korean flag. They stormed into houses, asked residents, "Why didn't you cooperate with people in the mountain?" and gathered them in a school ground. It turned out that the group of people, who were wearing Galjungui pants and holding the North Korean flag, were not armed rebels but police officers of the Oedo Police Box and Commando Unit.

Some of the residents figured out that there were people they knew in the group and tried hard not to fall into the trap. Yang Gyeong-ha (22) said, "If they are the Reds, I will fight them." Kim Byeong-hae (58), who was one of community leaders, swore at Kim Yeong-cheol, the manager of Oedo Police Box, crying out, "Hurray for the Republic of Korea!" Seventy (70) residents including these people were shot to death after all. A witness testified, "Mr. Kim Seong-gyu, who was over 60, was pointed out in the school ground and killed with his wife, son, daughter-in-law and grandchildren."<sup>208)</sup>

The repression forces discovered people who had escaped from the indiscriminate repression operation, hiding in caves and forests and killed them regardless of their age or gender. As mentioned in the statement of President Rhee Syng-man, most of the victims had gone up to a mountain because they were deceived by flyers of communists, or they lost their houses due to arson attacks. The victims were people who went down from the mountains with children after the situation eased.<sup>209)</sup> Some people who got through winter in

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207) Pants dyed with persimmon, Jeju's traditional work clothes.

208) Kim Se-won (Son of Kim Byeong-hae), Testimony as quoted in the 4·3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, The 445<sup>th</sup> Article of *The 4·3 Incident Speaks*, May 21, 1999.

the mountains, hiding here and there barely survived and came down to the villages after the situation eased, but some people were killed as soon as they were found during the strong repression operation.

In 1992, remains of 11 people were discovered in Darangshigul Cave located in the mountainous area of Gujwa-eup, which proves the indiscriminate operation during the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident period. The 11 people turned out to be people who were killed by an operation of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment on December 18, 1948. In addition, the victims were residents of Jongdal-ri and Hado-ri, Gujwa-eup. The shocking fact is that there were three women and a 9-year-old child among the victims. In the cave, there were household items such as plastic glasses, white buttons, belts, buckles, cloth, rubber shoes, pottery, brassware, brass spoons and chopsticks, an iron pot, pots, water jars, saucers used in ancestral rites, a water bottle, a frying pan, scissors, a Korean chamber pot, a roll of steel wire, a grill, a brazier, a basket, a kettle and wooden rice paddle, and tools such as a sickle, an ax, a saw, a cleaver, an adz, a pickax and a whetstone. In addition, next to the remains of one person, which were a little bit away from those of other ten people, there was a helmet, military boots, an iron spear and a sword that seemed like the person's property.<sup>210)</sup>

The intelligence report of the US Army recorded, "In their final military operations on Jeju-Do the departing 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, aided by civilians and police, on December 18<sup>th</sup> killed 130 men and captured 50, taking 1 rifle, 40 swords and 32 spears."<sup>211)</sup> For a week from December 21 to 28, which was the last time for withdrawal of the remained forces of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, as many as 463 people were shot to death.<sup>212)</sup> The imbalance between the number of dead people and that of captured arms shows how indiscriminate the operation was.

The US Army's report recorded as follows, stating that the operation of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment was launched on the premise that residents of mountain villages

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209) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, April 13, 1949.

210) The 4 · 3 News Team of *Jemin Ilbo*, *ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp.416-439.

211) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1021, December 24, 1948.

212) *Ibid.*

had cooperated with armed rebels:

The 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment was withdrawn and was replaced by the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, which promptly substituted an indiscriminate reign of terror for the do-nothing policies of the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment.

The 9<sup>th</sup> waged reasonably successful warfare against the rebels, but, simultaneously to stamp out all resistance, it adopted a program of mass slaughter among civilians in the hill villages avowedly on the premise that the people all were furnishing aid and comfort to guerrilla troops. During its period of occupation until December 1948, most of the casualties among islanders occurred. The plan on the surface appeared to be profitable, and during the last 2 months of 1948 there was a period of relatively little rebel activity on Jeju, but actually the indiscriminate tactics of the organization developed new rebel converts. In December when the 9<sup>th</sup> was replaced by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment a new wave of guerrilla terrorism was launched.<sup>213)</sup>

Rebels were rarely active during the strong repression operation according to the above report, but the program of mass slaughter was carried out all over the island as planned. As pointed out earlier, the program resulted in unconvincing military achievements: a number of enemies were killed, with no casualties among South Korean soldiers. In addition, the indiscriminate operation ended up encouraging residents to join the armed resistance group.

In the meantime, villages such as Sehwa-ri in Gujwa-myeon, Seongeup-ri in Pyoseon-myeon, and Namwon-ri and Wimi-ri in Namwon-myeon were badly damaged by the armed rebels. The armed rebels had killed members of right-wing organizations such as the police, Seobuk Young Men's Association and Daedong Youth Corps, rightists who cooperated with the military and the police, and family members of the rightists, but after November, 1948 when the repression forces launched strong operations, the armed rebels identified some villages that were considered cooperative not to them but to the repression forces, and killed the residents indiscriminately. This was because those villages were posts for the military and the police and the rebels wanted to retaliate against the repression forces for killing evaders' families.

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213) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1097, April 1, 1949.

## D. The Replacement of Repression Forces

### 1) The Meaning of the Replacement of Regiment

On December 29, 1948 the force stationed in Jeju was changed, from the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment (Regimental Commander Ham Byeong-seon) which had been stationed in Daejeon.<sup>214)</sup>

Unlike the previous replacements, there are doubts about the replacement of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment. In case of the replacement on May 15, 1948, the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment was attached to the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment because the authorities reinforced the forces to reorganize battle formation after the Commander of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment was changed due to his not being active in repression operation. When it comes to the reorganization of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment on July 15, 1948 and withdrawal of the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment, it is analyzed that the authorities intended to overcome the aftermath of the assassination of the 11<sup>th</sup> Regimental Commander Park Jin-gyeong that had happened a month earlier.

If so, why was the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment withdrawn as of December 1948 and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment given the responsibility of operations for repressing the uprising in Jeju? In case of the two previous replacements, instead of moving the entire forces, a part of the forces was moved as the Regimental Commander was replaced, while soldiers of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment who were from Jeju remained. The replacement of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment, however, was to move the entire forces, which raises doubts about the background. Moreover, the US Army evaluated the strong repression operation of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment as a successful one, as the operation weakened the activities of armed rebels. Soon after the replacement of regiment, Martial Law was lifted, as of December 31, 1948. It is doubtful why the regiments were replaced at that point, unless the authorities intended to provide the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment with combat experience.

The doubt can be resolved when considering the attitude of President Rhee Syng-man, who, on January 21, 1949, ordered the eradication of rioters in Jeju

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214) Department of Publishing Military History at Army Headquarters, *Daily Record of the Army*, Vol. 2, December 29, 1948.

by using harsh means in order to receive aid from the United States. Lee Eung-jun, who worked as the first Army Chief of Staff, wrote in his autobiography about what an impetuous person the president was:

As the suppression of red guerrillas took a long time, President Rhee once pushed me to report that the red guerrillas were gone, instead of reporting about the details of suppression operation.<sup>215)</sup>

It seems that the replacement of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment was already planned around the time when President Rhee declared Martial Law on November 17, 1948 to immediately settle the Jeju situation. This is because the authorities could not trust the soldiers stationed in Jeju, who deserted from the army several times and even assassinated the Regimental Commander. In addition, the executives of the repression operation believed that some soldiers, including soldiers from Jeju were communists. After 41 members of the Korean Constabulary deserted from the army on May 21, 1948, a report of the US Army recorded as follows:

This regiment is considered by some observers to be unreliable in that many of its members seem to have sympathy for the raiders in the hills. Though from a short-range view its removal may seem desirable, a long-range view is that whatever Communists there are in the regiment will probably identify themselves by deserting, and the personnel remaining can be considered dependable in the future.<sup>216)</sup>

President Rhee Syng-man first appointed Seobuk (meaning ‘Northwest’) Young Men’s Association as reliable punitive forces. The US Army also established a concrete plan about sending the association members to the military forces around November 1948 when the strong repression operation began. The plan was to recruit up to full strength all 3 Battalions, mainly from NW Youth.<sup>217)</sup> The association members were thus sent to the forces stationed

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215) Lee Eungjun, *Retrospect over the 90 Years*, San Un Memorial Association, 1982, p.270.

216) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Summary*, No. 141, May 28, 1948.

217) “Weekly Activities of PMAG,” November 15, 1948, RG 338: *Record of U.S. Army*

in Jeju and the police from the middle of December. The assistance furnished the police and constabulary by the NWYMA on Jeju-Do has been commended by several American officers.<sup>218)</sup> The US Army recognized Seobuk Young Men's Association as follows:

The Northwest Young Men's Association (frequently referred to as the Seobuks) is composed of refugees from North Korea. It is noted for its violent anticommunism, which it demonstrates whenever a communist is to be found. It has long operated with the police and constabulary in the active defense of installations and in the collection of information.<sup>219)</sup>

The US Army and the repression authorities believed that the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment would also play a leading role in repressing the uprising in Jeju because the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment stationed in Daejeon had combat experience during the Yeosu-Suncheon Incident.

Although the replacement of regiments was completed on December 29, 1948, a plan for the replacement was already set around early December. Lieutenant Colonel H. E. Fuller at PMAG reported on December 6, "Plan to remove 9<sup>th</sup> Regt now on Jeju do to mainland, replacing with 2<sup>nd</sup> Regt."<sup>220)</sup> According to the schedule, the advance party of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment closed Jeju-do at December 16,<sup>221)</sup> and the advance group of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment closed at December 19.<sup>222)</sup> In addition, all possible precautionary measures were taken prior to this units' movement to prevent a similar mutiny which had been led by the Yeosu 14<sup>th</sup> Regiment on October 19<sup>th</sup> 1948 which had been

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*Commands*, Entry: Provisional Military Advisory Group (1948-1949) and Koran Military Advisory Group (1949-1953), Box 4.

218) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 951, October 1, 1948.

219) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1005, December 6, 1948.

220) "Weekly Activities of PMAG," December 6, 1948, RG 338: *Record of U.S. Army Commands*, Entry: Provisional Military Advisory Group (1948-1949) and Koran Military Advisory Group (1949-1953), Box 4.

221) Charles L. Wesolowsky, Advisor 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, Korean Constabulary, Cheju-Do, *Daily Report*, December 17, 1948; Lee Yun, *Field Diary 2*, p.3. Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1017, records as December 17, 1948.

222) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1017, December 20, 1948.

scheduled to be dispatched to Jeju.<sup>223)</sup> With regard to this matter, the US Army's report recorded, "All communistic elements were purged from the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment before it departed from Daejeon."<sup>224)</sup>

The 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment stationed in Jeju was replaced by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment and members of Seobuk Young Men's Association, the extreme anti-communists, were sent to the punitive forces. These were measures to end the situation in Jeju as soon as possible through stronger operation than that of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, consistent with the President Rhee's order to suppress rioters harshly.

Meanwhile, the plan for replacement of the regiments stimulated emulation of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, which was slated to be withdrawn, accelerating reckless repression operations. It is fair to say that the emulation of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment was boosted by the plan, resulting in successful operations, rather than the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment that carried out successful operations which was withdrawn. The 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, in fact, launched the severest repression operations from the middle of December when its advance group started to move to Daejeon to the end of December.

During the operation the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment gathered the innocent residents of seaside villages and shot people whose young family members had disappeared. In addition, the regiment told people that it would save the lives of those who confessed to participating in protests in the past, but the regiment killed the people who surrendered themselves as a group. These were reckless operations for just gaining military achievements.

## 2) Strengthening Fighting Power

Lieutenant Colonel Ham Byeong-seon, the Commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment, had served as a warrant officer of volunteer forces during the Japanese colonial rule. He was appointed as a repression commander in Jeju-do district followed by the 11<sup>th</sup> Regimental Commander Choi Gyeong-rok and the 9<sup>th</sup> Regimental Commander Song Yo-chan who were also warrant officers of the

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223) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1015, December 17, 1948.

224) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1097, April 1, 1949.

Japanese army.<sup>225)</sup> It seems that they assumed control of repression operations in Jeju in recognition of combat experiences in fighting against the Chinese Army and anti-Japanese North Korean partisans. Ham Byeong-seon was sent to Jeju less than a month after he was appointed as the Commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment as of December 7, 1948.<sup>226)</sup>

The top executives of the military strengthened the fighting power of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment to help Commander Ham to carry out the strong operations. First, the top executives dispatched members of Seobuk Young Men's Association to the military and the police. Second, the Seongsanpo Police Box and Moseolpo Police Box were newly established to strengthen the organization of the police. Third, aircrafts of the army aviation command and Commando Squadron affiliated with the 6<sup>th</sup> Brigade were sent to Jeju to be commanded by the Commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment. In addition, the Army Headquarters separated the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment from the existing 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade as of January 20, 1949 to form it as a unit under the direct control of the Army Headquarters.<sup>227)</sup>

A plan for assigning members of Seobuk Young Men's Association to the military and the police was carried out secretly from the end of November 1948. President Rhee Syng-man and Minister of Home Affairs agreed to furnish approximately 6,500 men for the Korean Army and approximately 1,700 men for the National Police force.<sup>228)</sup> The 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion among three battalions of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment consisted mostly of the members of Seobuk Young Men's Association.<sup>229)</sup> Members of the association who were sent to Jeju on December 20, 1948 undertook a mission of the elite company.

On December 20, 200 Northwest Young Men's Association (NWYMA) members were secretly inducted into the Constabulary at Daejeon. Assigned to

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225) Sasaki Harutaka, *Secret History of the Korean War: the founding of a nation and its ordeal*, translated by Kang Chang-gu, (Byeonghaksa, 1997), p.283.

226) Department of Publishing Military History at Army Headquarters, *Daily Report on the Army*, Vol. 2, December 7, 1948.

227) Department of Publishing Military History at Army Headquarters, *Daily Report on the Army*, Vol. 3, January 20, 1949.

228) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1005, December 6, 1948.

229) *Army Headquarters Operation Order Sending*, No. 81, May 5, 1949.

the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, newly arrived from duty on Jeju-do, the men were immediately issued uniforms. Their induction was secretly planned between leaders of the NWYMA and the commanding officer of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade.

<Comment> The secret induction of these 200 men indicates that plans by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade to form an “elite company” from members of the NWYMA are being completed.<sup>230)</sup>

The mission of the elite company was “to hunt down dissenters from the 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade and to be utilized as spearhead if North Korea invades the South in order to assign the members of Seobuk Young Men’s Association as military officers and to accept special consideration regarding supply and equipment.”<sup>231)</sup> The elite company was sent not only to strengthen the military power but also to work as the military police for hunting down dissenters in the army. The association members, therefore, wielded absolute power in Jeju.

According to one of the elite company, however, the company was formed while the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment was stationed in Jeju, having enormous power so that the military police could not interfere with them. The soldiers of the elite company worked without military insignia while the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment was stationed, but they were assigned to regular forces while the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment was stationed.<sup>232)</sup>

Members of Seobuk Young Men’s Association were assigned to the police besides the military. In order to attract the members to the police, President Rhee Syng-man actively enticed them by giving the rank of police sergeant to those who brought 20 members, police lieutenant rank to those who brought 50 members, and police inspector rank to those who brought 200 members. When Jeong Yong-cheol, who was a middle-ranking member of Seobuk Young Men’s Association, worked as a manager of Samyang Police Box, he was employed specially as a police lieutenant for bringing members of Seobuk Young Men’s Association.<sup>233)</sup> The members had undergone a 12-day training

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230) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1023, December 28, 1948.

231) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1018, December 21, 1948.

232) Roh Yun-bok (former special member of the Seobuk Young Men’s Association), Testimony recorded on March 28, 2002.

233) Kim Si-hun (former police officer, former member of the Seobuk Young Men’s Association),

period under supervision of the SEOUL Metropolitan Police. After the completion of the training these members were placed on regular status and assigned to Jeju in early December 1948.<sup>234)</sup> The president sent members of Seobuk Young Men's Association to the Jeju police and passed a bill to establish more police stations in Jeju at the Cabinet meeting at the same time.<sup>235)</sup> As a result, two more police stations were added to the existing two stations. On January 18, 1949 the Presidential Decree No.50 to establish Moseolpo Police Station and Seongsanpo Police Station was issued and took effect on the day of the issue.

Moseolpo Police Station, located in Daejeong-myeon, Nam-Jeju-gun, had jurisdiction over Daejeong-myeon and Andeok-myeon in Nam-Jeju-gun and Hallim-myeon in Buk-Jeju-gun. Seongsanpo Police Station, located in Seongsan-myeon, Namjeju-gun, had jurisdiction over Seongsan-myeon and Pyoseon-myeon in Nam-Jeju-gun and Gujwa-myeon in Buk-Jeju-gun. Those two police stations assumed jurisdictions of the existing Jeju Police Station and Seogwipo Police Station.<sup>236)</sup> On February 19, 505 police officers of the Police Special Forces (Commander: Police Commissioner Kim Tae-il) were dispatched to Jeju to strengthen the police power.<sup>237)</sup>

The US Army also participated in the repression operation. It is uncertain how much the US Army took part in the operation, but the following statement of President Rhee shows a little bit on their part.

Presidential Message about the administration: It is said that the US Navy that called at Jeju achieved excellent results in suppressing the armed revolt. To keep face with the US endeavor, here I dispatch one military battalion and 1,000 policemen to Jeju. I hope they will completely suppress the revolt on the island. In addition, since there are many people calling for lifting Martial Law on Yeosu-Suncheon district, I would like the cabinet to consider it.<sup>238)</sup>

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Testimony recorded on February 26, 2002.

234) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1011, December 13, 1948.

235) *6<sup>th</sup> Minutes of the Cabinet Council*, January 11, 1949.

236) *Official Gazette* No. 32, January 18, 1949.

237) *Jayu Shinmun*, May 19, 1949.

238) *14<sup>th</sup> Minutes of the Cabinet Council*, January 28, 1949.

The Army Headquarters sent two airplanes of the army aviation command by January 24, 1949 to help the repression operation.<sup>239)</sup> The headquarters also dispatched a Guerrilla Battalion, the 6<sup>th</sup> Brigade, to Jeju on January 31, 1949 to carry out the repression operation under command of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regimental Commander.<sup>240)</sup>

### 3) A Continued Massacre

The original goal of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment was to “carry out the encircling operation to annihilate the enemy beyond the lukewarm and passive operations of the past.”<sup>241)</sup> The regiment claimed to launch the operation through three stages. Prime Minister Lee Beom-seok explained the three stages of operation as follows:

The military operation in Jeju was carried out through three stages. In the first stage, forces were deployed in each region to be familiar with the layout of the land, while separating armed rioters in the village. The second stage was to gather the forces to launch mop-up operations in the villages. In the third stage, the forces started to besiege and chase the armed rioters who escaped to the top of Mt. Halla since February 25. There have been many battles, and the forces are staying at the top of the mountain to besiege the rioters while securing safety of the rear area.<sup>242)</sup>

A journalist who covered the region reported about the three stages of operation as follows:

The operation was divided into three stages. The first stage, from January 1<sup>st</sup> to 31<sup>st</sup>, was to focus on defending the coastline and settling the public’s sentiments. The second stage, from February 1<sup>st</sup> to end of the month, was to actively carry out “open arms” program for insurgents by spreading flyers to avoid a fratricidal

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239) *Army Headquarters Operation Order Sending*, No. 18, January 22, 1949.

240) Hq. USAFIK, *G-3 Operations Report*, No. 5, February 5, 1949.

241) *Gukdo Shinmun*, April 21, 1949.

242) *National Assembly Stenographic Records*, the 2<sup>nd</sup> National Assembly, No. 56, March 17, 1949.

war, thus relieving anxiety of civilians. The peace mission consisted of defectors that were sent to Mt. Halla for 20 days to encourage the insurgents' defection, but the mission was missing. The South Korean army that has undertaken a conciliatory operation, therefore, decided to launch an armed mop-up operation, which is the third stage of the operation from March 1<sup>st</sup> to 31<sup>st</sup>.<sup>243)</sup>

According to the two materials above, even though there are some differences in dates, the first stage was the so-called "open arms" program, the second stage was delinking armed rebels from civilians, and the third stage was a mop-up operation in mountain villages.

The reason the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment, which was sent for an immediate settlement of the situation in Jeju, claimed to carry out an "open arms" program for the first month rather than a strong repression operation seems that they had to make themselves familiar with the geographic features of Jeju and to gain time for figuring out the actual circumstances of the region as Lee Beom-seok said. It seems that the 2<sup>nd</sup> regiment judged the situation was almost settled by the strong repression operation of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment before replacement.

The advance group of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment arrived in Jeju on December 17, 1948, and the entire regiment started operations in the Jeju-do district on December 29, 1948. While the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment moved to Jeju, the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment carried out the severest repression operation. During that time unarmed civilians were shot to death as a group by the military force and armed rebels hid in the mountains. According to the military force, 105 rebels were killed but the South Korean Army had no casualties.<sup>244)</sup> Major Lee Chang-jeong, the director of the press of Ministry of National Defense, said at the press conference on December 30, 1948, "As the repression has settled the uprising for the time being, Martial Law will be lifted in a few days,"<sup>245)</sup> praising the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment that completed operations in Jeju. Chief of the General Staff Chae Byeong-deok once said, "Martial Law that has been implemented since November 17 will be lifted as of the end of this year because the uprising

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243) *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, June 29, 1949.

244) *Daedong Shinmun*, December 17, 1948.

245) *Gukje Shinmun*, December 31, 1948.

in Jeju has been settled day by day.”<sup>246)</sup>

The armed resistance had already lost power before the replacement of regiment, so the top executives of the military could announce that the repression has settled the uprising for the time being and that the uprising in Jeju has been settled day by day. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment, therefore, decided to carry out an “open arms” program in order to figure out the actual circumstance before carrying out the encircling operation to annihilate the enemy.

The regiment’s plan had to be revised due to an attack by the armed rebels that had watched for a chance while the regiments were replaced, and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment also launched strong repression operations as the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment did. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment, however, did not reach the mountains where the armed rebels were, but went to seaside villages to carry out revenge attacks on the residents. The regiment carried out large-scale executions without holding any trials. The US Army’s report recorded about the operation of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment as follows:

The 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment, commanded by Colonel Ham Byeong-seon, initially took up billets in coastal towns and villages, and its commander established a program of propaganda intended to enlighten the island people and to woo rebels down from the hills. Lack of aggressive action against armed rebels in their mountain hide-outs made a farce of the program, and the encouraged guerrillas foraged far afield to strike coastal villages under the noses of protecting troops. The 2<sup>nd</sup> then became somewhat more aggressive, but its activities were largely confined to counter-measures against the people of coastal villages who were charged with aiding rebel forces in their activities and often were summarily executed in large numbers without the benefit of a trial.<sup>247)</sup>

The armed rebels resumed attacks starting with a surprise attack on the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion stationed in Odeung-ri, Jeju-eup on January 1, 1949. The US PMAG reported, “Raiders promptly attacked 2<sup>nd</sup> Regt at 3 towns on Jan 1, by a total of 600. 30 Rebels were killed, 10 prisoners taken; no Constabulary killed.”<sup>248)</sup>

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246) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, January 1, 1949.

247) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1097, April 1, 1949.

248) “Weekly Activities of PMAG,” January 4, 1948. RG 338: *Records of US Army Commands*,

According to the sources of the military, however, seven soldiers of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion were killed.<sup>249)</sup> According to a list of those killed in battle that is included in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment's album, ten soldiers including First Lieutenant Ko Byeong-seon, who was specially promoted to Captain after being killed in the battle, were killed during the attack.<sup>250)</sup> Ko Byeong-seon had the highest rank among three dead company grade officers while the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment was stationed in Jeju. Due to this incident that killed a company grade officer, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment had to revise the entire plan for repression.

A fire of unknown origin broke out at the Jeju Provincial Government building located in the center of Jeju-eup on January 3, disturbing the repression authorities.<sup>251)</sup> This incident turned out to be caused by an insider who started a fire because of disillusionment,<sup>252)</sup> but the police, seemingly afraid of being blamed, denied the incident itself, saying they did not receive any report until January 5.<sup>253)</sup> This incident was mentioned at the Cabinet meeting. The Minister of Home Affairs reported, "There is a strong likelihood that an impure element started a fire."<sup>254)</sup> The US Army reported, "Sabotage was suspected in the fire, which was confined to 1 building."<sup>255)</sup> Even though those reports later turned out to be wrong, the reports played a role in accelerating strong repression operations because the authorities believed shortly after the incident that the fire was the work of the armed rebels.

The 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment, therefore, created an atmosphere for strong operation. It claimed, "Two ships of the 3,000-ton class with Soviet markings were observed approximately 5 miles off Samyang-ri, Jeju-Do by the Korean Coast Guard

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Entry: Provisional Military Advisory Group (1948-1949) and Korean Military Advisory Group (1949-1953), Box 4.

249) The Institute for Military History Compilation of the Ministry of National Defense, *History of the Korean War*, Vol. 1, 1967, p.445.

250) The 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment, *Records during Being Stationed in Jeju*, August 1949. When comparing a list of those killed in battle in this album and tombstones in cemetery for the loyal dead located in Jeju, some of dates and names are different.

251) *Chosun Ilbo*, January 6, 1949.

252) Kang Yong-sam, Lee Gyeong-su, *Annals of Jeju*, Taegwang-Munhwasa, 1984, pp.654-656.

253) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, January 6, 1949.

254) *Minutes of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Cabinet Council*, January 5, 1949.

255) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1030, January 6, 1949.

at January 3. The ships sighted were vessels with supplies from North Korea intended for raider forces on Jeju-Do.”<sup>256)</sup>

The rumor of the Soviet vessels had been often spread by the Korean Constabulary before launching a strong operation, and the US Army commented, “Such opinions had been suggested earlier by the security forces, but they are uncertain.” The following report shows how Commander Ham Byeong-seon was flustered when armed rebels made attacks just after he was stationed in Jeju:

The commanding officer of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment stationed on Jeju-Do, radioed Constabulary Headquarters on January 4 requesting the continuance of martial law on the island. He pointed out that his operations would be handicapped both in dealing with guerrillas and in thwarting suspected supply operations of North Korean vessels should the curfews and movement restrictions of martial law be discontinued. Two attacks by raider forces on January 1 may have prompted the request. One force, estimated to number 100, attacked a company of his regiment stationed at Ora-ri.<sup>257)</sup> Twenty of the raiders were killed, but 27 men in the Constabulary company suffered wounds. On the same day the small village of Dodu-ri in the same area was raided. Ten of the inhabitants were killed; several were wounded; 26 homes were burned and a large amount of food and clothing was plundered. (Constabulary Report)<sup>258)</sup>

A military booklet that seems to be written based on testimonies of soldiers such as Commander Ham Byeong-seon recorded about the operation: “Joint operations of the army, navy and air forces were carried out on January 4. Before the operations, flyers were spread in Mt. Halla to encourage people to defect, which was an ultimatum. Naval ships fired a warning shot with 37mm artillery, and Type L-4 and Type L-5 liaison aircraft of the Air Force dropped domestic hand grenades and bombs. Each battalion searched the whole area of Jeju-eup and Mt. Halla, but they failed to find a base of rioters.”<sup>259)</sup>

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256) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1029, January 5, 1949.

257) It seems that the US Army confused ‘Odeung-ri’ with ‘Ora-ri.’

258) Ibid.

259) The Institute for Military History Compilation of the Ministry of National Defense, *ibid.*, p.445.

However, neither media coverage nor the US Army's materials carried any record of the operation on January 4. Maybe it is because there was no gunfight with the armed rebels on that day. They probably confused this operation with another joint operation of the army, navy and air forces on February 4.<sup>260)</sup> It seems that the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment started a strong repression operation on January 6:

The 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment of the South Korean Army that has kept its silence since it arrived at Jeju on December 28 started action as of 3 a.m. on January 6 and defeated the main forces of the enemy throughout the island. One troop of the South Korean Army arrived in Myeongdeok-ri,<sup>261)</sup> located about 8km away from Jeju-eup, at 6:30 a.m. on 6<sup>th</sup> and found the main force of the enemy consisting of about 70 armed guerrillas with guns and about 250 armed rioters with iron and bamboo spears was in hiding. Commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment took direct control of the operation to annihilate the enemy by overcoming topographically unfavorable conditions. When the enemy was completely encircled, the Commander penetrated single-handed into the enemy's territory and pretended to be a rioter cleverly. The Commander said a code of rioters to other rioter, but it did not work. He had a narrow escape from the territory and launched an encircling operation to annihilate the enemy with great force. After a four hour long fierce battle the enemy was completely wiped out, and the South Korean Army achieved brilliant military gains as follows: 153 abandoned corpses of the enemy, one M1 rifle, 500 bullets, many Japanese swords and bamboo spears, clothes, and propaganda flyers were captured; Three South Korean soldiers were killed and five were injured in battle. [Article censored by the army in the region]<sup>262)</sup>

The military succeeded in capturing 153 abandoned corpses of the enemy, one M1 rifle, 500 bullets, many Japanese swords and bamboo spears, clothes, and propaganda flyers, and the military damage of three dead soldiers and five injured soldiers show how fierce the battle was. The album of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment recorded a list of seven soldiers who were killed in battle on January 6.<sup>263)</sup>

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260) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, February 9, 1949.

261) There is no name of a place like Myeongdeok-ri in Jeju.

262) *Dokrip Shinmun*, January 12, 1949.

263) The 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment, *Records during Being Stationed in Jeju*, August 1949.

The 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment's operation started with a battle on January 6. The armed rebels were also on their guard while the regiment was not familiar with the place. The all-out war thus resumed in January, 1949, but the armed rebels' Type 99 Arisaka Rifles were no match for the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment's firepower. The 'Uigwi-ri Battle' on January, 1949, in particular, resulted in weakening the power of the armed rebels:

An estimated force of 200 raiders attacked the 2<sup>nd</sup> Company of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment at IKUI-Ri (Uigwi-ri), CHEJU-Do, at 6:30, January 12 and suffered a sound defeat. When the raiders withdrew after a 2-hour fight they had lost 51 men as opposed to 2 killed and 10 wounded for the KA unit. Arms taken from the rebels included 4 M-1 rifles, 10 Model 99 rifles and 3 carbines.<sup>264)</sup>

It turned out that two more soldiers were killed in the battle. Upon investigation at a cemetery for the loyal dead located in Namwon-eup, four soldiers including Sergeant Major Moon Seok-chun, Master Sergeant Lee Beom-pal, Sergeant First Class Ahn Seong-hyeok and Lim Chan-su were sacrificed in that battle. Even though the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment was shocked to lose four members, the battle struck a fatal blow to the armed rebels.

Considering a variety of circumstances, almost every armed rebel was mobilized for the attack. This means the armed rebels did everything in their power, so it seems that the rebels' power was rapidly weakened after being defeated in the battle and losing 51 people. After this battle, the armed rebels attacked a village to assault police officers and kill residents in January, but there are no records that the rebels directly attacked the military. The US Army's report of early February, 1949 recorded, "Delayed reports from Jeju Do, which have not been summarized previously, show that rebels are still active but not on as large scale as in the past."<sup>265)</sup>

Meanwhile, the armed rebels' attacks brought out a vicious circle because it led to retaliatory shootings of repression forces against civilians. When

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264) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1037, January 14, 1949.

265) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1055, February 4, 1949.

Uigwi-ri Battle occurred, 80 residents were captured while wandering in the mountainous area and sent to Uigwi Elementary School which was the army post. Soon after the battle, soldiers of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment shot all of the residents to death in the back yard of the school. Corpses of the 80 residents were later buried together by other residents of the village, and a tombstone called Hyeonuihapjangmyo was erected near the burial ground located in Uigwi-ri.<sup>266)</sup>

On January 17 the so-called Bukchon Incident, which is the most tragic incident in Bukchon-ri, Jocheon-myeon, occurred. Some troops of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment's 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion stationed in Sehwa were attacked by armed rebels at an uphill path around the entrance of Bukchon village on the way to Hamdeok where the headquarters of the battalion was located, and two soldiers were killed. Then furious soldiers set fire to Bukchon-ri, shooting 300 residents to death as a group. The soldiers also shot 100 residents who had been evacuated to Hamdeok-ri. Kim Byeong-seok, who was a police officer and a driver of battalion commander's car, gave a shocking testimony about the incident, "The soldiers killed the residents because there was nowhere to accommodate them after setting fire to all the houses. The soldiers used guns instead of mortars in order to experience shooting people to death."<sup>267)</sup>

Around January in 1949, every seaside village in Jeju was surrounded by a wall. It seems building the wall started from December, 1948, and a news story explained, "Men and women of all ages actively participated in building the 120,000 meter-long wall which is reminiscent of the Great Wall of China, and the wall was completed in a short time, helping purge the inside of villages and defending against rioters' attack."<sup>268)</sup> Jeju people had to go through troubles by being mobilized in the massive construction work of the wall. As young men had fled, women, the elderly and children were forced into hard labor.

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266) The 4 • 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4 • 3 Incident Speaks*, Vol. 5, Jeonyewon, 1998, pp.141-142.

267) Kim Byeong-seok (a former police officer), Testimony recorded on February 1, 2002.

268) *Jayu Shinmun*, March 22, 1949.

After building the wall surrounding all seaside villages and having the residents stand watch, the armed rebels were more isolated, thus residents who evacuated to seaside villages were no longer suspected of supporting the rebels. Shooting evaders' families continued, however. Residents remaining in mountain villages were killed. Some mountain villagers, who lost their houses due to the arson attack of the military and the police in November and December, 1948 when the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment was stationed, evacuated to seaside villages, while some of the villagers got through winter hiding in caves and forests near their village. Many of them, however, were found during the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment's repression operation in mountainous areas and shot to death.

On January 25, 1949, American advisers of the 2<sup>nd</sup> KA Regiment saw 97 bodies, men women and children. Each had been shot 5 or 6 times. Empty shells and clips at the scene indicated that M-1 rifles had been used, but both police and KA denied participation in the incident.<sup>269)</sup>

The PMAG witnessed that 76 people including five women and a middle school boy were killed by the Corps for Protection of People under direction of the military and the police in Dodu-ri, Jeju-eup on February 20<sup>th</sup>. The PMAG reported that four members of KMAG witnessed, by chance, the execution of 38 of the rebels and counted 38 already dead when they arrived.<sup>270)</sup> It is, however, unconvincing that the US Army, that had the authority to direct operations of the South Korean Army, just stood by and witnessed the scene. This shows the US Army cannot avoid the responsibility for the massacre of civilians.

More residents were sacrificed in February, 1949. Residents in Bonggae District, Jeju-eup (Bonggae-ri, Yonggang-ri, Hoecheon-ri) were killed as a group on February 4. The media gave prominent coverage to the military achievements during joint operations of the army, navy and air forces on that day:

Joint operations of the army, navy and air forces were launched under the

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269) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1055, February 4, 1949.

270) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1077, March 3, 1949.

direction of Commander Ham Byeong-seon in Bonggae District, Jeju-eup at 3 a.m. on 4<sup>th</sup>. It is said the forces are fighting a fierce battle with armed rioters. According to reports, brave soldiers of the 7<sup>th</sup> Company of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion arrested leaders of rioters such as Kang Tae-mun, the so-called judge of the People's Army and Park Eung-su, the so-called assassination leader, and the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion arrested Ko Yeong-jun, the Master Segeant of the rebels. The military achievements are confirmed as follows: 360 were killed; 130 were taken prisoners; many goods such as food and clothes were captured. (Censored by Ministry of National Defense)<sup>271)</sup>

If 360 rebels were killed and 130 were taken prisoners, the armed rebels should be considered completely destroyed on that day because the numbers exceed "from 150 to 400"<sup>272)</sup> which was reported by Minister of Home Affairs at the Cabinet meeting in mid-January, 1949. Most of the victims, however, were unarmed civilians, especially the weak and the elderly who were unable to escape quickly. Residents, who had lost their houses due to arson by soldiers and hid in caves and forests near their village during winter, were attacked at dawn by soldiers and killed as a group.

The Bonggae District was completely devastated because all the houses were burned and the residents were killed as a group. When surviving residents reconstructed their village after the situation was settled, Commander Ham renamed the village after his family name. He changed the name of the village to Hammyeong-ri, which is a combination of his family name and given name of Captain Kim Myeong (G-3).<sup>273)</sup> The area was called Hammyeong-ri for a while, but has now regained its original name.

When the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment showed off its military achievements during joint operations of the army, navy and air forces, stating it killed 360 of armed rebels and captured 130 of them, soldiers in other region were attacked by armed rebels while moving arms. The soldiers, who were moving in two trucks loaded with 150 Type 99 Arisaka Rifles, were ambushed by armed rebels near Gimnyeong-ri, Gujwa-myeon. Fifteen soldiers were killed, and the

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271) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, February 9, 1949.

272) *Minutes of the 10<sup>th</sup> Cabinet Council*, January 17, 1949.

273) *Jeju Shinmun*, February 5, 1955.

rebels appropriated the 150 rifles.<sup>274)</sup>

It is not certain when exactly the armed resistance group was destroyed, but it is assumed that they were ruined when the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment started the mop-up operation in mountainous areas in mid-March, considering media coverages. After inspecting Jeju, Prime Minister Lee Beom-seok said to journalists in Seoul, “The military started to search on February 5 from seaside villages, proceeding towards Mt. Hallasan. The police were in charge of villages that were wiped out, and the military carried out a full-scale attack on the main force of rioters in the southwestern area of Mt. Hallasan. The number of armed rioters in Jeju was about 260, and each rioter with a gun was followed by 20 civilian supporters holding bamboo spears. The rioters fled into a valley because of the mop-up operations.”<sup>275)</sup>

A magazine reported the operations resulted in a complete mop-up. According to the magazine, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment obtained information that the main force of armed rebels was hiding in piedmont region of Namwon-myeon bivouacked camped in the region on February 15 and attacked the main force at dawn on 16<sup>th</sup>, killing 160 of the rebels. The magazine added, “The enemy escaped, abandoning more than a half of the armed rebels, so it would be only dozens of people who were not damaged. It is difficult to count the number of corpses including unarmed rebels with iron spears. The regiment gained great achievements, while the rioters were fatally damaged. After the annihilation operation, there were no more attacks of rioters from the mountain.”<sup>276)</sup>

Malfunctioning media was one of the reasons the innocent, unarmed civilians were sacrificed in a conflict between repression forces and armed rebels. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment controlled the media as the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment did. As all reports about the military should be censored by the provost marshal headquarters except for official announcements,<sup>277)</sup> the central government

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274) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1061, February 11, 1949.

275) *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, March 17, 1949.

276) Seo Jae-gwon, *Trip to Jeju Island after the Suppression of the Incident*, the September issue of *Sincheonji* in 1949, pp.176-177.

277) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, January 15, 1949.

had no way to know about the massacre of the innocent people in Jeju. The National Assembly only mentioned about the aftermath of Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion and continuously announced the unilateral position of the government when it came to the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident.

The police caused Jeju people a lot of damage. Considering that the then prosecutor was imprisoned, it is possible to assume how much the people were damaged. Prosecutor Yang Eul served his time as a probationary prosecutor at Seoul District Public Prosecutors' Office and was appointed as a prosecutor at the Jeju District Public Prosecutors' Office as of February 23, 1949.<sup>278)</sup> While preparing to move to Jeju, however, he was arrested and transported to Jeju by police inspectors who came up from the Jeju Police Station on February 28. The police inspectors hauled him in without an arrest warrant issued by a judge – just like kidnapping. As the incumbent prosecutor was arrested without prior approval of the Justice Minister, this incident caused a stir in the legal profession.

Public Prosecutor General Gwon Seung-ryeol met the Justice Minister to discuss measures, and Director of the Seoul District Public Prosecutors' Office expressed his regret for deeds of the police. In addition, the Supreme Public Prosecutors' Office contacted the department of public order and sent a telegram to Jeju District Public Prosecutors' Office calling for lifting the arrest.<sup>279)</sup> Vice-Minister of Home Affairs Kim Hyo-seok, however, immediately issued a statement, claiming that Prosecutor Yang was arrested with an official arrest warrant issued by the Jeju District Judge because Yang turned out to be a person concerned with a crime that had occurred at the end of October 1948 when he lived in Jeju. Vice-Minister Kim added that the report that the police arrested the incumbent prosecutor illegally was groundless and injured the prestige of the police, threatening that he was investigating the sources of the report.<sup>280)</sup>

Unlike Vice-Minister Kim's statement, Prosecutor Yang Eul was officially

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278) *Official Gazette* No. 46, February 24, 1948.

279) *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, March 1 and 4, 1949 ; *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, March 4, 1949.

280) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, March 6, 1949.

imprisoned on March 14, 1949.<sup>281)</sup> The Jeju District Public Prosecutors' Office transferred the case to the Gwangju District Public Prosecutors' Office on May 30 because it was hard to deal with the case because Yang was the incumbent prosecutor in Jeju. Prosecutor Yang was suspected of violating the US Military Government Law No.1 and conspiring, aiding and abetting a rebellion, but he received a verdict of not guilty at the trial held in Gwangju District Court on October 31, 1949.<sup>282)</sup> Prosecutor Yang was released eight months after he was illegally arrested on February 28. He was already relieved of his post at his own request as of May 25, just before he was transferred from Jeju to Gwangju.<sup>283)</sup>

It is inconceivable that the police illegally arrest a prosecutor to torture and interrogate even nowadays, but at that time the prosecution was overwhelmed by the police, for example, the police summarily shot an incumbent prosecutor to death during the Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion. That is why the Minister of Home Affairs collided with the Minister of Justice at the Cabinet meeting, attended by President Rhee Syng-man, on February 11, 1949.

- A report on administrative circumstances by the Minister of Home Affairs: The police arrested a red element and a person who violated a national policy and sent them to the Public Prosecutors' Office, but they received a verdict of not guilty or a light penalty, which is damaging to the prestige of the police and the national interest, causing a lot of complaints. I thus urge the prosecution to act in concert with the police.
- An item for disciplining the military and the police by the Minister of Justice: The South Korean Army has recently despised others except the military as if it only exists in the whole universe, causing many serious damages to civilians. In the Japanese colonial rule, when the military requisitioned supplies from civilians, they compensated the loss later, but now there is no compensation at all. In Jeju, a prosecutor has been missing for four months after he or she was enticed by a police officer, and it has been a few weeks since the director of the Jeju District Prosecutors' Office has been missing. As there are a lot of complaints from civilians due to such incidents, Mr.

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281) *Donggwang Shinmun*, November 2, 1949.

282) *Dong-A Ilbo*, November 2, 1949.

283) *Official Gazette* No. 99, May 24, 1949.

President is requested to give an order to exercise strict control over the police.<sup>284)</sup>

As soon as the Minister of Home Affairs complained that the prosecution took a moderate action, the Minister of Justice called on the president for exercising strict control, pointing out the despotic military and police. President Rhee did not respond to the request of the Justice Minister, but he took the police's side. The president had already ordered to eradicate rioters in Jeju by using harsh means at the Cabinet meeting on January 21. In addition, the Public Prosecutor General sent the following official document to each affiliated organization on February 23, about ten days after the Minister of Home Affairs collided with the Justice Minister at the Cabinet meeting, and the document also proves that the president agreed with a hard-line policy of the police:

An item on right-wing cases: I believe that the right-wing cases will be well dealt with in line with the national policies including the National Security Law that have been declared since the establishment of the government of the Republic of Korea. It is said, however, that in some regions those cases have been dealt with too generously, causing anxiety about the future. I am, therefore, calling on punishing the cases severely to strengthen and stabilize the foundation of the country and reporting cases of violation of the National Security Law in detail regardless of the importance of cases, as well as immediately reporting results of the punishment.<sup>285)</sup>

According to the above document, the Public Prosecutor General gave an order to take stronger action against those who violated the National Security Law. This shows the attitude of the Ministry of Justice had greatly changed approximately ten days after the Minister of Home Affairs criticized the Minister of Justice, saying that the so-called "red" elements were not properly punished.

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284) *Minutes of the 18<sup>th</sup> Cabinet Council*, February 11, 1949.

285) Document of the Ministry of Justice, *Regarding Dealing with Leftist Cases*, restricted document No. 114, February 23, 1949.

Police Commissioner Kim Tae-il, who was dispatched to Jeju with 500 Police Support Unit members on February 19 and returned to Seoul on May 18, reported on operations for the last three months, “We completely wiped out rioters through more than 140 operations in Jeju and returned to Seoul without losing any one on our side.”<sup>286)</sup> The Vice-Minister of Home Affairs announced more detailed military achievements a few days later: 495 rioters were killed and 1,524 of them were captured; two members of Police Reserves were severely injured, and three of them were slightly injured.<sup>287)</sup> Even though the police focused on guarding seaside villages while the military troops were carrying out operations in mountainous areas, how could the police return without losing any one during more than 140 operations over three months?

Meanwhile, strong repression operations of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment continued for about two months until early March, 1949. Most of the armed rebels were killed, and the rest of them had to scatter in small groups of twos and threes, living from hand to mouth. There were still many residents around mountain villages, however. The residents had to move from place to place to avoid being shot dead by the military and the police.

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286) *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, May 19, 1949; *Gukdo Shinmun*, May 19, 1949.

287) *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, May 22, 1949.

## 4. The Period of Peace Establishment

(2 March 1949 – 24 June 1950)

### A. A Joint Anti-guerrilla and Pacification Operation

#### 1) The Establishment of the Jeju Area Battle Headquarters

On 2 March 1949, the Jeju Area Battle Headquarters was established. Yoo Jae-heung and Ham Byeong-seon were appointed as commander and lieutenant major, respectively.<sup>1)</sup> As a result, the occupation forces in Korea were raised to a higher status. Commander Yoo was given authority to control not only the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment and Commando Unit, which were already residing in Jeju, but also the Jeju Police Force, Police Support Unit and the right-wing youth organization. On 19 February, 505 troops were dispatched from the Police Special Forces (Commander Kim Tae-il) as the support unit in Jeju.<sup>2)</sup>

According to the National Intelligence Estimate of the U.S., on 1 April, there were 2,622 ROK armed forces, 1,700 police officers and 50,000 members of the civil defense groups, who were under the control of Commander Yoo.<sup>3)</sup> Also, the army headquarters sent naval vessels and troops to Jeju with the cooperation of the navy and ordered Commander Yoo to conduct the joint operation of the Jeju Area Battle Headquarters, using the army and navy.<sup>4)</sup> At that time, the dispatched navy was the 3<sup>rd</sup> Special Service Force (Commander Nam Sang-hwe) and it was charged with blockading the sea.<sup>5)</sup> Although the armed rebel force was nearly destroyed by the firm repression of the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> Regiments, the government established the Jeju Area Battle Headquarters to further influence the upcoming reelection. The duty of the Battle Headquarters was quite clearly demonstrated through its abolition on 15 May, soon after the

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1) Department of Publishing Military History at Army Headquarters, *Daily Record of the Army*, Vol. 3, March 2, 1949.

2) *Jayu Shinmun*, May 19, 1949.

3) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1097, April 1, 1949.

4) *Army Headquarter Operation Order Sending*, No. 57, March 17, 1949.

5) *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, 17 May, 1949.

elections. Furthermore, President Rhee Syng-man was deeply concerned about the situation on Jeju due to aid from the U.S. government.

With the withdrawal of the U.S. Military scheduled for the end of June, Rhee was deeply concerned by the compelling issues relating to arms and economic aid from the U.S. On 9 April 1949, during his inspection of Jeju, Rhee said: "The national government and the Americans are deeply concerned about Jeju and we will provide relief goods."<sup>6)</sup>

The reason for President Rhee stressing "the United State's concern regarding the 4 · 3 Incident" was to emphasize that the United States was strongly supportive of his government and its mission in creating a strongly anti-communist Korean state. Such strong will and attention is clearly expressed in the provisory clause of the 'Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act'. At that time, President Truman enhanced the significance of Korea as a bastion of democracy in the Far East, and requested the House of Representatives pass the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act for Korea, which was estimated at approximately 150 Million US dollars.<sup>7)</sup> Despite opposing opinions from the Republican Party, the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act was finally passed on 30 June, during a secret meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee. However, the Republican Party included a provisory clause stating that the aid for Korea will immediately cease if any form of coalition government is established in Korea with one or more members of the Communist Party.<sup>8)</sup> On the next day, President Rhee portrayed this decision as "anti-communism conditional aid for Korea" at a cabinet meeting.<sup>9)</sup>

There is one factor, however, which must be clarified. During the time the Jeju Area Battle Headquarters was established from 2 March to 15 May 1949, Commander Yoo Jae-heung did not always reside in Jeju. According to a secret document from the US army, "Commander Yoo was detailed in early March and, after a series of meetings with high-ranking officials such as Lee

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6) *Jayu Shinmun*, April 12, 1949.

7) *Dong-A Ilbo*, June 22, 1949.

8) *Jayu Shinmun*, July 2, 1949.

9) *State Affairs Meeting Report*, 63 Meeting July 1, 1949.

Beom-seok and commander-in-chief of the South Korean Army General Chae Byeong-deok, Yoo arrived in Jeju at the end of the month and started to exercise the right of command.<sup>10)</sup> As confirmed in the document kept by the US army, the arrival date of Commander Yoo was not 2 March, but during the last week of March. Therefore, Commander Yoo arrived on Jeju between 27 March (Sunday) and 31 March (Thursday). News articles from that period also support this fact, as in Jeju-related articles towards the end of March, the person in charge of the occupation forces was still stated to be Ham Byeong-seon, instead of Yoo Jae-heung.<sup>11)</sup> The first time the name of Yoo Jae-heung appeared in news articles about Jeju was during early April, when the Minister of National Defense Shin Seong-mo visited Jeju.<sup>12)</sup>

The operation of the Jeju Area Battle Headquarters can therefore be divided into two periods: a) from 20 March to the last week of March, led by 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment Commander, Ham Byeong-seon, and; b) from the last week of March to 15 May, led by Commander Yoo Jae-heung. When these two periods are compared there are distinctive differences in the situation on the ground.

The 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment Commander, Ham Byeong-seon announced his objective for operations on 1 March: “The Korean National Armed Forces will shift its direction from relaxed and moderate operation to the third stage of operation, which will clear all the military enemies and will begin from 1 March and be completed by 31 March.<sup>13)</sup> The press bureau of the Jeju Area Battle Headquarters reported the early stage of operations during this period as follows:

On 16 March, the press bureau of Jeju Area Battle Headquarters announced that the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment's third stage of the operation to clear rioters began in earnest from 9-15 March. They gained many military successes, as shown below:

Killed 181, captured 195 war prisoners and collected 3 carbine rifles, 12

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10) “Visit to the Island of Cheju,” May 18, 1949, RG 319: *Records of the Army Staff*, Entry 85: Army-Intelligence Document File, Box 3736.

11) *Jayu Shinmun*, March 20-22, 1949.

12) *Jayu Shinmun*, April 10, 1949.

13) *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, June 29, 1949.

type-99 rifles, 2 grenades, 34 bullets, etc. [A report under Jeju dateline] (Under the Press Censorship Bureau of the Ministry of Defense)<sup>14)</sup>

A member of the National Assembly who visited Jeju during this period commented that: “They started their full-scale attack at 10 o’clock in the morning.”<sup>15)</sup> The Press Bureau of the Ministry of Defense announced the actions of the Jeju Area Battle Headquarters as, “Success - killed 171, captured 196 war prisoners, collected 3 M1 rifles, 3 carbine rifles, 13 type-99 rifles and 15 bullets. Damage - 1 member of Minbodan (civic group) dead, 3 injured.”<sup>16)</sup>

When inspected closely, the final report presented by the Press Bureau of the Ministry of Defense, says “△ Military Achievements - Killed 821, captured 999, collected 35 weapons, 30 bullets, 12 spears, 49 bags of grains, 4 Japanese swords, 16 helmets, 2 communication instruments, 166 confidential documents, 185 lists of names △ Casualties - 27 dead, 15 injures, 17 dead police officers and 1 dead citizen.”<sup>17)</sup>

The number of casualties and war prisoners demonstrate the characteristics of the “extermination operations” led by Colonel Ham Byeong-seon. Among the dead or captured citizens, there were many unarmed people who escaped to the mountains, enveloped by fear of death.

In accordance with this fact, one report released by the U.S Army reported the military actions of the anti-guerrilla force in Jeju as against “Rebels” and reported “Killed 1,075, captured 3,509 and 2,065 surrenders”. They also commented that: “The term ‘Rebel’ used in most parts of this report can become valid only if we automatically categorize people living in the upland areas of the island”.<sup>18)</sup> This means that the Korean Ministry of Defense worked on the assumption that all ordinary citizens who were living in upland areas were ‘Rebels’ and included the numbers of such victims in their

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14) *Chosun Jungang Ilbo*, March 2, 1949.

15) *Jayu Shinmun*, March 23, 1949.

16) *Jayu Shinmun*, March 22, 1949.

17) *Donggwang Shinmun*, April 10, 1949.

18) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No.1113, May 9, 1949.

‘Military Achievements’.

Such operations caused a massive human death toll. A report from the U.S Army recorded the situation on Jeju by the end of March 1949, stating “It is estimated that approximately 14,000 to 15,000 citizens were killed and 80% of them were murdered by the anti-guerrilla forces. About one third of households on the island were destroyed and one fourth of the 300,000 population lost their township and were forced to move along the coastal area.”<sup>19)</sup>

The commander of the Jeju Area Battle Headquarters, Yoo Jae-heung arrived in Jeju during the last week of March and began his pacification operations. He also redeployed troops from the coastal areas to the upland areas. While the headquarters of the regiment and troops for operations stayed in Jeju-eup, the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion was sent to a nearby area, around the present Suakgyo Bridge, and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment was deployed to the Gwaneumsa Temple. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Regiment was positioned at Jocheon-myeon, Gyorae-ri and the Special Forces were assigned to go to the upland areas of Noru Oreum.<sup>20)</sup> The Special Forces consisted of 50 troops under the control of Captain Kim Myeong who was in charge of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment. The purpose of these Special Forces was to collect information from armed citizens by initiating conversation in the Jeju dialect.<sup>21)</sup> They also carried out repression and pacification strategies, such as gathering citizens from nearby towns around the coastal area and showing flying reconnaissance planes, or shooting rocket launchers to show off their authority.<sup>22)</sup> Former commander Yoo Jae-heung stated:

“When I arrived in Jeju, there were about 20,000 refugees on the mountain. There were police officers and troops in the coastal areas and guerrillas and refugees were staying in the mountain. When it gets dark, they swear at each other and often end up fighting. So I said ‘All troops climb up the mountain. We have to exterminate all the communist guerrillas’ and ordered three battalions and one task force to Mt. Halla. During the early stages, each battalion defeated

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19) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1097, April 1, 1949.

20) Ibid.

21) Ibid.

22) *Seoul Shinmun*, April 1, 1949.

the guerrillas and finally I maneuvered four battalions together to clear all the guerrillas.’<sup>23)</sup>

Commander Yoo planned an operation to arrest armed guerrillas and force the ‘20,000 refugees’ to come down from the mountain. On 1 April 1949, a report from the U.S. Army commented on this operation plan as follows:

“Although the outlook of the current situation in Jeju seems positive, it is most likely that 250 armed guerrillas will bring about a new kind of terrorist attack if they are not killed or captured and have their weapons taken away. A leader of rebels who was arrested said that his comrades would be hiding until the troops withdrew themselves and then they would resume the attack. According to information in a report, the combat leader tried to find the hiding place of the rebels, but the guerrillas stopped their attack and continued to flee. We could not find them. The South Korean Army is planning to exterminate all the guerrillas before the middle of April. This means that their new plan is for troops and the Minbodan (Peoples Protective Corps) to sweep the mountain and drive the guerrillas to the opposite side of the island, where the police camp is. This plan seems rather effective because of the long distance and perilous topography.<sup>24)</sup>

The initiative of the South Korean Army was to track down and sweep out armed guerrillas by mobilizing civic groups. This would begin from April 1949. The media reported the military achievements of the Jeju Area Battle Headquarters, from 2 March to 15 May, as follows:

According to the Jeju Area Battle Headquarters, the results of the comprehensive mop-up operations are as follows:

- △ Confiscated weapons: 3 automatic rifles, 25 M1 rifles, 28 carbine rifles, 106 type-99 rifles, 2 type-38 rifles, 4 type-44 rifles, 9 pistols, 25 disused rifles, 224 other weapons
- △ 6,177 War prisoners and defectors, killed 1,117
- △ Casualties: 35 dead, 7 injured, 11 dead members of Minbodan<sup>25)</sup>

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23) Yoo Jae-heung (82, Nohyeong-dong, former Commander in Chief of Jeju Area Battle Headquarters, former Minister of Defense), Testimony recorded on September 6, 2002.

24) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1097, April 1, 1949.

The Assistant Commissioner Kim Tae-il temporarily transferred 500 from each police unit and dispatched them to Jeju on 19 February and returned to Seoul on 18 May. One of the Vice-Ministers of the Ministry of Home Affairs, who conducted operations at the same time as the Jeju Area Battle Headquarters, noted that the military achievements gained by the Special Police Unit were, from 24 February to 14 May:

△ Killed 485 rebels; captured 1,524 war prisoners, one American style light machine gun, over 50 M-1, type-38 and type-99 carbine rifles, 950 bags of grains, 1,034 clothes, 207 bedding, 834 dishes, 455 items of furniture. △ Casualties: two severely injured, three minor injuries, two vehicles.<sup>26)</sup>

Therefore, the total number of war prisoners / defectors was 7,641 and killed 1,612, although, the number provided by the South Korean Government at the time always remained at 'approximately 250 people'. These results demonstrate the fact that the early stages of the anti-guerrilla operation did not lead to great sacrifices, but they also show that the 'extermination operation' was carried out continuously until the end of March 1949, under the control of Commander Yoo.

## 2) Pacification

Since the establishment of the Jeju Area Battle Headquarters on 2 March, the necessity of an unyielding anti-guerrilla pacification operation had been continuously raised. On 10 March, Prime Minister Lee Beom-seok inspected Jeju and stated that: "This anti-guerrilla operation has to be successful but operations for pacification should be carried out with a generous attitude towards the rebels so that we can urge them to take time for self-reflection".<sup>27)</sup> This announcement by Lee had a great impact on Jeju citizens. One witness described the speech given by Lee as follows:

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25) *Chosun Ilbo*, May 20, 1949.

26) *Kyungghyang Shinmun*, May 22, 1949.

27) *Jayu Shinmun*, March 16, 1949.

“When Prime Minister Lee Beom-seok visited Jeju, he gave a speech at Gwandeokjeong. I thought he was going to say something rather horrible but he did not. He was surely different from Jo Byeong-ok. Lee said ‘The US army showed me some pictures of dead bodies of Jeju natives and it was very tragic’. Indeed, he did not make any comment about unyielding extermination operations and did not give any words of comfort, but compared to President Rhee and Cho, we were actually fascinated.”<sup>28)</sup>

“Anyway, the area above the coastline was all burnt out, and I received a report saying that there are 20,000 refugees and 230 armed guerrillas in the mountain.”<sup>29)</sup>

A publication released by the Ministry of Defense described the situation at the time: “All the towns within 4km from the coastline to Mt. Halla were severely damaged by the anti-guerrilla operation and escaped citizens in the mountains were colluding with guerrillas and hence we had to make about 15,000 people climb down from the mountain and accommodate them with a project for the people”.<sup>30)</sup> Even when Yoo Jae-heung, the commander of the Jeju Area Battle Headquarters, came back to Seoul after accomplishing his mission, he disclosed the fact that “Among the guerrillas, there were only a few partisan communists, most of whom were victims of the anti-guerrilla operation so we did our best to have them defect and minimize further damage.”<sup>31)</sup>

Also, in order to conclude the anti-guerrilla operation by letting escaped citizens in the mountain come down to their towns, certain measures for aid were needed. Father Austin Sweeney was in Jeju during this period and told another priest that: “If this country was more civilized, the ‘Help for Jeju’ should be provided nation-wide. People here are living like animals and can barely eat one sweet potato per day.”<sup>32)</sup>

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28) Kim Hyeong-jung (age 88, Jeju-si, former public officer of the Jeju Provincial Office), Testimony recorded on September 13, 2002.

29) Yoo Jae-heung, Testimony.

30) The Institute for Military History Compilation of the Ministry of National Defense, *ibid.*, p.445.

31) *Chosun Ilbo*, May 18, 1949

32) “Letter from Father Austin Sweeney, Catholic Missionary. Cheje Island to father George

On 10 March, Minister of Defense Shin Seong-mo visited Jeju with Prime Minister Lee Beom-seok and said, "The most compelling issue is not only the military operation, and if aid measures and preparation for refugees and defectors are not made, including food, clothes and housing, there is the possibility that they might go back to the mountain and take part in the guerrilla uprising."<sup>33)</sup> During this time, a member of the National Assembly visited Jeju and depicted the situation of refugees as follows:

“The total number of refugees has reached 86,797 and unprivileged refugees don’t even have time to bring their food and clothes. They are staying in a cage similar to a pigsty. They spread dried grass to sleep on and eat seaweed and plants. All the refugees were groaning in starvation and an unbearable odor stinks to high heaven. I just looked at the sky and wept. No one could have fought back tears if they were at the scene.”<sup>34)</sup>

As a result, the Jeju Area Battle Headquarters established a special department that was in charge of solving administrative and economical problems for citizens while the headquarters focused on carrying out their military operation.<sup>35)</sup> In addition, the Korean military band was dispatched to Jeju to console Jeju natives.<sup>36)</sup>

As mentioned earlier, the anti-guerrilla operation can be divided into two periods: a) led by Ham Byung-seon and b) led by Yoo Jae Heung. The pacification began in earnest just after commander Yoo took over control of Jeju. A confidential document from the U.S. described the first period of anti-guerrilla operations as ‘severe tactics’ and the second period as ‘a program of amnesty’.

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Carroll, Catholic Missionary, Seoul,” February 15, 1949, Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 145 dated March 14, 1949 from American Mission in Korea, RG 263: *Records of the Central Intelligence Agency*, Entry: Murphy Papers: The Murphy Collection on International Communism, 1917-1958, Korea, Box 69.

33) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, March 17, 1949.

34) *Jayu Shinmun*, March 23, 1949.

35) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, March 17, 1949.

36) *Army Headquarters Operation Order Sending*, No. 50, March 4, 1949.

As soon as Commander Yoo took over control of Jeju from Commander Ham, he immediately stopped the tragic operations that killed citizens indiscriminately to begin a program of amnesty. He tried to capture war prisoners and question them himself. The war prisoners felt guilty and if they were not participating in the battle with guerrillas, the South Korean Army provided them with food and cigarettes and released them. The result of the moderate questioning was satisfactory, because released prisoners would guide Commander Yoo's troops to the hidden weapons, talk to their colleagues and be welcomed and fairly treated if they surrendered. Commander Yoo estimated that under the program of amnesty, each released war prisoner brought back six of their colleagues.<sup>37)</sup>

Regarding this incident, Commander Yoo commented that, "While we blocked the tyranny of the Northwest Youth, we carried out the pacification strategy saying that we will forget about the past, so, hidden people, descend from the mountain without worrying. As a result, the rumor spread very fast and a few thousand people came down from the mountains and the number added up to 20,000 in the end."<sup>38)</sup>

Regarding this phenomenon of increased defectors, the Minister of Society Lee Yoon-young, who visited Jeju from 7 – 13 April, recalled: "There are increasing numbers of defectors. While I was in Jeju I could see 898 defectors and as of today the number reached 3,500. There are five prison camps in Jeju and 3,174 people are staying in there."<sup>39)</sup> The number of defectors kept on increasing and finally reached 6,000 or more.<sup>40)</sup> If that is the truth behind the pacification, who were these people captured as war prisoners and defectors? After his visit to Jeju on 9 April, President Rhee announced the following statement:

"About 2,800 communist men and women became defectors, but there are still a few thousand people who cannot make their way because of fear, Their towns

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37) "Visit to the Island of Cheju," May 18, 1949, RG 319: *Records of Army Staff Entry* 85: Army-Intelligence Document File, Box 3736.

38) Yoo Jae-heung, Testimony.

39) *Dong-A Ilbo*, April 15, 1949.

40) *Chosun Ilbo*, March 20, 1949.

have all burnt and they don't have any shelter or food, which means that they are waiting hopelessly to die..."

"Ignorant men and women who were fooled by communist propaganda, as well as others, went back to the mountain as their houses were burnt down. But life in the mountain is just as terrible so they don't have anything, even to rob any food from others. 2,800 boys and girls are included, and we are accommodating them in an empty office and providing them with two meals per day with no side dishes..."<sup>41)</sup>

In the statement, the phrase "2,800 communist men and women became defectors" is used, as well as, "In that 2,800 boys and girls are included." This means the same thing, but is only spoken differently. One witness who was an elementary schoolboy in the autumn of 1948, was forced to climb up to the mountain and became a guerrilla. In April 1949, he was captured as a war prisoner and locked in the alcoholic drink factory. Here is his memoir of the times he spent as a prisoner:

"My parents went to Japan before 4 · 3 and my younger sister (4) and I (12) were staying at my grandfather's house. However, during September and October 1948, while my grandfather (Kim Eon-ban, 61) was plowing the field with a cow, troops from the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment robbed him and shot him to death. After a little while, police officers ordered people to gather around the Town Hall of Ora 1-Gu. About 200 to 300 people gathered around the Town Hall and police officers said 'close your eyes and bow.' After a while, 10 or more people were chosen and they were standing in front of us. The police officers said "Look at this carefully," and shot them. While our heads were down, someone must have pointed their fingers at them. After my grandfather passed away, our second uncle (who had been missing) came back and said "We have to climb up the mountain to save our lives." Therefore, in November, my grandmother (50), aunty, cousin (1), younger sister and I climbed up the mountain for refuge. At first, we were staying near the YeorANJI Oreum, but when the anti-guerrilla force approached us we made our way further inside the forest, day by day, to find a cave to stay in. When I woke up in the morning, I could hear my back creak as I was sleeping on frozen ground."

"We could only feed ourselves one meal per day. When we heard the sound

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41) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, April 13, 1949.

of gun shots, we shivered in fear. Finally, in April 1949, we were caught by the troops when they started firing into the cave. We were taken to the storage house of the agricultural school, but then moved to the alcoholic beverage factory again. They interrogated us, one by one, and when I said that my parents are dead the examining officer shouted “Orphanage!” and told me to stand in the orphanage line. However, when they found out that I had my grandmother, I didn't have to go into an orphanage. If I was closer to 17 years old, they would have killed me, but I was only 12 and so thin that I could hardly eat anything, and I think that saved my life. However, my aunt (Hyeon Gye-saeng, 26) was severely suffering from cold when she was captured and she died before we moved to the alcoholic beverage factory. When I graduated from high school, I wanted to enter the Korean Military Academy but my teacher rejected me, saying: “Because of your past you are not eligible to enter the Academy.”<sup>42)</sup>

As President Rhee mentioned earlier in his speech, most of the refugees in the mountains were ‘ignorant people who were fooled by communists, or just people who lost their households.’ Although they had been treated as ‘guerrillas’ and were indiscriminately shot at and killed, all the defectors were investigated carefully and, according to a US Army report, the status of defectors was described as of 1 April, 1949:

“The current policy is to detain anyone who had been arrested or surrendered by themselves or even people who descend from the mountain. Women, children and elderly are categorized into refugees, but men who are battle worthy are inspected and being educated.”<sup>43)</sup>

Commander Yoo left Jeju after the 5·10 reelection was carried out safely.<sup>44)</sup> The Jeju Area Battle Headquarters was officially closed on 15 May and its assigned duty was handed over to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment.<sup>45)</sup> Also, in addition to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion of Seobuk Youth was also withdrawn from the Jeju Area Battle Headquarters.<sup>46)</sup> The withdrawal of the

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42) Kim Byeong-jong (age 65, Japan, Osaka), Testimony recorded on December 25, 2001.

43) Hq. USAFIK G-2 *Periodic Report*, No. 1097, April 1, 1949.

44) *Donggwang Shinmun*, May 15, 1949.

45) *Army Headquarters Operation Order Sending*, No. 81, May 5, 1949.

46) *Ibid.*

2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment and 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion was ordered by the chief of the military advisory group, Brigadier General Robert, who told Shin Seong-mo that all the youth from the Seobuk side should be returned.<sup>47)</sup>

Earlier, both the U.S and ROK Armies had encouraged the use of Seobuk Youth alongside police and even encouraged it.<sup>48)</sup> However, when the situation eased off, the tyranny of the Seobuk Youth did not stop and they even made the situation worse and more violent. That's why the U.S. and ROK Armies decided to withdraw them. On 18 May, the Special Police Force left Jeju after accomplishing a three-month-long operation and with this withdrawal, the bloodshed seemed to have ceased. However, after Commander- in-Chief Yoo left Jeju, 1,600 or more people were shot dead or sent to prisons despite his promise that "Anyone who comes down from the mountain will not be asked about their past and I will guarantee their life."

After the closing down of the Jeju Area Battle Headquarters, Jeju was again under the control of commander-in-chief of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment, Ham Byeong-seon. Moreover, with the closing down of the Jeju Area Battle Headquarters, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment, on 25 May, was also withdrawn and there was a great reduction in troops.<sup>49)</sup> On 20 June, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment was transferred to the Capital Garrison Command.<sup>50)</sup> Then, on 7 July it was again transferred to Incheon (the complete transfer including the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion occurred on 13 August).<sup>51)</sup> The total duration of Commander-in-Chief Ham Byeong-seon's stay on Jeju was therefore a little more than 8 months, from 29 December 1948.

The proclamation ceremony of the Korean Press Association was held on 5 June 1949 and it gradually expanded its power nationwide.<sup>52)</sup> The Korean

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47) "Minutes of Conference 16 April" April 16, 1949, RG 338: *Records of US Army Commands Entry*: Provisional Military Advisory Group (1948-1949) and Korean Military Advisory Group (1949-1953), Box 8.

48) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 951, October 1, 1948.

49) *Army Headquarters Operation Order Sending*, No. 92, May 10, 1949.

50) *Ministry of National Defense General Order* No. 18, June 14, 1949.

51) Department of Publishing Military History at Army Headquarters, *Daily Record of the Army*, Vol. 3, July 7, 1949.

52) *Dong-A Ilbo*, June 6, 1949.

Press Association was established under the purpose of enlightening the defectors from the South Korean Labor Party and to control them within a boundary of leftist organizations. Unlike the mainland, anyone who had a hint of communist ideology was killed during the 4 · 3 Incident. Therefore, there had been no urgent need for establishing a Korean Press Association in the Jeju area. As it was a nationwide campaign in which Jeju also had to participate, however, the Korean Press Association began to recruit members. On two occasions between 25 October and the end of November “defector recruitment periods” were held. By 27 November, it had 39,986 members, 5,283 of whom were from Jeju.<sup>53)</sup> The members of the Korean Press Association were taken into “preventative custody” however, and were executed by firing squad. (Further details are summarized in Chapter 4, under Clause 2 ‘death toll of “preventive custody”’.)

### 3) 5 · 10 Reelection

When the situation in Jeju began to cool, President Rhee began to prepare for the reelection of members of the National Assembly in two election districts in Jeju. During mid-March, Communication Director Kim Dong-seong delivered President Rhee’s will to hold the reelection on 10 May.<sup>54)</sup> As the election date approached, government officials continuously visited Jeju. On 7 April, Minister of Defense Shin Seong-mo<sup>55)</sup> and Minister of Society Lee Yoon-young visited Jeju as a special assignment for the president. They were charged with the president’s special assignment to “annihilate any remaining guerrillas as soon as possible and find measures to revive the economy of Jeju.”<sup>56)</sup>

On 9 April, President Rhee and the First Lady visited Jeju and inspected

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53) *Seoul Shinmun*, December 2, 1949.

54) *Jayu Shinmun*, March 20, 1949.

55) Lee Beom-seok served as prime minister as well as the first minister of national defense but on March 21, 1949 Shin Seong-mo, who had been the minister of the interior, was appointed as defense minister. Therefore, Lee Beom-seok was able to serve as prime minister only. (*Official Gazette*, No. 68, April 2, 1949).

56) *Gukdo Shinmun*, April 10, 1949.

security. Rhee participated in a welcoming ceremony at the square of Gwan-deokjeong and said, “I feel very regretful to hear that there are still some rebels. Because of that, I believe that my two ministers and the Jeju people can cooperate to build peace as soon as possible.” Rhee also asserted that, “Our government and the Americans are deeply concerned about Jeju and we will provide relief supplies to you all.”<sup>57)</sup>

After inspecting all the military units in other regions, Shin Seong-mo, the Minister of Defense, met reporters on 15 April and said, “The rebels in Mt. Halla are all dispersed and the success of anti-guerrilla operations is just a matter of time. I ordered my troops not to leave one rebel alive.”<sup>58)</sup> The UN Advisory Group for Korea tried to visit Jeju to investigate public order and security, but due to the fog in the sky they could not arrive.<sup>59)</sup> However, they returned to Jeju on 8 May and inspected the reelection. They made their way back on 14 May.<sup>60)</sup> In two election districts in Bukjejugun (Gap and Eul), not only Jeju natives but Ham Sang-hun, the Director of Propaganda for Democracy of the Public Party was nominated.<sup>61)</sup> Moreover, Moon Bong-hae, the central leader of the Seobuk Youth ran for election too.<sup>62)</sup>

Unlike the previous year, the reelection held on 10 May 1949, was carried out safely. The registration of the electorate recorded a rate of 96% in Gap-Gu and 97% in Eul-Gu, and it was very high when compared to 1948. Also, the turnout of voters was much higher. Gap-Gu reached 97% and Eul-Gu 99%.<sup>63)</sup> The result of the vote count showed Hong Sun-nyeong from Gap-Gu and Yang Byeong-jik Yang from Eul-Gu won the election.<sup>64)</sup>

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57) *Jayu Shinmun*, April 12, 1949.

58) *Seoul Shinmun*, April 16, 1949.

59) *Donggwang Shinmun*, April 21, 1949.

60) *Donggwang Shinmun*, May 19, 1949.

61) *Chosun Ilbo*, April 16, 1949.

62) *Chosun Ilbo*, May 12, 1949.

63) *Gukdo Shinmun*, May 15, 1949.

64) *Gukdo Shinmun*, May 14, 1949; *Donggwang Shinmun*, May 14, 1949.

## B. Weakening the Guerrillas

### 1) Murder of Lee Deok-gu

Following the heightened attacks from mid-November 1948 and the establishment of the Jeju Area Battle Headquarters, the armed guerrillas were routed by ‘mop-up’ and ‘defector’ operations. On 7 April 1949, Minister of Defense Shin Seong-mo received a report saying “A few days ago, many high-ranking guerrillas defected and according to their testimony and our own information, only 40 to 50 guerrillas are left in the mountain.”<sup>65)</sup> One report stated that a war prisoner had said that: ‘From March, Lee Deok-gu and his 20 or more colleagues buried their weapons under the ground and dispersed. They are looking for an opportunity to surrender.’<sup>66)</sup> In mid-April, the guerrillas in executive positions were killed or captured and their influence collapsed. Lee Chang-jeong, the Chief of the Press Bureau for Jeju Area Battle Headquarters announced: “On 21 April, we finally we killed the head of the South Korean Labor Party Kim Yong-gwan. This means the end of mopping-up operations.”<sup>67)</sup>

On 7 June, the leader of the armed guerrillas, Lee Deok-gu, was killed. The death of Lee had a great impact as, although the strength of the guerrillas had diminished recently, Lee was playing a role as a symbol of the guerrillas, followed by Kim Dalsam. The Ministry of Defense was encouraged and reported that Lee was killed by the 2nd Regiment’s determined operation.<sup>68)</sup>

[Joint News from Jeju] On 7 June, rebel Lee Deok-gu was killed by the police unit led by Kim Yeong-ju from Hwabuk Police Box of the Jeju Police when it engaged in a gunfight near a wooded area at 4 o’clock in the afternoon Lee was killed and his subordinate captured. The body of Lee Deok-gu was kept in Jeju Police Station.<sup>69)</sup>

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65) *Chosun Ilbo*, April 19, 1949.

66) *Gukdo Shinmun*, April 23, 1949.

67) *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, April 26, 1949.

68) *Dong-A Ilbo*, June 12, 1949.

69) *Donggwang Shinmun*, June 11, 1949.

The police officers tied the body of Lee to a wooden cross and exhibited it at the main entrance of Jeju Police Station for a day and then cremated it. Lee's nephew Kang Sil went to the police station to confirm the identity of the body and he added:

“My uncle received one gun shot to his forehead and the rest of his of body was clean. The body was exhibited for just one day. It was the rainy season and by the afternoon the body started to smell badly. The police officers cremated my uncle in Namsugak and told my father to ‘at least collect the bones’. However, it was pouring the next day and the bones were swept away.”<sup>70)</sup>

## 2) Change of Armed Force Installation

### ① Separate Battalion

On 15 July 1949, the 1st Separate Battalion was dispatched to Jeju with Commander-in-Chief Kim Yong-ju, who succeeded Commander Yoo.<sup>71)</sup> The 1<sup>st</sup> Separate Battalion was previously the Korean Military Search Academy. The Korean Military Searching Academy (Principal Kim Yong-joo<sup>72)</sup>) and its commando unit participated in Mt. Jiri operations in the Sancheong Area of South Gyeongsang province<sup>73)</sup> until 31 January 1949.<sup>74)</sup> This battalion came under the command of the Mt. Jiri Area Battle Headquarters on 27 February when the headquarters were organized and operated mainly in the Mt. Jiri areas. On 20 June, its name was changed to ‘1<sup>st</sup> Separate Battalion’<sup>75)</sup> and on 15 July it moved to Jeju from Suwon in Gyeonggi Province. (It was on 13 August when the battalion officially took over the charge of defending the Jeju area from the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment.<sup>76)</sup>)

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70) Kang-sil (64, Japan), Testimony recorded on December 27, 2001.

71) Department of Publishing Military History at Army Headquarters, *Daily Record of the Army*, Vol. 3, July 15, 1949.

72) Department of Publishing Military History at Army Headquarters, *Daily Record of the Army*, Vol. 3, January 16, 1949.

73) *Army Headquarters Operation Order Sending*, No. 22, January 27, 1949.

74) *Army Headquarters Operation Order Sending*, No. 44, February 27, 1949.

75) *Ministry of National Defense General Order* No. 17, June 11, 1949.

By the time the 1<sup>st</sup> Separate Battalion arrived in Jeju, the uprising had settled down and there was no reason for any more damage. The commissioned officers from the Independent Battalion were assigned to Jeju Girls' Middle School and Jeju Middle School and conducted military training.<sup>77)</sup> However, Commander Kim recalls the last mopping-up operation as follows:

“We changed our name to the 1<sup>st</sup> Separate Battalion and conducted final mopping-up operations. The other troops have finished mopping up “red” guerrillas, so we just had to clean up the vestiges. At that time, I was a Lieutenant Major but soon I was detailed as the Chief Martial Law Administrator and I was affiliated to the 5<sup>th</sup> Division. We conducted the last mopping-up operation there and we did a pretty good job compared to other military units. We had one undercover squadron and arranged to get them employed as township officers, drivers, teachers, etc. There is still someone who is working as a deputy principal of a school. Also, an officer of a township got promoted and is now working in the provincial office.... They collected all the information. As a result, while we were just staying in the military base, we could easily get information. This made the task very clear and clean. Anyone caught from that stage onward was sentenced to death and in that sense I was their murderer ... When troops brought guerrillas in front of me, being the Chief Martial Law Administrator, what should I have done? So I ordered my troops to excavate a cave to the west of Jeju airfield and bury the guerrillas there. That's why I could not go to Jeju until now. I followed the orders from the central government but Jeju natives believe it was me who killed all of them. By that mopping-out operation we put down the revolt.”<sup>78)</sup>

This means that the South Korean Army made a trap by using undercover troops who were hired in provincial offices. When Kim says “So I ordered my troops to excavate a cave to the west of Jeju airfield and buried the guerrillas there,” it demonstrates the fact that proper legal procedures had not been undertaken before executing the guerrillas.

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76) Department of Publishing Military History at Army Headquarters, *Daily Record of the Army*, Vol. 3, August 13, 1949.

77) *Seoul Shinmun*, September 17, 1949.

78) Kim Yong-ju (former Commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> Separate Battalion) Testimony as quoted in *Collection of Veterans' Testimonies* which is kept by the Institute for Military History Compilation of the Ministry of National Defense.

Moreover, the South Korean Government lifted martial law by 31 December 1948, but in effect it was still active into 1949. In his testimony, Kim still called himself “the Chief Martial Law Administrator”. The independent battalion withdrew on 27 December, finishing its mission of five months in Jeju.

## ② The Stationing of the Marine Corps

As the Independent Battalion left Jeju, the Marine Corps (Commanding Officer Colonel Shin Hyeon-jun) arrived in Jeju. The Marine Corps consisted of 1,200 troops and its headquarters were placed in Jeju-eup and the 1st and 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalions were placed in the Moseulpo area.<sup>79)</sup> In the letter that Commander Shin Hyun-jun wrote to the Chief of Naval Operations, he recognized that: “Most of the leaders of the 4 · 3 Incident have escaped the island and the red guerrillas who are staying in Mt. Halla are those who were deceived by the escaped ones. Jeju natives have blood ties with the red guerrillas and they still have a strong sense of resentment and fear of troops.”<sup>80)</sup> The Marine Corps stated that their purposes in Jeju were: ① physical and mental training for Marine Corps; ② to provide and give support to Jeju natives who have lost their loved ones and homes; ③ to suppress the remaining red guerrillas on Mt. Halla<sup>81)</sup>

The Marine Corps Headquarters carried out the first anti-guerrilla operation from February to June. In the ‘History of the Marine Corps’ the results of their anti-guerrilla operation lists as follows:

- △ On 5, 6 June, killed eight and capture eight alive near Dol Oreum
- △ 10 March Jungmun-myeon 881 highlands field hospital and killed director of doctors
- △ End of March, killed seven by attacking the meeting place of guerrillas
- △ 15 March, at 1394 highland, killed one and injured three in guerrillas’ hideout.
- △ 17 March, 1394 highland and 500 Generals areas were attacked and two killed.
- △ 22 March, 500m away from Dol Oreum, attacked guerrillas and they ran away.

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79) Headquarters of Marine Corps, *History of Marine Corps Development*, 1961, p.11.

80) Headquarters of Marine Corps, *History of Marine Corps Battles*, 1962, p.18.

81) Headquarters of Marine Corps, *ibid.*, 1961, p.17.

△ 20 May, the headquarters of anti-guerrilla expedition moved to Ssal Oreum (South of Mt. Halla) and started to search forested area.<sup>82)</sup>

On the other hand, when the Korean War broke out on 25 June 1950, the commander of the Marine Corps was detailed as the chief martial law administrator for the Jeju Area Battle Headquarters at the same time. While he succeeded in the anti-guerrilla operation, he failed in satisfying the needs of Jeju natives. Especially, he illegally killed too many lives right after the outbreak of war and tortured many high-ranking Jeju people after the so-called ‘Yuji Incident,’ or ‘The North Korean Welcoming Party Preparation Committee’. However, these two incidents were fabricated and not in the schedule at all.

Also, at the same time, Shin killed Kang Seong-mo, the district head, without any legal procedure. Kim Ho-gyeom, the former Seogwipo police station chief, said that the death of Kang was supposedly about “making a smart mark”. According to him, the Marine Corps forced Kang to prepare a few cows and a few hundred bags of bracken, so that they could eat, but Kang did not conform nor cooperate with them.<sup>83)</sup>

Kang’s bereaved family accused Shin. The bill of indictment was accepted as a second case of ‘massacre of innocent people’. In the bill, Kang’s family said: The reason for the massacre was because their father, Kang Seong-mo, (former district head) made a request to the Marine Corps not to harass innocent people by forcing them to collect bracken to feed the troops.<sup>84)</sup> His request was accepted by the Jeju District Public Prosecutor’s Office and they started the investigation.<sup>85)</sup> However, the 5·16 coup took place and the investigation could go no further.

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82) Headquarters Marine Corps, *ibid.*, 1961, pp.21-22.

83) Kim Ho-gyeom (Seoul, a police officer at the time) Testimony as quoted in the 4·3 News Team of *Jemin Ilbo*, *The 4·3 Incident Speaks*, Vol. 5, pp.185-186.

84) *Jeju Shinbo*, July 3, 1960.

85) *Jeju Shinbo*, January 14, 1961.

## **5. The Closing Period of the 4 · 3 Incident** (June 25, 1950 ~ September 21, 1954)

### **A. The Korean War and “Preventive Custody”**

#### 1) The Korean War and the Situation in Jeju

At 4 a.m. on 25 June 1950, the devastating war between North Korea and South Korea started, after the North attacked the South. The South Korean Army could not restrain the North and on 28 June, Seoul was taken. The U.S. Army came with reinforcements from Japan; however they were also defeated and retreated to the Nakdong River on 1 August. While North Korea had the upper hand on the peninsula, the United Nations Security Council called on the North to retreat behind the 38 Parallel, which it refused to do. A UN Joint Command was then established to fight alongside the South Korean Army and combined they carried out the offensive and defensive battle for one and a half months. The fighting took place near the Nakdong River and finally on 15 September they conducted Operation Chromite in Incheon. With the success of Operation Chromite, they reclaimed Seoul on 28 September. They moved on and occupied Pyongyang and continued as far as the Amnokgang River. Unification seemed imminent.

However, on 25 October there was a massive offensive as the North's military was swelled by the Chinese, who had intervened on their behalf. The UN Joint Command had to retreat from Seoul and evacuated to the Pyeongtaek area. The South Korean Army and UN Joint Command tried to fight back, but the Communist Chinese Army was too strong. The Korean and UN forces could not defeat them. While a war of attrition continued, there was little change and finally, on 27 July, an armistice was agreed

On 8 July 1950, the whole Korean peninsula except Jeollanam and Jeollabuk provinces was under martial law. After the South Korean Army had moved north of the 38 Parallel, the South Korean Government lifted martial law in Jeju Island on 10 October. The South Korean Government also lifted martial

law across the whole Korean Peninsula on 10 November. Instead, it proclaimed “security status martial law” in most of South Korea on the same day, except Jeju Island and the southern part of Gyeongsang Province.<sup>1)</sup> However, when the situation got worse, the South Korean Government changed the condition from ‘security status martial law’ to ‘emergency martial law’ south of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel. After that the emergency martial law on the Jeju area was lifted on 22 February 1951.<sup>2)</sup> On 16 July 1951, the 5<sup>th</sup> Recruit Training Center was established in Jeju and when the war situation got worse, the 1<sup>st</sup> Recruit Training Center moved to the Moseulpo area.<sup>3)</sup> Also, two sets of cabins and radio channel operation centers were established in Jeju and in the Moseulpo area, there were also Communist Chinese Army detention centers built. As shown above, many military facilities were established in Jeju and they operated effectively.

From December 1950, a lot of war refugees started to come to Jeju. The South Korean Government held a cabinet meeting on 12 January 1951 and discussed sending 42,000 refugees to Jeju.<sup>4)</sup> The number of refugees recorded on 1 March 1951 increased to 87,000 on 15 March and reached 148,794 on 20 May.<sup>5)</sup> When the war between the North and South stabilized, some refugees made their way back to their own hometowns, but until January 1952, there were still 22,000 refugees in Bukjejugun and 6,500 people in Namjejugun; this means that a total of 28,460 refugees still remained in Jeju.<sup>6)</sup>

The 1<sup>st</sup> Recruit Training Center had eight training regiments, two teaching regiments, one noncommissioned officers' school and one military hospital. Before its closing in August 1954,<sup>7)</sup> it was one of the largest army bases in Jeju, which fostered many veterans. Also, the chief of the 1<sup>st</sup> Recruit Training Center was able to order operations and alert directions, even though he did

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1) The Bureau of Public Information Republic of Korea, *Official Gazette* No. 383, July 8, 1950; *Official Gazette* No. 396, October 10, 1950; *Official Gazette* No. 406, November 7, 1950.

2) *Dong-A Ilbo*, February 22, 1951; The Bureau of Public Information Republic of Korea, *Official Gazette* extra issue, December 7, 1950; *Official Gazette* extra issue, February 22, 1951.

3) Army Headquarters, *Operation Directives*, No. 29, January 21, 1951.

4) *6<sup>th</sup> Minutes of the Cabinet Council*, January 12, 1951.

5) Boo Man-geun, *Liberation - 30 Years' history of Jeju*, Munjosa, 1975, pp.116-117.

6) *Jeju Shinbo*, February 2, 1952.

7) Army Headquarters, *Instructions* No. 290, May 2, 1954.

not participate in the mopping-up operations of the armed guerrillas in the mountain. He made an order on 1 July 1952 to strengthen the security of the force and on 1 October he made an order to assign 1 security battalion to prepare for Chinese attack.

The United Nations Joint Command accommodated war prisoners in Busan at first, but due to the counter attack and interference of the Communist Chinese, they had to make a large detention camp on Geoje Island. Including both the Chinese and North Koreans, the recorded number of prisoners was 166,000. However, there was a conflict between pro-communist and anti-communist refugees among the enlisted soldiers from both China and North Korea. As a result, there were tragic murder cases and the director of the detention camp was even kidnapped. Therefore, the United Nations Joint Command divided the prisoners of war into two sides and pro-communist Chinese prisoners who wanted to return to mainland China were taken to Jeju airfield and flown home, while those who did not want to return (anti-communists) were taken into custody in Moseulpo. All North Korean prisoners were sent to the mainland. As of 1 February 1953, there were 5,809 refugees in Jeju airfield and 14,314<sup>8)</sup> refugees staying at Moseulpo airfield. On 1 October 1952, those who stayed at Jeju airfield held a demonstration to celebrate the third anniversary of the Chinese Communist Government. Two platoons of the US army in the detention camp repressed their demonstration and in this process, 56 prisoners of war were killed and 113 were injured.<sup>9)</sup>

## 2) Preventive Custody

When the Korean War broke out, the South Korean Government practiced “preventive custody” of reporters’ and individuals suspected of being opposed to the government. On 25 June at 2:25 pm., the Director of Public Order sent

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8) National Defense and Military Research Institute, *War Prisoners of the Korean War*, 1996, pp.68-76; The 1st Training Camp, *Operation Orders*, No. 7, September 28, 1953.

9) *Jeju Shinbo*, October 3, 1952; 4 ; *Chosun Ilbo*, October 4, 1952; Army Intelligence Agency, *Periodic Intelligence Report* No. 276, October 2, 1952; *Red Flag*, October 15, 1952.

an urgent telephone message stating there was a “nationwide crackdown and strengthening of security in prisons”. This message was sent to the commissioner of Jeju Police Station and the message stated: “Arrest all the people on the black list and strengthen security at all prisons”. On 8 July, the South Korean Government declared martial law and all of the police force, army and court organizations were vested in this promulgation of martial law.

Following the promulgation of martial law, all the people on the black list were arrested immediately in Jeju. From the end of June to early August, all public servants, teachers, students and housewives had to go through the process of “preventive custody”. At that time, the total number of people who went through “preventive custody” was recorded as 820, but a report written by an employee of the U.S Embassy stated that the police were specially keeping an eye on 700 executives of the Citizens’ Guidance Federation.

From the end of July to early August in the Jeju area, the executions of the subjects of the preventive custody held in the police stations in Jeju-eup, Seogwipo and Moseulpo were conducted by the Korean Army. These kinds of firing squad executions were done in secret. People who were detained at Moseulpo Police Station were killed at ‘Seosaroreum’ and this site was discovered by chance by local people. Apart from that, other information about how many were killed, where they were killed or how the execution was carried out was treated with strict confidentiality. (Detailed information about “preventive custody” is listed in the Chapter 4. Damage report, 2. Casualties, A, Group execution.)

By September 1950, death by firing squad had ceased. The Jeju Police Bureau hosted a joint meeting on 14 September and gathered their opinions to release prisoners who were impenitent and let them serve their roles as citizens of Korea. According to the examination results, 153 people under preventive custody were released on 18 September 1950.<sup>10)</sup> Following that, another 48 people under preventive custody were released from the Jeju Police Station.<sup>11)</sup> Seogwipo Police Station had released all detainees on 17 September.

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10) *Jeju Shinbo*, September 20, 1950.

11) *Jeju Shinbo*, September 23, 1950.

Moseulpo Police Station had released 90 people out of 344 before 18 September.<sup>12)</sup>

On the other hand, the ‘Incident of Local Dignitaries’ happened. In August 1950, the president of the Jeju District Court, the superintendent public prosecutor, the head of Jeju-eup, lawyers, businessmen, and teachers were arrested for preparing a ‘welcoming party for the North Korean People’s Army’ (At that time the commander of Jeju area battle headquarters was Shin Hyeon-jun.) The Martial Law Command arrested them and the atmosphere on Jeju became very heated.

However, Governor Kim Chung-hui believed the incident was slander and after discussing with Lee Seong-ju, the commissioner of Jeju Police Station, they submitted a petition to Jo Byeong-ok, Secretary of the Interior, and Shin Seong-mo, Minister of Defense. Furthermore, Gong Byeong-sun, Head of Jeju Special Forces wrote a report to the Ministry of Defense to reinvestigate the case. Chief-Detective Seonu Jong-won from the Headquarters of the National Police found out that the accusations were fabricated by Shin In-cheol, who was a Captain of the Martial Law Command. From the ‘Incident of Local Dignitaries’, Jeju society became rather intimidated. The Jeju natives witnessed the crisis of both their current President of the local district court and Superintendent Public Prosecutor nearly dying. Moreover, since this incident happened around the same time as the executions of the subjects of the preventive custody (on August 20), it sent a shudder of fear through the Jeju community in August of 1950.

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12) *Sending References of the Released among the Subjects of the preventive custody*, September 18, 1950 (in police files with related to the subjects of the preventive custody kept by Lee Do-yeong).

## **B. Annihilation of the Remaining Guerrillas**

### **1) Activities of Surviving Guerrillas**

After the anti-guerrilla operation from March to April 1949, the guerrillas' attacks were infrequent and the South Korean Government believed that they had defeated all the guerrillas. During the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment and the 1<sup>st</sup> Separate Battalion's operation period, they did not experience any attacks and during the Marine Corps' operation period in the early 1950s, only minor combat took place. Until then, surviving guerrillas in Mt. Halla numbered 60 or more and they tried to avoid any combat and hide their weapons. They were surviving by receiving food and aid from their parents and siblings.

However, the first attack by the armed guerrillas after the breakout of the Korean War occurred on 25 July 1950, just one month after the beginning of the Korean War and they burnt 99 houses.<sup>13)</sup> According to data from left-wing figures, since the outbreak of the Korean War, the armed guerrillas on the island had been actively attacking the police. On 25 July they attacked the Hawon Police Box in Jungmun-myeon and one battalion whose leader was Kim Ui-bong went to Jocheon-myeon farming district and carried out political propaganda to promote communism.<sup>14)</sup>

The guerrillas in Mt Halla heard about the outbreak of war and they discussed their future. At this time, the leading members, Go Seung-ok, Baek Chang-won and Song Won-byeong, insisted that they should go down the mountain as the North Korean Army had approached the Mokpo area. However, the youngsters wanted to keep the spirit of 4 · 3 and stay as heroic figures on the mountain. As a result of the argument, the leading three members were tied up by fellow guerrillas incited by Huh Yeong-sam and Kim Seong-gyu and executed the next day. After that, Kim Seong-gyu led the armed guerrillas and went down to the Jungmun area<sup>15)</sup> and Hun Yeong-sam assumed the role

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13) Hawon Village Community, *History of Hawon Village*, 1999. p.379.

14) Kim Bong-hyeon · Kim Min-ju, *History of Armed Uprising of Jeju People*, Osaka, Bunyusha, 1963, pp.257-258.

of commander on that day.

Starting by attacking Hawon, the armed guerrillas began to attack other towns and police boxes to kill right-wing figures and gather food. They also abducted youngsters aged 20 or younger to expand their power. Therefore, while police killed and captured guerrillas, the number of guerrillas kept on increasing because of the kidnapping. The guerrillas on Mt. Halla continued to attack Jeju natives and police stations and boxes and from July many left-wing figures in Jeju started to form supporting groups such as the 'Welcoming North Korean Communist Organization' and carried out campaigns to support the armed guerrillas.<sup>16)</sup>

As of March 1951, the armed guerrillas comprised of Commander Heo Young-sam (also in charge of the South Korean Labor Party, Native of Andeok), Commanding Officer Kim Tae-gil (alias Moon Ho-cheol), Operation Adviser Yoo (Unknown name, from Daegu), and a drillmaster (name unknown). They also organized their forces into four platoons and a command including the 11<sup>th</sup> Platoon (Commander Kim Young-chan, 14 members in three groups), the 50<sup>th</sup> Platoon (Commander Ko In-su (alias So Hyeong-sam), the 1<sup>st</sup> Platoon (Commander Kim Man-ok, 14 members in three groups), and the 7<sup>th</sup> Platoon (Commander Moon Do-gong, 14 members in three groups).<sup>17)</sup>

The South Korean Army's record of 16 March 1951 states: on 13 March at 24:00, 20 armed guerrillas and 20 unarmed guerrillas attacked Iho-ri, Jeju-eup and engaged in gunfire for 20 minutes and then they ran away to the mountain. During this gunfire, 12 innocent people were killed, 12 were abducted and 7 cows, 3 horses, clothes and food were stolen.<sup>18)</sup> The armed guerrillas tried to expand their power by attacking and abduction but the police stopped them and they were not successful in expanding their number and hence their power. In May 1952, the total number of guerrillas accounted for was 65 (armed 30, unarmed 35), they had 30 small arms and their commander

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15) Jeong Na-gak (age 74, Jeju, former police officer) Testimony recorded on October 10, 2001.

16) Kim Bong-hyeon and Kim Min-ju, *Ibid.* p.257.

17) Headquarters National Police, *Republic of Korea, Daily Intelligence Report*, March 11, 1951.

18) Army Intelligence Agency, *Periodic Intelligence Report* No. 75, March 16, 1951.

was Kim Sung-gyu.<sup>19)</sup>

At 2 a.m. on 16 September 1952, an unknown number of guerrillas disguised as South Korean Army personnel and police attacked Jeju Broadcasting Station. They abducted Kim Doo-gyu, the broadcasting manager, two 18-year-old workers and stole a telephone and broadcasting clock.<sup>20)</sup> The three abducted hostages were found a few days later near the guerrillas' camp, but all of them had been brutally murdered and buried under the ground.<sup>21)</sup> One month later, at 3 a.m. on 31 October, 27 guerrillas attacked Seogwipo power plant - even though it was under surveillance by eight police officers - and burnt it down.<sup>22)</sup> The electricity was out for a long period of time and it made the local people more frightened. One former guerrilla said that until April 1949 they could be called guerrillas, but after that there were barely guerrillas. Those who stayed on the mountain after June 1949 were more like bandits.<sup>23)</sup>

On the other hand, when the U.S. Embassy received a report saying the guerrillas in Jeju were starting to resume their activity on 13 August 1950, they formed an inspection team consisting of Naval Attaché John P. Seifert, Third Secretary Donald S. Macdonald and Vice-Consul Philip Rowe; they visited Jeju from 15 to 17 August. Also, they met the Jeju governor, the general manager of the Provincial Office, and commander of the Marine Corps and together they assessed the situation. They submitted a report of the assessment of Jeju to the U.S. Embassy. The U.S. Embassy expressed that they would focus more on the Jeju issue and they believed the South Korean Government would also place special focus on Jeju. They also suggested that Jeju needed an experienced guerrilla combat advisor. In terms of anti-guerrilla action and reconnaissance, the U.S said it was necessary to establish riot

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19) Army Intelligence Agency, *Army Periodic Intelligence Report* No. 137, May 16, 1952. It is known that the commander of the guerrillas was Kim Seong-gyu; Where and when the former commander Huh Yeong-sam was killed by police is unknown.

20) Army Intelligence Agency, *Periodic Intelligence Report* No. 262, September 18, 1952. Jeju Police Agency, *History of Jeju Police*, 1990, p.317.

21) *Pyeonghwa Shinmun*, September 19, 1952.

22) Army Intelligence Agency, *Periodic Intelligence Report* No. 305, October 31, 1952; *Periodic Intelligence Report* No. 306, November 1, 1952.

23) Kim Min-ju (age 71, Japan, former armed guerilla), Testimony recorded on July 8, 2002.

police and they should be well-trained in guerrilla tactics. They note that the Marine Corps should be saved for the more serious attacks.<sup>24)</sup> However, Drumright had a different opinion, saying the Marine Corps were needed on the mainland so they should be withdrawn soon.<sup>25)</sup> On 24 August, the Jeju Garrison Command started to form the riot team and began their operations.<sup>26)</sup>

## 2) Police Repression Operation

After the Korean War broke out, the South Korean Government declared martial law and the Marine Corps on Jeju had to leave for the mainland in September. Therefore, police officers were in charge of the guerrilla repression operation and after the incident at Hawon-ri in July, the police paid sharp attention to any movement of guerrillas. First of all, the police began to collect information about the guerrillas and they found out that a considerable number were still active. Therefore, they gathered volunteer police officers and Jeju civil-defense forces together to cooperate with the police. They established two new battalions called the Sinseon Unit and the Maengho Troop. In order to stabilize security, the Jeju Police Bureau chose 246 young men as volunteer police in July, under Captain Pil Saeng Kang, with two battalions.<sup>27)</sup> The also president made his ninth urgent order (4 August) for urgent security and by mid-August, men aged 17 to 50 joined the homeland defense force on a township basis.<sup>28)</sup> Furthermore, on 12 August, a warning was released saying that any cow or horse can only be out in the fields between 7am and 7pm and it must not go up the slopes of Mt. Halla. If anyone does not follow this rule, the owner of the horse and cow was to be considered a guerrilla and

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24) Huh Ho-jun, *A Study on the Development of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and U.S. Army's Counterstrategy*, Jeju National University master's degree thesis, 2002, p.120.

25) Everett F. Drumright to John M. Allison Department of State August 29, 1950, The Foreign Service of The United State of america, American Embassy, Taegu Office.

26) *Jeju Shinbo*, August 26, 1950.

27) *Jeju Shinbo*, August 5, 1950; Kang Yong-sam and Lee Gyeong-su, *Annals of Jeju*, 1984, Taegwang-Munhwasa, pp.769-775.

28) *Jeju Shinbo*, August 9 and 11, 1950; The Bureau of Public Information Republic of Korea, *Official Gazette*, No. 387, August 4, 1950.

would be executed, along with the horse or cow.<sup>29)</sup>

According to data collected by the police, the military achievements gained from 1 October 1950 to 22 April 1952 are as follows:

△ Killed: 56 guerrillas; △ Collected weapons: 11 (one Russian rifle, three carbine, seven Japanese rifles) and two grenades. Casualties: △ 17 police officers (15 dead, two injured), △ Self-Defense Force: 24 (11 dead, 11 injured, two missing). △ Civilians: 42 (one dead, one injured, 38 abducted), △ Loss of livestock: 44 cows and nine horses; △ Loss of weapons: two carbines, 12 rifles.<sup>30)</sup>

As the Jeju Civil-Defense Force was dispersed, civilian security was threatened and as a result, many people volunteered to form the police force, firefighters, and interception forces. To keep in line with the mainland, Jeju also established a Special Civil-Defense Force called ‘Teukdongdae’ on 25 January 1952 to support the anti-guerrilla operations.<sup>31)</sup>

The police force also built checkpoints or guard posts along main roads and streets in order to block any contact between guerrillas and civilians, as well as to isolate the guerrillas. These checkpoints had been built before the Korean War, and by 1952 there were a total of 32 checkpoints across Jeju. These guard posts were made out of stone walls with the help of civilians; one police officer and five to six young men stayed together at each checkpoint every night. There was also a large room, which could accommodate more than 30 anti-guerrilla operation members, so that they could use these guard posts as temporary lodgings. There was telephone communication between checkpoints, but due to bad reception they used wireless radios to communicate. Housewives stayed in these guard posts too to cook food for the anti-guerrilla operation members. Some important guard posts were very large and could accommodate 60 or more people, and these were equipped with a restaurant and bedrooms. The guard posts were divided into two categories; permanent and temporary

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29) *Jeju Shinbo*, 1950, 8. 13.

30) Headquarters, Korean National Police force, Republic of Korea, *Daily Enemy Activity Report #0006*, April 24, 1951.

31) *Jeju Shinbo*, January 19 and 26, 1952.

where police stayed only during the periods of operations.<sup>32)</sup>

Despite the police force's endless efforts to establish guard posts and dispatch police forces for anti-guerrilla operations, no marked progress was achieved. In early December 1952, former Jeju Police Commissioner, Yoon Seok-yeol, stated that: "We will sweep all the guerrillas by early spring. We will also punish people who spread rumors, fence-sitters and communists, and we will continue our special tactics for those people too."<sup>33)</sup>

Further, the Department of Security in the Ministry of Home Affairs sent Kim Jun-jong and his seven subordinates to Jeju from 1 April to 30 April to carry out "Guerrilla Mop-up Operations". The objective of this special task force team was to lead the guerrillas to the west of Mt. Halla and capture them. Their aim was to use a relatively small police force to steadily approach the guerrillas, pushing up a line of defense.<sup>34)</sup> For this 'spring operation', the police ordered Jeju people not to go into Mt. Halla in early April. The restricted areas were located 5.8 kilometers away from the coastalline in the precincts of the Seongsanpo Police Station and the Moseulpo Police Station and in the jurisdictions of the Jeju Police Station and the Seogwipo Police Station; the outside of the line between the police posts of Ara and Haean was designated a no-trespassing zone.<sup>35)</sup>

This operation took one week of preparation and one week of arranging, totaling 16 days, but again few military achievements were gained. Yoon Seok-ryeol, the Jeju police commissioner, said in his speech on 19 May that, "The special operation that we've carried out from early April was constant, but because of the geographical conditions, it was hard to even find the guerrillas and I am very regretful about that. But the operation is still ongoing and we are moving our outposts further inside the wooded areas, seven kilometers to eight kilometers inside, so that we can close the blockade. We

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32) *Jeju Shinbo*, April 5, 1952; Jeju 4·3 Research Institute, *The Long Journey of the 4·3 Incident*, Vol. 5, 1992, pp.76-81.

33) *Jeju Shinbo*, April 29, 1952.

34) Bureau of Public Order, *Public Security Order*, No. 13, March 26, 1952.

35) *Jeju Shinbo*, April 29, 1952.

are also getting more troops and facilities to combat the guerrillas.”<sup>36)</sup>

The following areas were the no-trespassing areas where the forward-deployed checkpoints were installed:

- △ Jeju-eup Area : outside of the line that connects Myeongdoam - Yeongpyeong  
- Jukseong - Geumak - Yusindong
- △ Aewol-eup Area : outside of the line that connects Yusindong - Geumdeok  
- Seogwang - Geumak
- △ Hallim-myeon Area : outside of the line that connects Geumak - Jeongmuroreum  
- Doeurak
- △ Andeok-myeon Area : outside of the line that connects Doeurak - Byeongak  
- Nokhaji
- △ Jungmun-myeon Area : outside of the line that connects Nokhaji - Sechoji
- △ Seogwipo-myeon Area : outside of the line that connects Sechoji - Miak - Suak
- △ Namwon-myeon Area : outside of the line that connects Suak - 456 highland  
- Minak
- △ Pyoseon-myeon Area : outside of the line that connects Minak - Daerokbong  
- Modunak - Gaemioreum
- △ Gujwa-myeon Area : outside of the line that connects Gaemioreum - Nopeunoreum  
- Cheoreum
- △ Jocheon-myeon Area : outside of the line that connects Cheoreum - Albamagi  
- Cheonmiak - Sugidong - myeongdoam<sup>37)</sup>

The police force attempted to induce defection among the remaining guerrillas, including contacting them through relatives, spreading flyers on the mountain and delivering inducement of defection lectures to village residents. The Jeju Council also printed out propaganda, saying: ‘If you defect, our nation will guarantee your life and the Jeju Council will take responsibility for the rest of your life. Let’s stop this meaningless rebellion and join in the peace building for Jeju.’<sup>38)</sup> From October 1950, police forces started to run a new department specializing in defector management, with six members in the department. This department’s task was to take in captured war prisoners or

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36) *Jeju Shinbo*, May 20, 1952.

37) *Jeju Shinbo*, September 30, 1952.

38) *Jeju Shinbo*, June 5, 1952.

defectors and interrogate them with special skills. In doing so, their objective was to gather information about the guerrillas and find suitable measures to oppose them. In other words, they delivered useful information to the anti-guerrilla operations team and through loudspeakers they would induce defection and spread flyers and use guerrillas' family members to persuade them to defect. This department's other task was to introduce jobs for defectors and if there were any dead bodies on the battle field, they would go there and find out the identity of the dead person.<sup>39)</sup>

The propaganda flyers were spread under the name of the chairperson of the Jeju Council but later they were spread under the name of the commissioner of Jeju Police Station. This kind of inducement for defection lasted for a year and there were even cases where guerrillas killed their colleagues and defected. Along with spreading flyers, they hosted special speeches by ex-guerrillas who had defected themselves and were living a whole new life. They would compare the life on the mountain with the life that they now enjoy and family members of guerrillas would secretly contact and persuade them. This kind of "open arms" program was very successful. Defectors did confirm that many rebels were agitated. On 19 June, two guerrillas defected and said: "Many of our colleagues are being agitated and want to climb down the mountain but if that mood is known to the others there will be death threats, so because of fear it is really hard to put it in action. If what the police are saying is true, I think many guerrillas will come down from the mountain."<sup>40)</sup>

According to Kim Gi-yeol (female, 22): 'Recently, many guerrillas have been confused and agitated and one of our colleagues, Yang Sun-ae, tried to escape a few days ago and she was killed immediately. Lee In-seon was also killed because of betraying the group.'<sup>41)</sup> Kang Chan-seok (farmer, 19) who defected on 26 July, said 'Recently, there is unrest among guerrillas and the boss is busy watching over them and purges are being undertaken. Now, the

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39) Jung Na Gak (74 years old, Jeju city Ildo 1-Dong, Former Police Officer, October 10, 2001. Recorded) Testimony.

40) *Jeju Shinbo*, June 22, 1952.

41) *Jeju Shinbo*, July 24, 1952.

total number of guerrillas is 70 and people who joined after 4 · 3 are 24 and even they are very agitated.<sup>42)</sup>

From the outbreak of the Korean War until 22 June 1952, a total number of 22 guerrillas defected and they got jobs offered by police, or they worked as public servants; they could also stay at home and concentrate on their own occupations.<sup>43)</sup> As of 13 October 1952, Yoon Seok-ryeol, commissioner of Jeju Police Station resigned and Lee Kyung-jin from Busan Marine Police Station got a promotion and was inaugurated as the new commissioner of Jeju Police Station. Commissioner Lee Kyung-jin had a lot of experience in anti-guerrilla operations, as Geumsan theater commander, Nakdonggang theater commander and Donghae theater commander.<sup>44)</sup>

As soon as the new commissioner was inaugurated in Jeju, he started active anti-guerrilla plans and established the 100 Police Headquarters on 1 November (referred to as 100 Headquarters).<sup>45)</sup> Four battalions were placed under the 100 Police Headquarters (Commander: Senior Superintendent Kim Won-yong, Seogwipo) and these were: 101<sup>st</sup> Battalion (Commanding Officer: Inspector Han Jae-gil, Seongeup), 102<sup>nd</sup> Battalion (Commanding Officer: Inspector Han Nak-gu, Seongsanpo), 103<sup>rd</sup> Battalion (Commanding Officer: Inspector Jang Seok-gwan, Nokhaji), 105<sup>th</sup> Battalion (Commanding Officer: Inspector Hyeon Byeong-du, Daraeoreum). The total number of troops was 110 per battalion and there were three battalions and two platoons with 30 people. These squadrons had their own names and these were: Baekrok, Shinpung, Shinsun and Pilseung. Therefore, the 100 Police Headquarters had four battalions, one headquarters, a communication center, and one supply station and there were 500 troops in total.<sup>46)</sup>

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42) *Jeju Shinbo*, July 30, 1952.

43) *Jeju Shinbo*, June 22, 1952.

44) *Jeju Shinbo*, December 3, 1953.

45) Jeju Police Agency, *History of Jeju Police*, 1990, p.318.

46) Kim Chang-geun (age 75 years old, Aewol-eup, former police officer), Testimony recorded on September 20, 2001; Song Bong-chun (age 77, Daejung-eup, former member of a right-wing organization and police officer), Testimony recorded on August 8, 2002; Han Jae-gil (age 81, Seogwipo, former police officer), Testimony recorded on October 23, 2002.

However, Jeju Police Station formed another inspection squadron (Commanding Officer: Lieutenant Huh Chang-sun) whose objective it was to gather information about guerrillas and sometimes they cooperated with the anti-guerrilla operations team. Also, each police station was given an inspection guerrilla unit and they did the same job as the inspection squadron.

The members of 100 Police Headquarters had to be trained for two weeks in Moseulpo at the Army 1<sup>st</sup> Training Camp, and they were all equipped with an M-1 rifle and two grenades and stayed in the mountains in order to stay in the same conditions as the guerrillas. The Jeju police also asked for a budget of 31 million won for the winter operation and in addition they requested food, clothing, gloves and blankets. The total amount was 68 million won. With their request, they said: 'If this budget is provided to us, the anti-gerrilla operations team will not do any damage to local housing and we will do our best to capture and assimilate the guerrillas.'<sup>47)</sup> This implies that there had been some damage to housing due to the lack of budget because the members of the anti-guerrilla operations team had forced Jeju people to provide board and lodging.

Jeju Police also appealed to the security department that they needed more troops and received three squadrons (114 people per squadron) between 25 December 1952 and 15 June 1953.<sup>48)</sup> These forces were used to fill in the absence of 100 Police Headquarters, or used as mobile reserve for each police station. The 100 Police Headquarters prohibited its anti-guerrilla operations team to climb down the mountain and they kept in touch with each other by the telephone cable that was made during Japanese occupation. They called it 'Hajimaki', meaning hair band. However, because the guerrillas frequently cut the telephone cable, they used wireless radios more often. The commander of 100 Police Headquarters boarded a helicopter and confirmed each checkpoint's location by walkie-talkie and he gave military orders. The way they found out the checkpoints and battalions' location was by smoke bomb.<sup>49)</sup>

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47) *Jeju Shinbo*, November 4, 1952.

48) Bureau of Public Order, *Public Security Order*, No. 84, December 10, 1952; *Public Security Order* No. 16, June 8, 1953.

The operation area on land above 500 meters was the responsibility of the 100 Police Headquarters and below that level it was each police station's responsibility. Therefore, if police from 100 Police Headquarters came down below 500 meters, that was a violation of military action. Because of this complex system, there were cases where police from 100 Police Headquarter came down below 500 meters and exchanged gunfire with the inspection squadron units from police stations.<sup>50)</sup> The total number of guerrillas in Mt. Halla was recorded as 68 on 1 June 1952, but as a result of constant anti-guerrilla operations and inducement of defection, they had decreased to 44 by 20 November.<sup>51)</sup> Kang Tae-won (20) from Jocheon-myeon was captured on 26 November 1952 and he told of the process of his escape, from internal discord to final escape from the group.

“I was abducted by the guerrillas on a day in September 1951, when I went up the mountain to get some wood. I had to go through mental training by Gwon Soo Jung and he said if we wait for a half year the Russians will come to this island and give freedom to us. He also said they will give land to farm and Jeju will become like a utopia but I didn't believe him. I was then transferred to an armed guerrilla group and engaged in plunder a few times, but I felt tired. One day, while acting as sentry, I fell asleep and they found me. I saw them preparing to execute me, so I pretended to go to the toilet and ran away, avoiding female rebels. I was in the mountain for four months and was captured by the guerrillas as a prisoner.

The food, clothing and shelter of the guerrillas were very simple - they ate porridge and salt only. Sometimes they ate horse. They use one blanket for two people and slept in very secluded bush. When it was raining, they used the blanket as shelter. They cried out for freedom in words and they said they were working for the people but what exactly they were doing was dictatorship. As a result, there had been internal struggle. In other words, when Heo Young-sam was the commander, people like Gwon Pal siphoned off ammunition because it was in short supply. However, after Heo was killed by the police and Kim Seong-

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49) Jwa Ok-yeon (age 76, Hangyung-myeon, former police officer), Testimony recorded on February 27, 2002.

50) Song Bong-chun (age 77, Daejung-eup, former member of a right-wing organization and police officer), Testimony recorded on August 8, 2002.

51) *Jeju Shinbo*, November 19, 1952.

gyu succeeded Heo, the new commander Kim found that Gwon had pocketed the ammunition. Even though Kim and Heo had a very close relationship, without hesitation, Kim tortured Gwon, but Gwon managed to escape. Kim Seong-gyu was very harsh to his colleagues and violent so 11 subordinates went to Gwon's side. The battalions continued the hostility, but one day there was a gunfight, and Gwon's faction was exterminated. On Kim's side too, too many people were injured and hence their power rapidly weakened."<sup>52)</sup>

The Jeju Police exterminated guerrillas using the 100 Police Headquarters and other anti-guerrilla units and each police station was prepared for combat and sometimes they went on stakeouts. In 1953, when the Rainbow Unit of the Korean Army joined them, for three months the Jeju Police carried out concerted operations with the corps.

The Cheongryong Company of the 101st Troop began its operation on 22 December 1952 and on 24 December they had a gunfight with 20 guerrillas in Malche Oreum forest. They killed four guerrillas. Also on 24 January 1953, 20 guerrillas attacked households and stole cows and horses. The 100 Police Headquarter chased the guerrillas until the next day and Kim Jong-hwa's squadron engaged in three hours of gunfire and killed five guerrillas. On the 26, the 101<sup>st</sup> Troop had a four-hour-long gunfight with the guerrillas and killed four and captured one alive. Hence, in total they killed nine guerrillas and captured one war prisoner within two days. The director of public order sent a congratulatory letter to the Jeju Police.<sup>53)</sup> Former Commanding Officer Han Jae-gil recalls the pursuit as follows:

“When there was an attack in the Jungmun area, we started to chase them to the Aewol area. In Aewol, we started to see footprints and the company commander ordered us to go downwards. However, I refused because the guerrillas would have to take food and carry it on their horses heading to the mountain. There is no reason for them to have gone down to the town. So, I made the order to chase them up the mountainside. When we went up the mountain, we saw their military camp. These people wore shoes the wrong way

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52) *Jeju Shinbo*, December 5 and 6, 1952.

53) *Jeju Shinbo*, January 26, 27 and 28, 1953.

round and climbed up the mountain just to fool us. We surrounded them and attacked them. After the gunfight, we found cows and horses that they had stolen from the Jungmun area. We captured women war prisoners, too.”<sup>54)</sup>

The armed guerrillas of Mt. Halla gradually became powerless as they were already fighting against the police’s anti-guerrilla units and the 100 Headquarters anti-guerrilla units. On 20 November 1952, the police force demolished all the checkpoints and police guard posts and withdrew all the police forces.<sup>55)</sup> They printed 20,000 propaganda leaflets for Jeju natives to ask for their cooperation and promised freedom for any defectors. A reward of 10 million won was offered for killing, capturing or delivering the dead body of guerrilla boss Kim Seong-gyu. And if anyone captured an old guerrilla (who had joined the armed guerrilla units since the early stage of the 4 · 3 Incident), they would get a reward of one million won.<sup>56)</sup>

On 13 October 1953, the commander of 100 Headquarters was changed to Senior Superintendent Kim Won-yong and as a result, 101 Headquarters Vice-Commander Han Jae-gil became commander and Jeong Chung-bin became vice-commander. Around late-October 1953 to November, it was the 13<sup>th</sup> month for Director Lee Kyung-jin and the military achievements and casualties during his time are as follows:

- △ Military Achievements: Killed: 29, Captured: 14; Defectors: 22; Killed or missing: 15; Total: 80
- △ Equipment damage: Rifles: 25; Bullets: 352; Food: 82 bags; Cows and horses: 135, and other damage
- △ Casualties: 10 allies dead (one police officer, nine conscripted police officers)  
Equipment damage: Stolen rifles: seven
- △ Remaining guerrillas: 11 (five old guerrillas, six abducted guerrillas)<sup>57)</sup>

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54) Han Jae-gil (age 81, Seogwipo, former police officer), Testimony recorded on October 23, 2002.

55) *Jeju Shinbo*, November 21, 1953.

56) *Jeju Shinbo*, November 21, 1953.

57) *Jeju Shinbo*, December 3, 1953.

In order to exterminate the 11 guerrillas, the police force carried out their tactics and gained military achievements both in December 1953 and January 1954. On 15 January, the police force announced that there were only six guerrillas left in the mountain and stated their military achievements as follows:

December 1953 ~ 15 January 1954

- △ Casualties: Killed one; one dead body, three defected; total: five
- △ Weapons and others: Rifles: 13; food, subversive documents, basic commodities
- △ Surviving guerrillas: six (four males, two females)
- △ Obtained intelligence: the six guerrillas are divided into two groups (three males, one female) and (one male, one female) they have lost contact and two males, Kim Sung-gyu and Jeong Gwon-su, have gun shot wounds.<sup>58)</sup>

On 13 February 1954, one female guerrilla, Jo Hwa-ok (19), defected and the number decreased to five (four males and one female), and three weapons were left with them. According to Cho, they ran out of food a month previously and ate vegetables, sweet potatoes and horse meat. They were scared to approach towns, and her team of four thought that even inside a cave was not safe, so they slept under brambles with one blanket. The surviving guerrillas were five in total and had three rifles. Kim Sung-gyu had one rifle and he was with Han Soon-ae as a team and Jeong Gwon-su, Oh Won-gwon and Byeon Chang-hui have two rifles and were moving together.<sup>59)</sup> The police force decided these few guerrillas would not be a problem and gave permission to Jeju natives to come back to their homes as of 1 April and they partially opened Mt. Halla.<sup>60)</sup>

### 3) Military Anti-guerrilla Operation

#### ① Marine Corps Anti-guerrilla Operation

When the Korean War broke out on 25 June 1950, the Marine Corps in

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58) *Jeju Shinbo*, January 15 and February 16, 1954.

59) *Jeju Shinbo*, February 16, 1954.

60) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 18, 1954.

Jeju ceased the anti-guerrilla operation and concentrated on security in the coastal areas. When emergency martial law was declared on 8 July, the Jeju Marine Corps' role expanded to include keeping the safety and security of the coastal area to prevent enemy attacks and they were charged with catching and eliminating the enemy as soon as they were found. When the North Korean Army moved southward with tanks, the Marine Corps moved the 1st Regiment (3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion) to Gunsan on 15 July.

On the other hand, there was also the Marine Corps headquarters, which conscripted 3,000 new troops from 5 August and they formed a new regiment. On 1 September, the Marine Corps headquarters left Jeju with Commander Hyeon Jun-shin<sup>61)</sup> and arrived in Busan. They trained with the U.S. Marine Corps and participated in Operation Chromite on 15 September.<sup>62)</sup> Due to Chinese reinforcements, North Korea's front line rapidly moved south, and the number of war refugees increased greatly, too. During this period, the armed guerrillas restarted their activities with fervor. At that time, the Jeju recruiting centers were newly established, but as the armed guerrillas began reappearing, the South Korean Army sent a squadron of Marine Corps. On 14 January 1951, the Marine Corps were organized as a fighting force into four platoons alongside a few police. The leading force was the Marine Corps and its commander was Gwon Seok-gi, who made a contribution in the Tongyoung Operation.

On 17 January, the Marine Corps and police forces' anti-guerrilla expedition operation began. At that time the total number of armed guerrillas was estimated to be around 80. The anti-guerrilla expedition team made their base camp in Seogwipo (south of Mt. Halla) and searched the east side of the mountain. On 27 January, the anti-guerrilla expedition team's 1st Platoon caught 29 guerrillas in Eoseungsaengak and had a firefight for 40 minutes. They killed three guerrillas and captured some loot. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Platoon discovered 30

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61) Jeju Shinbo, August 5 and September 1, 1950; Joint Investigation Party between Military and Police Dispatched to Jeju, *Daily Record of Investigation (Case of Establishing a preparation committee for welcoming the North Korean People's Army)*, September 1, 1950.

62) Headquarters of Marine Corps, *History of Marine Corps Battles*, Vol. 1, 1962, pp.38-40.

guerrillas moving their food around the Saraak area and ambushed them, killing three guerrillas. On 10 February, they discovered the hideout of the guerrillas between Saraak and Myeongdoam, raided it and killed 15. However, they were surrounded by 60 other guerrillas; however, fortunately the 1<sup>st</sup> Platoon was on hand to help and they were able to fight back against the guerrillas. Many guerrillas ran away at that time and the Marine Corps killed a total of 20 in this gun-fighting, although Seo Jae-yun and 10 other members of the Marine Corps were killed. On 22 February, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Platoon encountered 40 guerrillas and killed five after a gunfight.

The Marine Corps led the army and police cooperative operation team and continued the operation until March, killing 50 guerrillas and capturing a sizeable amount of weaponry, so the guerrillas were depleted.

## ② Army Special Forces' Anti-guerrilla Operation

On 1 January, a secret special operations force was established in Daegu and its name was later changed to the special operations forces (hereafter unit 9172). The commander of this unit was Colonel Lee Gi-geon, vice commanders were Major Park Chang-am and Major Song Jeong-hyeop. This unit was arranged into two parts: underground operation unit and ambush unit. They were specially trained for five months in Hawaii.

After the special training, the unit was divided into the Donghaean unit and the Mt. Halla unit and trained again in Hyeoljeongjeong in Busan. The Donghaean unit focused on ambush using marine infiltration and the Mt. Halla unit focused on practicing all round tactics and the capture of the guerrillas. The Mt. Halla unit stayed on Jeju from 20 January - 27 May 1953, and changed its name to the Rainbow Unit, by the order of Headquarters Intelligence Department (Commander, Colonel Lee Cheol-hui) on 25 January. The Rainbow Unit was led by Major Park Chang-am and there were 86 troops (25 officers and 61 enlisted men) and they arrived in Jeju on 29 January and moved to Seogwi-myeon, Shinhyo-ri.<sup>63)</sup> The Rainbow Unit had

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63) Military Staff College, *Military Review* 79, 1967, p.10; Army Intelligence Staff Bureau, *Revolution of red Guerrillas*, 1971, pp.523-524.

a Headquarters (five officers and six enlisted men) and five platoons (four officers and eleven enlisted men each); one platoon was comprised of a headquarters (one officer, two enlisted men) and three groups (one officer and three enlisted men) and everyone was equipped with a carbine rifle or M-1 rifle and walkie-talkie. After getting ready at Shinhyo Elementary School, the Rainbow Unit climbed up Mt. Halla at night and carried out their operations. The period of the Rainbow Unit's operations followed slightly after the 100 Headquarters' operations.

The Rainbow Unit lacked troops so they focused on psychological warfare and when they carried out operations they removed their insignia so the commander wouldn't get shot. Alongside 100 Headquarters', the Rainbow Unit carried out one to seven operations and most involved the police surrounding the armed guerrillas and then the Rainbow Unit staked them out. Alternatively, the police force would besiege the armed guerrillas and then the Rainbow Unit would search or raid them.

The sixth operation was carried out on 13 March and caused severe damage to the guerrillas. In this operation, the police force besieged from the rear and all the troops from five zones were deployed from Gyeonworak to Seongpanak. On this afternoon, they located the hiding place and attacked the guerrillas and they escaped to the peak of the Mt. Halla in groups of two to four people by using their knowledge of topography and the forest. The police force could not block the passage and they could not kill all the guerrillas. However, the armed guerrillas were flushed out of their hiding place, which they had used for the last three years. The objective of the seventh operation was to accelerate the success of the sixth operation and they covered Mt. Halla from May 1 to 3 during the day and climbed down at night to gather at Jeju police station. This was the end of the three-month operation.

A former police officer who participated in this operation said: "six people from the Inspection Department including myself were deployed to a special force called the Rainbow Unit. This unit was a strange one: a team consists of one soldier, one police officer and us from the Inspection Department. There was no insignia and we got supplies from light aircraft, but we only

got two blankets and two raincoats. We dug trenches for two people and spent the nights. Our life was more miserable than that of the guerrillas. However, when I think back now, their objective was not to capture the red guerrillas but secretly train us to send to North Korea. When we were on our way back from Mt. Halla, we were inspected and when we showed a kind of ID the MP saluted and we could pass through.<sup>64)</sup> It means the Rainbow Unit was intended for Jeju operations as well as for infiltration missions to North Korea.

In this operation, there had been a lack of cooperation between the police force and the Rainbow Unit and there was a misconceived gunfight between them, allowing the guerrillas to escape. The results of this operation are as follows: killed seven, captured two, defected two, with no casualties to allies.<sup>65)</sup>

### **C. Lifting of Standstill Orders**

#### **1) Lifting of the Standstill Order and the Last Anti-guerrilla Expedition**

On 28 August 1954, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Shin Sang-muk, arrived in Jeju to succeed Police Commissioner Lee Gyeong-jin. As the last five guerrillas had been hidden for a long time, Shin lifted the closure of Mt. Halla on 21 September 1954, and opened up the mountain. Also, Jeju natives' castle security was also lifted.<sup>66)</sup> After opening Mt.Halla for a year, on 21 September, 1955, a peace memorial monument was established on the north side of Baengnokdam. On this monument, it says: "Shine forever Shin Sang-muk, commissioner of the Jeju Police Force, who opened up Mt. Halla on 21 September which had been closed for eight years. His heroic achievement should be remembered forever and we thank you for your contribution to the peace and blessing of Jeju Island.<sup>67)</sup>

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64) Ko Yeong-jin (age 78, Jeju-si, former police officer), Testimony recorded on February 7, 2002.

65) Military Staff College, Ibid., p.13; Lee Jang-ho (former military officer of Rainbow Corps), Testimony recorded by the Institute for Military History Compilation.

66) Jeju Police Agency, Ibid., pp.318-319.

67) Jeju Police Agency, Ibid., p.319.

However, the rest of the five guerrillas were still in the mountain so, even though the closure had been lifted, it didn't mean that the anti-guerrilla operation had ended, too. On 9 February, Commissioner Shin visited the family members of the five guerrillas and persuaded them that he guaranteed their relatives' lives if they surrendered.<sup>68)</sup> On 3 April, the anti-guerrilla unit engaged the enemy in a fire-fight in Chaoreum in Gujwa-eup, Songdang-ri, and killed Jung Gwon-soo, the number two boss of the guerrillas. This military achievement was gained after two years and two months and now the guerrilla numbers were reduced to four. However, the police force could not find any more traces of guerrillas and on 11 March 1957, in the police meeting, they decided to make the catching of the guerrillas the individual responsibility of each police station and its superintendent.<sup>69)</sup>

On 21 March 1957, the Jeju police anti-guerrilla unit captured Han Soon-ae, the only female member, while her group was in the Wolpyeongdong area getting some food, as she was slower than the other male guerrillas.<sup>70)</sup> On the 27, the anti-guerrilla unit had a gunfight with three guerrillas in Mt. Halla's Pyeonganak area. This area was very bushy and in this fighting the unit killed two guerrillas, including Kim Seong-gyu and the last surviving guerrilla Oh Won-gwon was also captured on 2 April in Gujwa-myeon, Songdand-ri.<sup>71)</sup> Finally, this was the end of gunfighting in Mt. Halla.

## 2) Relief of Refugees and the Reconstruction of Towns

### ① Relief of Refugees

The most compelling issue after 4·3 was relief for the refugees. These refugees were the victims of arson, but most of them had left their own townships because they were told to move away from upland areas to the coastal area. The withdrawal of Jeju natives from upland areas was carried out without any

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68) *Jeju Shinbo*, February 10, 1955.

69) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 23, 1957.

70) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 23, 1957.

71) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 29, April 3 and May 15, 1957; *Chosun Ilbo*, April 3, 1957.

countermeasure. Because of police and soldiers' arson, many Jeju natives became refugees and went up to the mountain, or moved to the coastal area without any work to earn a living. Wintertime was especially harsh for them.

The number of refugees from 4 · 3 numbered 80,000 to 90,000.<sup>72)</sup> That means one third of the Jeju population had become refugees. However, the relief of refugees was dealt with insincerely in parliament. One of the members of the national assembly, Oh Yong-guk's unread script and Joo Ki-yong's 'Jeju Inspection Report' mentioned the issue of Jeju refugees. From the Ministry of Public Administration and Security, they decided to provide aid and a budget for Jeju after the Prime Minister and Minister of Home Affairs' visit to Jeju.

On 22 October 1948, during the parliament meeting regarding international affairs and national security, they discussed the issues of the refugees from the Yeosu-Suncheon Incident in Jeonnam Province but the issue of the Jeju refugees wasn't discussed at the meeting. After a while, in the 124 meeting on 8 December 1948, the parliament decided to deploy members of the National Assembly to the uprising area.<sup>73)</sup> As a result, Oh Yong-guk, who visited Jeju, wrote a report about Jeju including emergency aid measures:

“Emergency aid for refugees: 80,000 to 90,000 refugees are in Jeju due to murder, arson, and robbery by the armed guerrillas and also by operations by the South Korean Army. It is important to relieve these refugees and Jeju is trying its best to relieve these refugees in cooperation with the Provincial Office and citizens.

1) Supply food – The refugees are staying in empty houses or outdoors, in simple camps in the landscape, and food is provided by the army, which they took from the guerrillas. There is the food stock of Jeju donated by the citizens. People are eating sweet potatoes but a lot more support and aid is needed for Jeju.

2) Supply clothing – Guerrillas took all their clothing and blankets so they are receiving donated clothing from other province's wealthy people. The central

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72) The number of war refugees stated in *Jayu Shinmun* was 86,797 (March 23, 1949); *Chosun Ilbo* 88,990 (June 2, 1949), and *Seoul Shinmun* stated 97,703 (September 1, 1949).

73) The Secretariat of the National Assembly, Dispatching Pacification Team to Incident Place, *National Assembly Stenographic Records*, the 1st National Assembly, No. 124, December 8, 1948.

government sent 10,000 yards of cotton, but because it is wintertime, people are shivering so that it is hard to look at them. So, clothing supplies are essential.”<sup>74)</sup>

A member of the National Assembly Joo Ki-yong portrays the horrible scenes in Jeju in his report ‘Jeju Exploration’, which was written during his 10-day visit to Jeju from 1 March 1949.

“Status of refugees: Damaged houses in the hilly, upland areas and agricultural areas, including Namwon, Bukchon, Dongbok, and Seogwipo amounted to 16,177 households and 30,461 dong. The number of victims is: 1,193 dead, 419 injured and 86,797 refugees. They didn't even have time to move their food and clothing so they are living in places resembling a pig cage. They sleep on dried vegetation, placed on the ground. They can only eat seaweed, and plants from the mountain and their houses have a terrible odor. When I visited them, I just looked at the sky and shed tears. They are not only lacking in food, but there is no clothing and bedding and moreover disease is spreading and it is hard to even look at them living such a life. Therefore, the central government should send food, clothing and medicine to these refugees. Also, our Korean citizens should economize themselves and save food, clothing and medicine for these people in Jeju. Under the ideology of patriotism we should participate in this movement and we have to save these people. I ask for your help with all my heart.”<sup>75)</sup>

On 10 March 1949, the Prime Minister Lee Beom-seok and Minister of Home Affairs Shin Seong-mo visited Jeju, after which the food and clothing supply began. Lee emphasized the inspection results and insisted on the urgent relief and reconstruction of Jeju.<sup>76)</sup> Finally, the Ministry of Society sent five trucks of food, clothing, bedding and daily necessities and followed that with another eight trucks sent.<sup>77)</sup> Also, the central government estimated it would cost 12 million Korean won to save the Jeju people between July 1949 and

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74) The Secretariat of the National Assembly, *Pacification Team Report in National Assembly Stenographic Records*, the 2nd National Assembly Ordinary Session, No. 3, January 11, 1949.

75) *Jayu Shinmun*, March 20, 22, 23 and 24, 1949.

76) *Dong-A Ilbo*, March 16, 1949; *Seoul Shinmun*, March 15 and 17, 1949.

77) *Dokrip Shinmun*, March 19, 1949; *Donggwang Shinmun*, March 19, 1949.

October 1949.<sup>78)</sup>

After the outbreak of the Korean War, refugees from the mainland flooded into Jeju and there were also refugees of 4 · 3, exacerbating the situation on Jeju. The total number of Korean War refugees on the island was 149,000 and more. The emergency relief work for these refugees was raised as one of the most urgent issues, but the result was unsatisfactory. On 30 January 1953, the Jeju Restoration and Revival Committee held its 16<sup>th</sup> meeting and decided to provide 2,814 bags of rice, 14,500 yards (13,050 m) of cotton, 2,275 blankets, 428 cartons of milk and 38 boxes of soap.<sup>79)</sup> From the outbreak of 4 · 3 to 21 September 1954, when the conflict neared its end, there is no specific data for how much aid Jeju received. However, it is true that the essential aid that was dispersed on 30 January 1953 was not enough for them.

## ② Reconstruction of the Upland Villages

Due to the 4 · 3 Incident, 160 villages were damaged and 15,228 households were destroyed and 35,921 houses<sup>80)</sup> were severely impaired; this means most of the upland areas were destroyed. The police and army ordered people to move out from their own villages and villages were ruined. The reconstruction of these villages started in the spring of 1949 around the coastal areas with the permission of the police.

The central government had not yet established official measures for helping Jeju so on 11 January 1949, Jeju native Oh Yong-guk, member of the National Assembly, wrote in his report: “The reconstruction of Jeju’s households will use publicly-owned trees and some privately-owned trees. If people are incapable of reconstructing their houses, 30 million to 50 million Korean won should be provided for each household.<sup>81)</sup> A member of the National Assembly,

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78) *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, July 21, 1949.

79) *Jeju Shinbo*, December 2, 1953.

80) According to *Jeju Province* in 1963, it stated that 8 households were damaged, *Seoul Shinmun* (September 1, 1949) stated 39,280 houses were destroyed and, Joo Gi-yong, who visited Jeju Island, noted that the number of households and houses that had been damaged were 16,177 and 30,461 respectively.

81) The Secretariat of the National Assembly, *Pacification Team Report* in *National Assembly*

Joo Gi-yong, visited Jeju in early March 1949 and reported that all the villages in the upland areas are burnt..... 16,000 households lost their homes. Therefore we should provide 20,000 Korean won to each household to build temporary homes.<sup>82)</sup> However the political circles could not solve this problem.

On the other hand, there was a case where the commanding officer of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment decided to reconstruct the village and the burnt school classrooms. Major Jeon Boo-il was the 1st Battalion Commander in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment and during late February 1949, he used trees which were cut down in the anti-guerrilla operations to make classrooms in Jungmun Middle School. Students could study in those new classrooms.<sup>83)</sup> Also, in July 1949, commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment, Ham Byeong-seon, brought all the Jeju natives who were forced to move to coastal areas back to their original hometowns. He reconstructed Bonggae-ri, people came back to their homes and the place name was changed to Hammyeong-ri.”<sup>84)</sup>

In 1950, the central government set the standard compensation for destroyed homes at 15,000 Korean won for a totally destroyed house, 10,000 Korean won for half-destroyed house and a total of 30 million won was provided as housing allowance nationwide and Jeju received 2.7 million won.<sup>85)</sup> However, this small amount could not solve the housing problem in Jeju, at all.

In February 1950, the Jeju governor and Jeju Restoration and Revival Committee President Kim Chung-hui asked the central government for support. He stated that there were 100,000 refugees from 4·3 in Jeju and they were living in caves, so he asked Jeju to pay approximately 2.7 billion Korean won for reconstructing damaged housing and other industrial institutions and public facilities. He asked the central government to pay 1.42 billion Korean won and he required a loan of 4.7 billion Korean won and in total, the amount was 8.9 billion Korean won.<sup>86)</sup> However, before this request reached the central

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*Stenographic Records*, the 2<sup>nd</sup> National Assembly Ordinary Session, No. 3, January 11, 1949.

82) *Dokrip Shinmun*, March 19, 1949; *Jayu Shinmun*, March 24, 1949.

83) Jeon Bu-il, *Live Today for Tomorrow*, Daedo-Munhwasa, 1993, pp.261-262.

84) *Jeju Shinbo*, February 5, 1955.

85) *Dong-A Ilbo*, January 12, 1950; *Chosun Ilbo*, January 12, 1950.

86) *Request for Funds for Reviving Jeju Province* in related documents at Prime Minister's

government, the Korean War broke out.

During the war, there was no special effort to reconstruct the damaged towns. The government's focus was fully on the war and they could not afford an extra budget for Jeju.

After a while, the central government started to collect basic data for reconstructing the damaged houses from 4 · 3.<sup>87)</sup> Mt. Halla was finally reopened on 1 April 1954 and it was the first time Jeju natives could go back to their homes in upland areas and reconstruction work could take place. On 21 December 1953, the Jeju Restoration and Revival Committee supplied construction materials for 5,000 households which is equivalent to 90,000 refugees and dispersed it to 6,770 households.<sup>88)</sup> However, the aid from the central government was still lacking.

After martial law was lifted on Mt. Halla, Jeju began to support a refugee resettlement program in earnest from 21 September 1954. On 20 November 1954, the Governor of Jeju sent an official document to leaders of townships, saying: "In order to resolve the shortage of wood for construction, I give permission to cut the national forest. So, find out who wants to build a new house with wood."<sup>89)</sup> In a letter of 2 March 1955, to the central government, he asked for urgent help for 2,074 damaged households and 898 households of the refugees from the mainland which cultivated the wasteland. He requested rice, building materials, farming tools, timber, cement and nails.<sup>90)</sup> We can see that the governor of Jeju wanted to obtain timber by cutting the national forest.

In September 1954, the restoration project for Mt. Halla and support from central government were achieved by the effort of the Jeju natives themselves.

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Office, February 10, 1950.

87) *Jeju Shinbo*, September 28, 1952.

88) *Jeju Shinbo*, December 23, 1953.

89) Jeju Province, *Refugee Resettlement - 4 · 3 Incident Damage Report*, 1955, pp.263-264.

90) Jeju Province, *Ibid.*, pp.244-247.



## **IV. Damage Report**

### **1. Outlook**

The Jeju 4 · 3 Incident took place from March 1947 to 21 September 1954, and it caused an enormous amount of human death and material damage. Although it has been over 50 years since the outbreak of 4 · 3 and a lot of dispute over innocent victims of 4 · 3 has been ongoing, the government has never got to the root of the matter. Moreover, the central government has never officially researched the human death toll and material damage of 4 · 3.

However, we can estimate the scale of damage through the report by the Jeju Provincial Office, Jeju native members of the national assembly's inspection report and journalists' reporting. Also, the data relating to region, age, gender, time, assailant and overall scale of damage can be estimated by the reports submitted to the Special Committee on Massacres of Citizens in June 1960. Also, in the 1990s, Jeju received damage reports and from 8 June 2000 to 30 May 2001 Jeju received victim's reports from family members in accordance with the 4 · 3 Special Law.

Obviously, the reported "facts" differ depending on the research institution and records. This report includes 4 · 3 records and various reports and it divides damage into two categories: a) human death toll and b) material damage.

### **A. Human Death Toll Overview**

#### **1) Human Death Toll**

The number of 4 · 3 victims (dead or missing) mentioned in newspapers, national assembly meeting reports and U.S. Embassy records are listed as follows:

□ Human Death Toll Based on Different Data

Number		Time presented	Presenter	Data	Note
Victims	Refugees				
15,000		49.2.15	Father Sweeny	U.S Embassy Document '49.3.14	
20,000		49.3	Associated Newspapers	'Yeonhap Shinmun '49.3.4	
	64,378	49.3	6 Jeju representatives	'Dong-A Ilbo '49.3.12	
15,000		49.3	Armed Forces Korea Headquarters	Armed Forces Korea Headquarters '49.4.1	
17,000		49.4.2	LA Compatriots	Letter to President Truman from Korean compatriots in LA '49.4.2	
15,000		49.4.10	New York Times	'New York Times '49.4.10	
15,000		49.5	U.S Army Advisory group	U.S Embassy Document '49.5.18	
	70,000	49.5.17	Gi Young Jang	'Cabinet Council Meeting Minutes '49.5.17	
40,000		49.6	Young Jin Kim correspondent	'Kyunghyang Shinmun '49.6.28	
30,000		49.6	Jeju authority	'Joseon Jungang Ilbo '49.6.28	population 282,942 (1946) 250,400 (1949)
29,702	97,703	49.9	Seoul Newspaper	'Seoul Shinmun '49.91	Ministry of home affairs vice-minister was with them
30,000	80,000	49.9	Jae Gwon Seo	'Shinchunji '49. September edition	
30,000		50.2.10	Governor Chung Hui Kim	'Prime Minister's office document '50.2.10	
27,719	78,534	50.4	Governor Yong Ha Kim	U.S. Embassy Document '50.5.23	
60,000		52.9.27	Father Ryan	Ryan's Letter '52.9.27	
27,719		53.	Jeju provincial office	'Jejudosaellam'	
65,000		60.5.30	Member of National Assembly, Dam Ryong Koh	'Jeju shinbo '60.5.31	
50,000 ~60,000		60.7	Chang Moo Koh	'Chosun Ilbo' '60.7.17	

40,000 ~50,000		61.1.26	Member of National Assembly Sung Sook Kim	'Chosun Ilbo' 61.1.26	
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As can be seen from this chart above, the human death toll may be divided into three periods. First of all, the number of people murdered from February 1949 to May 1949, recorded as 20,000. After that, the number of victims given in this chart for between June 1949 and April 1950 is 27,719 to 40,000. Lastly, after the 4 · 19 Revolution, the national assembly received a request to get to the root of the 4 · 3 Incident in Jeju. According to this data, it is estimated the total number of victims range from 40,000 to 65,000.

The first period of death toll research done by the Yeonhap Shinmun (newspaper) in March 1949 and data released by Korea and U.S Army Headquarters is considered to have credibility. First of all, the estimate released by the Yeonhap Shinmun categorized the death toll at eup and myeon level and it can be assumed that field work went into the data. (Refer to table below):

eup and myeon	Jeju-eup	Aewol-myeon	Hallim-myeon	Jochoen-myeon	Gujwa-myeon	Seongsan-myeon
Death toll	4,500	5,000	3,000	2,000	1,000	500
eup and myeon	Pyoseon-myeon	Namwon-myeon	Seogwi-myeon	Jungmun-myeon	Andeok-myeon	Daejung-myeon
Death toll	300	600	1,000	1,500	400	200
Total	20,000					

According to a comprehensive report on the 4 · 3 Incident made by the Headquarters of the United States Army Forces in Korea, the number of the victims was 15,000 and this figure seems to reflect direct information from the police and the intelligence department of the occupation army. Also, the report says, “During the last year, it is estimated that about 14,000 to 15,000 citizens died and at least 80% of them were killed by the anti-guerrilla expeditions.” Therefore, the report shows that more than 80% of the victims were residents, not the armed guerrillas killed in action.

Even though the above two documents seem very reliable, they were drawn

up based on the data as of March 1949. Thus, they don't reflect the number of the victims who were intensively killed during the first half of 1949. It is necessary to look up the statistical data collected after the 5·10 general elections and the dissolution of the Jeju Command Post on 15 May 1949, when the incident almost settled down. In this light, the data obtained from June 1949 to April 1950 are worthy of notice.

The statistical data at this time came from the official announcements from the Jeju provincial government. The Joseon Jungang Ilbo cited the announcement of the Jeju government that, according to the census carried out on 1 May 1950, the number of Jeju citizens was 250,400, down from 282,942 in 1946, showing a decrease of about 30,000 people during the incident. This figure is similar to the number 29,702, which appeared in an article (September 1, 1949) in the Seoul Shinmun, which was produced by a reporter who accompanied the party of the Vice-Minister of the Interior Department.

Also, the number is very close to the figures of 30,000 and 27,719, which two Jeju governors, Kim Chung-hui and Kim Yong-ha, disclosed in 1950, respectively. However, it is not clear whether the Jeju Provincial Government carried out actual investigations, visiting each eup, myeon and villages or simply estimated the number of victims from the results of the census. The Jeju Provincial Government recorded the figure of 27,719 as the number of the victims of the Jeju 4·3 Incident in its official '*Brochure of Jeju Province*' in 1953.

Meanwhile, with regard to the population of Jeju Island, a US document shows that the number was 281,000 as of January 1 1948.<sup>1)</sup> Also, according to the census conducted on 1 May 1949, for the first time after the establishment of the South Korean Government by the Bureau of Public Information of South Korea, the population of Jeju Island was 254,580 (114,759 males and 139,830 females).<sup>2)</sup> In other words, the census shows that the population decreased by 26,411 over one year and four months. Of course, there are fundamental limits to the ability to estimate the number of the victims through

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1) National Economic Board, USAMGIK, South Korean Interim Government Activities, No. 32, May 1948.

2) *Seoul Shinmun*, October 14, 1949.

the census results. First, it isn't clear whether the census of 1 January 1948 was conducted accurately. Secondly, the natural increase in population should be considered. When those two elements are factored in, it is estimated that the decrease in the population of Jeju between the beginning of 1948 and the end of 1949 was between 25,000 and 30,000.

It is difficult to conclude that the above number is the number of the victims during the 4 · 3 Incident. First, there were some people who fled to Japan or the mainland in order to save their lives. They began to escape from the island after the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident during the year of 1948. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the decrease in the population came from these factors, too, in part. In addition, after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, about 3,000 subjects of the preventive custody were executed in Jeju and all across the country while they were imprisoned<sup>3)</sup> and they were not included in the census carried out in May 1949. Therefore, it is possible to assume that the number of people who left the island and the number of people who were executed through the preventive custody are roughly the same. Considering all these circumstances, it can be said that the decrease in the population of Jeju Island from the beginning of 1948 to the end of 1949 -- that is 25,000 - 30,000 -- represented the number of the victims from the 4 · 3 Incident.

## 2) Death Toll in Reports by Victims' Families

Since the end of the 4 · 3 Incident, there have been three time periods in which public institutions received reports on the victims of the incident from their family members. Concretely, in June 1960, the Special Committee on Massacres of Citizens, established by the National Assembly, received reports on the victims; and from 7 February 1994 to 29 February 2000, the Jeju Provincial Council's Special Committee of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident received reports on the victims. Finally, from 8 June 2000 to 30 May 2001, the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident Committee established by the 4 · 3 Special Law, received

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3) The situations of prisoners and subjects of the preventive custody are described in Chapter IV: Damage Report in this report.

reports on the people who were killed during the incident. With these reports, the scale of the casualties and the actual conditions of the damage by region, age, gender, time-variance and perpetrator factors can be understood.

**① Reports to the Investigation Committee for the Massacre of Citizens at the National Assembly**

On 6 June 1960, the members of the Special Committee on Massacres of Citizens arrived on Jeju to investigate the massacre of people during the Jeju 4·3 Incident. Coping with their arrival, from 2 – 10 June, the Cheju Shinbo received reports of the massacre of citizens during the Jeju 4·3 Incident and the Korean War. At this time, a total of 1,259 cases and 1,457 human deaths were reported. The items of the report form were as follows:

Personal information of victims, information on family members of victims, date and place of imprisonment, implementing agency of imprisonment, date of last visit, executioners, date and place of execution, situation of execution, handling after execution, name and address of witnesses, demands, and other references.

As the 1,457 reported victims were classified by gender, home address, and age,<sup>4)</sup> 1,172 were males (80.4%) and 285 were females (19.6%). The following table shows the situations classified by address and age.

Number of Victims by Location

(Unit: No. of people)

Division No. of Victims	Jeju-si	Jocheon- myeon	Gujwa- myeon	Aewol- myeon	Hangyeong- myeon	Hallim- eup	Jungmun- myeon
Total	92	235	51	104	50	138	3
Ratio (%)	6.3	16.1	3.5	7.1	3.4	9.5	0.2
	Andeok- myeon	Daejeong- eup	Seogwi- eup	Namwon- myeon	Seongsan- myeon	Pyoseon- myeon	
Total	216	8	35	244	21	223	
Ratio (%)	14.8	0.5	2.4	16.7	1.4	15.3	

(The total number of victims is 1,420 and 37 people are left out.)

4) *Jeju Shinbo*, June 13, 1960.

Number of Victims by Their Age

(Unit: No. of people)

Division No. of victims	Under 10	11-20	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	Over 61	Others
Total	82	147	437	290	181	60	119	103
Ratio (%)	5.8	10.4	30.8	20.4	12.8	4.2	8.4	7.3

(Victims whose ages are not clear go to the ‘Others’ column. The total number of victims is 1,419 and 38 people are left out.)

**② Reports to the Jeju Provincial Council**

On 20 March 1993, the Jeju 3 April Special Committee was set up at the fourth Jeju Provincial Council. The Special Committee opened an ‘Office for Receiving Damage Reports from the 4 · 3 Incident’ on 7 February 1994 and began to receive reports. Since the office opened, 12,243 people had been reported as victims of the incident by 29 February 2000. The following tables show the victims categorized as to their regions, gender, age and the perpetrators.

Number of Victims by Region

(Unit: No. of people)

Division No. of victims	Jeju-si	Seogwipo-si	Bukjeju-gun	Namjeju-gun	Outside of Jeju
Total	3,384	1,197	4,523	3,133	6
Ratio (%)	27.6	9.8	36.9	25.6	0.05

Number of Victims by Gender

(Unit: No. of people)

Division No. of victims	Male	Female	Others	Remarks
Total	9,637	2,574	32	
Ratio (%)	78.7	21.0	0.26	

Number of Victims by Age

(Unit: No. of people)

Division No. of victims	Under 10	11-20	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	Over 61	Others
Total	676	2,119	4,257	1,851	1,159	817	706	658
Ratio (%)	5.5	17.3	34.7	15.1	9.5	6.7	5.8	5.4

(Victims whose age is not clear go to the 'Other' column.)

Number of Victims by Perpetrator

(Unit: No. of people)

Division No. of victims	Punitive expeditions	Armed guerrillas	Others	Unable to be classified
Total	10,277	1,353	209	404
Ratio (%)	84.0	11.1	1.7	3.3

(Those who died of starvation, illness or suicide go to the 'Other' column.)

**③ Reports to the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident Committee**

As shown in Article 1, the main purpose of the Jeju 4 · 3 Special Law is to honor the victims and their families through an investigation of the incident. The 'victims' in the law are defined as those who were killed, missing, or disabled because of the incident and pass through the screening and deliberation processes by the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident Committee.

The committee opened offices at home and abroad to receive reports on the victims of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident from 8 June 2000 and received reports of 13,213 victims up until 4 January 2001. However, the committee thought that there were many cases which had not been reported yet, so it extended the term of the report for 90 days and eased the qualifications of guarantors. As a result of the second reception, as of 30 May 2001, a total of 14,028 victims were reported at home and abroad.<sup>5)</sup>

The following tables show the victims categorized according to region (village), gender, time (year, month), and perpetrator.

5) The committee received the reports twice from 8 June 2000 to 30 May 2001. The number of the reported victims is 14,208 but some victims are reported twice and some information is inadequate, so the number needs to be adjusted again. Meanwhile, from January 2004, for three months, the committee received additional reports of the victims.

Number of Reports

(Unit: No. of people)

Division Regions	Total	Dead	Missing	Disabled	Remarks
Total	14,028	10,715	3,171	142	
Jeju Island	13,391	10,201	3,056	134	
Abroad	637	514	115	8	
	576	462	106	8	
	57	48	9	-	
	4	4	-	-	

\* Men: 11,043 (78.7%), Women: 2,985 (21.3%)

Reception of Reports by Region

(Unit: No. of people)

Division	No. of reporters	No. of Victims				No. of family members affected
		Total	Dead	Missing	Disabled	
Total	9,917	14,028	10,715	3,171	142	28,561
Jeju Island	57	87	73	12	2	203
Jeju-si	3,146	4,606	3,389	1,180	37	7,743
Seogwipo-si	953	1,322	1,012	297	13	2,974
Bukjeju-gun	3,404	4,714	3,626	1,024	64	10,031
Namjeju-gun	2,357	3,299	2,615	658	26	7,610

Number of Victims by Age

(Unit: No. of people)

Division	Under 10	11-20	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	Over 61
Total	814	3,026	4,956	2,108	1,365	899	860
Ratio (%)	5.8	21.6	35.3	15	9.8	6.4	6.1

Number of Victims by Year

(Unit: No. of people)

Division	Before 1947	1948	1949	1950	After 1951	Others
Total	101	7,443	4,802	1,100	326	256
Ratio (%)	0.7	53.1	34.2	7.8	2.3	1.8


(Among the victims dead before 1947, there are ones who died at the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident or whose family registers have mistakes. Among the victims dead after 1951, there are ones whose notification of death was late. Those for whom there was no information of year of death go to the 'Others' column.)

Number of Victims according to the Perpetrator

Division	Anti-guerrilla expeditions	Armed guerrillas	Others	No information
Total	10,955	1,764	43	1,266
Ratio (%)	78.1	12.6	0.3	9.0

(The police, the army, the Seobuk Young Men's Association, the Country Guard Corps, the People's Protective Corps (Minbodan), and the Police Reserves go to the 'Anti-guerrilla expeditions' column. The Armed guerrillas, the commando battalion, the Self-Protection Society, the North Korean People's Army, rioters, communist guerrillas, and unidentified assailants go to the 'Armed Guerrillas' column. Suicides, residents, and unidentified cases go to the 'No Information' column.)

Number of Victims by Month



□ Number of Victims by Village

Jeju-eup	Geonju	Naedo	Nohyeong	Doram	Dadu	Daryeon	Dopyeong	Boggae	Sando	Samgung	Ara	Yeondong	Yeongyeong		
													112	Other	
Aewol-myeon	62	17	512	42	264	180	151	280	73	236	197	107	112	3,890	
	Okeung	Ora	Oedo	Yeonggang	Yeongdam	Wajyang	Ido	Iho	Ildo	Huan	Hwabak	Huicheon	Other		
	91	247	84	145	57	75	66	368	39	71	297	117	1		
	Gonae	Goseong	Gwakji	Gwangryeong	Guem	Geunbok	Geunseong	Naeup	Sanga	Sangwi	Sogil	Susan	Sinm		1,501
	39	86	23	168	36	114	7	67	46	73	68	75	48		
	Aewol	Eodo	Ereum	Jangion	Hega	Higwi	Other								
	59	132	59	99	43	259	1								
	Gosan	Gwaibok	Geunmaeng	Geunbung	Geunak	Nalcheon	Daeam	Dongnyeong	Domo	Myeongwol	Sangdae	Sangmyeong	Suwon		1,043
	35	90	16	4	147	37	24	52	22	141	12	56	17		
	Sinjang	Ongpo	Yeongsu	Wohyeong	Wolrim	Jeoji	Jeosu	Jeongsu	Pampo	Hallim	Heopjae				
3	1	22	1	2	116	52	100	16	61	17					
Gyerae	Daeul	Bukchon	Seonheal	Sinchon	Sinheung	Wisan	Waheal	Jochon	Hambok					1,841	
53	125	462	208	220	99	82	101	219	268						
Gujwa-myeon	Gimnyeong	Dokcheon	Donghak	Sangdo	Schwa	Songdang	Yeopyeong	Woljeong	Jongdal	Pyongdae	Hado	Handong	Haengwon	910	
47	21	138	49	63	76	5	45	107	39	165	35	115			
Other															
5															
Seogwi-myeon	Donghaeng	Beophwan	Bomok	Sanghyo	Seogwi	Secho	Seohaeng	Sinhyo	Topyeong	Hahyo	Hoguan	Other		544	
44	14	2	41	66	20	140	27	87	38	64	1				
Jungmun-myeon	Gangjeong	Daejo	Dwan	Sangye	Saekdal	Yeognam	Wolpyeong	Jungnam	Haye	Hawon	Huisu	Other		739	
197	37	57	85	64	52	14	108	37	50	37	1				
Andeok-myeon	Gamsan	Gwangryeong	Deoksu	Donggyeong	Sagye	Sangchang	Sangcheon	Seogwang	Changcheon	Hwasun	Other			785	
89	50	38	205	32	98	70	99	74	29	1					
Daejeong-myeon	Capa	Gueok	Dongil	Mureung	Boseong	Singmo	Sindo	Sinpyeong	Ansong	Yeongrak	Ineong	Ilgwa	Hano	600	
13	13	46	67	38	52	59	78	38	37	30	43	86			
Namwon-myeon	Namwon	Sunang	Sinye	Sinhang	Wimi	Uigwi	Taehang	Haye	Hanam					914	
97	104	78	102	40	255	97	32	109							
Pyoseon-myeon	Gasi	Songseup	Schwa	Tosan	Proson	Hacheon								725	
419	76	46	172	8	4										
Seongsan-myeon	Gosong	Nansan	Sandal	Seongsan	Susan	Shung	Sinsan	Sinyang	Sincheon	Sinung	Ojo	Opyeong		449	
62	102	13	16	125	13	14	13	23	32	15					

① A total of 14,028 persons was reported as the victims including 87 persons whose hometown addresses could not be identified. ② Those who have myeon addresses but don't have village addresses go to the 'Other' columns. ③ In case that village shave more than 100 victims, they are shaded.)

#### ④ Analysis of Results

The interesting items in the report form are the number of victims by age, time and the perpetrators, particularly as these items are important to grasp the real conditions of the incident.

At first, the ratios of the victims under age 10 are similar in the reports to the National Assembly, the Jeju Provincial Council and the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident Committee. They are 5.8%, 5.5%, and 5.8% respectively. Also, the ratios of the victims over 61 are 8.4%, 5.8%, and 6.1% respectively, broadly similar with each other. Children under age 10 and old men over 61 with difficulties in moving around were the ones who had little fighting ability, at all.

When the reports to the 4 · 3 Incident Committee are analyzed based on the time factor, it appears that 53.1% of the victims died in 1948 and 34.2% of the victims died in 1949. The data sorted by month clearly show that the casualties were intensively inflicted from October 1948 to February 1949 when the repression operations were in full swing. 10,761 victims were reported killed from April 1948 to June 1949 and 83% of those victims (8,894 victims) were killed in the first five months.

Next, with regard to the perpetrators, 84% of the victims were killed by the anti-guerrilla expeditions and 11.1% of the victims lost their lives to the armed guerrillas in the reports to the Jeju Provincial Council. According to the reports to the 4 · 3 Incident Committee, 78.1% of the victims were killed by the anti-guerrilla expeditions and 12.6% of the victims lost their lives to the armed guerrillas.

When only the anti-guerrilla expeditions and the armed guerrillas are considered, the ratios of the reports to the Jeju Provincial Council are 88.4% and 11.6% and those of the reports to the 4 · 3 Incident Committee are 86.1% and 13.9% respectively. The ratios in the two cases are similar to each other. These statistical data are also in line with the comprehensive report made by the Headquarters of the United States Army Forces in Korea which says that more than 80% of the victims were killed by anti-guerrilla expeditions.

These ratios indicate that most of the victims (about 20,000 to 30,000 people) were killed by the governmental authority. Moreover, the fact that above 10%

of the victims were children and old men clearly shows that the 4 · 3 Incident was an infringement on human rights by the government authority.

### 3) Death Toll of the Military, the Police and Right-wing Organizations

#### ① Number of Soldiers who were Killed

Throughout the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident, the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, which was founded in Jeju, and the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment, the 1<sup>st</sup> Separate Battalion, Marine Corps, and the Rainbow Unit of the Korean Armed Forces which had been dispatched to Jeju from other areas, had all been stationed. Among these troops, the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment were on the island from the second half of 1948, to the first half of 1949 when the armed conflict was at its height.

12 soldiers killed in action from the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment were on the list,<sup>6)</sup> but the total number of fallen soldiers is hard to identify. However, a report titled *9<sup>th</sup> Regiment Cheju-Do Daily Report* made by an American military advisor to the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment says that nine soldiers from the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment were killed in action in the vicinity of Shinum-ri on 19 December 1948 and G-2 Periodic Reports of the Headquarters of the United States Army Forces in Korea say that one man was killed in Jongdal-ri; one constabulary man died in action in Jungmun-ri on 11 November, and two constabulary men were killed in action in the vicinity of Bukchon-ri on 18 November 1948. Also, the Dong-A Ilbo and the Chosun Ilbo reported that one soldier was killed in action in Saekdal-ri and another man was down in Ara-ri on 10 October. Kang Jong-seok who had been an enlisted man of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment testified that about 40 soldiers were killed in action and there was a funeral for them in Daejeon.<sup>7)</sup> In the case of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment, Regiment Commander Ham Byeong-seon officially revealed that 92 men were killed in action on 3 June

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6) Ministry of National Defense, *Record of Merits of Fallen Heroes and Soldiers*, Vol. 1-9, 1996-1998.

7) Kang Jong-seok (age 36, enlisted man of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, Testimony recorded on May 20, 1966.), Testimony quoted in *Collection of Veterans' Testimonies* which is kept by the Institute for Military History Compilation of the Ministry of National Defense.

1949.<sup>8)</sup> Meanwhile, 27 men from the Commando Battalion of the 6<sup>th</sup> Brigade, which was deployed to the Jeju Command Post, died in action.<sup>9)</sup>

The number of the soldiers of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment who died in action is less than that of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment and the Commando Battalion of the 6<sup>th</sup> Brigade. This is in contrast to the fact that more residents were killed in 1948 (7,443 people, 53.1%) than in 1949 (4,802 people, 34.2%) as the reports to the 4 · 3 Incident Committee show. What these numbers indicate is that the military operation of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment was an uncompromising anti-guerrilla operation against ordinary people, rather than armed guerrillas. On the other hand, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment carried out its military operations mainly in Halla Mountain, engaging directly with the armed guerrillas. That's why the number of the soldiers of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment who died in action is greater than that of other troops.

Except for the soldiers of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment, four men from the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment<sup>10)</sup> and 13 marines<sup>11)</sup> died during the incident. It is impossible to find the exact total of the soldiers who died during the incident but it is estimated that the number is around 180.<sup>12)</sup>

## ② Number of Policemen Who Died

According to the list sent to the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident Committee from the Jeju Provincial Police Agency, 122 policemen died in action or on the job during the incident and 92 policemen were wounded.<sup>13)</sup> However, when the committee

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8) *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, June 4 and 10, 1949.

9) *Daily record of the Army*, according to a record dated May 20, 1949, during the battles which lasted for five months, 119 soldiers were killed in action. This number includes 27 men of the commando battalion of the 6 Brigade as well as 92 men of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment.

10) Incoming Message, July 4, 1948. (United States Armed Forces Command in Korea Outgoing Message).

11) Navy Headquarters, Reply to the request of documents related with the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident (Document No. 12600-111, March 27, 2001).

12) According to an official document sent to the 4 · 3 Incident Committee from South Korean Army Headquarters (*Forwarding the Data Related with the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident*, Document no. 31001-010056, March 23, 2001), the number of the soldiers who died during the incident is 83 (one from the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment, two from the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment and 80 from the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment). However, this figure is hard to be trusted because it is based on secondary data.

investigated the tombstones in Chunghon cemetery (a cemetery for fallen heroes who died protecting their homeland), it turned out that 140 policemen died in the incident. Among them, 41 policemen (29%) died from April to November 1948, 17 men (12%) were killed from December 1948 to April 1949, and 82 policemen (58%) died from May 1949 to September 1956.

As the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment had fewer casualties than the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment, not many policemen were killed while the anti-guerrilla operations were in full swing. It is because the police also liquidated mainly residents, not the armed guerrillas. Then, after 1950, when the police were in charge of putting down the remnants of the armed guerrillas, they suffered higher casualties while engaging with the armed guerrillas on the slopes of Mt. Halla.<sup>14)</sup>

### ③ Casualties of Right-wing Organizations

The right-wing organizations involved in the incident were the United Young Men's Party, the Seobuk Young Men's Association, the Community Protective Corps, the People's Protective Corps, the Young Men's Defense Corps, the Commando Battalion, and the Korean Students' Federation. Although these organizations took part in putting down the armed guerrillas alongside the army and the police anti-guerrilla expeditions, their main roles were defending, patrolling and standing guard over villages, and standing on sentry. Among these right-wing organizations, the People's Protective Corps consisted of men aged between 18 and 55 who lost their homes or whose family members were killed or kidnapped while the armed guerrillas attacked villages. Even though a considerable number of the People's Protective Corps were very cooperative with the army and the police, some of them were executed on the charge of neglecting their duties when the armed guerrillas attacked or of being in league with the guerrillas.

The members of the right-wing organizations who were killed during the

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13) Jeju Provincial Police Agency, *Forwarding the list of the policemen who died or wounded with regard to the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident* (Document No. 63740-141, March 24, 2001).

14) Kim Jong-min, *50 Years after the 4 · 3, Study on Jeju 4 · 3*, Yeoksa-bipyongsas, 1999, p.389.

incident and their family members are now recognized as men of national merit and the bereaved families by the nation. According to the list obtained from the Jeju regional office of the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs, 744 people are registered as men of national merit with regard to the incident as of today.<sup>15)</sup> Most of them were reported as policemen or the members of the ‘Corps of Patriots’.<sup>16)</sup> Among those 744 people, 105 were policemen and the rest were members of the right-wing organizations.

## **B. General Cases of Material Damage**

The material damage from the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident can be categorized as demolition of villages and communities, incineration of public facilities, and damage to industries. The following table shows the material damage inflicted on Jeju from the incident. These data come from various sources such as newspapers, minutes of cabinet meetings, and documents from the U.S. Embassy in Seoul.

As shown in the table, about 300 villages, 20,000 households, and 40,000 houses were destroyed. These figures correspond with those in an official announcement made by the Jeju local government in 1953. According to the announcement, 19,934 households and 39,285 houses were demolished.<sup>17)</sup> At the beginning of 1955, damage investigations were conducted by each eup, myeon and village. As a result, it turned out that 15,015 households were

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15) A total of 657 people are on the list of men of national merit related with the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident which the Jeju regional office of Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs sent to the Jeju Provincial Council. (The Jeju Regional Office of Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs, *Forwarding the List of Men of National Merit and Their Families*, December 18, 1996). Also, 478 people are on the list which the regional office sent to the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident Committee (The Jeju Regional Office of Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs, *Forwarding the list of men of merit related with the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident and their families*, April 29, 2002). The committee compared the two lists with each other and screened those who are on the both lists, it turned out that the total number of the men of national merit with regard to the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident is 744.

16) The Corps of Patriots refers to a right-wing organization with a focus on the People’s Protective Corps (the Minbodan).

17) Jeju Provincial Office, *Brochure of Jeju Province*, 1955.

damaged (12,270 households suffered from incineration of their houses and 2,745 households were evacuated to other villages).<sup>18)</sup> However, given that the investigations in Jeju-eup, Gujwa-myeon, Jocheon-myeon, and Daejeong-myeon were poorly conducted, it is reasonable to estimate that about 20,000 households were damaged by the incident.

Cases of Material Damage

Time of Count	Numerical Data				Source
	Village	House	Public Facilities	Others	
1949. 3. 4.	295 villages	About 20,000 households			The Chosun Jungang Ilbo (1949. 3. 4.)
1949. 3. 4.	73 ri	20,280 houses			The Yeonhap Shinmun (1949. 3. 4.)
1949. 3. 12.	295 villages	12,985 households 26,337 houses	34 schools		The Tong A Ilbo (1949. 3. 12.)
1949. 3. 23.		16,797 households 30,461 houses			The Cha Yoo Shin Mun (1949. 3. 23.)
1949. 3. 25.		17,912 households 33,489 houses			The Kyunghyang Shinmun (1949. 6. 29.)
End of March 1949		18,000 households	47 schools		The Cha Yoo Shin Mun (1949. 4. 19.)
1949. 4. 23.		33,500 households		About 20 factories	The Gukdo Shinmun (1949. 4. 23.)
1949. 5. 17.	300 villages	About 30,000 households	40 schools/ 220 classrooms	60,000 seoks* of grains	Minutes of Cabinet Meeting (1949. 5. 17.)
End of May 1949	300 villages	18,000 households	46 schools/ 4 myeon offices/ about 10 public buildings		<i>Shincheonji</i> September issue 1949.
1949. 6. 2.	300 villages	17,912 households 33,489 houses	44 schools	39 factories	The Chosun Ilbo (1949. 6. 2.)
1949. 6. 28.		About 20,000 households			The Chosun Jungang Ilbo (1949. 6. 28.)

18) Jeju Provincial Office, *Refugee Settlement – Damage Investigation of the 4·3 Incident*, 1955.

1949. 7. 20.		26,790 households			The Gukdo Shinmun (1949. 9. 8.)
1949. 9. 1.		39,280 houses			The Seoul Shinmun (1949. 9. 1.)
1950. 2. 10.		40,000 houses			Document at Prime Minister's Office (1950. 2. 10.)
1950. 5. 23.		39,285 houses			Document at U.S. Embassy in Seoul (1950. 5. 23.)
1950. 7. 26.	296 villages				Document at U.S. Embassy in Seoul (1950. 7. 26.)

\* 1 seok = about 180 liters

Most of the destroyed villages were restored through the ‘settlement projects for displaced people’ in the 1950s and the 1960s. Regardless of the projects, several villages were never restored because the original villagers did not return to them after the incident was over. As of today, 84 ‘lost villages’ have been identified so far.

During the development of the 4 · 3 Incident, schools, public offices, police boxes, and public facilities were incinerated and destroyed due to frequent armed clashes between the armed guerrillas and the army and the police. Family registers were lost at Andoek-myeon, Gujwa-myeon, Jungmun-myeon, and Jocheon-myeon as offices were burned down.

The 4 · 3 Incident brought economic recession to various industries in Jeju. Jeju citizens experienced severe difficulties in living their lives because agriculture, stock-farming, the fishing industry, collecting sea foods, and trade became so stagnant. The lives of Jeju citizens were so devastated that 28.8% of the total population in Jeju was unemployed as of May 1949.

## 2. Human Death Toll

### A. Massacre

#### 1) Casualties during Scorched Earth Operations

In around the middle of November 1948, uncompromising repression operations were carried out. Under these operations, a curfew was imposed on the residents of the upland areas and if anyone broke it, he or she was executed without exception. From the middle of November 1948 to February 1949, for about four months, the anti-guerrilla expeditions burned down the upland villages and killed the residents collectively. The most horrendous actions of the incident unfurled. During this period, the casualties were the highest and most of the upland villages were literally burnt to the ground. The anti-guerrilla expeditions issued an evacuation order to the residents of the upland villages and made them go down to seaside villages. However, in some cases, the order was not delivered to some villages or, in other cases, the anti-guerrilla expeditions stormed villages before the evacuation order was delivered to them and burned houses and killed the residents indiscriminately. Many of the residents who lost their homes and family members could not go down to seaside villages because of the fear of death and hid in upland areas. Some of them were caught and killed by the anti-guerrilla expeditions later. There were massacres of people by the members of the Seobuk Young Men's Association not only in the upland villages but also in seaside villages.

The actual circumstances of the massacres of residents by the army and the police are being revealed through about 14,000 damage reports and testimonies given by approximately 500 witnesses. Also, data from the US Army confirmed these facts. Secret reports of the US Army say, "The 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment adopted a plan to massacre residents" or "The 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment undertook severe military operations to kill everyone caught in the operational areas regardless of whether they possessed identification or weapons." However, the committee could not find any operation diaries of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment or the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment.

The committee searched documents at the Ministry of National Defense and the archives of the headquarters of the army but could not unearth any valuable data. Therefore, mainly testimonies about the massacres and damage given by witnesses will be introduced here.

#### □ The Case of Gyorae-ri, Jocheon-myeon

At around 5 a.m. on November 13 1948, soldiers stormed Gyorae-ri, a village in the upland area. They besieged the village and began to set houses on fire and shoot the residents. People who ran out of their houses were gunned down by the soldiers. When the day broke, the whole village, where about 100 households lived, had already been burnt to ashes.

The victims of the day are as follows. Yang Jae-won (60), wife of Yang Jae-won (60), Kim Man-gap (57), Yang Gwan-seok (female, 50), Boo Ja-saeng (44), Boo Yeong-suk (female, 38), son of Bu Yeong-suk (three), Ko Gye-saeng (female, 18), Ko Ok-sim (female, 14), Kim Sun-jae (female, 14), Kim Mun-yong (nine). Kim In-saeng lost 14 family members and relatives at the same time on the day, including his grandmother Mrs. Kang (70), mother Kim Chae-hwa (45), sister Kim Yeong-ja (15), brother Kim Sun-saeng (10), another brother (five), sister-in-law Yang Nam-seon (25), niece (eight), nephew (five), another nephew (three), relative Kim Seong-jin (65), another relative Kim Seong-ji (60), wife of Kim Seong-ji (60), his cousin's wife Shin Bo-bae (25), and a nanny of his brother's family whose family name was Shin (15) (Among the victims, Kim Man-gap and Yang Gwan-seok did not die instantly. They survived for a few more days but couldn't get proper treatment. Kim died on November 17 and Yang lost his life on November 30). All the victims were elderly people, children and teenagers. Most of the victims were shot and burned. A 14-year-old girl was stabbed to death by a bayonet. Yang Bok-cheon who lost her nine-year-old son talked about the situation of that day as follows:

On that day, my husband and a nephew escaped from the village before the soldiers came and I was staying at home with my nine-year-old son and

three-year-old daughter. At dawn, I heard the loud report of gunshots. I even couldn't imagine that the soldiers would kill innocent people like us. Some soldiers stormed my house and set the house on fire. I begged them for our lives but they pushed me aside and shot a gun at me. When I fell down carrying my daughter on my back, my son rushed to me crying "Mommy!" Then the soldiers fired a shot at my son. I still vividly remember the voices of the soldiers saying, "This son of bitch is still alive!" when they shot at my son. My son was shot in the chest and even his heart came out of his body. They were not humans. When the soldiers left my house, I dragged my son into the yard so that he couldn't be burned. After that I untied the blanket and checked my daughter. Until then, I couldn't think that she might have been shot. However, I found out that the blanket was in tatters and there was a hole in my daughter's leg. A bullet which passed through my side also destroyed my daughter's leg. After the incident, we hid in a forest for about 10 days and went down to Jocheon-ri upon receiving a notice that everybody should move to seaside villages. I still have difficulties in moving around and my daughter became disabled and can't walk properly now. Not a single notice of evacuating the village had been delivered to us before the soldiers rushed into the village. It was so sudden and that's why that many people were killed on that day.<sup>1)</sup>

Meanwhile, on that day, a six-year-old boy miraculously survived even though he was shot three times. His name was Kim Yong-gil (his childhood name was Kim Chang-sik). Thanks to his great grandmother who wrapped him in a blanket and threw him into a bamboo grove to save him, and even though she was shot and dying at the time, he could survive. Later, Kim's story became known to the world as a tragedy. One media outlet covered his life of deep sorrow as follows.

Kim Yong-gil (51), who had been disabled his entire life due to bullets shot by the anti-guerrilla expeditions at the 4 · 3 Incident breathed his last wrapped in flames in a shack in a nameless orchard in Ara-dong, Jeju-si, on the morning of the 8<sup>th</sup>, finally ending his ordeal.<sup>2)</sup>

According to the news article, for his entire life, Kim couldn't bend his

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1) Yang Bok-cheon (female, age 84), Testimony recorded on October 17, 2001.

2) *Jemin Ilbo*, November 9, 1993.

right arm because of the bullet wound from the incident. He walked on crutches all his life because the knee joint in his left leg was shattered. He married a woman when he was 30, had a daughter and enjoyed a short happy life. However, when his first daughter was two years old, his wife died while giving birth to a second daughter. Kim sold his house and a farming field and even hired himself out as a day laborer to bring up his only daughter. After his daughter graduated from high school and got a job, he sent her to her aunt's house and lived alone in a shack at an orchard farm in Ara-dong ever since. Meanwhile, a fire broke out at his shack and he died in flames, ending his life riddled with sorrow.

#### □ The Case of Jeju Agriculture School Camp

In the fall of 1948, at the Jeju Agriculture School where the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment was stationed, a lot of representative figures from legal, administrative, educational and media circles in Jeju were held. Even word spread that if someone was not held at Jeju Agriculture School, then he or she was not a prominent figure. The camp was made up of tents on the school grounds, like a death camp. The list of the identified ones who were held at the camp at the time is as follows:

##### ▲ Legal Circle

Choi Won-sun (Jeju District Court President), Kim Bang-sun (Prosecutor of the Jeju District Prosecutors' Office), Song Du-hyeon (independence patriot, Chief Clerk of the Jeju District Court), Kim Jin-yeong (clerk of the Jeju District Court), Yang Seong-du (clerk of the Jeju District Court), Hong In-pyo (clerk of the Jeju District Court)

##### ▲ Educational Circle

Hyeon Gyeong-ho (the 1st Principal of Jeju Middle School, co-Chair of the Democratic People's Front), Lee Gwan-seok (head of the school affairs section of the Jeju Provincial Office of Education, principal of Jeju Middle School), Chae Se-byeong (school vice-commissioner of the School Affairs section of the Jeju Provincial Office of Education), Ko Chil-jong, Moon Jae-sun (teacher), Hyeon Du-hwang (teacher at Jeju Middle School, son of Hyeon Gyeong-ho)

▲ Media Circle

Park Gyeong-hun (president of the Jeju Shinbo, ex-governor, co-chair of the Democratic People's Front), Shin Du-bang (executive director of the Jeju Shinbo), Kim Ho-jin (chief editor of the Jeju Shinbo), Hyeon In-ha (reporter and branch manager of the Kyunghyang Shinmun), Lee Sang-hui (branch manager of the Seoul Shinmun)

▲ Government Employees of the Jeju Provincial Office

Ko Sun-hyeop (livestock polices division), Kim Wang-jin (Agricultural Management Division), Kim Hyeong-jung (Agricultural Management Division), Yang Seung-hun (Social Affairs Division), Lim Jae-chan (Forest Management Division), Choi Seong-don (Public Health Division), Jeong Hui-jo

▲ Property Management Bureau

Han Byeong-taek (vice-head of the Bureau, former teacher of Jeju Agriculture School), Kang Sun-hyeon (the Disposal Division of the Bureau, former teacher of Jeju Jeil Middle School), Kang Chang-u (former teacher of Jeju Agriculture School), Kim In-ji, Kim Tae-ho (head of General Affairs Division), Kim Hak-rim (former teacher of Jeju Agriculture School), Yang Mun-su (former teacher of Jeju Middle School), Choi Gil-du (General Affairs Division)

▲ New Korea Company Ltd.

Kang Jae-ryang (manager of New Korea Company Ltd. alcohol factory), Yang Mun-pil (New Korea Company Ltd. Farm Manager), Kim Gi-yu

▲ Other

Oh Chang-heun (doctor), Bae Du-bong (anti-Japanese activist), Ko Bong-hyo (mushroom farmer, brother of Ko Jin-hui who attended at the South Korean Peoples Assembly in Haeju.), Ko Ye-gu (branch manager of a transportation company, chairperson of the 3·10 General Strike Jeju-eup Joint Struggle Committee in 1947). Kim Du-hun (manager of Financial Affairs Division of the Democratic People's Front), Kim Su-rim (son of the head of Jeju-eup, Kim Cha-bong), Moon Bong-taek (founding member of the Korean National Youth), Yoon Chang-seok (head of Jocheon-myeon), Jo Dae-su (independence patriot), Choi Nam-sik (former vice-chairperson of the Preparing Committee for Rehabilitation), Jeong Sang-jo (former executive of the Democratic People's Front).

It can be easily pictured how ordinary citizens underwent all sorts of hardships

in that even the president of the Jeju District Court and a prosecutor of the Jeju District Prosecutors' Office were arrested and tortured. Some of the inmates at the Jeju Agriculture School Camp had a narrow escape from death but many people were executed. Soldiers entered the tent camp and listed off the inmates who were going to be executed. When the soldiers called the inmates names, they shouted, "Discharge!" Frequently, the inmates were 'released' and they trembled from fear on all such occasions.<sup>3)</sup>

The 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment executed the inmates intensively as they left Jeju, and were replaced with the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment at the end of December 1948. The execution, carried out at a horse mill in the vicinity of a hill commonly known as 'Gosan Dongsan' on 23 December 1948, was one of them. The victims of the execution were Hyeon Gyeong-ho, Kim Won-jung, Bae Du-bong, Lee Sang-hui, Hyeon Du-hwang, and one person whose name is unknown. After executing them, the soldiers set fire to the dead bodies. Hyeon Jeong-ja, niece of Hyeon Gyeong-ho, gave her testimony, saying "We could find the dead bodies thanks to the driver who had taken the victims to Bakseongnae Stream (the place of the execution), who told us secretly where the execution was carried out. However, because all the dead bodies were burnt, it was very hard to identify the victims. We checked Uncle Hyeon (Hyeon Gyeong-ho) through the half-burned clothes he was wearing and identified Hyeon Du-hwang (cousin) through a medicine bottle in his pocket."<sup>4)</sup>

In addition to Song Yo-chan, the colonel-in-chief of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, the military captain Tak Seong-rok, intelligence staff, and Choi Nan-su, chief inspector of the Special Police Investigation Squad under the Jeju Emergency Security Forces were blamed for the killing of civilians. They had total control over Jeju people's lives. Yoon Tae-jun, then a soldier, testified.

"Everyone was executed by just one word from Tak Seong-rok, then an

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3) Kim Hyeong-jung (age 88, worked at the Jeju Provincial Office at the time), Testimony recorded on September 13, 2001; Choi Gil-du (age 85, worked at the Property Management Bureau at the time), Testimony recorded on June 22, 2001.

4) Hyeon Gyeong-ja (age 69, second grade at Jeju Girls Middle School at the time), Testimony recorded on July 26, 2001.

intelligence officer in the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment. At that time, people captured by the military police were released, but Captain Park killed everyone in his custody, regardless of whether they were soldiers or civilians. The Seobuk Youth members were much crueller. They made the situation worse by raping unmarried women, stealing cattle, and falsely labeling the innocent as ‘commies’, or ‘people favoring the Worker’s Party of North Korea’. They were just called in to subdue the rebels. That’s why more residents headed to the hills.”<sup>5)</sup>

There have been a great number of testimonies about him because of his barbaric and inhumane acts. Among the testimonies was the claim that he stigmatized all who went against him as ‘commies’, and killed or raped many women. “He is not a human. Many women forcibly became his wives. Before he left Jeju, he killed his wife at the Sarabong. He acted as if he had a license of murder,” said Choi Gil-du.<sup>6)</sup> Surprisingly, Tak was a drug-addict. Ha Du-yong said:

Upon his arrival on Jeju, Tak hurried to the hospital for the so-called ‘opium shot’. At that time, no one could access the drug except authorized personnel. So, the manager in charge of the drug had him injected. His addiction was serious. He even asked the nurse to shoot his armpit because she could not find any spot for the needle. He was the most frequent visitor to the hospital during his duty.<sup>7)</sup>

Jang Si-young also said, “When I was running the hospital with Oh Chang-hun in Busan, Tak asked Oh continuously to inject opium.”<sup>8)</sup> Kim Jeong-mu, a military officer for the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, said about Tak.

“In the backyard of the agriculture school, 20 tents were set up for the prison camp. One day, I accompanied the colonel-in-chief for his regular inspection. I noticed one prisoner whose face took on a whitish hue, which was strange to

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5) Yoon Tae-jun (age 73, Seoul, staff sergeant for supply in the 9th Regiment at the time), Testimony recorded on May 2, 2001.

6) Choi Gil-du, Testimony.

7) Ha Do-yong (age 75, Jeju, he was in charge of accounting for the Jeju Provincial Hospital at the time), Testimony recorded on June 28, 2001.

8) Jang Si-young (age 81, Jeju, a doctor at the time), Testimony recorded on October 19, 2002.

me. If he had been in the mountain, his face should have been blackish. So I asked him what happened. His name was Oh Chang-hun, a doctor. He said to me that Tak put me behind bars only because he refused his request for the opium shot.

His lamentation was strong enough to make me feel upset with Tak. Even though I made my way to the south from the Communists, Tak's acts were beyond my understanding. So, I headed to Tak right away with a gun. I told Tak, "Why did you label somebody who did not belong to the Worker's Party as a member of the party? I have no choice but to kill you if this happens again." After that, Tak set Oh free. Feeling threatened from Tak after being released, Oh kept asking me to help him to become an army surgeon. We visited the Army Headquarters in Seoul together for his job, but it didn't work out. Oh refused to live in Jeju because he still felt threatened. Eventually, he opened his clinic, 'Oh Children's Hospital' in Busan. For Tak's age, his position as intelligence staff was inappropriate. He did not graduate from military school. He was just blowing a trumpet in the military band. But he was promoted to a captain earlier than I. He also raped many women."<sup>9)</sup>

The 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment's staff for intelligence was the key figure of the military's brutal crackdown. The fact that a military chief like Tak was a drug addict, committing brutal murders and sexual assaults, demonstrates how imprudently the crackdown operations were planned and executed.

Choi Nan-su, then Chief Inspector for the Special Investigation Squad under the Jeju Emergency Security Command, was involved with the 4 · 3 Incident. After the general election on 10 May 1948, he came to Jeju with detectives for the national police agency.<sup>10)</sup> Again, Choi visited Jeju on June 1948 for his inspection duty.<sup>11)</sup> It was during his third visit to Jeju when the merciless anti-guerrilla operation on the Jeju community took place in early November 1948. Choi, then, was the chief officer for the special investigation squad under the Jeju Emergency Security Command. He filled the squad with officers from outside the island except only one.<sup>12)</sup> Kim Ho-gyeom, then a senior police

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9) Kim Jeong-mu (age 77, Seoul, a former chief staff for logistics in the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment), Testimony recorded on September 25, 2002.

10) *Chosun Ilbo*, May 18, 1948.

11) *Dong-A Ilbo*, June 24, 1948.

12) Kim Byeong-taek (age 77, Jeju, one of the Special Investigation Squad agents at the time),

officer, stated:

“There was a widespread distrust toward Jeju-native police officers from the law enforcement authorities in Seoul. The reason was that there were so many cases where the captured rebels turned out to be relatives of the local police. For this reason, the government formed a special investigation squad led by Choi and dispatched it to the island. From his experience as a detective during the Japanese occupation, Choi more often than not used his torture skills. This brought about a constant disagreement between us. One night, during the night shift at the Jeju police station, I could not fall asleep at all due to a woman's screaming from the interrogation room. Soon, I found out that Choi had been torturing the woman. She was naked and her body was hung upside down. Seized with a rage at the sight, I expelled the interrogating agents from the room.

The next day, I strongly raised my objection against Choi, saying “Choi is uncontrollable. He will aggravate the situation and eventually the Jeju community will turn their back on people from the mainland. It also makes it much harder to suppress the insurrection.” However, Choi still behaved obstinately. Anyone who was severely tortured could not but make a false confession. Sometimes, the squad distributed North Korean propaganda leaflets secretly in a village and apprehended and tortured its residents for no reason. They were so-called 'Government-controlled Communists' during the Liberal party rule”.<sup>13)</sup>

Choi was notorious not only in Jeju, but also in Seoul, for his ploy to assassinate parliamentary members who pushed forward establishing Banmin Teugui, short for the ‘Special Committee for Prosecution of Anti-National Offenders’. The assassination plot was undertaken before his third transfer to Jeju. In late October 1948, Choi with Roh Deok-sul, a pro-Japanese police officer, hired Baek Min-tae, a professional killer, and conspired together to assassinate those lawmakers. Choi’s plot was to abduct congressmen who belonged to the committee, force them to write a resignation letter, and kill all of them near the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel (the Military Demarcation Line), later reporting that they were killed after attempting to cross the border. Among those 15

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Testimony recorded on February 8, 2002.

- 13) Kim Ho-gyeom (Seoul, former chief of the Seogwipo Police Station), Testimony as quoted in the 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4 · 3 Incident Speaks*, Vol. 4, Jeonyewon, 1997, pp.222-223, p.386.

parliamentary members were Kim Byeong-no (chief justice of the Supreme Court), and Shin Ik-hui. In the midst of hatching the wicked plot, Choi joined the crackdown on Jeju rebels. Even after returning to Seoul in January 1949, Choi sought to execute his plan by supplying Baek, the hired killer, with more money and arms. However, all his attempts ended in utter failure because Baek surrendered himself to police. Baek had known that many pro-Japanese police began to be apprehended by the National Traitors Act Investigating Committee. Finally, Choi was sentenced to two years' imprisonment for the attempted murder in June 1949.<sup>14)</sup>

Kim Jae-neung, the chief of Seobuk Youth Organization wielded absolute power. He committed extortion, torture, and rape. He killed Kim Du-Hyeon, the director of the general affairs of Jeju Government, at his office because the director reportedly refused to Kim's request for supplies. A US military report for the incident, said, "One of the Youth Association beat Kim to death on 9 November. He stated that he never intended to kill him, but to question him as a known communist."<sup>15)</sup> They murdered the second-in-command of the Jeju administration, but just labeled him as 'Ppal-gang-i', or a communist. Kim also committed the depredation of the only media organization, Jeju Ilbo. Kim Yong-su, the then editor-in-chief recalled:

"There was no reason for the Jeju Ilbo to offend the Youth Organization. The Jeju Ilbo was forfeited only to serve their cause. There were few articles against their activities except the 'Bonggae-ri Operation' in which all government authorities including the Constabulary Regiment and the Youth Organization were mobilized under the leadership of Captain Lee Seok-bong of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion. We were ordered to describe it as 'the appropriate operation' even though there were many casualties reported. However, the Youth Organization raised their complaint that their role was not covered in the newspaper sufficiently to satisfy them.

Later, one of the Youth members came into the office and beat President Kim. I was also dragged out of my house by them on that night. Kim Jae-neung was

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14) Oh Ik-hwan, *Activities and Collapse of the National Traitors Act Investigating Committee, Understanding History before and after the Liberation*, Vol. 1, Hangilsa, 1979, pp.124-127.

15) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 987, November 13, 1948.

waiting for me at his office. In his mid-30s, Kim was about 180cm tall with a mustache, wearing the Japanese long boots. His build was huge - enough to scare ordinary people. What he did was severely beat people for no reason. When I was almost beaten to death, he ordered his men to get me out of there. They took me to the place where executions by the firing squad took place. Later, Ham Byeong-sun, the colonel-in-chief of 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment saved my life after realizing that my family was searching for me. I was given a position in charge of pacification activities in the Regiment.<sup>16)</sup>

Kim Jae-neung continued to exercise absolute power even after he placed himself as the president of Jeju Ilbo, appointing Kim Muk, from the Youth Organization as the editor-in-chief.

#### □ The Case of Haga-ri, Aewol-myeon

Haga-ri was a small village with about 160 families. Evacuation orders were not given to the village, because the order was only issued for communities located around upland areas. Haga-ri was located neither near the beach nor in the upland area. It allowed the residents to live normal lives even during the outbreak of the 4 · 3 Incident.

Around 1 a.m. on 13 November 1948, soldiers from the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment stationed in Oedo-ri raided the village. At that time, one of the families had just finished the ancestral rites and several villagers got together to throw a feast in Jung Gi-bong's house.

The soldiers broke into Jung's house and the neighborhood, dragging people at random out of the houses. In addition, they set 14 houses on fire and took villagers to the nearby field called 'Yooksiwooyoung', shooting them to death. The victims were Kim Du-cheon (71), Jung Gi-bong (67), Lee Jeong-hwa (female, 59), Yang Gong-myeong (48), Jang Sun-ho (45), Lim Gun-seon (42), Lim Yeong-eon (42), Yoon Chang-guk (41), Jeong Sun-a (39), Lim Chi-wan (38), Ko Tae-sik (37), Song Yu-saeng (33), Lim In-won (31), Jang Gi-hyu (30), Park Cheong-ryang (female, 30s), Ko Won-ryong (29), Park Gun-hwa

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16) Kim Yong-su (Gyeonggi Province), Testimony as quoted in the 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4 · 3 Incident Speaks*, Vol. 4, Jeonyewon, pp.173-174.

(female, 27), Jeong Sin-a (27), Kang Gi-hwan (26), Yang Gong-eon (26), Lim Hwa-bong (26), Ko Du-cheol (24), Ko Sun-hwa (female, 18), Jeong Do-a (18) and others. Ko Sun-hwa was near the end of her pregnancy. Ko Won-ryong was found alive and taken to the hospital but died two days later. Suffering bullet wounds Oh Chang-gi, who survived the scene, joined the Marines later and participated in the Incheon Landing Operations.

Kang Eung-mu, whose husband was killed, said, “three soldiers broke into my house and dragged my husband out of the room. They fired a machine gun at those people in the yard. People who were found alive were beheaded. Blood was all over the yard. It was a horrible scene. They never looked like soldiers but ‘human butchers’ to me.”<sup>17)</sup>

Why on earth did they come to Haga-ri and fire guns at those civilians? There were several rumors regarding that. One was a conspiracy between right-wing members in the coastal village and an employee of a vessel. Or, according to an intelligence source, the soldiers were on the way to suppress the armed rebels gathered at Wondong, a village located in the upland area. When the soldiers reached Haga-ri, they noticed villagers gathering together. Guns were fired at those villagers because they were mistaken for rebels. But, the fact that the soldiers fired guns at residents in Wondong right after committing the murder at Haga-ri has provided a more convincing explanation to the question above. That is, the villagers were ‘mistakenly’ murdered. However, no explanations justified murdering those innocent civilians, including the elderly people.

The clue to the more fundamental reason can be found in the date of the incident. In November 1948, Wondong village in Aewol-myeon, Gyorae-ri, Waheul-ri 2-gu, and Sinheung-ri in Jocheon-myeon, Sangcheon-ri, Sangchang-ri, and Changcheon-ri were villages where merciless killings and arson were committed. Many other villages were also targets for the same inhumane crime described above.

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17) Kang Eung-mu (female, age 83, Aewol-eup), Testimony recorded on June 1, 2002.

#### □ The Case of Wondong Village in Sogil-ri, Aewol-myeon

Wondong village has not existed since 13 November 1948, when the brutal crackdown on the insurrection just began. (Wondong had only 15 households and was divided into Sogil-ri located on the east of the river running through the village and Sangga-ri on the west). Now, the signpost, 'Wongi' only remains, indicating there had been a village. This village was formed during the Joseon Dynasty. It was a quiet neighborhood with only one inn and the rest of the residents engaged in farming.

Because of the low number of youth likely to join the rebels, the police only warned the residents not to cooperate with them. The rebels sometimes made political speeches before the villagers but never required any food from them. The evacuation order was not issued yet. The soldiers seemed to be mobilized around the village due to the intelligence reports of the rebels being gathered. It was these soldiers who mercilessly murdered inhabitants in Wondong. They searched the village thoroughly but found no rebel forces.

However, they killed every dweller in their sight regardless of age or gender. Thirty-four (34) victims were Lee Du-ik (64), Kim Gi-yong (60), Kim Seung-hong (58), Hyeon Du-byeong (50), Kim Gil-hong (49), Yang I-ryong (48), Lee Mu-saeng (the wife of Yang), Ko Byeong-gyu (43), Yang Jeong-saeng (female, 41), Kang Ki-song (40), Kim Yu-hong (40), Hur Hong (female, 40s), Lee Dal-ho (female, 36), Kang Chang-su (31), Kang Chang-gwon (29), Kang Chang-uk (28), Kang's wife (25), Kim Gwi-hwan (28), Yang Un-yong (28), Kim Seong-man (female, 24), Ko Im-saeng (female, 22), Hong Seong-gyu (22), Ko Tae-won (21), Kim Gwi-hyu (21), Yang Chun-hui (female, 21), Kang Gong-bu (20), Hyeon Chang-ha (20), Jang Bong-ho (female, 19), Lim Se-ok and Ko Nam-ok (female, 16), Yang Chun-saeng (female, 16), Hyeon Bong-wan (14), Ko Nam-ju (7), the son of Kang, Chang-uk (4). Especially, Ko Nam-bo lost his father and two younger brothers. Ko testified about the tragic day as follows:

"I remember it was around 5 a.m. because I watched soldiers assembling villagers holding lanterns. They tied their hands behind their backs and had them

tied to each other with rope. The villagers were never worried about them because two days ago, the police and soldiers came to the village but nothing happened. There was nothing we could do when they asked where the rebels hid. We were dragged almost all day long with our hands tied. We returned to the inn almost at 5 p.m. We thought the soldiers did not have any intention of killing us. They untied our hands. They threatened us saying “When we execute by gun, we have 9 people in a row” or “usually adults instantly die when the gun is fired, but kids cry until they die.” Then they bound us again. But this time my hands were tied round my stomach. Suddenly, after one of the soldiers talked on the walkie-talkie, he told us that we would die in 10 minutes. Probably, an order from the regiment was issued. Soon, a military truck appeared from the distance. While they greeted each other, I quickly untied the rope and ran swiftly to the woods. Soon after, I heard the noisy shooting sound. Soldiers moved away after burning the dead bodies.”<sup>18)</sup>

This is how Wondong village disappeared. Then how did those soldiers report the incident? A U.S. report below indicates how the tragic incident was understood:

On 13 November, through the operation of the constabulary force, 115 armed rebels were killed in Hangwon-ri, 37 in the area with coordinations of 937-1133, and four near Odeung-ri. They also found out that one of them had escaped from the force.” (from Defense Security Command reports)<sup>19)</sup>

Later, we figured out that the coordinations (937-1133) without a name on the American military map points exactly to Wondong. The merciless murders of everyone, from toddlers aged four to elders in their 60s, became the military accomplishment of ‘killing a mob.’

#### □ The Case of Tosan-ri, Pyoseon-myeon

The tragedy began 15 December 1948. Soldiers separated men aged 18 to 40 and women aged under 20 from residents at ‘Hyangsa’, or ‘shrine’, after

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18) Ko Nam-bo (Jeju-si), Testimony as quoted in the 4 • 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, The 434<sup>th</sup> Article of *The 4 • 3 Incident Speaks*, January 22, 1999.

19) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 989, November 16, 1948.

calling all residents. Then they were all locked up in Pyoseon Primary School and were executed by firing squad on 18 and 19 December. After that, the young were not seen any more. Many household in this village held a ‘Sahon’ ceremony, where it was believed that the dead young couple got married. The remaining families adopted children to carry on family lines.<sup>20)</sup>

Tosan-ri is divided into two villages: Uttosan and Altosan.<sup>21)</sup> The army did not know much about Tosan-ri. Altosan was located near the coast and Uttosan was only two kilometers away from the coast. That was the one reason the evacuation order in mid-November was not issued for these villages. On 12 December, the villagers were ordered to evacuate and leave for Altosan. During the evacuation, there were no casualties reported and no arson by the soldiers. However, on 15 December, right after the evacuation order, the army took the residents out of the village and executed them by firing squad.

Several reasons for the mass murder were given. First, three armed rebels were chased by the police, heading toward the coast. The police assembled all the villagers to search for those rebels. Second, a few residents were planned to be executed, but the massacre took place after an unexpected accident happened. One of the villagers confined in the Pyoseon Primary school escaped from the army and hid himself in a nearby farm house. The farm house owner noticed and attacked him, but the fugitive took the sword from him and stabbed him to death. Some believed that the soldiers, upset by that incident, began to murder all the villagers. All explanations above do not seem justifiable, either. In particular, the slaughter of women was inhumane.

Since the June Democracy Movement in 1987, under the democratic environment, the villagers have spoken out about the tragic accident. In the same year, the petition named ‘4 · 3 Silsanggi’ or ‘Actual Incident Report of 4 · 3’ was presented to the Government to get at the root of the incident and reinstate the honor of the dead. Kim Yang-hak, who led the petition, lost his two uncles and elder brother during the genocide. The fundamental question

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20) Kim Sang-bo (age 72, Pyoseon-myeon), Testimony recorded on May 22, 2002; Kim Dae-eun (age 70, Pyoseon-myeon), Testimony recorded on May 23, 2002.

21) ‘Ut’ means ‘up’, ‘Al’ means ‘down’ in Jeju dialect.

most of the villagers have now is ‘why did they have to be killed?’ Kim said:

“All the villagers were innocent and followed the evacuation order. If ideology mattered, it did not make any sense that only people who were aged between 18 and 40 were selected and killed. Furthermore, for no reason they took young and pretty women out of the villages because they bore bad intent. It only seemed to me that they had abnormal sexual desires. My sister-in-law, who got married to my dead brother, was killed at the age of 16. Her younger sister only survived until she was 15. Several times, I pleaded with her to tell me about what happened to her. But she did not mention anything out of shame.”<sup>22)</sup>

After the collapse of the Syngman Rhee administration due to the 19 April Revolution, the National Assembly began to investigate the mass murder of civilians. Tosan-ri residents reported 148 victims compared to 156 in the ‘Actual Incident Report of 4 · 3’. Tosan-ri had only 200 households.

## 2) Killing of Fugitives’ Families

If the Constabulary found any young children in a family evacuating from the mountain to the coast to be missing, they shot all of the family members to death, labeling them as a fugitive’s family. There was no exception for the families residing along the coast. In some places, the police used the residents’ registry to identify any missing person. Mostly, the elderly were shot to death. The residents called the killing ‘Daesal’ or ‘to be murdered for the family’ even though it was defined as ‘to execute a killer to death’. The mass killing took place usually near the coast. One middle-aged woman whose husband fled into the mountain hid herself in the storage during the genocide and appeared four years later.

### The Case of Hagwi-ri, Aewol-myeon

Around November 1948, when the full-fledged crackdown was about to begin, no young residents were seen in Hagwi-ri. They had to hide from the

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22) Kim Yang-hak (age 62, Pyoseon-myeon), Testimony recorded on May 22, 2002.

massacre.

On 5 December 1948<sup>23)</sup> the mobilization order was issued on the residents in Hagwi-ri to get firewood for the winter. The elderly and women followed the order equipped with tools. Some of them were young and were sure to be safe.

However, it was a trap set by the police. They started to beat the mobilized people mentioning such reasons as ‘cutting down electric poles’. Then the young were put in trucks and were never to return. Prisoners were killed by the South Korean Army right after the Korean War broke out. Not knowing the exact date of death, the bereaved families held the ancestral rite on the birthday of the dead. Sometimes, there were unexpected postcards sent from Daegu prison a year after they were taken. One of the victims, Kang Chang-ha’s mother, reported to the Special Committee for Investigating the Murder of Civilians as follows:

“My son was imprisoned at Daegu Prison right after the mobilization order. He even sent a letter to me but still remained missing. Reported by Shin Jeong-mo, 77, his mother and Kang Gu-ja, 19, his daughter.”<sup>24)</sup>

The so-called ‘mobilization order for labor’ and ‘special period for surrendering’ were not only limited to Hagwi-ri. It was an island-wide and typical operation for searching for any young residents. This indicates that the operation was decided at the higher levels of the authority.

The police station in Oedo caught many young dwellers from not only ‘mobilization order for labor’ but also during ‘special periods for surrendering’. The latter was first carried out in Gaesudong area (renamed later as ‘Hakwondong’).

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23) The date of ancestral rites gives the most accurate clue to estimate the date of death. However, those who were mobilized at that time were not killed on the spot, making it hard to pinpoint the date of mobilization. But, it is likely that the mobilization took place in December 5 1948. During the investigation by the National Assembly later, the Bereaved Family Report the date of ‘December 3’ or ‘December 5’.

24) The 4<sup>th</sup> National Assembly, An Investigation Report of Massacres of Civilians (6-1), 1960, p.216.

The police put up a notice, asking the young to turn themselves in. There were several young armed rebels in the mountain. The notice included the list of 10 young residents and said that if they turned themselves in, they would be safe; otherwise the whole village would be in big trouble. The emergency meeting was convened, but no decisions were made. They just could not trust any word from the police because those young residents who followed the mobilization order were all taken into custody. That's why the residents could not expect any voluntary appearance by the young. However, Kim Ho-jung first stepped up before the public, saying "If I safely return from the police, then surrender yourselves to the police." On 7 December, he was shot to death.

On 10 December, in the morning, the police accompanied by members of the Daedong Youth Association raided Gaesudong Village. Gaining advanced intelligence of the raid, most of the residents hid themselves except the elderly. Ko Chang-seon recalled as follows:

"The news that Kim Ho-jung was executed shocked the whole village. The rest of the nine young residents fled to the mountain. We were all seized with fear and dread. Then, we received intelligence from an anonymous source from Oedo-ri that sooner or later, the police would raid the village and every one must run away. However, we had no place to go. Family meetings were held. My father left a message which explained a will of how much debt we had and where the cash was placed. And he asked anyone who survives to take that money and informed us of whom we should follow in case of his absence."<sup>25)</sup>

The police that raided the village dragged all the villagers to the 'Bihag' hill. Then, they shot to death all the family members whose young sons had fled. The victims were Kim Nak-jun (female, 69), Ko Hui-jeon (65), Kim Jae-bong (65), Ko Yeong-sam (62), Ko Du-ju (60s), Baek Yong-heung (female, 60s), Hyeon Gwi-deok (female, 60s), Kang Hwa-sun (female, 61), Kang Seung-hak (50s), Kim Ji-su (50s), Kang Ki-yu (49), Ko Jeong-gyu's wife (30), Kim Gye-saeng (female, 29), Kang Du-jung (16). Except the fugitives' families, those 36 villagers who came down to the Gaesudong from Jangeon-ri and

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25) Ko Chang-seon (age 66, Aewol-eup), Testimony recorded on August 23, 2001.

Gwanryeong-ri due to the evacuation order were all shot into death.

This 'Gaesudong Massacre' was notorious for its brutal way of killing. One of the victims was a pregnant woman who was hung upside down naked and, stabbed by swords. She was the wife of Ko Jeong-gyu, who fled to the mountain.

The following is a testimony by Ahn In-haeng, a survivor of the massacre. He was only 13 years old. He was said to have survived because his mother held him in her arm during the shooting. His father, Ahn Tae-ryong, 33, was also killed 5 days earlier.

“After the villagers gathered at the ‘Bihak’ hill, the police dragged two men before us. They were a father and his son. The father was in his 70s and his son looked in his mid 30s. The police started to beat the son. His father begged the police to stop the beating, saying “We are evacuated. And he is the fourth, only son in our family. Please stop beating him.” The police beat the father to death. His son began to run away, but was shot and killed. Everyone was in panic at the sight. The police pointed at one woman who was pregnant. They hung her upside down in the nearby tree and stabbed her with swords. It was the most horrible scene I’d ever seen. Every one closed their eyes, but the police shouted, “Open your eyes and look at her.” Then, they began to search for so-called ‘rebels’ families’ among us. They called my family because my father was taken in and killed during the ‘Oedo firewood incident’. Actually, my father did not have to be mobilized because he was evacuated. Instead, the owner of the house we stayed at was subject to the order. However, my father who thanked him for providing the shelter for us responded to the order instead of him.

I had three brothers. I was the eldest, then 13, and had three younger brothers, who were 10, seven, and four years old. My mother (Kang In-pal, 34) sensed the imminent death and separated herself from the younger brothers. However, I was tied with the 10-year-old brother and my mother. My younger brother was saved due to my mother's heartfelt plea, but I was not released because they decided that I might make contact with the rebels. Finally, 12 villagers were dragged to the near field. They argued with one another, saying “Let’s stab them to death,” or “Just shoot them because we do not have much time left.” I can vividly remember their talk. During the short period of time, I thought to myself, “I would rather be killed by shooting than swords, because I could not stand the pain by the sword.” At the moment, I heard the shooting sound, and then

my mother fell down, holding me in her breast tightly at the same time. The blood from my mother was all over my body. She shivered terribly. After the shooting, the police stabbed every one because they believed there could be survivors. However, I could avoid the sword because my mother lay on me. This made us orphans. One of my younger brothers, who was four years old, died of measles and the youngest died because of lack of breast feeding. If I were a movie director, I could describe that brutal massacre on the screen vividly. How can I forget the day?"<sup>26)</sup>

The killing never stopped against the villagers in Gaesudong. The police frequently visited the village, searching for the fugitive's families. The most horrendous incident took place in January 24 1949. In the evening, Kim San-chun (28), Ko Dae-gyu's wife, was ordered to come into the Oedo police station. She was the sister-in-law of the pregnant woman who was hung upside down and killed. The police recognized the relationship between Kim and Ko Dae-gyu who fled. Kim and her three-year-old son were killed together. In addition to that mother and son, the victims included Kang Seon (female, 60s), Kang Gye-hyo (50s), Shin I-sin (female, 50s), Kim Jeong-bok (female, 37), Kang Jae-saeng (30s), Kim Jeong (female, 30s), Kang Seon-haeng (female), Kang Gyeong-su (20s).

Ko Chang-sun compared the family registries and genealogy to put the list of victims altogether. He said, "In the village composed of 56 households, a total of 63 residents were killed." The testimonies about the brutalities continued to be reported. Kim Gye-sun who married a man in Hagwi Il(1)-ri left an unbelievable story:

"It was the next spring after the 4·3 Incident broke out that an unmarried woman from Geumdeok-ri was dragged to Hagwi police station and was tortured by electricity every day. She hid herself somewhere in the coast but was caught and dragged to the police. The police stood her up before Daehan Youth Association members at Hagwi Primary school. At that time, everyone had to join the group. When she appeared before us, she fainted. However, the police stripped her, yelling at us "She is a woman, so women come forward and stab her. Otherwise,

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26) Ahn In-haeng (age 67, Aewol-eup), Testimony recorded on August 21, 2001.

we will stab all of you.” We were all scared. However, a woman stepped forward and stabbed her. Before my turn arrived, she already died. The police confirmed her death and ordered the men to take care of her body. After I got back home, I could not do anything normally because I was reminded of the dead body. I also heard that everyone who witnessed the brutality suffer from the same illness that I had. I could not forget the scene until I die. Later, I found out that the reason for the killing was the police failed to rape her. One of my friends felt deeply sorry for her, saying "She could have survive if she let them rape her ...”<sup>27)</sup>

Another victim was Kang Jo-sun who was then 18 years old. Kang Jo-haeng, her brother, said:

“The young residents in our village had to stand guard for the Shineom police station by turns before it was attacked. One day, I was arrested for no reason on the way to my hometown, Geumdeok-ri. I noticed 30 other villagers, including my brothers and sisters, standing on the street tied with ropes. We were taken into Shineom police station where the police had someone who was blinded in one eye standing before us. Then, they ordered him to point to anyone randomly among us. Anyone pointed at by him was dragged out, but the others were safe. Including me, 50 residents were afterwards transferred to the Jeju Police Station, where we were beaten and tortured every day.

They forced us to confess that we belonged to the rebels that attacked the Shineom police station. We were locked up in the station for 15 days. Then we had to stamp a seal on a document they never talked of under coercion. After that, I was labeled as a rebel that attacked the station. While we were in the prison for more than six months, we were never brought to trial. In August, I had rashes and malaria all over my body. Every meal time, the prison guard hit my hands 10 times, a total of 30 times a day, after he asked me to stretch my hand out of the bar to grab the meal. I had a severe bruise on the hand later. Finally, I was acquitted of all claims by dismissal of the prosecutors after trials at Kwangju Prison and released on 31 December 1948. However, I had to stay on the mainland for eight more months due to the chaotic situation in Jeju. After I came back to Jeju the next year, I heard that my brother, Kang Jo-jeong, 28, and sister, 18 had been murdered brutally by the police.”<sup>28)</sup>

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27) Kim Gye-sun (age 70, Aewol-eup), Testimony recorded on August 22, 2001.

28) Kang Jo-haeng (age 78, Aewol-eup), Testimony recorded on August 23, 2001.

Most of the officers at Oedo police station came from the Seobuk Youth Association. Their brutality was so notorious that during the Special Investigation into the Murder of Civilians led by the National Assembly after the April Revolution, they became the first ones who were accused by the Jeju government. In its article, *Jeju Shinbo*, a local newspaper, wrote, “Such barbarous acts as stabbing to death innocent civilians, including not only the elderly but a 10-month-old baby, can never be forgotten and forgiven.” It reported more cases including the following:

“The accused, Kim Byeoug-chaе, the former chief of Oedo police station, and Lee Yoon-do, an officer at the same station, were reported to have brutally murdered Lee Yang-ho's family, then living at Oedo-ri 252, Jeju City using bamboo swords without any lawful procedures at around 3 p.m. on February 17 1949... [It is too long to read in full, so certain parts are omitted.] The only reason for the murder was that there was only one young son found. However, Lee Wan-young, the eldest son, Lee Wan-yeong, was taken into custody by them. The victims were Lee Yang-ho (67), Lee Wan-yeong's father, Ko Jeong-suk (63), his mother, Ko Ui-sun (41), his wife, Lee Ki-yeong (18), his younger brother, Lee Young-hui (19), Ko Chun-ja (19), Lee Bong-hui (18), Lee Ok-ja (7), Lee Ok-hui (3). Among them was even a 10-day-old grandson. This is a case reported by the baby's great grandmother later. It clearly identified Kim Byeong-chaе, the police chief at Oedo police station, as the principal offender, and Lee Yoon-do, a police officer, as an accomplice with Lee Sang-hun (43), then a chief officer of ‘Minbodan’, or ‘a lower branch of the police’, presented as a witness. This report clearly asked for compensation from the Government’.<sup>29)</sup>

#### Cases at Gasi-ri, Pyoseon-myeon

Those who resided around the upland areas were suspected of supporting the rebels and became the target of merciless killing. On 15 November 1948, upon arriving at Gasi-ri, the Constabulary Police randomly shot villagers, 30 of whom, mostly the elderly, lost their lives. The victims were Kim Su-gye (female), Kim In-ha (female), Kim Jeong-suk (female), Kim Ho-jik (male), Ahn Man-gyu (male), Oh Gyeong-saeng (female), Oh Yun-bu (female), Oh

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29) *Jeju Shinbo*, June 24, 1960.

Hui-baek (female), Jeong Jae-byeong (male), Jeong Jong-eon (male), Ko Sin-chun (female, 42), Kang Mae-chun (female, 37), Ahn Jae-won (20), Ahn Yeong-sun (female, 19), Ahn Jae-sun (female, 15), an unidentified child, Ahn Il-jin, Ahn Ok-hui, Ahn Ok-sun, Ahn Gyu-ban (40s), Kang Jae-ho (12), Kang Sun-i (female, 7), an unidentified child (4). In particular, Ahn Man-gyu in his 60s fled to nearby woods with Kim In-ha, his wife, and his grandson and granddaughter. However, they were found by the police and were executed together.

Every soldier was not so brutal. Ko Tae-ok, one of the villagers, said, “At hearing the noisy shooting, I quickly headed to a nearby brook. But, my wife and son stayed at home. One of the soldiers said to my wife that she must leave right away otherwise she would be killed, while he set fire to the house. Then he walked away.” His family was able to save their lives.<sup>30)</sup>

The remaining people were literally in panic. They could flee neither to the mountain nor to the coast. They just stayed at the village. Around November 22, they were ordered to evacuate to the coastal village of Pyoseon. The villagers were scattered. Some of them moved to Pyoseon or Tosan according to the order. Others were too scared to leave the village. All of them who stayed or wandered around the village were killed by the Constabulary Police.

On the other hand, those who followed the orders were locked up at Pyoseon Elementary School. On 22 December, they were asked to gather at the playground and checked every family by using family registries to make sure all of the family members were evacuated. Several hours later, a total of 76 villagers who were missing any family members, were taken to the field near the so-called ‘Beodeulmot’ and they shot all of them to death. Mostly, the victims were aged over 60 because their children had already left them. The following is the testimony of Oh Guk-man who barely survived, but lost his parents:

When we were detained at Pyoseon Primary School, we were ordered to

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30) Ko Tae-ok (Pyoseon-myeon), Testimony as quoted in the 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4 · 3 Incident Speaks*, Vol. 5, Jeonyewon, p.95.

gather in the playground. It was 22 December, according to the lunar calendar. They split us into two groups: according to the family registry, one which had all of the family members gathered and one that didn't. At that time, my brother was missing, so my family was classified as 'a fugitive's family'. They ordered anyone who was under 16 and with babies to come forward. I was actually 16 but was registered as 14 by my father. Thanks to my father, my life was saved. During that day, 76 residents were shot to death. The soldiers only covered the dead bodies with soil. Then the bodies were buried a year later. My father was identified by his tobacco pipe.<sup>31)</sup>

Villagers were even ordered to clap their hands while watching their neighbors murdered. Oh Tae-gyeong said, "We had to watch the whole shooting scene, even clapping our hands. The most horrendous thing was to watch the crawling baby murdered."<sup>32)</sup>

### 3) Killing against Those Who Surrendered to the Police

The Constabulary Police always threatened us, saying "If anyone of you did wrongful acts, we strongly urge them to surrender to the police in order not to be shot to death. We already have the relevant list of names." Actually, they did not have any real "names" because they wanted any suspects to surrender to the police. But many villagers turned themselves in to the police. These people were involved in the activities of the Preparatory Committee for National Founding or People's Committee. They also participated in the protest against the shooting incident by the police during the March Independence Movement ceremony in 1947. Besides, they had provided the rebels with food and shelter. They were all killed by the Constabulary Police.

#### The Case of Waheul-ri, Jocheon-myeon

As the rebels attacked the Jocheon police station and withdrew on 11 November 1948, the police chased after them to Waheul 1-ri and set fire to

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31) Oh Guk-man (age 70, Pyoseon-myeon), Testimony recorded on May 29, 2002.

32) Oh Tae-gyeong (age 71, Pyoseon-myeon), Testimony recorded on May 30, 2002.

the village. The residents hid themselves in Waheul Cave and could avoid the possible massacre. However, on 13 November, when the police surrounded Waheul 2-ri, the soldiers set fire to every house and especially the elderly who stayed at home were killed.

A week later, the evacuation order was given to the remaining residents. 15 days after the order was issued, one of the villagers gave himself up to the police. His name was Kim Tae-u. He was evacuated to Jocheon-ri with his family. And then a 17-year-old boy stated how he turned himself in:

A few days after the whole village was set on fire, I heard that the police station issued an evacuation order. I had never heard of that before. We moved to Jocheon-ri. Soon, we were told that the soldiers would guarantee our safety if we turned ourselves in to the police. Therefore, I turned myself to the police station at Hamdeok, where the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment was stationed. I was confined in the classroom of Hamdeok Elementary School. They did not interrogate me. So, I got released because I was not mature enough. However, the rest of the young residents were all killed.<sup>33)</sup>

The conciliatory approach was used for not only those who were evacuated from the mountain areas, but also those who resided along the coast. Their typical rhetoric was that anyone who turned themselves in to the police would be secure. About 200 young adults from the Jocheon area turned themselves in the office. Among those who turned themselves in to the police, many were from Waheul-ri. They had no choice but to follow orders from the armed rebels, including supplying foods and attending political rallies held in the mountain.

They all had to face mass murder at the stream named 'Pakseonnae'. It was 21 December. The victims from Waheul ri were Moon Myeong-guk (40), Baek Su-ok (35), Ko Chang-hun (33), Kim Won-geun (33), Baek Tae-rim (33), Kim Si-jin (31), Ko Tae-sun (30), Ko Gong-rim (29), Baek Jong-ok (35), Ko Yun-jong (27), Baek Sang-ok (26), Kim Seok-bong (26), Kim Gi-un (25), Kim Man-chu (25), Lee Han-bong (25), Kim Jung-ok (24), Lee Seong-bae

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33) Kim Tae-u (age 71, Jocheon-myeon), Testimony recorded on September 26, 2001.

(24), Lee Won-sik (24), Jang Byeong-ho (24), Kim Yeong-hwa (22), Kim Dong-ok (21), Lee Seong-il (21), Lim Ik-song (21), Kim Jung-hwa (20), Park Bong-rim (20), Yang Chi-gyu (20), Lee Se-bong (20), Kang Myeong-sik (20), Lim Gyeong-song (19), Lim Jun-song (19), Hong Young-jong (19), Moon Myeong-bong (18), Yang Chi-ok (18), Yang Su-bong (20s), and others.

Kim Tae-jun was the only survivor from the massacre. His return enabled the bereaved families to confirm the death of their relatives. Kim recalled as follows:

I turned myself in to the police not because I felt I did wrong things, but because I trusted the words from the police. Actually, I provided the armed rebels with 15 won. Those who gave themselves up to the police gathered at Hamdeok Primary School. We spent two weeks doing nothing there. At 5 p.m. on 21 December, the police called some of them to join the crackdown on the rebels. Others including myself joined them voluntarily because we believed that joining the police could save us from our fate. Soon a bus arrived. Some of us got on the bus, but others couldn't because there wasn't enough room for them.<sup>34)</sup>

The police were given a kind of quota: the number of people who would be murdered. Of the total of 200 villagers who turned themselves in, 150 of them got on the bus. Kim described the moment of the mass killing as follows.

Upon our arrival, the soldiers tied all of us with wires. We were loaded into a truck. Two of them escaped from the truck because, unlike us, they were tied with a straw rope. It was easily broken. When we arrived at the destination, the chief told us that if we cooperated with them, they would let our family know where we were killed. They took all of our belongings from us. They took 10 of us to the nearby stream and killed them. I was shot in the left shoulder and right arm. I tried to stay conscious and hid myself between rocks. There were more survivors but all of them were caught by the soldiers and were all burned to death. It was early morning when I escaped from the place. It was extremely cold with a heavy snowstorm. I had severe frostbite on the toes and was bleeding from the arm. Throughout the night I kept walking, relying upon the

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34) Kim Tae-jun (Jocheon-eup), Testimony as quoted in the 4·3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4·3 Incident Speaks*, Vol. 4, Jeonyewon, pp.406-408.

lighthouse at Wondang Hill. It took five days to get to my hometown. Upon arrival, I lost consciousness.

The massacre claiming 150 young adults' lives literally put all the bereaved families into a state of numbness and shock. One resident told us a story about a mother who lost her son and died of severe mental disorder from the shock.

My 21-year-old cousin, Kim Hong-gyu, was killed at 'Bakseonnae' with other young men. No one knew they were going to be killed. I watched them singing and waving their hands at us on the truck, while the truck was passing through Shinchon. His mother fell unconscious with the news. Later, she suffered from mental illness. Her condition got more serious. A year later, she died.<sup>35)</sup>

#### 4) Crackdown by Entrapment

The soldiers and police who disguised themselves as rebels asked any villagers to join them. Anyone who cooperated with them was shot to death. It was the typical so-called 'crackdown by entrapment'. Everyone said, "Not only wild bears, but tigers scare them." In other words, they were afraid of the Constabulary Police as well as the armed rebels. During the day, the police killed anyone who was suspected of being a rebel, while the rebels murdered anyone who cooperated with the police, calling them 'Bandonbunja', or 'reactionary'. The operations by the police continued.

#### Cases of Dopyeong-ri, Jeju-eup

The massacre against Dopyeong-ri residents was an example of the entrapment operation. In the early morning, of 3 January 1949, a group of people wearing 'Galjoongi'<sup>36)</sup> appeared at Dopyeong village. They were armed with guns. Some of them held 'Ingukgi', the North Korean flag and they shook hands with people on the street, saying 'Dongmu', a word that was used before names by North Koreans. They even pressed villagers to support the rebels.

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35) Kim Tae-gyu (age 66, Japan), Testimony recorded on December 26, 2002.

36) Jeju's traditional work clothes, colored with persimmon.

They were soldiers and police disguised as rebels.

Some of the villagers noticed that and tried not to fall for the trap. Yang Gyeon-ha (22) said, “I will fight against the rebels.” And Kim Byeong-hae (58) shouted, “Daehanminguk, forever!” - Daehanminguk being the official name in Korean for South Korea. A total of 70 people were killed including the men mentioned right above. Kim Se-won testified, “Kim Seong-gyu, aged over 60, was murdered with his wife, son, daughter-in-law, and grandson.”<sup>37)</sup>

## 5) Murders against Civilians Who Fled to Mountains

Many villagers left their burned homes behind and fled to the mountains. Their hideouts were mostly either caves or woods. The extreme fear of being caught and the extreme cold overwhelmed them. However, they were eventually found during the joint search by the soldiers and police, and all of them were shot to death. They committed merciless murders against those innocent civilians. The soldiers and police celebrated the genocide as a ‘brilliant military accomplishment’.

### Cases of Yonggang-ri, Jeju-eup

At 10 a.m. on November 20 1948, the soldiers who arrived at the village began setting fire to houses. It was the beginning of the brutal crackdown on Yonggang-ri. The dwellers fled to so-called ‘Saetmeoheul’, a type of forest located 10km away from the village. Thorn bushes and rocks made it hard for soldiers to move forward. However, they fired shots at the woods leaving two people dead and one sustained an injury to his arm. As a result of the raid, the whole town became devastated, but the damage was not considerable, compared to other villages.

Given that Yonggang-ri was located deep in the mountain, it was under the control of the rebels. It was a village where not only many civilians gathered to boycott the general election on May 10, but some deserters from the 9th

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37) Kim Se-won (Jeju-si, the son of the late Kim Byeong-hae), Testimony as quoted in the 4 • 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, The 445<sup>th</sup> Article of *The 4 • 3 Incident Speaks*, May 21, 1999.

Regiment hid themselves. Nine of them later joined the rebels. As the Constabulary Police suppressed the rebels hard, the villagers had to be ready to flee. The soldiers shot both the rebels and the civilians to death. Even though the entire village was burned to the ground, no one could leave their hometown behind. All they could do was just to wait for the situation to end. 'Hide-and-seek' between the police and the villagers seemed to last forever. Mud huts became shelters for the villagers. And if the guard sent the sign of the police reaching them, they ran away immediately. Then the police burned all the huts they found.

The evacuation order was not issued to Yonggang-ri yet. However, some of the villagers evacuated themselves to Hwabuk or Samyang beforehand. The elderly who were evacuated had to return to the village, because it was very common for the police to shoot to death the fugitive's family and those who had evacuated. Ko Sin-jong, who evacuated himself to Hwabuk at the age of 13, said, "After my house was burned to the ground, we headed to the coast. But we returned to where we were, because we heard that anyone who came from the mountain would be killed."<sup>38)</sup>

Since then, no massacres took place until late December 1948, when the 9th Regiment was stationed at the village. It was news and information that made it possible for the villagers to stay unharmed, although they also posted sentries around their hideouts. The intelligence mostly came from dwellers at coastal villages where the Constabulary Police were based. Due to the subordinates of the police who joined the crackdowns, the villagers along the coast knew the details of the police's operations.

On 4 February 1949, the police raided Yonggang-ri. Panicked, the villagers desperately sought shelter. Unfortunately, there were few places for the villagers to hide, so most of them headed to 'Dangkareum' and 'Daeryunsoo', where a few trees grew. Chasing after them, the police shot all of them, mostly women and the elderly, to death. From this massacre, 105 villagers lost their lives. The tragedy took place in Bonggae-ri and Hoicheon-ri. That's why there

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38) Ko Sin-jong (age 66, Jeju-si), Testimony recorded on July 12, 2001.

are so many people who hold ancestral rites at Bonggae-ri, Yonggang-ri, and Hoicheon-ri on January 6 by the lunar calendar.

The Ministry of National Defense announced, “The army, navy and air forces led by the regimental commander, Ham Byeong-seon, carried out joint operations against the armed rebels around Bonggae-ri, Jeju-eup, at 3 a.m., on 4 February.” And it added, “We successfully completed the mission by killing 360, taking 130 captive, and obtaining their supplies including foods and clothes.”<sup>39)</sup> Their announcement that 360 rebels were killed and 130 were taken captive, but no single weapon was obtained, proved how exaggerated the operation result was.

There is still a question around why the villagers suddenly got caught and were killed during a single day. Bringing back the memories of the day, Ko Yun-seop, one of survivors, said, “The soldiers chased after the villagers like hare coursing, from every quarter like Wolpyeong-ri, Samyang-ri, and Hamdeok-ri. In particular, the soldiers lay in ambush, shooting the villagers running away. My elder brother ran to ‘Chil Oreum’ but was shot to death. Around 100 people including myself headed to ‘Sonanggul’ [currently, located near a landfill site]. 70 to 80 of them, mostly women, were shot to death by the soldiers who lay in ambush.”<sup>40)</sup>

Song Gi-jeon, who lost his grandmother and younger sister, said as follows:

We received a warning that the soldiers were not very far from us. Soon, the elderly ran to ‘Dangkareum’ or ‘Daeryonsoo’ and young adults as usual headed to the east. That’s because the military was stationed in the west (Jukseong village, Odeung-ri). However, the soldiers approached us from not only Jukseong village but from Hamdeok-ri. We were sure to be surrounded. Many old residents were killed on their way. I could barely save my life, but my maternal grandmother, uncle, and younger sister lost their lives. When I returned to the village, it was covered with dead bodies. I noticed some of the dead bodies with their head face down between rocks. Some bodies seemed to have been killed while climbing a tree. I engaged in endless combat during the Korean War as a marine. I confess that I killed so many people. However, this atrocity against

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39) *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, February 9, 1949.

40) Ko Yun-seop (age 75, Jeju-si), Testimony recorded on June 29, 2001.

unarmed civilians was the most horrible.<sup>41)</sup>

The survivors could no more reside near the village. They had to hold out deep in the mountain. It was between late March 1949 and early April 1949 that they climbed down the mountain. Although the severe hunger was the major reason they had to descend from the mountain, the rumor that the soldiers did not kill any residents triggered their decision. It was a typical placation strategy conducted by Colonel-in-Chief You Jae-heung of Jeju Combat Command.

#### □ The Massacre of 'Bilaemotgul'

The fate of a village largely depended on where it was located. The residents at coastal villages had no choice but to follow the rules of the Constabulary Police, while the people deep in mountains had to follow directions from the rebels. The residents had to send food to the rebels through so-called 'Whatshasiwi'. There were young adults who joined the rebels. During the day, the soldiers raided the village searching for young adults, but only to beat the innocent civilians. It was a situation where the day was ruled by the soldiers with the night by the rebels. The brutal beating claimed one of the innocent residents, Yang Chuk-saeng (female, 59). Kang Tae-ho, her son, testified.

My mother gave birth to eight sons and one daughter. All of them died of illnesses except me and my brother. My father passed away when I was five. My mother said, "Go out and find a good place to hide. You have to survive." I dug a hole under the stone wall and hid myself. It was a common way to hide. One day, the soldiers came by. My mother was ordered to tell them where my father and I were. But she said that she was a widow. Then a merciless beating started. She screamed. There was nothing I could do. Later, I found out she lost consciousness. I could not help crying at the terrible sight of her. She suffered from the aftereffects of the day and died half a year later.<sup>42)</sup>

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41) Song Gi-jeon (Jeju-si), Testimony as quoted in the 4 • 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, The 455<sup>th</sup> Article of *The 4 • 3 Incident Speaks*, August, 20, 1999.

42) Kang Tae-ho (age 73, Aewol-eup), Testimony as quoted in the 4 • 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, The 428<sup>th</sup> Article of *The 4 • 3 Incident Speaks*, October, 16, 1998.

The police were stationed at Eoeum-ri in October 1948. 20 police officers carried out crackdown operations. Since then, the rebels disappeared but any young adults were shot.

On 15 November 1948, an evacuation order was issued on Eoeum-ri. Then, the young adults began leaving the hideouts because they believed that the order could save their lives. However, the police beat 10 of them almost to death and dragged them to the nearby playground to shoot all of them on 20 November. It took three days for all of the residents to evacuate by 18 November. The whole village was burned to the ground.

Some families with fugitive relatives could not make it to the coast and were caught and shot to death later by the police. Especially, the massacre at 'Bilaemot' cave was the most notorious for brutality. The villagers had long believed the saying that there was enough space for more than 30 people to stay inside the cave. So, they seemed to have fled to the cave, but all of them were to be shot to death.

This cave is the longest one in the world and has been designated as the Natural Monument No. 342. Few knew of its existence during the 4·3 Incident. The entrance was so narrow that only one person could barely pass through it. A cloud of smoke rose from the cave due to the warm temperature inside it. But it was generally thought to be so-called 'Gwae' (refer to the footnote)<sup>43)</sup> in Jeju dialect.

On January 1 1949, the police spotted the cave and shot all of them to death. The question was how the cave was found and why all the evacuees were shot. The only survivor, Yang Tae-byeong said:

My mother and I headed for the neighboring village, Napeup, upon the evacuation order. I was never on guard, because I had belonged to one of the left-wing organizations. Sometime later, we moved to Aewol-ri. I was not given guard duty there, either. I heard that anyone who had participated in the organization, 'the Joseon Democratic and Patriotic Young Men's Association', which I attended before, would soon be executed. I was shocked to hear that

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43) 'Gwae' means a cave which stretches deep into the ground and its entrance was covered with huge rocks or cliff.

I was a member of an organization that I actually had never heard of. I believed that somebody put names randomly into the list.

Then I fled to the cave and found there were already 28 residents from Napeup-ri, some of whom were from my hometown including Kang Gyu-nam's mother, his wife, a son and a daughter, Song Si-y<sup>44</sup>ng, his wife, Yang Sin-ha and others. The cave was dark and very narrow for us to pass through. However, all of us were found. Probably, the smoke from the cave gave a hint to the police. We quickly hid ourselves. We went out of the cave because the police said that no one would get hurt. The police even called one of our names. I was among them.

The police, however, killed us one by one when we got out of the cave. And the most unforgettable scene that happened to me was when they smashed the sons of Kang Gyu-nam and Song Si-young to death on nearby rocks. They were not human beings any more. On the other hand, Kang Gyu nam's wife refused to get out and headed with her daughter deep inside the cave. I remember that later she was found dead by the excavators.<sup>44)</sup>

Not only residents from Eoem-ri, but also from Napeup-ri, Jangjeon-ri and Sanggwi-ri were in the cave. Hyeon Byeong-gu, Hyeon Yong-seung (75), his wife (75), Byeon Yong-ok (female, 28, Hyeon Byeong-gu's wife), Hyeon's son (1), Yang Gi-won (female, 67), Jin Seung-hui (54), Kim Jeong-hyeon (53), Hyeon Won-hak's wife (50s), Hyeon Gyu-chil (33), his wife (30s), Ahn In-mu (29) were from Napeup. Jin Gwan-haeng (80s) from Sanggui-ri, Byeon Jeong-ok (female, 29), and her two siblings of 5 and 3 years old from Jangjeon-ri were all killed.

#### The Case of Seonheul-ri, Jocheon-myeon

The Constabulary Police raided Seonheul-ri on 21 November 1948. However, the residents had already hidden themselves on the news of the death of five villagers by the police and tried to save their lives. After the police left, setting fire to the entire village, the evacuation of Seonheul-ri was ordered. The elderly followed the order, but most villagers escaped to nearby forests or caves.

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44) Yang Tae-byeong (age 74, Aewol-eup), Testimony recorded on June 22, 2001.

Two days later, on 23 November, five young women, in their 20s, were shot to death at a beach near Hamdeok, which made more residents head to ‘Seonheulgot’<sup>45)</sup> to hide. It provided a sufficient density of trees and naturally formed caves for them to hide.

However, on November 25, ‘Banmotgul’ (cave) was found. 15 residents were shot to death on the spot. Some of the rest were taken to Hamdeok primary school where the police was based. The next day, the police found ‘Moksimulgul’ based on the information obtained from torturing the captives. Again, most of residents were killed on the spot, and were burned. One of the survivors, Yang Yun-hui, then a 17-year-old, said:

The hideout we hid in was found because the captives from ‘Banmotgul’ released the location. We headed further into the cave as they chased after us. However, holding torches, they shot the guns at us. Around 5 p.m. we all were caught and taken out. The police divided us according to age and gender. All of the middle-aged men were executed while my sister and I, along with elderly people, were placed in tents at Hamdeok Elementary School. However, the military tents set up by the American soldiers could not accommodate all of us. Then, the Constabulary Police just questioned the residents and killed all of them the next day. I deceived them, telling them that I was 15 years old. We were divided into three groups: A, B and C. Fortunately, I belonged to the C group and was released. My sister, however, was shot to death on January 24 1949 with other civilians at ‘Seoubong’ cliff.<sup>46)</sup>

On 27 November, another hideout was discovered. It was the ‘Benbaengdui’ cave. During the three-day operation - Banmotgul (25 November), Moksimoolgul (26 November), Benbangduigul (27 November) - countless civilians were killed. Kim Hyeong-jo, who was lucky to stay alive, testified about the horrendous ordeal. In particular, he hid a list of residents' names to remember the events.

I was hiding in the Moksimoolgul when the murder of people in Banmotgool took place. The next day, we headed to the cave to retrieve the bodies. On the

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45) ‘Got’ means a wooded area in Jeju dialect.

46) Yang Yun-hui (age 71, Jocheon-eup), Testimony recorded on October 12, 2001.

way there, we heard the sound of mortars. Immediately, we rushed to the Moksimoolgul. We, however, ran further up to Wootbam Oreum, and then arrived at Benbangdigul. The police found our location the next day. In the meantime, somebody found a tiny hole where the air blew in. As soon as we reached outside, the police began shooting at us. I began to run against the police as hard as I could. Eventually, five of us saved our lives but none of the rest did. Later, people went back to the cave, shocked at the sight of the residents being burned to death. Fortunately, we could recognize everyone except two who got severely burned on the face. We buried all of the bodies temporarily to save them from being eaten by crows. For posterity, we placed a little wooden sign with the person's name inscribed beside the bodies. Then, I wrote the list of names of the dead in my notebook and put the other into a pot and buried it. I told the others, "If I die, please let people know about the massacre using this notebook." The damage was especially huge in Seonheul-ri. Of 300 households in Seonheul-1-ri, a total of 157 inhabitants were shot to death.<sup>47)</sup>

## 6) Massacre in Revenge

If the army posts of the Constabulary Police were attacked or the forces were ambushed on the move, causing loss of lives or injuries, they would immediately retaliate. Most victims of the retaliation would be families of the fleeing. That is why a vicious cycle continued with the rebels attacking and then families of the fleeing being shot to death. The forces would sometimes attack all residents of the villages where they got ambushed as well as the families of the escapees, as in the case of Bukchon-ri, Jocheon-myeon.

### The Case of Bukchon-ri, Jocheon-myeon

On 17 January, the most tragic event, the so-called the Bukchon Incident, took place in the coastal village of Bukchon-ri, Jocheon-myeon. In the morning of that day, some of the troops from the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment were ambushed and two soldiers were killed at the uphill path of Bukchon village on their way to Hamdeok where there was the headquarters of the battalion. At a loss, the village elders took the bodies of the soldiers to the headquarters

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47) Kim Hyeong-jo (age 80, Jocheon-eup), Testimony recorded on September 25, 2001.

of the battalion after careful consideration. Being furious, the soldiers there shot to death all the elders except one related to one of the police. Then two platoons of soldiers stormed into the village of Bukchon under the lead of an officer.

It was around 11 o'clock in the morning and the village was besieged by the rebels. Soldiers attacked each house, gathering at gunpoint anyone they could find into the school playground and setting the whole village on fire. About 400 houses were burned to ashes in a day. About 1,000 residents at the playground were terrified. The army officer on the platform called the one who was responsible for the Minbodan, a villagers' group, Jang Un-gwan, and executed him on the spot before the eyes of the other residents for 'failing to stand sentry for the village'.

Soldiers separated the families of soldiers and police to the western part of the playground. Then they forced a young student to find the families of the communists, but that did not work. So they took residents away dozens at a time to the farm near the school and started to shoot them to death. The massacre continued until the battalion commander ordered them to stop around five o'clock in the afternoon. Residents there testified that the victims of that day amounted to 300.

Meanwhile, the battalion commander who ordered an end to the shooting told the residents to come to Hamdeok and withdrew the forces. Some of the survivors fled to the mountain the next day and others went to Hamdeok. But about 100 of those who went to Hamdeok, taking orders from the commander, were sacrificed after being involved in the 'operation of hunting down communists'. This incident caused so many families' lines to die out in the village of Bukchon.<sup>48)</sup>

Kim Byeong-seok gave a stunning testimony about this incident. Kim's mother was killed by the rebels on 13 May 1948 because one of her sons was

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48) Account by Moon Deok-sun (age 75. Bukchon-ri, Jocheon-eup, a housewife at the time, eyewitness of the incident, interviewed and recorded on May 3, 2002); Kim Seok-bo (age 67. Bukchon-ri, Jocheon-eup, a elementary school student at that time, eyewitness, interviewed and recorded on May 31, 2002); The 4·3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4·3 Incident Speaks* vol. 2, Jeonyewon, 1994, pp.405-408.

a policeman. The police recommended the other sons to become policemen and Kim was employed as a policeman through the special hiring program, which made four sons out of eight sons policemen. “My father said to us, ‘if you take revenge on someone, then his or her children will revenge themselves on you and the vicious cycle cannot be broken. So make sure the vicious cycle will be broken in your generation.’ So I tried to pull myself together and prevent unnecessary deaths.” said Kim Byeong-seok. Kim testified the following about his experience in the Bukchon incident after he became a policeman:

“Thanks to my driver’s license, I was assigned to the vehicle department after being employed as a policeman. One day, a first sergeant from the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment came and said, “The car of the battalion commander was broken, so borrow another one.” Then my boss sent me to Hamdeok, saying to me, “the camp for the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion is in Hamdeok, which is your hometown. So he suggested I go with him and visit my home while I am there for a few days.” I normally drove a GMC but at that time I drove an ambulance-style car to Hamdeok. We took a look at the eleventh company in Weoljeong-ri together with the battalion commander, and we were on our way to the camp. Then the military car ahead of us was ambushed in front of Bukchon Elementary School. The troops were ordered to mobilize and I was headed to the school together with the commander in the car. I saw the soldiers burning the whole village of Bukchon-ri and making the residents gather at the school playground. The commander ordered first 'to separate the families of soldiers and policemen' and then had a staff conference in the car. It was an ambulance-style car with about seven to eight officers sitting on the long benches at each side. Some of them said, "Let's fire a mortar from the top of the stone wall and decimate them." Then one officer said, “There are soldiers who have never killed anyone after they joined the army. So it would be good for each unit to take several of the residents and shoot them to death.”

His proposal was accepted. I almost lost my senses. Bukchon-ri was close to my hometown Hamdeok-ri, so it had some of my relatives and friends living there. I begged the commander to stop, so he ordered to take them out. But I couldn't remember the names of my relatives and friends, maybe because I almost lost my mind. I just remembered Jang Yun-seok who was a driver working with me. Jang and seven to eight members of his family were saved first. I kept begging the commander, “I lost my mother to the rebels and out of nine siblings

four became policemen. My family is anti-communist. And what kind of ideology would those seniors, women and children have? Please save their lives.” The commander asked in response, “I would like to save them, but then how could we deal with their basic necessities like clothes, meals and housing?” The commander himself did not mean to harm them in the first place. So I answered, “Don’t worry. If they could go to Hamdeok, they have their relatives living there. Hamdeok is a big village, so that problem can be taken care of.” Because I kept begging him, he finally ordered to stop the fire, saying, “Now, it’s your responsibility.” Hundreds of lives had already been lost, though.”<sup>49)</sup>

According to the testimony, the forces killed the villagers because they had already burned all the houses and had no plan to accommodate the villagers. In addition, they wanted to take the opportunity to give each soldier the experience of shooting them to death, using guns instead of mortars. Even though the villagers suffered such absurd losses, they could not talk about it later. They had no choice but to shrink in fear as they were taken away to the police station, their only crime comforting the souls of the victims.

The incident, known as the ‘Aigo Incident’ (‘Aigo’ is an exclamation of utmost anguish in Korean) took place on 23 January 1954. It was the day a farewell service for Kim Seok-tae, a fallen soldier of the Korean War, was held. On that day, the residents were gathered at the school playground for the farewell service of the fallen soldier and the so-called ‘Flower Play’. One man said, “Six years ago today this village was burned to ashes and people were killed under a false accusation. Let’s take a moment to commemorate the souls of the victims.” Taking his proposal, villagers came to lament at the top of their voices, which later became known to the police and led to the trouble.<sup>50)</sup>

After the April Revolution on April 19, 1960, the Parliament launched the

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49) Kim Byeong-seok (age 73, Jocheon-eup, a policeman at that time), Testimony recorded on February 1, 2002.

50) Bukchon Police Outstation, *Report on Public Opinion - A Public Opinion on Head of the Village of Bukchon*, March 13, 1954. ; *Incident Report*, March 15, 1954; Inspection Division of the Jeju Police Station, *Report on Inspection- Holding Memorial Services for Those Executed*, March 16, 1954. ; Jeju Police Station, *Fact-finding Report - Holding Memorial Services for Those Executed*, March 17, 1954.

project to discover the truth about the massacre of the residents. One newspaper covered and reported the massacre and the damage done to Bukchon-ri, saying “men are very rare in this village with the voter ratio of men to women almost one to three” under the headline of “Terrible Nightmare, Village of Widows... collective memorial service around this time every year.”<sup>51)</sup> However, the May 16 Coup, led by Major General Park Chung-hee on 16 May 1961, buried the efforts to get to the bottom of it. Furthermore, the police distorted the truth about the Bukchon incident, published in *History of Jeju Police* as follows:

“Communist guerrillas invaded this village, killing and abducting most of the men in the village, except children and elders. As the police counterattacked them, some of the guerrillas fled to the mountain and others hid themselves in the village, plundering and looting. The prolonged cleanup operation devastated the village.”<sup>52)</sup>

The perpetrators who killed the villagers of Bukchon-ri were replaced after this incident. Again the villagers could not speak a word about it. Although the campaign to get to the bottom of the 4 · 3 Incident started and the truth became well known, the police published the *History of Jeju Police* in 2000, again containing the above, with no change at all. Unlike 10 years before, however, many residents of Jeju, including residents of Bukchon-ri, expressed their anger over the book. Outraged, residents across Jeju forced the police to recall the book *History of Jeju Police*, take out the part about the 4 · 3 Incident and distribute it again.

#### The Case of Samyang-ri, Jeju-eup

Samyang-ri, located at the eastern end of Jeju-eup, saw continued sacrifice throughout the massacre, even though it was a coastal village. The Constabulary Police often built road blocks with layers of stones on the provincial road along the coast line to stop the vehicles and kept a close watch on Samyang-ri, where police stations were attacked frequently. The police arrested and beat

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51) *Chosun Ilbo*, December 22, 1960.

52) Jeju-do Police Bureau, *History of Jeju Police*, 1990, p.315.

young people there without any reason whenever they saw them. In order to avoid this, young people would tear the floor off and make their own shelter under the floor, or some would dig a pit under the farm to hide themselves.

On 27 October 1948, however, they had no choice but to come out of their shelter for a funeral of a grandmother in the village. The tradition that would bring people together to help each other in bad times meant they all went to the funeral one by one. Waiting for an opportunity, the police raided the funeral, arrested the young people and detained them. No one expected these young people to be shot to death. The next day, however, these young people were shot to death for revenge as soon as the police station in Samyang-ri was attacked by the rebels.

The revenge of the Constabulary Police continued against the attacks by the rebels. In early November, the anti-guerrilla expedition made all the residents of Samyang-ri gather at Samyang Elementary School, picked about 35 young people and took them to Hamdeok-ri where there was a military post. On 12 November they killed half of them. “On that day soldiers threatened the people, asking them to come up front if they had joined a leftist organization, such as the South Korean Labor Party in the past. Since nobody came forward, they just started to pick anyone like ‘you, come here! you, come here!’, and took them away and killed them,” said Moon Chang-hae, one of the relatives of the deceased in this incident: “Since then, the forces started to shoot people to death indiscriminately, so the young people fled to the mountains.”<sup>53)</sup> On November 27, one young man who had dug a burrow near the shipyard and hidden himself there, was found, taken away and killed. Nowhere in the village was safe.

Fleeing to the mountains separated the residents in the village. The remaining residents were forced to join Daedong Youth Group (later changed to Daehan Youth Group) or Minbodan and to take orders from the police. Even those who ran away to the mountains were not immune from the influences of the police. Regardless of their intention, relatives and friends had to take the side

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53) Moon Chang-hae (age 69, Jeju-si), Testimony recorded on July 12, 2001.

of the rebels, or the police. The situation at that time caused an unavoidable tragedy.

The remaining residents were able to live safely for a while without any loss of life by obeying the orders of the Constabulary Police, until 27 December 1948, when ten more residents lost their lives to the police. The incident was a massacre caused by the soldiers venting their anger. On that day, the soldiers launched an anti-guerrilla operation near Myeongdoam, Bonggae-ri, when they were ambushed by the rebels. Coming down to Samyang-ri, angry soldiers met 12 residents standing sentry, took them to the place called Gounimaru and shot them to death without any reason. Luckily, Kim Jeong-bong survived the shooting and crawled to his home, but his father carried him on his back to the police station for fear of possible trouble. The police shot and killed him on the spot.

3 January 1949 was the day when the residents were hit hardest by both the armed rebels and Constabulary Police. At that time the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment was posted in Jeju instead of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment. Taking advantage of the transition of the regiments, the rebels staged a grand-scale attack. The rebels killed ten residents on sentry duty at the village entry and set houses on fire on the path down from the mountain. Samyang Elementary School was burned at that time. After the rebel forces left, the police started shooting in revenge. The so-called ‘families of the escapees’, whose youth had disappeared, were subject to shooting. Kim Yang-gun, son of one of the victims, testified as follows:

“On 3 January 1949, the Samyang Police Station was attacked. Those who fled to the mountain heard about the losses of their parents and brothers and sisters and then attacked the station and killed the people who were standing sentry in revenge. After the station was attacked by the people who went to the mountain, the police executed the residents, and relatives of those people the next day. Innocent people killed each other. After the attack on 3 January, the families of those who went to the mountain were decimated, even one-year-old babies. My family had never gone to the mountain and I was assigned to the Mindobdan working there, but even my father (Kim Yeo-jin) and my sister (Kim Im-saeng) were taken away to the police station and killed. The reason was that my father was the uncle of a man who went to the mountain. My sister was

18 years old then. My mother died from repressed anger one month after my father and my sister got killed.”<sup>54)</sup>

The vicious cycle of ambush by the rebels and revenge by the police was devastating. Tombstones of the graves for the police within the Cemetery for the Loyal Dead show that out of 140 police officers who were victims, 41 (29%) were killed when the rebels were stronger (from 3 April to 7 November 1948), 17 (12%) when the Constabulary Police launched the relentless anti-guerrilla operation (from 5 December 1948 to 1 March 1949) and 82 (58%) when only dozens of them remained after the rebels were defeated (from 25 May 1949 to 30 September 1956). The fact that more police officers were killed while the Constabulary Police had the upper hand after the anti-guerrilla operation indicates that the police did not enter the enemy's camp until the rebels almost lost their power. This fact also suggests that most of the victims during the operation were not the rebels who were killed while exchanging fire with the Constabulary Police, but the residents who had lived in the village. Should not the Constabulary Police have tracked down and suppressed the rebels, instead of shooting and killing innocent people in revenge if they got attacked by the rebels? It can never be condoned.

The attacks against Samyang-ri by the rebels were tenacious. On 22 February 1949, the rebels attacked the village and killed four people standing sentry and injured one police officer. The next day the police started shooting people to death in revenge. Police Chief Jeong of Samyang Station was notorious not only to the residents of Samyang but also to the residents of Doryeon-ri, Bonggae-ri, Yonggang-ri and Hoecheon-ri villages. Most of the residents who suffered during that time remembered Chief Jeong who used to say, “A day cannot go by without killing one or more, for it would make me lose my appetite.” Kim Yang-geun, one of the residents, said, “At that time there were Chief Jeong, Sergeant Baek, Constable Kang, Constable Lee as well as others at the station. In particular, Chief Jeong and Sergeant Baek were the ones who ate meals after killing people because they used to say

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54) Kim Yang-geun (age 69, Jeju-si), Testimony recorded on July 11, 2001.

that not killing anyone would make them lose their appetite.” Kim Je-jin, who worked there for a short time as part of the tenth class of the Jeju Police Academy, testified as follows:

As the Samyang Station was attacked, I worked there temporarily for a few days. I found that Chief Jeong from the Seobuk Youth Group was so cruel. I saw him rape women. One cold winter day, he let naked women sit on the watchtower for a long time. They shivered with cold, so I put coats on them. Then day broke and dozens of men and women were taken away to the farm near the Samyang Station and killed. It would have been less painful if a gun had been used. The police made members of the village Daedong Youth Group thrust spears.<sup>55)</sup>

The notorious Chief Jeong’s full name was Jeong Yong-cheol. Ko Bong-su testified the following on the tragic incident caused by Jeong on 24 February 1949:

“I was working as a squad commander of the Daehan Youth Group. One day I went to the station for a regular report and saw a woman held in custody because her husband went to the mountain. Suddenly Chief Jeong put the gun barrel into a heater. Then he stripped the woman of her clothes. She was pregnant with a bulging belly and breast. Chief Jeong inserted the red-hot gunpoint into her vagina. It was so horrible that I could not watch it anymore. Chief Jeong then poured oil on her head and set her on fire. We just tried to bury her body, but she was still alive a little bit as the dirt was moving a little. I heard Chief Jeong himself did not live long.”<sup>56)</sup>

The female victimized was Kim Jin-ok, 21, wife of Kim Tae-saeng who fled to the mountain. Kim lost both his wife and parents on the same day and the next day, on 25 February, lost his wife’s grandparents. A few days later he lost his mother-in-law and sister-in-law. His fleeing to the mountain led to the loss of life for his whole family. The fact that Kim was a Korean War

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55) Kim Je-jin (age 78, Hallim-eup, a graduate of the Jeju Police Academy), Testimony recorded on November 19, 2001.

56) Ko Bong-su (age 79, Jeju-si) Testimony as quoted in the 4 • 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, The 456<sup>th</sup> Article of *The 4 • 3 Incident Speaks*, August 28, 1999.

veteran, however, signifies how reckless the anti-guerrilla operation was. Kim testified as follows while still alive (he died in 1998).

I was scared when the shooting spree happened in the fall, so I fled to the mountain. For a while I ran here and there, but I got exhausted, came down to Wondang Hill and hid myself. Then I got found by people who came to Wondan Hill to plant pine trees, and I was taken away to Samyang Police Station and beaten almost to death. I was again taken away to downtown Jeju-eup and interrogated. If you are lucky enough to meet a rather nice interrogator, you can survive, but if not, you cannot, it was like that. I was the lucky one. When I came back to my hometown, Chief Jeong had been replaced by Chief Choi. Then the war broke out, and I voluntarily joined the army after writing a letter with my blood. My military number is 0310413. Many of those who survived the interrogation together with me joined the army voluntarily, but most of them were killed on the battle ground.<sup>57)</sup>

“Chief Jeong of Samyang Station was just an ordinary man who had a crush on a lady who was put in the prison of Jeju Police Station and offered convenience to her. Kim Si-hun, who was dispatched together with Jeong Yong-cheol to Jeju as a member of the Seobuk Youth Group, said, “Jeong came to Jeju with the rank of lieutenant through a special employment program and became the Chief of Samyang Station. He was a little bit of an odd man. He would just take out a gun and point it at anyone who offended him. At that time a police officer killing one man was as easy as killing flies. Jeong, however, was the man who had a crush on a lady named Lee Ok and visited the prison to see her.”<sup>58)</sup>

Why were members of the Seobuk Youth Group turned into policemen and sent to Jeju? Why did they get preferential treatment being employed as lieutenants from the start? According to the American military reports regarding this, it was the decision made by then President Syngman Rhee that would

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57) Kim Tae-saeng (deceased, Jeju-si), Testimony as quoted in the 4 • 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, The 456<sup>th</sup> Article of *The 4 • 3 Incident Speaks*, August 28, 1998.

58) Kim Si-hun (age 79, Pyoseon-myeon, former policeman from the Seobuk Young Men’s Association), Testimony recorded on February 26, 2002.

turn the members of the Youth Group, which had been known as an anti-communist group, into policemen. In order to increase the number of applicants, those who could bring 20 members together to join the team would be employed as a sergeant, 50 members as a lieutenant and 200 members as an inspector.<sup>59)</sup> Jeong Yong-cheol was employed as a lieutenant through the special employment under this guideline. It was then President Syngman Rhee who dressed the members of the Seobuk Youth Group as policemen and sent them to Jeju.

President Rhee took advantage of the members of the Youth Group who came down from the North alone with no one to rely on and harbored extreme hatred toward communism. One scholar said, "It might not have been necessary to abet them in committing evil and atrocious acts. Just whispering to the members that they were communists would be sufficient. Like a wind-up doll, they would go in a pre-set direction."<sup>60)</sup> The members of the Youth Group may be victims of history themselves. The problem was those who incited them.

## 7) Killing Those Who were Taken into Preventive Custody

### ① Forming the Citizens' Guidance Federation in Jeju

Four months after the National Security Law was enacted on 1 December 1948, the preparatory meeting for forming the Citizens' Guidance Federation was held on 21 April 1949 and then the Launching Declaration Ceremony in the city official residence on 5 June.<sup>61)</sup> Its goals were stated in the mission statement as follows:

1. We will muster what support we can for the government of the Republic of Korea.
2. We will oppose and overthrow the puppet government of North Korea.

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59) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 1005, December 6, 1948.

60) Hwang Sang-ik, *The Jeju 4·3 Incident in terms of the History of Medicine*, Jeju 4·3 Research, Yeoksa-Bipyongsas, 1999, p.318.

61) *Dong-A Ilbo*, June 6, 1949.

3. We will denounce and destroy communism which ignores the freedom and national characteristics of mankind.
4. We will expose and defeat the policies of the Labor Parties of North and South Korea to destroy the Korean people by further arming us with theories of liberal democracy.
5. We will make concerted efforts with political parties and civic groups of the democratic camp.<sup>62)</sup>

The creation of the Citizens' Guidance Federation aimed to convert the leftists and destroy the South Korean Labor Party and the North Korean Labor Party, the Labor Parties of North and South Korea. Externally, they sought to give guidance to leftist converts, but their intention was to destroy the leftists through confessions made by converts.

As for the operation of the Alliance, the headquarters at the center and each local branch were run following the organization structure of the prosecution office and each provincial branch was allowed some autonomy. The whole management of the Alliance was decided at the Steering Council and the members of each local branch of the Alliance were managed through local police stations by local prosecution offices. Local branches had their provincial offices until November 1949 and municipal branches until December.<sup>63)</sup>

In fact, an advisory committee controlled and managed a provincial subdivision. The advisory committee was composed mainly of a director of prosecution, a police commissioner, a superintendent, a section chief of investigation in police office, a mayor, county governor, and a prison warden. Concrete guidelines and policy for the Guidance Federation were decided by them. There were departments, such as the finance department, the general affairs department, the press bureau, the operation department, the organization department and the women's department.

After forming the organizing system of the provincial subdivision, the guidelines and the management system, each provincial subdivision was

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62) *Dong-A Ilbo*, April 23, 1949.

63) Kim Sun-ho, *Process and Characteristics of the Citizens' Guidance Federation Incident*, master's thesis of Department of History, Kyung Hee University, 2002, pp.21-26.

pressured to join the Guidance Federation via right-wing groups and police officers. In the case of Gyeongsangnam-do, Minbodan (Peoples Protective Corps) and Investigation Chief of the Police personally gathered the members including from eup, myeon and ri from April to May 1950.<sup>64)</sup> As a result of this drive, reorganization of the provincial subdivision, the number of the Guidance Federation rapidly increased throughout the country.

It was clear that the Guidance Federation would be organized also in Jeju. A member of staff of the U.S. Embassy in Korea, who investigated the Jeju situation on 17 August 1950, reported as follows:

27,000 registered Citizens' Guidance Federation members and approximately 50,000 people who are relatives of the killed and accused rebels remain as potential subversive elements in Jeju.<sup>65)</sup>

Unlike the mainland, in Jeju, since most of the armed guerrillas and the people who were regarded with any slight suspicion of helping the guerillas had already been killed by the army and the police, there was no need to organize 27,000 members of the Citizens' Guidance Federation.

It is hard to understand the period of the Guidance Federation organization of Jeju concretely because there is little evidence. But it is apparent that the Guidance Federation was organized by November 1949 through the following content:

The Citizens' Guidance Federation is setting up a period for turning leftists to the right from 15 October to the end of November and now trying its best to do the job. It is alleged that the number of leftists who surrendered themselves to the alliance in South Korea reaches about 39,900. Upon this, Mr. Lee, head of the department of public order issued a statement as follows.

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64) Jeon Gap-saeng, *The Fact of Massacre of Civilians in Gyeongnam Areas*, *The War and Human Rights, Sourcebook of Massacre of Civilians Symposium*, The Pan-National Committee for Investigation Massacre of Civilians and Honoring Victims before and after the Korean War, 2001.

65) Memorandum for the Record, Subj.: Conditions on Cheju Island, John P. Seifert, Naval Attache, Donald S. MacDonald, Third Secretary of Embassy, Philip C. Rowe, Vice Consul, Aug 17, 1950.

“...From October 15, we have set up a period for self-surrender of leftists and gained unexpected fruit. For expanding this special favor to leftists living in remote mountain villages, we extended the period twice to the end of November and let many people know this. According to the reports from each police station around the country, the number of leftists who switched from the left to the right are as follows; 12, 196 from Seoul, 5,964 from Gyeonggi, 4,978 from Gangwon, 3,512 from Chungbuk, 1,054 from Chungnam, 1,938 from Gyeongbuk, 2,143 from Gyeongnam, 1,660 from Jeonbuk, 115 from Jeonnam, 5,283 from Jeju, and 143 from the Railroad Police, the total number being 39,986. It is a huge success ...”<sup>66)</sup>

In other words, as of the end of November 1949, 5,283 converts joined the Citizens' Guidance Federation in Jeju, the highest number next to Seoul and Gyeonggi. The number of converts who joined the Alliance in Jeju kept increasing and reached about 27,000 before and after the beginning of the Korean War in June 1950. It is highly doubtful that the approximately 30,000 converts were really necessary in Jeju where a massive number of people were sacrificed during the 4 · 3 Incident.

The excerpt below from a legal document shows that the organizations of the alliance in Jeju were organized by ri (town) unit and even policemen in police boxes were involved in managing and operating the organizations.

“The defendant (Han Sang-beom) was appointed as a policeman in Jeju on 1 December 1948 and worked at the security division at the Jeju Police Station for a month. On 2 January 1949, the defendant was appointed to the Dodu Police Box in Jeju-eup and carried out outside duty. At around 2:30 p.m. 24 March 1950, under the order of the Chief of the Police Box, he was scheduled to visit the first and second districts of Iho-ri to encourage paying membership fees to the alliance. While he was heading for a newly established village in the second district - in the same ri after visiting the first district - he spotted a number of people gathering at a barley field near ‘Odorong’ Village in Iho-ri”<sup>67)</sup>

In other words, the police boxes were in charge of managing the Citizens'

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66) *Seoul Shinmun*, December 2, 1949; *Chosun Ilbo*, *Dong-A Ilbo*, December 2, 1949.

67) Jeju District Court, Sentence, Criminal Trial No. 78. May 11, 1950.

Guidance Federation in each ri and the policemen were dealing with all the administrative business, such as collecting membership fees.

According to the testimonies from the policemen who made people join the Alliance and managed them, the organizations of the Alliance in the Jeju area were set up by making people who did left-wing activities in the past surrender themselves and the policemen in the investigation section were involved in this.<sup>68)</sup> Another testimony argues that only the lists were complied according to the notice from the central government and no actual activities were conducted.<sup>69)</sup> However, in Jongdal-ri, Gujwa-eup, the police were active in encouraging young people to join the alliance<sup>70)</sup> and people in Iho-ri attended the welcoming ceremony held at Dodu Elementary School.<sup>71)</sup>

The Citizens' Guidance Federation in Jeju Island was organized in the four areas of jurisdiction of the Jeju Police. Each area had its own headquarters and under it there were branch offices belonging to each police box. The structure of the headquarters consisted of a secretary-general, a director of administration, a director of propaganda, a director of organization as well as others. For example, under the control of Seongsanpo Police Station, Kang Seok-jun from Seongsanpo was a secretary-general, Kang Seok-hong (from Ojo-ri, Seongsan-myeon (Songsan myeon)) was director of administration, Chae Jeong-ok (from Jongdal-ri, Gujwa-myeon) was a director of organization, and Boo Yeong-seong (from Hado-ri, Gujwa-myeon) was a director of propaganda.<sup>72)</sup>

The people who joined the alliance were the ones who participated in some left-wing activities in the past. Most of them were the executive staff of the

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68) Kim Jae-jin (age 78, a policeman at that time), Testimony recorded on November 19, 2001; Song Won-hwa (age 81, a policeman at that time), Testimony recorded on June 1, 2002; Jeong Nam-du (age 74, a policeman at that time), Testimony recorded October 10, 2001. Jeong witnessed that the intelligence division of the army was involved in recruiting the members of the Citizens' Guidance Federation.

69) Kim Saeng-min (age 77, worked as a contact of the South Korea Labor Party then turned into a policeman), Testimony recorded on July 13, 2001. Kim said he had been a director of organization of the Citizens' Guidance Federation but had hardly done anything.

70) Chae Jeong-ok (age 79, a teacher at that time), Testimony recorded on November 15, 2001.

71) Lee Bo-yeon (age 72, an ordinary citizen at that time), Testimony recorded on August 3, 2001.

72) Chae Jeong-ok, Testimony.

People's Committee, the people involved in the 1 March Shooting Incident, or those who were tried or in prison for the 4 · 3 Incident.<sup>73)</sup> However, even people who were friendly towards the police and the army, such as the chairperson of the Dae Dong Youth Corps or heads of villages were forcibly inducted into the Alliance.<sup>74)</sup> In Jongdal-ri, without exception, almost all the young people were enlisted in the Alliance. Kim Gye-su from Uiqwi-ri, Namwon-eup, had been imprisoned at Seogwipo Prison Camp for fleeing, yet he returned readily to join the Alliance because he heard a rumor that once the people of the upland villages joined the Alliance, all charges against them would be cleared.<sup>75)</sup>

Even though a considerable number of people joined the Alliance in each village in Jeju, few testimonies tell concrete of the activities of the members of the Alliance. Only a few stories talk about lecture meetings and plays given by the executive staff of the Alliance as pacification activities. In the case of the headquarters under Seongsanpo Police Station, lecture meetings organized by the alliance were held, making a tour of each village in Gujwa-myeon, Seongsan-myeon and Pyoseon-myeon. A lot of people were mobilized for these events. The meetings were held by the Alliance but actually managed by the Inspection Division of Seongsanpo Police Station. A play called 'A Story of a Deceased Husband of a Revolutionary' was also performed.<sup>76)</sup>

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73) Kim Yeong-ok (age 79, a government employee at that time), Testimony recorded May 1, 2002. Kim Yeong-ok was arrested on charge of being involved in the strike in 1949. He was released after a week-long interrogation. When he was released, Kim Ho-gyeom, then the chief of the Seogwipo Police Station, invited Kim Yeong-ok to join the Citizens' Guidance Federation.

74) In Iho-ri, the head of the Daedong Youth Corps joined the alliance and in Seogwipo, a head of a village became a member of the alliance. Song Du-pyeong had been an executive of the People's Committee but later surrendered himself to the police. Song helped to build stone fences around the Seogwipo area when the army stationed there and provided the army with food and other stuff. On November 7, 1948, when the armed guerrillas made a surprise attack on Seogwipo, his house was burned down (Testimony from Jeong Nam-du).

75) Kim Gye-su (age 83, who lived in the mountain at that time), Testimony recorded on May 21, 2002.

76) Chae Jeong-ok, Testimony; Boo Yeong-seong (age 84, head of the Daedong Youth Corps in Hado-ri at that time), Testimony recorded on December 15, 2000.

## ② Process of Preventive Custody

When North Korea launched an attack against South Korea and commenced the Korean War on 25 June 1950, the South Korean Government began to hold in custody the members of the Citizens' Guidance Federation and people under suspicion of being against the government. 'Preventive Custody' was used to keep people in custody who were suspected of being highly likely to commit crimes, and its origin dates back to the Japanese colonial era. Shifting to a wartime posture when the Second World War broke out, the Japanese Empire enforced on colonial Joseon the 'Act of Preventive Custody of Political Prisoners in Joseon (1941)'. Furthermore, when defeat came near in 1945, the empire extensively held anti-Japanese figures in custody through 'Measure 1 of the State of Emergency.' The details of the measure involved holding people under suspicion of being communists and nationalists in custody if the Soviet Army and the US and the British Armies landed on the Korean Peninsula and moving the detainees to the rear if enemy lines came near the police stations. The measure ordered that the detainees should be executed if there was no time to move them to other areas. This measure was wired in code to the chiefs of the police stations across the nation when the Soviet army advanced into Manchuria and rapidly cut the Japanese Army there to pieces.<sup>77)</sup>

But this act of preventive custody was abolished immediately after the US Military Government began. Ordinance 11 of the US Military Government stipulated that 'within the territory occupied south of North Latitude 38 degrees, the policies and doctrines which discriminate against and are oppressive to the Korean people, and to restore to the Korean people the rule of Justice and Equality before the law, Act of Punishing Political Convicts, The Preventive Custody Act, Act of Preserving Public Order, Act of Publication, the Decree for the Protection of Political Convicts, the Act of Shrine, and the Judicial Power of Police Chiefs are hereby repealed.'

Thus, during the US military ruling, under this legal action, preventive

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77) Lim Dae-sik, *Formation of the Pro-Japanese and Pro-American Police and its Divisive Activities, Fifty Years of Division and Challenges for Unification*, Yeoksa-Bipyongsa, 1995.

custody could not be carried out. However, when the Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion broke out in October 1946, after the establishment of the South Korean Government, the Interior Ministry attempted to carry out preventive custody measures in Gwangju and Iri, near Yeosu and Suncheon, where the mutiny broke out. This failed because of the objection from the prosecutor in charge. After this, the Ministry of the Interior pressed the National Assembly to enact the Communist Supervision Law, which stipulated ‘preventive custody measures’.<sup>78)</sup> Also, in Jeju, extensive preventive custody measures had been taken since October 1948.

When the Korean War broke out, the government urgently issued the ‘custody of people under suspicion and tightening the security of the prisons in the nation’ order to each police station by telephone under the name of the head of the Department of Public Order at 2:25 p.m. 25 June 1950. These instructions were sent to the head of the Jeju Police Bureau and there were further details, such as ‘immediately arresting people under suspicion’ and ‘strengthening the security of prisons in the nation’.<sup>79)</sup> On 29 June, the order of arresting rebellious elements,’ was delivered to the head of the Jeju Police Bureau, and, on 30 June, the order of dealing with detained rebellious elements’ was sent to the same man. An official document dated 29 June stated that ‘the members of the Citizens’ Guidance Federation and other rebellious elements must be arrested and should not be released without my instructions.’ Following this, on 6 July, the emergency martial law commander of the Jeju district issued an order for ‘submitting the lists of the preventive custody subjects in Jeju’ to the head of the Jeju Police Bureau and on 11 July, again the head of the Department of Public Order issued an order for ‘arresting impure elements’ to the police chief in Jeju.<sup>80)</sup>

The preventive custody of the members of the alliance and other rebellious

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78) Kim Sunho, *Formation of the Pro-Japanese and Pro-American Police and its Divisive Activities, Fifty Years of Division and Challenges For Unification*, Yeoksa-Bipyongsa, 1995, p.33.

79) *April 3, Those Who Never Returned*, Jeju KBS Documentary film aired on March 30, 2000.

80) *Submitting the List of the Preventive Custody Subjects*, August 6, 1950. In Lee Do-yeong, *Deathly preventive custody*, pp.209-210.

elements was dealt with by only two parties: the police authorities (the Department of Public Order – the Jeju Police Bureau – Police Stations in each district in Jeju) and the military authorities (the Ministry of National Defense – the Martial Law Command in Jeju). No other authorities could know about this because it was done in strict secrecy. At the time, the Jeju District Prosecutors’ Office argued around whether the rights of interrogation and the preventive custody measures were taken legally and promised to take proper measures for the detainees, but the Jeju Police Bureau denied any cooperation with the prosecutors’ office saying it would follow orders only from the Department of Public Order.<sup>81)</sup> On 8 July, as martial law was declared, all the institutions came under the control of the military. Therefore, the martial law commander would manage the preventive custody measures. According to this development, the preventive custody measures were taken jointly by the military and the police under the leadership of the military and the handling of the detainees fell within the jurisdiction of the military only.

According to the orders from the central government, a roundup arrest of people under suspicion was immediately made in Jeju. Official documents received by the Jeju Police Bureau shows that from the end of June to the beginning of August, many people such as government employees, teachers, students and women were arrested.<sup>82)</sup> One document sent to the head of the Jeju Police Bureau by the chief of the Moseulpo Police Station reveals the fact that ‘impure teachers’ were arrested in the Moseulpo district and additional arrests of teachers at Boseong Elementary School were made after that.

“Regarding the roundup arrest of teachers at some schools and alleged communists on 28 July, as we already reported, we arrested impure teachers and alleged communists according to a radio notice. With regard to the arrest of all the teachers at Boseong Elementary School, at first, we had carefully considered the possible difficulties of operating the school if we arrested all of them.

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81) Ibid.

82) *Remarks by OOO on Roundups of People under Suspicion*, Jeju Police Station No. 6206, July 1, 1950; *Report of detainees of government employees*, Seogwipo Police Station No. 1880, July 7, 1950. In Lee Do-yeong, *Deathly Preventive Custody*, pp.197-200.

However, the four teachers including, Principal Ko Chang-gu, are all impure elements so, we had to arrest them. Therefore, we informed the school affair authorities of the halt of the school's operation and looked forward to urgently dispatching other teachers to the school.

(Post script) The four teachers who are under arrest are Principal Ko Chang-gu, Lee Yun-bae, Hyeon Chang-min, and Huh Yeong-pil. Please refer to the report no. 2942 concerning the arrest of teachers and alleged communists.<sup>83)</sup>

Regarding the number of the detainees, an official police document police says, as of 4 August 1950, the number of arrested people is 820 in Jeju.<sup>84)</sup> Another report produced by a clerk at the US Embassy in Korea also demands attention:

A total of 1,120 prisoners are detained in Jeju Island and most of them are in custody at the police stations. It is necessary that prisoners arrested and tried under the martial law need to be separated from other prisoners, but no information is available for this. However, the police announced that 700 leaders of the Citizens' Guidance Federation had been arrested since June 25.<sup>85)</sup>

It was 17 August when the clerks of the US Embassy investigated this matter in Jeju so this assumes that an additional 300 people were arrested in 15 days. Regarding the detainees not being separated from each other because there was no information for that process, it shows there were no clear standards for preventive custody. However, the police separately managed the 700 executives of the Citizens' Guidance Federation at the time.

The Jeju Police authorities secretly examined and graded the detainees according to the relative seriousness of crimes and transferred them to the martial law command of the Marine Corps stationed on Jeju. The instructions

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83) *Roundups of Impure Teachers and Operation of School*, August 3, 1950. In Lee Do-yeong, *Deathly Preventive Custody*, pp.205-206.

84) *Arrests of Impure Elements*, August 6, 1950. In Lee Do-yeong, *Deathly Preventive Custody*, p.209.

85) Memorandum for the record, Subj.: Conditions on Cheju Island, John P. Seifert, Naval Attache. Donald S. MacDonald, Third Secretary of Embassy, Philip C. Rowe, Vice Consul, Aug 17, 1950.

for screening detainees were issued by the Jeju Police Bureau and delivered to each police station in Jeju on 7 July 1950.<sup>86)</sup> According to these instructions, the detainees were graded A, B, C, and D. Grade D refers to a most important person, grade C refers to ‘an important person’ and grade B means ‘a person with minor importance’ and grade A refers to ‘a person who does not fit into clear-cut criteria’. It is unclear what these grades were based on.

Among the detainees at that time, many people didn’t partake in any left-wing activities or go to the mountain during the 4 · 3 Incident. This also can be found in police documents. According to a report titled ‘Regarding releasing the subjects of the preventive custody,’ made by the chief of the Seogwipo Police Station and sent to the head of the Jeju Police Bureau on 15 August 1950, the detainees had been arrested mainly because of the following charges:

- circulating false rumors that the North Korean People’s Army landed on Jeju
- having a suspicious attitude after receiving a three-year suspended prison sentence on charge of interrupting police telephone communication
- having no criminal record, but having a suspicious attitude
- arrested while being interrogated for scattering leaflets<sup>87)</sup>

In another case, a man was arrested by reason of having hostility against the police because he had argued with a policeman while drinking.<sup>88)</sup> In many cases, people were illegally arrested because of these kind of personal feelings and slander labeling them as undesirable elements.

At that time, the Jeju District Prosecutors’ Office requested the lists of the detainees from the police authorities. The prosecutors’ office tried to supervise the detainees who were illegally arrested for the protection of human rights. However, the police denied to cooperate with the prosecutors’ office saying

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86) *April 3, Those Who Never Returned*, Jeju KBS Documentary filmaired on March 30, 2000.

87) *Releasing the Subjects of the Preventive Custody*, August 15, 1950. In Lee Do-yeong, *Deathly Preventive Custody*, pp.216-217.

88) *Report of Inquiries of Facts*, August 6, 1950. In Lee Do-yeong, *Deathly Preventive Custody*, pp.220-221.

unveiling the names of the detainees is under jurisdiction of the martial law, thus they cannot submit the lists to other institutions except the martial law command in Jeju.<sup>89)</sup>

### ③ Execution of Detainees

When the Korean War broke out, the preventive custody was carried out on a national scale and the execution of the detainees by firing squad was done intentionally. In Jeju, from the end of July to the end of August, wholesale execution was carried out many times in Jeju-eup and Seogwipo and Moseulpo areas. This was when the UN forces confronted the North Korean Army at the Nakdong River (southeastern part of the Korean Peninsula). Therefore, it seems that the execution was carried out in order to make Jeju Island into a retaliation base beforehand in the critical situation of the North Korean Army occupying the Gyeongnam and Pusan areas in the near future.

At the time, the order of execution and its carrying out were managed by the Combat Information Center of the South Korean Army Headquarters in Jeju, the Marine Corps stationed in Jeju, and the Jeju Police Bureau. One document which supports this was an order delivered to the Seongsanpo Police Station by Navy Commander Kim Du-chan, who was an assistant chief of staff for intelligence of the Marine Corps in Jeju on 30 August 1950.

“Regarding the detainees your station has been detaining since the imposition of martial law on Jeju, execute the grade D and C detainees who haven’t been executed yet and report the results to the head of the Combat Information Center of the Army Headquarters in Jeju by September 6.”<sup>90)</sup>

Based on this order, it can be seen that the local office of the Combat Information Center of the South Korean Army Headquarters made the order to execute the detainees and the army and the police carried out the execution.

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89) *Arrests of Impure Elements*, August 4 and 6, 1950; *Submitting the list of the preventive custody subjects*, August 6, 7 and 8, 1950. In Lee Do-yeong, *Deathly Preventive Custody*, pp.208-213.

90) *Execution of the Subjects of the Preventive Custody*, August 30, 1950. In Lee Do-yeong, *Deathly Preventive Custody*, p.95.

The Police could not decide and carry out the execution autonomously. Kim Ho-gyeom, the chief of the Seogwipo Police Station at the time, said, “The preventive custody was not carried out autonomously by the police. Even though I was the chief of police, I couldn’t save my friend who was detained by the preventive custody.”<sup>91)</sup>

Nam Sang-hwi, who is a reserve brigadier general and was a commander of the Navy Defense Forces in Pohang during the Korean War, witnessed that at the beginning of July, under his order, about 200 citizens who had been detained in Gyeongju, Pohang and Yeongdeok areas were loaded onto a warship, killed and dumped at sea. According to his testimony, he did not order this killing on his own, but he got the order from the Defense Minister Shin Seong-mo.<sup>92)</sup> Meanwhile, there is another testimony that the order of execution was placed by Kim Chang-ryong, the section chief of the Combat Information Center of the Army Headquarters.<sup>93)</sup>

The execution of the detainees was carried out in strict secrecy. The place of the execution of the detainees detained at a camp managed by the Moseulpo Police Station (Seotal Oreum) was accidentally found later by residents, but the places, date and time of the execution of other detainees by the Jeju and Seogwipo Police Stations were managed with absolute secrecy. The government was so thorough in keeping this confidential that even President Rhee Syngman ordered at a Cabinet meeting not to make public the preventive custody by the police.<sup>94)</sup> Until now, for more than 50 years after the execution, the victims’ families have been troubled with this not knowing when and where their loved ones were killed.

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91) *Jemin Ilbo*, January 20, 2001.

92) *Ibid.*

93) Kim Jong-pil (belonged to the Combat Information Center of the Army in 1950), Testimony recorded on January 24, 2001. In Lee Do-yeong, *Deathly Preventive Custody*, pp.176 -177.

94) 104<sup>th</sup> Minutes of the Cabinet Council, November 26, 1952.

## □ Preventive Custody in Jeju-eup

It is very difficult to grasp the truth of the preventive custody in Jeju-eup because not a single record remains regarding the total number of the detainees and the number of the detainees from Jeju-eup, Jocheon- myeon, and Aewol-eup who were executed. Furthermore, there were no family members who recovered the dead bodies of the victims. Only stories about the execution were passed onto the victims' families by word of mouth. When the details of various reports and testimonies are aggregated, it can be assumed that executions of detainees managed by Jeju Police Station were carried out twice.

The first execution was carried out on 4 August 1950.<sup>95)</sup> Hundreds of the detainees who had been detained at the Jeju Police Station and an alcohol factory were dragged to Jeju Harbor, loaded on a ship, and executed and dumped at sea. According to a testimony given by Jang Si-yong, who guarded Jeju Harbor as a member of the civilian defense corps, at around 9 p.m. ten vehicles loaded with about 50 people arrived at the harbor and then a ship embarked with around 500 naked people and took to sea. In around two hours, the ship returned to the harbor in ballast.<sup>96)</sup> Park Chun-taek, who worked as a civilian worker in the Marine Corps, and Kim In-pyeong, who sailed cargo ships out at Jeju Harbor, also witnessed that a considerable number of the detainees in confinement at an alcohol factory were loaded onto a navy patrol boat and buried at sea.<sup>97)</sup>

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95) The families of the victims reported that the date of the execution was July 16 or August 4. According to the testimony of Kim Mi-seon who lost her brother, she heard from a policeman who managed the subjects of the preventive custody that the date of the execution was August 4. Testimony as quoted in the Jeju 4·3 Institute, *Now I can Speak*, Vol. 1, pp.37-38.

96) Jang Si-yong (a member of the civilian defense corps at the time), Testimony as quoted in the Jeju 4·3 Institute, *April 3 and History*, Vol. 23, p.12; Kang Tae-jung (a middle school student at the time), Testimony recorded on December 29, 2002. Kang Tae-jung was arrested at the end of July 1950 and held at an alcohol factory in August. Kang met three survivors there and according to Kang, the three survivors told him that they saw the Subjects of the Preventive Custody dragged out from the two warehouses with their arms bound with ropes and with their tops taken off.

97) Park Chun-taek (a civilian worker in the Marine Corps at the time), Testimony as quoted in *Monthly Jeju People*, 1989, pp.142-143; Kim In-pyeong (age 77, a captain of a cargo ship at the time), Testimony recorded on October 11, 2001.

The second execution was carried out over the night of 19 August 1950 until the following morning. This time, the victims were those who had been detained mainly at the Jeju Police Station. Hundreds of detainees were carried to Jeju Airport by truck, killed and secretly buried there. Most of the victims' families indicate the same date as the date of the execution and those who had been detained at the same holding cells and were released later also tell the same story.

#### Preventive Custody in Seogwipo

Like the case of Jeju-eup, the total number of detainees from the jurisdiction of Seogwipo Police Station, such as Seogwi-myeon, Jungmun-myeon and Namwon-myeon and the number of the detainees who were killed later have not been identified so far. Also, not a single family member recovered the dead bodies of the victims. However, most of the detainees under the jurisdiction of the Seogwipo Police Station were held at a warehouse for storing sliced potatoes, located in Seogwipo. Thus, the families of the detainees brought food and clothes to them through the policemen who stood guard over the warehouse. Because of this, the victims' family members could directly check the fact that the detainees disappeared or heard the news from the other inmates on the day of the execution. Also, it was possible to record the testimonies from the survivors who were imprisoned at the Seogwipo camp with the victims. According to their testimonies, the day of execution of the detainees in Seogwipo was 29 July 1950. The survivors witnessed that about 150 detainees were killed on that day.<sup>98)</sup>

Among the detainees held in Seogwipo, some were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Jeju Police Bureau on 12 August. The list of the detainees executed in Dosun-ri includes 12 people who had been transferred to the Jeju Police Bureau from the Seogwipo Police Station. About 20 detainees including teachers at Jungmun School who were separately held in custody at the Jungmun-ri camp were also missing.<sup>99)</sup> It is estimated that most of them were

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98) Lee Jae-jun (age 77, a teacher at Seogwi Elementary School at the time), Testimony recorded on February 22, 2002.

executed by firing squad at Jeju Airport.

As of July 2002, the Victims' Family Association for the Execution of Preventive Custody Subjects from the Three Myeons' (chairperson Lee Bang-chun) established on 31 August, 2001, has identified 77 detainees from Seogwi-myeon, Jungmun-myeon and Namwon-myeon, so far.

□ Preventive Custody at Moseulpo

It is possible to figure out the total number of the preventive custody subjects and the number of the victims killed by firing squad from the jurisdiction of the Moseulpo Police Station, such as Daejeong-myeon, Hallim-myeon and Andeok-myeon because the relevant records about them exist. Also, the details of the execution are well-known thanks to the residents who witnessed the execution, which was carried out early in the morning. The following table shows the actual circumstances of the preventive custody at the Moseulpo Police Station.<sup>100)</sup>

■ The Situation of Preventive Custody at Moseulpo Police Station As of 5 p.m. September 3, 1950

No. of Detainees Grade	Arrest	Remitted	On Bail	Now in Custody	Remarks
D	109	108		4	Four people are detained at Moseulpo
C	144	144			
B	68		9	59	35 out of 59 detained at Moseulpo, 24 detained at Hallim
A	23		10	13	12 out of 13 detained at Moseulpo, one detained at Hallim
Total	344	252	19	76	51 out of 76 detained at Moseulpo, 25 detained at Hallim

In other words, the total number of preventive custody subjects in the

99) Lee Chi-geun (age 73, a student of the Jeju Agriculture School at the time), Testimony recorded on June 5, 2002.

100) *Submitting the List of the Preventive Custody Subjects*, September 4, 1950. A File of the Police Documents Possessed by Lee Do-yeong, p.378.

jurisdiction of the Moseulpo Police Station was 344 and 252 persons out of the 344 detainees were remitted to the South Korean Army and executed.<sup>101)</sup> According to the official document of 7 July 1950, which was sent to each police station from the Jeju Police Bureau and ordered to submit the lists of the detainees, the detainees had to be screened according to the four grades of D, C, B and A. Grade D refers to a most important person, grade C refers to ‘an important person’ and grade B means ‘a person with minor importance’ and grade A refers to ‘a person who does not fit into clear-cut criteria’.<sup>102)</sup> Among the detainees, people with grade D and C were sent to the army by the police and killed. In case of the Moseulpo Police Station, no names of the subjects sent to the army can be found now, but the records show the number of detainees who were remitted to the army was 252.

The victims were those who had been detained at a warehouse in the jurisdiction of the Moseulpo Police Station and another warehouse located at the Hallim Harbor under the control of the Hallim Police Box. The detainees at the warehouse in Moseulpo were executed at 5 a.m., 20 August 1950 and the detainees held at the warehouse in Hallim were killed at 2 a.m. on the same day. The place of the execution was a cave in Seotal Oreum, in Sangmo-ri, Daejeong-myeon, which had been used as an ammunition dump during the Japanese Colonial Period. Although the execution was carried out at the same place, the exact sites of the killings were a little different between the victims in Moseulpo and those in Hallim. The story of the execution was delivered to the victims’ families because some residents witnessed the execution. About 400 to 500 victims’ family members gathered to the site in order to recover the dead bodies but they couldn’t because the soldiers of the CIC held them back.

On 30 March 1956, the families of the victims from Hallim secretly collected the remains on the site of the execution. They buried the 61 recovered bodies

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101) The number of the Subjects of the Preventive Custody is 344, while the sum of the number of the people remitted, on bail and in custody is 347. The reason of the discrepancy is unknown.

102) *April 3, Those Who Never Returned*, Jeju KBS Documentary Film. aired on March 30, 2000.

in the ‘Manbengdui Cemetery’ located in Geumak-ri, Hallim-eup.

In May 1956, the families of the victims in Moseulpo petitioned the authorities concerned for collecting the remains of the victims and got permission for that. As a result, they collected 132 dead bodies and buried them in a cemetery in Sangmo-ri, Daejeong-myeon which they jointly bought for this purpose. They named the grave site ‘*Baek-jo-il-son-ji-ji*’, meaning ‘one descendent from one hundred grandfathers’.

#### □ Seongsanpo Preventive Custody

In the case of the preventive custody and the execution of the detainees in the jurisdiction of the Seongsanpo Police Station, such as Seongsan-myeon, Gujwa-myeon, and Pyoseon-myeon, the relevant records are in the existing police documents and this is the only case among all the records about preventive custody and executions carried out in Jeju. Among the detainees held at the Seongsanpo Police Station, four people were grade D and 76 people were classified as grade C. However, Moon Hyeong-sun, then the chief of the Seongsanpo Police Station, denied the order from the army and handed over only six people to them. The related document shows the names of the 6 people: Oh Hui-sam (age 51), Ko Yeong-hwan (24), Jin Byeong-ryong (22), Oh Gun-pyo (36), Kang Yong-bin (54), and Kang Seung-hwan (22).<sup>103)</sup> On 28 July, at around 3 p.m., they were transported to Seogwipo, loaded onto two trucks and the four soldiers who executed them could also be identified. They were Ko Gwang-su, Lim Mun-seon, Park Seosang, and Kim Jong-man, all of whom belonged to the Criminal Investigation Department of the Marine Corps. As the execution of the preventive custody subjects at the Seogwipo Police Station was carried out in the morning of July 29, it is presumed that these six detainees from Seongsanpo were probably killed on the same day.

However, the other detainees escaped death thanks to the chief of the Police, Mr. Moon, who refused to follow the order from the army. In other

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103) *April 3, Those Who Never Returned*, aired on March 30, 2000. Jeju KBS Documentary Film.

words, as mentioned earlier, Navy Commander Kim Du-chan, the assistant chief of staff for intelligence of the Marine Corps in Jeju, delivered an order for executing the preventive custody subjects to the Seongsanpo Police Station on 30 August 1950, but Moon himself refused to follow the order because he thought it ‘unjust’.

#### ④ Release of Preventive Custody Subjects

When September 1950 came, the execution of the detainees stopped in Jeju. The main reason was the withdrawal of the Marine Corps from Jeju. The Marine Corps (Commander Sin Hyeon-jun), which had been stationed in Jeju to completely quell the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident, left Jeju at the end of August with 3,000 Jeju young men who had newly enlisted in the Marine Corps to join the Incheon Landing Operation. As the Marine Corps withdrew and many young men in Jeju joined the army, a serious vacuum was created in the security of the Jeju area. Besides, the number of the detainees increased considerably due to an incident on 27 July in which rebellious leaflets were distributed.<sup>104)</sup> It turned out that the rebellious leaflets were spread by the armed guerrillas on 31 August, thus, the suspected detainees were, in fact, innocent.

According to this, at the beginning of September, each chief of the police recommended the release of the subjects of the preventive custody to the head of the Jeju Police Bureau. On 6 September 1950, Yoo Geun-eok, the chief of the Jeju Police Station, recommended the release of the detainees to the head of the Jeju Police Bureau saying, “It is necessary to release those who show sincere repentance and let them engage in their occupations in order to settle the public sentiment after a strict screening.”<sup>105)</sup> Upon this, the head of the bureau issued instructions to release the subjects who regret their wrong doings after a thorough screening.

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104) With regard to ‘rebellious leaflets’, refer to *Record of Investigation of the Preparatory Committee for Welcoming the North Korean People’s Army*; the Special Committee for Investigation of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident and Honoring the Victims, *the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident Sourcebook*, Vol. 5, pp.123-124, pp.129-131.

105) *Inquiry into dealing with the subjects of the Preventive Custody*, September 6, 1950. Lee Do-yeong, *Deathly Preventive Custody*, p.246.

On 14 September, the Jeju Police Bureau held a joint meeting of investigators concerned in Jeju. At the meeting, the participants decided to eliminate the evils of sacrificing innocent residents by false personal accusations and release the detainees who show sincere repentance and let them discharge their duty as citizens. They set up the standards for reinvestigating and releasing the detainees and resolved to implement the following recommendations:

1. Immediate punishment by the authorities is strictly prohibited and all the subjects should be dealt with according to the law.
2. The authorities must interrogate the subjects dispassionately, excluding personal emotions.
3. The authorities should pay attention to the sanitary conditions of the prisons.<sup>106)</sup>

As a result of the rescreening by the investigation authorities, 153 detainees under the control of the Jeju Police Station were released on 18 September 1950. On the day of the release, a ceremony of the release was held at the Jeju Police Station with the head of the CIC, assistant chief of staff of the martial law command, section chief of the inspection division at the Jeju Police Bureau, heads of public offices and many local dignitaries in attendance.<sup>107)</sup> Following the first release, 48 other detainees held at the Jeju Police Station were also released.<sup>108)</sup>

On September 17, at the Seogwipo Police Station, all 120 detainees (43 with grade A, 77 with grade B) were released when the head of the CIC visited the station. However, 10 detainees with grade C and D were still in custody.<sup>109)</sup> At Moseulpo Police Station, the rescreening process had been finished before 18 September, and 90 out of the total 344 detainees were released.<sup>110)</sup> In fact, they just released the rest of the detainees after executing

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106) *Jeju Shinbo*, September 17, 1950.

107) *Jeju Shinbo*, September 20, 1950.

108) *Jeju Shinbo*, September 23, 1950.

109) *Report of the release of the Subjects of the Preventive Custody*, September 20, 1950. Lee Do-yeong, *Deathly Preventive Custody*, p.251.

110) *Sending References of the Released among the Subjects of the Preventive Custody*, September 18, 1950 (in police files with related to the subjects of the Preventive Custody kept

252 people on 20 August.

On 5 September, at Seongsanpo Police Station, six people suspected of spreading the rebellious leaflets were discharged at first.<sup>111)</sup> On 14 September, at the police station, a joint meeting of chiefs of inspectors organized by the head of the CIC was held. At the meeting, at the dictation of the head of the CIC, they selected the detainees who would be released. As a result, among the total 251 preventive custody subjects (177 men and 38 women), 102 people with grade A (82 men and 20 women), and 96 detainees with grade B (82 men and 14 women) were chosen to be freed. But 16 detainees with grade C and one person with grade D were classified as to be kept under arrest for a while.<sup>112)</sup>

**⑤ Outbreak of ‘The Incident of Local Dignitaries’<sup>113)</sup>**

At the beginning of August 1950, 16 prominent local figures including the president of the local court, chief public prosecutor, head of Jeju-eup, lawyers, businessmen and educationists were taken to the martial law command on the charge of establishing so-called a preparatory committee for welcoming the North Korean People’s Army’.<sup>114)</sup>

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by Lee Do-yeong, p.386).

111) *Releasing the Subjects of the Preventive Custody*, September 5, 1950. In Lee Do-yeong, *Deathly Preventive Custody*, pp.247-248.

112) *Documents on the Preventive Custody in the Seongsanpo Police Station*, A file of the police documents possessed by Lee Do-yeong, p.399.

113) In Jeju, people call this arrest ‘Incident of local dignitaries’ because the arrested people were local dignitaries such as heads of government organizations and local dignitaries in the Jeju area. The details of this incident come from *Record of Investigation of the Preparatory Committee for Welcoming the North Korean People’s Army*, the Special Committee for Investigation of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident and Honoring the Victims, the *Jeju 4 · 3 Incident Sourcebook*, Vol. 5, pp.108-147.

114) The list of the local dignitaries involved in this incident is as follows. Kim Jae-cheon (President of the Jeju District Court, Judge), Won Bok-beom (Chief Public Prosecutor), Hong Sun-won (General Manager of Administration at the Jeju Local Government), Jeon In-hong (Director of Local Affairs at the Jeju Local Government), Choi Nam-sik (Principal of the Jeju Agriculture School), Lee In-gu (ex Director of Social Affairs at the Jeju Local Government), Baek Hyeong-seok (Tradesman, Head of the Jeju Chapter of the Red Cross), Choi Won-sun (Lawyer), Kim Cha-bong (Head of Jeju-eup), Kim Mu-geun (Lawyer), Kim Jae-hong (Head of the Jeju Provincial Hospital), Lee Yun-hui (President of Jeju Joheung

According to the investigation conducted by Captain Shin In-cheol and others affiliated with the G-2 of the Marine Corps in Jeju, it was alleged that the suspects secretly gathered at Hong Sun-won's house on 10 July 1950 and organized a preparatory committee for welcoming the North Korean Army. They also elected Choi Nam-sik as chairperson along with other executives for each department and decided to collect 10 thousand won from each person as an admission fee. Furthermore, it was said that they met several times from 14 July to 5 August and even tried to organize a death squad and select targets, such as important figures in the army, the police and public offices.

In the end, Captain Shin arrested the director of the Jeju Provincial Hospital and another six people on 8 August and on 9 August; he put Kim Jae-cheon, the president of the Jeju District Court, and another 14 high-ranking officials and local dignitaries under arrest. For about 10 days after the arrest, Captain Shin and Kim Jong-man from the intelligence division, and Sergeant Park Seo-sang and Sergeant Yoo Ho-seon tortured the detainees and threatened to kill them simply because they did not confess to their conspiracy. To make matters worse, from noon of 13 August to 3:30 p.m. of the next day, Captain Min Yong-sik tortured Jang Yeong-mun, one of the suspects, so severely that Jang died around 4 p.m. on 14 August.

The US Embassy in Korea was also aware of this incident. A report dated August 17 1950 includes the following content:

The G-2 of the Korean Marine Corps insisted that 13 well-known figures in Jeju held meetings on 10, 15, and 22 July to discuss how they would welcome the North Korean Army if they landed on the island. This accusation is based on the confessions given by two men arrested on charge of spreading propaganda leaflets. The two men indicated 13 local dignitaries as the masterminds of the spread of the leaflets and argued that they were involved in the aforementioned meetings. Four out of the 13 suspects confessed to the holding of the meetings and their purposes. The Marine Corps tries to justify their activities by arguing that some of the suspects were arrested three years ago on charge of being

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Motor Company), Kim Yeong-hui (President of an Alcohol Factory), Jang Yong-mun (Clerk of the Chongu Patriotism Association), Han Sang-yong (Assistant Teacher of Jeju Agriculture School), and Jo Gyu-hwan (Drillmaster of Jeju Agriculture School).

involved in the Jeju Island Rebellion.<sup>115)</sup>

As the representative figures of Jeju, including the president of the court, chief public prosecutor, and head of Jeju-eup were arrested, then Jeju Governor Kim Chung-hui thought this was a conspiracy to frame them. He discussed the matter with Lee Seong-ju, the head of the Jeju Police Bureau, and presented a petition for investigating and revealing the truth of the case to Jo Byeong-ok, the Minister of Home Affairs, and Shin Seong-mo, the Minister of National Defense. Besides, Kong Byeong-sun, the head of the CIC in Jeju. He also submitted a report to the Ministry of National Defense which argued that the truth of this incident was different from what had been known. In the end, for a spot investigation, Seonu Jong-won, the chief of the criminal investigation section at the headquarters of national police, was dispatched to Jeju by the Ministry of Home Affairs. On 28 August, a joint investigation team of the military and the police (head of the team: Major Lee Ok-bong, Advisor: Police Commissioner Seonu Jong-won) was set up and six investigators from the mainland (two from the army, two from the navy and two from the police) joined the investigation team.

The investigation revealed that the so-called committee for welcoming the North Korean People's Army had never existed and the whole accusation was baseless slander. In other words, this incident was fabricated by Captain Shin In-choel who got a false confession from Choi Nam-sik who had been arrested on charge of spreading the rebellious leaflets on 27 July and asked Choi leading questions to point to prominent figures in Jeju society as accomplices in the case.

Captain Shin, Park Seo-sang, and Yoo Ho-seon were placed under arrest on charges of corruption and inflicting injuries. The 15 suspects, including Lee Yun-hui, were released at 6 p.m. on 3 September. The investigation ended at 5 p.m. on 10 September producing the comprehensive investigation report, and

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115) Memorandum for the record, Subj.: Conditions on Cheju Island, John P. Seifert, Naval Attache, Donald S. MacDonald, Third Secretary of Embassy, Philip C. Rowe, Vice Consul, Aug 17, 1950.

the joint investigation team disbanded. Even though the case was closed, Jang Yeong-mun died of torture during the interrogation and Kim Jae-cheon, the president of the Jeju District Court, became mentally deranged due to the aftereffects of the torture and died early.<sup>116)</sup>

Jeju society was severely constricted by the ‘Incident of Local Dignitaries’. Jeju citizens witnessed the case in which the incumbent president of the local court and a chief public prosecutor were arrested by the army and in danger of being killed. Because this incident happened side by side with the massive execution of the preventive custody subjects on 20 August, August of 1950 in Jeju was a time of fear.

#### 8) Killing of Residents by Armed Guerrillas

At the beginning of the 4·3 Incident, the armed guerrillas mainly killed policemen, members of the right-wing organizations, such as the Dae Dong Youth Corps (United Young Men’s Party) or the Seobuk Young Men’s Association, and right-wing figures cooperating with the army and the police, and their family members. However, from November 1948 when the anti- guerrilla operations began, they indiscriminately killed residents of villages which they thought sided with the anti-geurrilla operation and were not cooperative with them. Some villages such as Sehwa-ri in Gujwa-myeon, Seongeup-ri in Pyoseon-myeon, and Wimi-ri in Namwon-myeon, were damaged a great deal by the armed guerrillas. The reasons for this were that these villages served mainly as posts of the army and the police and the killings of the ‘family members of the fugitives’ occurred in these villages. After the armed guerrillas were nearly annihilated, sometimes starved guerrilla members killed residents who were standing sentry when they entered villages to loot food.

#### The Case of Sehwa-ri, Gujwa-myeon

Sehwa-ri was one of the two villages in Gujwa-myeon where a police box

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116) Moon Yang (age 82, judge at the Jeju District Court at the time), Testimony recorded on April 16, 2002.

was located. Because the right-wing was strong there, the residents of the village were very cooperative with the anti-guerrilla expeditions. At around 9 p.m. on 3 December 1948, the armed guerrilla unit made a surprise attack on the village. On entering the village, they started to burn houses along the road and killed people indiscriminately. The armed guerrilla unit burnt about 150 houses and retreated from the village at round 2 a.m. On this day, about 50 people, including those who fled from the upland villages, were killed. Ji Hyeong-chang who lost his family members and eight relatives, talked about the incident as follows:

“The Minbodan (Peoples Protective Corps) in Sehwa-ri was the strongest unit in Jeju Island. It was said that on that day the whole force of the South Korean Labor Party took part in the attack. They attacked the village all at once with three gunshots as a signal at around 9:30 p.m. As they went down along the roads they burnt houses and killed people indiscriminately. They even didn’t bother to ask ‘whether the residents sided with the South Korean Labor Party or the Minbodan’. They also extorted food and clothes. At that time, there were some policemen and the police reserves at the police box but they couldn’t even go out of the box because it was such an unexpected raid.”<sup>117)</sup>

At that time, even though there were about 35 policemen (15 policemen belonging to the station and 20 police reserves from Chungnam Province), they didn’t come out of the police box until the armed guerrilla unit retreated. When dawn broke, the police dragged 16 people from a neighboring village that had been held at the police box to a nearby field and executed them in full view of the village residents. A few days later, the police executed the family members of the armed guerrillas from Sehwa-ri.”

#### The Cases of Namwon-ri and Wimi-ri in Namwon-myeon

The armed guerrillas attacked Namwon-ri, the site of the myeon office and the Namwon Police Box, at about 7 a.m. on 28 November 1948. At the time,

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117) Ji Hyeong-jong (age 76, a member of the Daedong Youth Corps at the time), Testimony recorded on October 25, 2001.

at the Namwon Police Office, there were about 30 policemen including 20 police reserves. As the armed guerrillas encircled the police box which was surrounded by a stone wall, the policemen didn't come out until they retreated. For several hours, the armed guerrillas swept through the village, killing about 30 residents and burning almost all the houses; they also extorted food.

On the same day, the armed guerrillas also rushed into Wimi-ri, a neighboring village. In Wimi-ri, there was the Wimi Police Box. The armed guerrillas attacked the two villages, the only two places with police boxes in Namwon-myeon, on the same day. These attacks in which the armed guerrillas attacked the posts of the anti-guerrilla expeditions while the anti-guerrilla operations were in full swing were very shocking. The US army also made a detailed report on these attacks:

At 28 06:00 November an estimated 200 armed raiders and 500 unarmed raiders attacked the villages of NAMWON-NI (970-1120), and WIMI-NI (960-1120). Two hundred fifty homes were reportedly burned by the raiders, 500 civilians were killed and 70 civilians and 3 policemen were injured. Local police counter-attacked the raiders but were forced to withdraw because of lack of ammunition. One constabulary company and 30 policemen were sent from SOGWPO (950-1120) to attack the raiders. The latest report received of this action stated that 30 raiders had been killed and 3 captured. One policeman was wounded in the attack. (Police Report)<sup>118)</sup>

As in Namwon-ri, the armed guerrillas swept through Wimi-ri and killed women, the weak and the elderly, extorted food and burned houses. Hyeon Bong-hyeop's mother was killed by the guerrillas on that day, while she was struggling to take out food and clothes from a burning house. Hyeon told this story as follows:

“At that time, the chief of the Wimi Police Box was from North Korea. He was hard on young men in the village because he worried that these young men may blindly follow the guerrillas in the mountain. If he thought someone was a little bit suspicious, he unconditionally took him to the police box. As the

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118) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 1000, November 30, 1948.

situation went this way, the armed guerrillas came down to the village at night and tried to talk the residents into cooperation with them. But the residents couldn't take the risk because the Wimi Police Box was very strict about these kinds of activities. So, the armed guerrillas planned to burn down the village for being not cooperative with them. That was very extreme compared to how other villages were dealt with."<sup>119)</sup>

#### □ The Case of Dumo-ri, Hallim-myeon

At around 12 p.m. on 15 December 1948, the armed guerrillas entered Dumo 2-gu in Hallim-myeon (what is now Hanwon-ri, Hangeong-myeon) without warning. On the day, the residents stood in sentry at important positions under the leadership of the Minbodan but the guerrillas had no trouble sneaking into the village because the stone wall fences around the village had not been built yet. Every night, a policeman from the Dumo Police Box had patrolled the village but on the day of the attack, the policeman didn't come.

The armed guerrillas burned a house at the entrance of the village and shouted, "Come out and extinguish the fire!" It seems that they may have wanted to check the situation of the village. At this time, an old man named Kim Gyeong-seok who went out was killed by the guerrillas. A woman named Park Jeong-saeng who hurriedly went out to put out the fire was also brutally murdered. The armed guerrillas killed her with a Japanese sword. Soon the armed guerrillas occupied the village, extorted food and burned houses, openly brutalizing the village. However, when the police from the Dumo Police Box at Dumo-gu and the police reserves stationed in Gusan-ri were mobilized, they hurriedly retreated from the village at the signal of a bugle note. Even though it took less than an hour from the attack to the retreat, 13 residents were killed including one who died later from their injuries.<sup>120)</sup>

Dumo 2-gu was located in an area nearer to the mountain than Dumo 1-gu but the evacuation order was not applied to the village because it was only about 1 km away from the main road and a police box was also near to the

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119) Hyeon Bong-hyeop (age 81, a teacher at that time), Testimony recorded on May 7, 2002.

120) Jwa O-gyun (age 76, a volunteer policeman at that time), Testimony recorded on February 27, 2002.

village. The villagers thought that was why they had become the target of the attack. Because all the other upland villages were evacuated, Dumo 2-gu naturally became the front line. Also, no one in the village joined the armed guerrillas in the mountain and the residents were not cooperative with them, while keeping guard over the village thoroughly. The residents thought that these were the other reasons that the village had become the target of attack.

#### □ The Case of Seongeup-ri, Pyoseon-myeon

Seongeup-ri, Pyoseon-myeon had never been burned, despite being an upland village. The anti-guerrilla expeditions burned almost every upland village, except Seongeup-ri where the Seongeup Police Box was located. Because of this, even though Seongeup-ri was located in the upland area, farthest from the coastline in Pyoseon-myeon, the evacuation order was not applied to the village and, rather, it served as a post of the anti-guerrilla expeditions. The residents of the village were incorporated into the Minbodan and mobilized into the anti-guerrilla operations under the tight control of the police box. The armed guerrillas also had not been able to approach the village where the army and the police were stationed so, for a while, there had been no clashes between the two parties.

However, on 13 January 1949, the residents of Seongeup-ri went through an ordeal. On that day, the residents were busy preparing for a military operation. The operation on that day was led by the army. One army platoon, about 30 policemen from the Pyoseon Police Box and the Seongeup Police Box, almost all members of the Minbodan in the jurisdiction joined this broad-scale joint military operation.

Meanwhile, as the joint anti-guerrilla expedition searched for armed guerrillas in the upland areas, in the village, one woman was executed by the police. The woman had come back to Seongeup-ri where her home of birth was located and had just given birth to a baby, after her husband joined the armed guerrillas and went to the mountain. A policeman who did not join the operation and remained in the village dragged her from her home, stripped her naked. The policeman forced other village women to thrust a spear into her

and then executed her with a gun. When her baby cried and wiggled by her dead body, he also shot the baby in the face.

When the afternoon came, the villagers became busy with preparing for dinner for the anti-guerrilla expedition. Then, suddenly, the siren went off and someone shouted, “Guerrillas are attacking the village!” It was about 5 p.m. when dusk was falling. The armed guerrillas launched a counterattack on the village, taking advantage of the joint anti-guerrilla expedition being away. The armed guerrillas killed two residents who stood sentry outside the village and stormed door to door and stole food over two hours. Some people who didn’t willingly give food to them were killed and some houses were burned down. Seongeup Elementary School also caught fire on that day. Today, at the entrance to the village, stands a stone monument on which the names of the 38 victims of that day are inscribed.<sup>121)</sup>

## **B. Execution of Prisoners**

From 1 March 1947, when the 4 · 3 Incident was on the horizon, to 1954, thousands of people were tried and sentenced with regard to the 4 · 3 Incident. Trials related to the 4 · 3 Incident were general trials that happened at the Jeju District Court, the Gwangju District Court, the Daegu High Court, and the Supreme Court, and the court under the US Military Government and court-martials, which tried soldiers and civilians attached to the military. In addition to that, court-martials were held for civilians in December 1948, under martial law, and, exceptionally, court-martials that tried civilians invoking the National Defense Law were held in July 1949.

Many people who were tried with regard to the 4 · 3 Incident were fined, given custodial sentences or sentenced to probation. However, those who were sentenced to imprisonment had to leave Jeju and were confined in prisons located all over the country because there was no prison in Jeju at that time. Some prisoners served their terms and were released later and others died

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121) The April 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4 · 3 Incident Speaks*, Vol. 5, pp.87-92.

from unsanitary conditions in the prisons. But a considerable number of the prisoners were killed due to official orders from above to execute impure elements when the Korean War broke out in 1950. Because there is no way of identifying the time, date, place and reason for the execution of these prisoners, the victim's families reported those who were killed during their time in prison as missing victims to the 4 · 3 Incident Committee.

## 1) People Tried at General Court

### ① Before the 4 · 3 Incident (March 1, 1947 – April 2, 1948)

The courts of the US Military Government began to be held from 3 April 1947 in order to try those who had been prosecuted on charges of being involved in the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident, in which six people were shot and the following 3 · 10 General Strike. On 14 April 1947, the trials of the accused related with the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident were transferred to the Jeju District Court, so the local court would have jurisdiction over the accused. From 21 April, the trials related to the shooting incident began to be held at the Jeju District Court. In the end, all the trials, which had begun on 3 April, closed on 23 May. 52 people were sentenced to confinement and imprisonment, 52 people were sentenced to probation, 56 defendants were fined and others were given suspended sentences and nonindictment. The total number of the people who were tried is 328.<sup>122)</sup>

The convict given the maximum sentence was Huh Du-mun, who was given a one-year sentence. The rest were given a sentence of less than a year. Most of them were incarcerated in Mokpo Prison. The court also ordered that if the convicts who were fined couldn't pay the penalties, they would do forced labor, converting the penalties into 125 won a day.<sup>123)</sup> After the trials of the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident, between the second half of 1947 and early 1948, political and social conflict between ordinary citizens and the police under the

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122) Jeju Shinbo, May 26, 1947.

123) Jeju Shinbo, April 28, 1947.

US Military Government occurred in succession. The representative cases were as follows:

- 1947
  - June 2: Students' strike by students of Jeju Girls' Middle School
  - June 6: Civil petitioners from Jongdal-ri assaulted three policemen
  - June - July: Spreading of rebellious leaflets by students of the Teacher Training School and Jocheon School, and young men from each village
  - July 3: Confrontation and conflict between students and school authorities at Jeju Agricultural School
  - End of July: Objection to grain collection by villagers in Myeongwol-ri in Hallim-myeon
  - August 8: Village young men in Donggwang-ri beat government employees working on grain collection
  - August 13: Residents in Bukchon-ri clash with the police; injuries to both parties
  - August 14: Important figures including Park Gyeong-hun, chairperson of the Jeju People's Committee, were arrested.
  
- 1948
  - February 7-10: '2·7 Struggle' waged all over the island; clashes with the police
  - February 9: In Sagye-ri, Andeok-myeon, village young men beat policemen
  - March 6: Kim Yong-cheol dies of torture at the Jocheon Police Box
  - March 14: Yang Eunha from Yeongrak-ri dies of torture at the Moseulpo Police Box

With regard to the above cases, many people were arrested and brought to trial. According to the rulings relating to the 4·3 Incident that the 4·3 Incident Committee obtained from the National Archive of Korea, the total number of the people who were brought to trial at the Jeju District Court from 1 March 1947 to 3 April 1948 was 480. Among them, 82 people were sentenced to confinement and imprisonment, 150 people were sentenced to probation, and 248 defendants were given simple fines. Like the trials of the 3·1 Incident, no one was given a sentence of more than a year.

Those who were tried between 1947 and early 1948 returned to Jeju after

serving their terms or took refuge in Japan or other regions, so there was no case in which prisoners who had been sentenced to imprisonment at the above trials were executed during their time in prison.

**② After the 4 · 3 Incident (April 3, 1948. – September 21, 1954)**

The 4 · 3 Incident began with the armed guerrillas' attack on police boxes on 3 April 1948 and intensified as a conflict of arms between the police and the armed guerrillas. After a lull from the end of April to early May, the armed guerrillas resumed their attacks on the police, right-wing organizations and right-wing figures under the banner of objection to the 5 · 10 General Elections. When the voting of the two electoral precincts in Jeju was invalidated, the US Military Government judged that the situation in Jeju was deteriorating. Therefore, it dispatched more police reserves and anti-guerrilla forces to Jeju.

Naturally, the number of suspects arrested under criminal charges rose significantly. As the number of cases which had to be dealt with in Jeju increased, the existing court and prosecutors' office couldn't handle the cases quickly. In the end, on 26 May, the central judiciary sent additional judges and prosecutors to Jeju to tackle the problem. The judges who came to Jeju were Judge Sim Dong-gu from the Seoul High Court, Chief Judge Yang Won-il from a district court, Judge Choi Dong-uk, Judge Hwang Seong-hui, and Judge Kim Sang-muk. Three clerks also came to Jeju with the judges. As prosecutors, Park Geun-yeong, Lee Ju-sin, and Ahn Hui-gyeong were dispatched to Jeju with three clerks.<sup>124)</sup>

They began their duties from 31 May and carried out the trials rapidly. On that day, they finished four hearings related to the 4 · 3 Incident and in those hearings, the prosecution demanded a death sentence for one suspect, 10 years of prison labor for another suspect, seven years' imprisonment for two defendants, and five years' imprisonment for one defendant.<sup>125)</sup> The judges and the prosecutors from Seoul tried 42 cases with 37 defendants until they returned to Seoul on 11 June. The rulings they handed down are as follows

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124) *Hanseong Ilbo*, May 23, 1948; *Chosun Ilbo*, June 4, 1948.

125) *Chosun Ilbo*, June 4, 1948.

(sentences in parenthesis):<sup>126)</sup>

- Violation of Decree No. 2: 32 cases (maximum three years in prison, minimum six months in prison)
  - Murder: Two cases (life imprisonment, 10 years in prison)
  - Attempted Murder: Two cases (life imprisonment)
  - Abiding a Murder: One case (three years in prison)
  - Arson: One case (life imprisonment)
  - Preparation for Murder: One case (two years on probation)
  - Preparation for Arson: One case (two years on probation)
  - Obstruction of Movement: Two cases (two years in prison)
- Total: 42 cases of more than one year in prison 42 cases and 37 defendants

At that time, one lawyer who came to Jeju complained about the rulings saying, “No leaders of the armed guerrillas were prosecuted and those who were tried are only young men aged between 19 and 25. They didn’t know anything and just did mechanically what the leadership told them to do.”<sup>127)</sup> Reporter Jo Deok-song who was dispatched to Jeju to cover the trials told the story as follows:

Now in Jeju Island, the trials are proceeding to judge the armed guerrillas. Among many captives, only those who are facing criminal charges came to trial. Most of the defendants are young men about 20 years old. Every day, the court turns into a sea of tears shed from the families and relatives of the defendants and lawyers passionately argue cases for their defendants. One excerpt from them goes like this. “They (the defendants) did mechanically without any awareness of the consequences. If people like them have to be punished, all the captives should be brought to trial. I don’t ask a soft sentence to those who masterminded these riots but we should not confuse innocent citizens, those who are falsely charged, with the true criminals.”<sup>128)</sup>

Besides, the judges and the prosecutors reported to the US Military Government in Korea that they had faced difficulties in proceeding trials in

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126) *Daedong Shinmun*, June 17, 1948.

127) *Seoul Shinmun*, June 12, 1948.

128) Jo Deok-song, *Field Report, Bloodshedding Jeju Island, Sincheonji*, July Issue, 1948.

Jeju because of the pressure from many sides. The US Military Government acknowledged this and let the trials relating to the 4 · 3 Incident be transferred to the Gwangju District Court. These circumstances can be identified in the following record:

“Trials of riot cases in Cheju-do continued to claim the attention of the courts. A team consisting of two judges and the Chief Prosecutor of the Supreme Court, sent to Cheju-do in July (misreporting of June), returned to Seoul after completing trials of a majority of cases arising from the riots on that island. About 250 persons still were confined in the police prison. The judges reported that the atmosphere in Cheju-do was “not suitable” for the trial of riot cases. The judges were under constant fear for their safety. They feared violence at the hands of leftists if they sentenced rioters severely and at the hands of rightists if they sentenced rioters lightly. They recommended that serious riot cases be transferred to Mokpo or Kwangju for trial. The Military Governor authorized the Council of Justices, at their direction, to transfer any Cheju-do cases to Mokpo or Kwangju for trial.”<sup>129)</sup>

A record of the History of the United States Army Forces in Korea says, “As of July, 216 persons had been tried and 115 were being held.”<sup>130)</sup> Also, Police Inspector Joo Cheol-sun from the Metropolitan Police Agency who had been the third head of the anti-guerrilla expedition of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident, returned to Seoul on 20 August 1948 and reported that 977 ‘rioters’ had been arrested from 3 April to 3 August and 436 of them were sent to the prosecutors’ office.<sup>131)</sup>

After the judges and the prosecutors from Seoul returned, the trials continued at the Jeju District Court but dealing with 500 suspects at the same time was simply too much for the court. Also, some suspects in serious cases were transferred to the Gwangju District Court in order to secure the safety and the fairness of the trial.

On 23 August 1948, 32 suspects of the 4 · 3 Incident who had been interrogated

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129) RG 407: The Adjutant General’s Office, Entry 368, Box 2006, NARA.

130) USAFIK, *HUSAFIK*, part III, chapter IV, p.422.

131) *Gukje Shinmun*, August 24, 1948.

at the Jeju Prosecutors' Office were sent to the Gwangju Prosecutors' Office and held at Gwangju Prison.<sup>132)</sup> On 4 September, Vice-Chief Public Prosecutor Kim Yeong-chun at the Gwangju Prosecutors' Office decided that the Gwangju District Court would try them at the order of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. On 3 September, 40 additional suspects were transferred to Gwangju.<sup>133)</sup>

In the second half of 1948, a total of 131 suspects (74 cases) of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident were transferred to the Gwangju District Court. The trials for them proceeded at the Gwangju District Court for about 3 months from 1 October 1948 to 29 December 1948. Below is a brief summary of the trials by date:

- October 1: hearing 12 cases (18 suspects), seeking sentences by the prosecution
- October 8: seeking sentences for 8 suspects by the prosecution
- October 13: rendering judgments for 21 suspects
- October 14 – 15: seeking sentences for 17 suspects by the prosecution
- October 23: ruling postponed indefinitely due to the Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion
- November 26: seeking sentences for 22 suspects
- November 30: rendering judgments for 22 suspects
- December 7: seeking sentences for 36 suspects
- December 8: seeking sentences for 12 suspects
- December 16: rendering judgments for 6 suspects
- December 17: rendering judgments for 13 suspects
- December 21: rendering judgments for 9 suspects
- December 29: rendering judgments for 17 suspects

Among 131 defendants (74 cases), one defendant was sentenced to death, five were under sentence of life imprisonment, 82 were sentenced to between eight months and 15 years imprisonment, eight were sentenced to probation and 19 defendants were acquitted. From 17 November to 31 December 1948, there were no civilian trials, but there were court-martials because at the time Jeju was under martial law. The reason that the Gwangju District Court could continue to hold civilian trials was because those defendants had been charged before martial law was declared.

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132) *Donggwang Shinmun*, September 8, 1948.

133) *Gukje Shinmun*, September 11, 1948.

After 1949, when martial law was lifted, the 4 · 3 Incident defendants began to be tried at Jeju District Court again. It is difficult to grasp the exact situation of the civilian trials from 1949 to 1954, when the Incident ended, because the articles of the trials rarely appeared in the papers. The rulings which were obtained from the National Archive of Korea by the Jeju 3 April Committee show that, from 1949 to 1954, of 599 defendants, 361 received actual prison sentences (prison labor and imprisonment) and 238 defendants were sentenced to probation. Among those who were sentenced to prison labor and imprisonment, one defendant was sentenced to death, two were sentenced to 10 years imprisonment, one was given eight years imprisonment, seven defendants were sentenced to seven years imprisonment, one received six years imprisonment, 12 were sentenced to five years imprisonment, 12 defendants were given four years imprisonment, 42 defendants were sentenced to between three years and three years and six months imprisonment and 46 people were sentenced to between two years and two years and six months imprisonment.

Considering the above civilian trials related to the 4 · 3 Incident, it is estimated that the number of prisoners with more than two years' imprisonment was about 200. A detailed view shows that about 40 defendants were given their sentences in the trials by the judges from Seoul, around 80 defendants were given their sentences at the Gwangju District Court and the rest of the prisoners were sentenced at the Jeju District Court between 1949 and June 1950. Therefore, on balance, the number of the prisoners involved in the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident when the Korean War broke out in 1950 is approximately 200. Most of them had been held at Mokpo Prison and Gwangju Prison and later went missing; they are considered to have been executed in the early stages of the war.

## 2) Subjects of Court-Martial

During the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident, court-martials which tried soldiers and civilians attached to the military were held several times. However, according to court documents, ordinary civilians were also court-martialed twice in December

1948 and July 1949 (hereafter referred to as ‘1948 Court-Martial’ and ‘1949 Court-Martial’). The document titled ‘*Order of Court-Martial*’<sup>134)</sup> which is held at the National Archives of Korea contains the related content and the names of the subjects.

*Order of Court-Martial* includes a directive of holding court-martials and the list of the 2,530 subjects (871 tried by 1948 Court-Martial and 1,659 tried by 1949 Court-Martial). The directive includes orders of installing court, places of court, and names of crimes (criminal facts), measures by judges and measures by the related minister. The list includes tables which show personal information, pleas, sentences, dates of sentences, and prisons they were sent to. Also the list of the condemned criminals is separately annexed to the document.

Those subjects of court-martial were confined in prisons in Seoul, Incheon, Daegu, Jeonju and Mokpo. In the wake of the Korean War in 1950, most of the inmates were shot to death in line with a plan to weed out impure elements in each prison. In some cases, inmates were simply missing and their fate was not known.

#### ① The 1948 Court-Martial

The 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment assigned to the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment was reorganized in July 1948 (Regiment Commander: Major Song Yo-chan) and it took the lead in Jeju operations. On 11 October 1948, Jeju Defense Headquarters (Commander: Colonel Kim Sang-gyeom; Deputy Commander: Major Song Yo-chan) was

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134) On the cover of *Order of Court-Martial*, List of Court-Martial Subjects in December 1948 and July 1949” and “Jeju District Prosecutors’ Office” are printed. Although this document was held at the Jeju District Prosecutors’ Office, the document was made by the Jeju Martial-Law Command (Commander Lieutenant Major Ham Byeong-seon) and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment of the Capital Defense Command (Regiment Commander Colonel Ham Byeong-seon). *Order of Court-Martial* includes the directive of holding the High Military Court on which the seals of the Commander of the Jeju Martial-Law Command and the Regiment Commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment of the Capital Defense Command are stamped. The list of the court-martial subjects is annexed to the document. Order of Court-Martial had been held at the Jeju District Prosecutors’ Office and later was transferred to the National Archives of Korea on October 15, 1976. On September 15, 1999, then Assemblyman Chu Miae of the National Congress for New Politics made public the list after obtaining it from the Archives. The Jeju 4 · 3 Incident Committee keeps a copy of the list.

established and it carried out joint sweeping operations of the military and the police with great force. As Colonel Kim Sang-gyeom, brigade commander of the 5<sup>th</sup> Brigade of Gwangju became commander of Jeju Defense Headquarters, and command of the Jeju Anti-guerrilla Operation was promoted from regiment level to brigade level and it was also reinforced. Jeju Defense Headquarters took the high command of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, one battalion of the 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment, one battalion of the 6<sup>th</sup> Regiment, Navy Forces and the Jeju Police Guard.<sup>135)</sup> Besides, commander of the Jeju Defense Headquarters had jurisdiction over 'General Court Martial's right to purge.<sup>136)</sup> Furthermore, the South Korea Defense Squad ordered to send one battalion of the 14<sup>th</sup> Regiment in Yeosu, Subordinate of the 5<sup>th</sup> Brigade, to Jeju. Such reinforcements for the operations on Jeju were stalled, however, because of the outbreak of the Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion, but forceful anti-guerrilla operations mainly led by the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment were carried out without exception.

On 17 October, Regiment Commander Song Yo-chan of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment issued a decree ordering civilians to be removed from upland regions in Jeju and launched large-scale repression operations. Targets of the operation included general residents, as well as the armed guerrillas. As martial law was proclaimed in Jeju on 17 November 1948, the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment "adopted the plan of civilian 'massacre' under the assumption that all upland region residents provided armed guerrillas with help and convenience in order to get rid of all resistance"<sup>137)</sup> by 31 December 1948 when the Martial Law was lifted.

Large numbers of residents who barely escaped the mass slaughter were arrested and taken to military bases, and then temporarily imprisoned in camp or at the Jeju Agricultural School. In mid-October, the Korean Constabulary arrested 800 people during operations. They were put in camp and investigated for involvement with the armed rebels.<sup>138)</sup> They were mountain residents ruthlessly arrested by the Korean Constabulary under the so-called 'Brutal

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135) *Daily Record of the Army*, Vol. 2, October 11, 1948.

136) *Army Headquarters General Order*, Vol. 2, October 27, 1948.

137) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 1097, April 1, 1949.

138) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 964, October 16, 1948.

Search Operation' that the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment carried out at that time.<sup>139)</sup> Most of them were court-martialed, which was reported as 'Court-Martial Order.'

In Geumdoek-ri, Aewol-myeon, around 6 am on 11 October 1948, the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment besieged the town and arrested the young and confined them in Jeju Agricultural School.<sup>140)</sup> The 'court-martial order' indicated that 25 people of Geumdoek-ri were sentenced to prison in court-martial trials and transferred to prisons in different parts of the country in early December 1948.

From the end of October 1948 the anti-guerrilla force of the military and the police began to roundly hunt down public servants, judges, journalists and educators involved in the 3 · 1 Incident of 1947. They also stepped up the roundup and interrogation of people who invited the animosity of the Seobuk Young Men's Association.

Han Byeong-taek, Kim In-ji, Kang Sun-hyeon, Kim Tae-ho, Yang Mun-su, Kang Chan-gu and Kim Hak-rim who took custody of enemy property at the Office of Property Custody were arrested by the military and put in tents at the agricultural school, where the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment Headquarters were. Among them, Kang Sun-hyeon, Kim Tae-ho, and Kang Chan-gu were listed in the Court-Martial Order and they were transferred to Seodaemun Prison, Daegu Prison and Mokpo Prison respectively.<sup>141)</sup> Provisions Corporation's officials, Park Se-won and Park Sang-hun were also confirmed in the 'Court-martial order'. Yang Si-u and Ahn Du-won<sup>142)</sup> of the printing bureau of Jeju Shinbo, Chief Clerk in Jeju Provincial Court, Song Du-hyeon, Jeju Provincial Court officials Yang Seong-du and Hong In-pyo were also included in the 'Court-martial order' and they were confined at the agricultural school and then put to death or sent to Mokpo Prison or Mapo Prison after court-martial.

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139) RG 338: *Records of U.S. Army Commands, Entry: Provisional Military Advisory Group (1948-1949) and Korean military Advisory Group (1949-1953)*, Box 1. NARA.

140) *The 4<sup>th</sup> National Assembly Investigation Report on Massacres of Citizens*, Report from Geumdoek-ri, Aewol-myeon, Bukjeju-gun, 1960; 'Jeju 4 · 3 Incident Victim's Report' Receipt No. 88, Kang Hu-seon.

141) Choi Gil-du (age 85, Jeju-si, former government employee), Testimony recorded on June 22, 2001.

142) Ahn Du-won (age 75, Jeju-si, former employee in Printing Bureau of *Jeju Shinbo*), Testimony recorded April 2, 2002.

Besides the above cases, other 4 · 3 Incident suspects from Jeju were taken by the military and the police and investigated in each police office or prison. The 9th Regiment commander reported 1383 were arrested from 1 October to 20 November.<sup>143)</sup> Some of them received private judgments at Jeju Provincial Court or Gwangju Provincial Court. However, those who remained unconvicted prisoners until martial law was proclaimed in 17 November or who were arrested after the declaration of martial law were court-martialled in December 1948.

According to the Court-Martial Order, the 1948 Court-Martial was held 12 times from 3-27 December 1948, when martial law was proclaimed in the name of General Court-Martial under Martial Law.<sup>144)</sup> The Court-Martial trial sentenced 871 civilians on charges of rebellion violating Article 77 of the former criminal law. The Court-Martial Order covered the following:

Jeju Martial Law Area: General Court-Martial Order 20

Order to set up tribunal

Special command 29 was issued on 1 December 1948

Amendment of Command 39 was issued on 25 December 1948

The accused: the same as the attached sheet

Charge

Crime: Violation of Article 77 of Criminal Law

Criminal fact: Rebellion

Place and date of trial

Jeju Provincial Court

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143) RG 338: *Records of U.S. Army Commands, Entry*: Provisional Military Advisory group (1948-1949) and Korean military Advisory Group (1949-1953), Box 4. NARA.

144) As for the 1948 Court-Martial, the US document recorded that, "Court-Martial was held during this period to judge all the left-wing elements arrested by Korea Constabulary and the police. More than 700 went on trial until now. Among them 96 were sentenced to death and 330 were sentenced in prison. People sentenced to prison will be put in Mokpo Prison. Twenty three out of 96 sentenced to the death penalty were members of Korea Constabulary indicted for helping and instigating enemy. The trial is in session and about 170 are awaiting trial." (The <Document Attached> 1 of the 11 <Express Document> dated January 7, 1949 sent to the US Secretary of State by US Embassy in Seoul).

Session	1	2	3	4	5	6
Date	December 3	December 4	December 5	December 7	December 8	December 9
Session	7	8	9	10	11	12
Date	December 10	December 11	December 12	December 15	December 26	December 27

Counter-argument

All the accused were not guilty of each charge and fact of an offense.

Decision

All the accused were guilty of charges and fact of a crime.

Ruling

Capital punishment : Kim Yun-taek and 99 other persons

Life imprisonment : Yang Hae-gil and 101 other persons

Date of judgment delivery

Start: on 3 December 1948

Finish: on 27 December 1948

Secretary of the investigation's action

Settlement: to approve judgment and the order of execution

Secretary of confirmation's action

Settlement: to approve the judgment

But: 1. Kim Yong-gyu and 60 others would have sentences reduced to life imprisonment from the death penalty.

2. Yang Hae-gil and other 96 would have sentences reduced to 20 years in prison from life, and law would be enforced on them.

Capital punishment shall be executed no later than 28 February 1949 and its methods and place shall be ordered by the Chief of Jeju Martial Law Headquarters. (But, the commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment will do it if martial law is lifted.)

Prison to serve sentence

Adults would serve in Mokpo Prison, Mapo Prison and Daegu Prison, juvenile delinquents in Incheon Juvenile Prison, females in Jeonju Prison.

December 29, 1948

Jeju Martial Law Headquarters

Commander : Lieutenant Colonel Ham Byeong-seon (seal)

It was reported that initially 100 were sentenced to death and 102 were sentenced to life imprisonment but in the final judgment, 62 sentences were reduced to life imprisonment from the death penalty and 97 to 20 years in prison from life.<sup>145)</sup> According to this document, 39 (4.4 %) were put to death, 67 (7.7 %) were sentenced to life and the rest were sentenced 20 years in prison (97 people, 11.1. %), 15 years in prison (262 people, 30 %), five years in prison (222, 25.5 %), three years in prison (4, 0.5 %) and one year in prison (180, 20.7 %) by the 1948 Court-Martial.

39 people executed by capital punishment were not listed on the attached sheet of the ‘Court- martial order’ but separately printed along with ‘General Court-Martial Order 1’. The execution of those people took place around Hwabuk, Jeju at 14:30 on 27 February 1949. Related orders are as follows:

General Court-Martial Order 1 of Army Headquarters, 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment Headquarters  
It is ordered that the following inmates shall be put to death in line with General Court-Martial Order 20 in the Jeju Martial Law area on 29 December 1948.  
Inmates to be executed: Kim Yun-taek and 38 others (listed on the attached sheet)

Date of execution: At 14:30 on 27 February 1949

Place of execution: Executioner would designate around Hwabuk-ri, Jeju-eup, Bukjeju-gun, Jeju

Officer to execute: Captain Jo Yeong-gu, 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant Jeong Se-jin

Officer to join the execution: Army surgeon 1st Lieutenant Park Sin-beom,  
Military Intelligence official Second Lieutenant Park Tae-won

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145) Based on ‘*Court-Martial Order 20*’ contained in the Court-Martial Order commutation of sentence for those people was decided on December 29. But, in the attached list, the date is earlier: December 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8. As the attached list had an initial decision date, it also should have the initial sentence instead of the final reduced sentence, therefore the final reduced sentence written in the list left some doubt. Furthermore, the commutation was not notified to the accused or even their prisons. For example, in the case of Kim Chun-bae, imprisoned in Mapo Prison, he had his sentence reduced to 20 years in prison in the Court-Martial Order but he was sentenced to ‘life imprisonment without labor’ in the ‘*1949 Inmate List of Mapo Prison*’. The same went for Kang Sun-hyeon. She also had her sentence reduced to 20 years in prison but she herself had known that she would be sentenced to life in prison while she served in Seodaemun Prison. <Testimony of Kang Sunhyeon, then official in Office of Property Custody (Yongdam2-dong) (Jeju 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *4 · 3 Incident Speaks*, Vol. 4, p.167> That revealed that there were some problems in law enforcement at that time.

Method of execution and any other items not stipulated in this Order shall be in line with military capital punishment law.

22 February 1949

Army Headquarters, 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment

Regiment Commander Lieutenant Colonel Ham Byeong-seon (seal)

The date of execution can be confirmed, but the place of execution is just known as near Hwabuk-ri, and the exact location cannot be confirmed. Inmates were buried in secret after being shot to death and the families of the dead were not told the place. Some of the families were told that the place would be between Hwabuk and Samyang,<sup>146)</sup> a hill near Hwabuk<sup>147)</sup>, the coastal road from Hwabuk to Samyang<sup>148)</sup>, the western field entryway to Hwabuk<sup>149)</sup>, or a field near Hwabuk coastal road<sup>150)</sup>.

On 12 August 2002, the site investigation team of the Commission of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident confirmed in person one place after meeting with a witness who collected the body of his father, Kang Yun-gyu, at the scene of the execution. The witness, Kang Il-su went to the site with his uncle a month after he heard of his father's burial place from a relative, a police officer. He saw his father had been shot in the belly with two carbine bullets that he confirmed and he carried the body in a handcart to bury it at Dodu-ri cemetery in Jeju-eup. The place is a field, to the left side of the entrance to Dongjewon, to the right of the front gate of Ohyun High School, Hwabuk-dong, Jeju. It is an open area now.<sup>151)</sup>

Excluding the 38 shot to death in Jeju, 871 subject to court-martials listed in the Court-Martial Order were separately sent to Mokpo Prison, Mapo Prison, Seodaemun Prison, Daegu Prison, Incheon Prison and Jeonju Prison. 67 serving life had no record of their prison in the Court-Martial Order and

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146) 'Jeju 4 · 3 Incident Victims' Report', Kim Hang-yun.

147) 'Jeju 4 · 3 Incident Victims' Report', Kang Seong-bo.

148) 'Jeju 4 · 3 Incident Victims' Report', Jin Kyeong-man.

149) 'Jeju 4 · 3 Incident Victims' Report', Kang Yun-gyu.

150) 'Jeju 4 · 3 Incident Victims' Report', Kim Bong-su.

151) Kang Il-su (age 63, Jeju-si, an Elementary School Student at the time), Testimony recorded August 12, 2002.

had no record of their situation in prison, either. But, 24 of them were transferred to Daegu Prison on 4 March 1949 according to the ‘1949 Inmate List of Daegu Prison’, which suggested that they were sent to Daegu Prison or others after serving about two years in Mokpo Prison. 97 with a record of 20-year prison sentences also had no record of their prisons in the Court-Martial Order. However, the ‘1949 Inmates List of Mapo Prison’ shows that most of them were in Mapo Prison.

The people listed in Mokpo Prison in the Court-Martial Order are 453. The prison terms were 15 years (202), five years (157), three years (4) and one year (90). But 202 sentenced to 15 years in prison were transferred to Daegu Prison not long after serving in Mokpo Prison. This could be checked because they were recorded as inmates of Daegu Prison in the ‘1948 and 1949 Inmate Lists of Daegu Prison’.

Boys less than 19 years old were listed in Incheon Prison. A total 166 were imprisoned with 15-year prison terms (56), five-year prison terms (58) and one-year prison terms (52). 48 women were put in Jeonju Prison with 15-year sentences (3), five-year sentences (7) and one-year sentences (38).

As for regional distribution of inmates who would be subject to the 1948 Court-Martial based on the Court-Martial Order,<sup>152)</sup> residents of upland areas definitely made up a large proportion of them. But, the number of residents of Jeju-eup (Geonip-ri, Yongdam-ri and Ido-ri) and coastal villages (Dodu-ri, Hwabuk-ri, Aewol-ri, Hagwi-ri, Shinchon-ri, Jocheon-ri, Gangjeong-ri) is not small. Considering the strong evacuation operation carried out in the upland region after October 1948, the regional distribution suggests that the removal operation were not successfully conducted.

A particularly large number of mountain residents of Geumdoek-ri, Aewol-myeon were arrested by the military and as many as 25 of them were brought to the 1948 Court-Martial trial while other regions’ residents didn’t follow the military’s evacuation operation. The harsh crackdown by the anti-guerrilla

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152) Park Chan-sik, *The Truth of the Massacre of Inmates involved in the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident during the Korean War*; *The First Issue of the Jeju 4 · 3 and History*, Jeju 4 · 3 Research Institute, 2001, pp.50-51.

expeditions and the armed guerrillas' inducement and coercion to go to the mountain drove lots of residents there. No one resident in Seonheul-ri, Jochoemyeon was subject to the court-martial because on 25 and 26 November 1948, 94 residents were collectively shot to death by the anti-guerrilla force of the military and the police, who surrounded the cave where they were hiding. At this time, when a massive evacuation operation was underway in the upland region, few were involved in legal proceedings, which showed that many cases went to summary trial and execution on the spot without sending people to coastal villages or without custody.

The reason there were many residents in the coastal villages was due to the continuous surveillance and apprehension by military intelligence specialists, the police and Seobuk Young Men's Association. While the military took the lead in operations in the upland region, the police arrested the suspects who seemed to be in league with the armed guerrillas or people involved with leftist organizations. An extensive roundup of community leaders in Jeju-eup was underway and among the people who would be subject to the 1948 Court-Martial, there were lots of public officials, teachers, office workers and transportation business operators, suggesting the preventive custody act targeted them to block their connection with the armed guerrillas.

It seems that the 1948 Court-Martial aimed for the preventive detention of Jeju office workers and residents in coastal regions who were more likely to connect with partisan organizations and residents from upland regions, where evacuation operations were carried out as the anti-guerrilla force of the military and the police took a firm stand after October 1948. In addition, emergency martial law was proclaimed from 17 November to 31 December 1948 and the anti-guerrilla force could have people in detention and administer court-martial. If it had not been under martial law, those subject to court-martial would have been released from prison after investigation or been brought to trial in the normal legal procedure. This tough court-martial case, along with summary trial and execution without legal process, revealed another sacrifice of the people with respect to the 4 · 3 Incident.

## ② 1949 Court-Martial

On 2 March 1949, the government established the Jeju Command Post (Commander: Colonel Yoo Jae-heung) to suppress the 4 · 3 Incident ahead of the 5 · 10 election. As soon as Yoo Jae-heung started his new post, he ordered the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment stationed in the coastal region to go to the mountain and confront the armed guerrillas. In accordance with his order, the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment was stationed in Bengduichinbat (near Suakgyo) the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion in Gwaneumsa Temple, the 3<sup>rd</sup> in Gyorae-ri and Special Forces around Noru Oreum. He had an optimistic outlook that they would wipe out the insurgents completely before mid-April. He said, “I tried to put my plan into action to make a line with army bases and Minbodan fully across Jeju Island, clear the mountain and drive the insurgents to the police taking up positions at the opposite side of the island.”<sup>153)</sup>

Then again, he adopted a pardon plan and ordered a stop to the rampant shooting of the upland region residents. He also conducted an operation “to detain all the people from the mountain including those arrested during operation and active surrenders”<sup>154)</sup> The leaflets to encourage defection were distributed to escaped residents from early March.

Almost 20,000 upland region residents, as well as the armed guerrillas, had hidden on Mt. Halla at that time.<sup>155)</sup> They had escaped from the excessive evacuation operation of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment. Residents of Hannam-ri, Namwon-myeon went up as far as ‘Gonaengidoenbat’ inside of Mt. Halla. Over 90% of the 400 Hannam-ri residents collectively went up there and each family built mud huts in which they hid themselves.<sup>156)</sup> Nohyeong-ri residents moved to deep ‘Cheongsanido’ south of ‘Jogeundeure Oreum’ on Mt. Halla.<sup>157)</sup> The

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153) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 1,097, April 1, 1949.

154) Ibid.

155) Yoo Jae-heung (age 82, Seoul, former commander of the Jeju Command Post), Testimony recorded on September 6, 2002.

156) Ko Bong-won (age 72, Namwon-myeon, an ordinary citizen at the time), Testimony recorded December 14, 2000.

157) Hyeon Sang-ji (age 71, Jeju-si, who hid in the mountain at that time), Testimony recorded July 27, 2001.

residents collectively prepared a hideout on Mt. Halla and hid themselves. “Thousands of the weak and the elderly, children and women from Seongsan-myeon and Namwon-myeon, Namcheju-gun had been in Mulchat Oreum” said Kim Saeng-min who was a member of the Jeju Committee of the South Korean Labor Party and in charge of controlling people who sought shelter in Mt. Halla.<sup>158)</sup>

The pacification activities drove many people who hid on the mountain to descend. As many as 1,500 people went down from the mountain in March. Commander Yoo Jae-heung reported to the United Nations Commission on Korea, which visited Jeju on 11 May, that 3,600 captives were caught from 25 March to 12 April.<sup>159)</sup> On 21 April, the number of ‘captives or defectors’ surged to 5,817.<sup>160)</sup> According to the announcement of the operation by the Vice-Minister for Home Affairs on 22 May, “the total defectors are 6,014 from 5 March to 14 May and among them men are 2,974, women 3,040; and 4,613 were released and 1,851 currently imprisoned”.<sup>161)</sup> All of them were put in camps in Jeju-eup and Seogwipo. As for where they were held, the Absolute Alcohol (Oriental Development Company) warehouse in Jeju-eup was the biggest one and the agricultural school, convention hall in Ildo-ri and the camp in Yongdam-ri were used. In Seogwipo, the potato factory above Jeongbang Falls and the warehouse near Cheonjiyeon Falls were used as camps.

An inspection report of the United Nations Commission on Korea which visited the Absolute Alcohol plant on 11 May pointed out the following:

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158) Kim Saeng-min (age 77, Jeju-si, former executive of the South Korea Labor Party in Jeju), Testimony recorded July 13, 2001.

159) Transmitting Excerpt from UNCOK Report on Visit to Cheju Island, Despatch No. 358, June 17 1949, American Embassy, Korea.

160) *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, April 26, 1949.

161) *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, May 22, 1949. After June of 1949, total defectors were about 8,000 and about 5,000 of them were released and about 3,000 were in prison according to newspaper. (*Chosun Ilbo*, June 4, 1949; *Chosun Joongang Ilbo*, June 28, 1946.) At the end of June, the Chief of the 2nd Regiment Ham Byeong-seon told reporters “8,000 defectors are taken and remaining defectors in prison are only 2,000.” (*Kyunghyang Shinmun*, June 29, 1949).

It was found that about 2000 captives lived in an old warehouse. The number of females was about three times more than that of the males and there were lots of babies and children. The chief of the camp said, 90 % of captives surrendered on the mountain and the rest were arrested by the military anti-guerrilla force.<sup>162)</sup>

Inspecting police officers set up an office for investigation in the Absolute Alcohol plant and examined the captives. The following was the testimony of one police officer who was in charge of inspection of the plant as president of the Special Crime Investigation Unit.:

We tried to avoid torturing people because we are from the same hometown. Police officers from other provinces pretty much tortured them. They did it with all kinds of methods and someone had women undressed and hung from the ceiling.<sup>163)</sup>

The police used all sorts of torture on the captives to force them to confess their involvement with the armed guerrillas and handed them over to the military after drawing up a report.<sup>164)</sup> The official of the Absolute Alcohol plant testified, “Hundreds were detained in the warehouse which was built for drying sweet potatoes on a hill of the plant. I saw my countrymen and thought they might be arrested without special reason, because no one deserved to be called a ‘mob’. The military and the police dropped by the camp sometimes, but the Great Korean Youth Corps kept guard over them.”<sup>165)</sup>

The 1949 Court-Martial was called to try civilians who had hidden in Mt. Halla before they were brought to camps in Jeju. According to the Court-Martial Order, the 1949 Court-Martial was held 10 times from 23 June to 7

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162) Transmitting Excerpt from UNCOK Report on Visit to Cheju Island, Despatch No. 358, June 17, 1949, American Embassy, Korea.

163) Kim Byeong-taek (age 77, Jeju-si, former police officer), Testimony recorded February 8, 2002.

164) According to the testimonies of the survivors from the prisons, they all pointed out the police's brutal torture.

165) Kang Dong-hwa (age 81, Jeju-si, former employee of the absolute alcohol plant), Testimony recorded on July 18, 2002.

July 1949 under the name ‘General Court-Martial’<sup>166)</sup> The Court-Martial judged all 1,659 civilians guilty of ‘the crimes of aiding the enemy and communicating with the enemy, the crime of espionage,’ violating Articles 32 and 33 of the National Defense Law. The Court-Martial Order contains all 18 orders of the General Court-Martial Order and each order has an attached list. The content of Order 1 is as follows:

General Court-Martial Order 1

3 July, 1949

The 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Regiment of Capital Defense Command

Regiment Commander, Colonel Ham Byeong-seon (seal)

Order to set up tribunal

It is under Clause 1 of Special Order 71 by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Regiment of the Army Headquarters, issued 1 June, 1949

Place of trial: Jeju Provincial Court, Jeju

The accused: the same as the attached sheet

Charge

Crime: Violation of Articles 32 and 33 of the National Defense Law

Crime facts: The crime of aiding the enemy and communicating with the enemy and the crime of espionage

Counter-argument: refer to list of Clause 3

Decision: the same as above

Ruling: the same as above

Date of judgment delivery: the same as above

Secretary of Investigation’s action

Settlement: to approve judgment and order appropriate execution

Secretary of Confirmation’s action

Place to serve sentence: prison

In the document, out of 1659 subjects of the 1949 Court-Martial, 345 were put to death (20.8%) and 238 were sentenced to life imprisonment (14.3%). The rest were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment: 308 to 15 years

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166) As for the 1949 Court-Martial, the US data recorded as follows. “The result of trials for Jeju communists and sympathizers held from June 3 to July 12, 1949 are as follows. Indictment: 1652 of civilians, 47 of soldiers. Sentencing: Death penalty – 345, Life Imprisonment – 238, 15 years Imprisonment – 311, less than 7 years Imprisonment – 705, Acquittal – 54, Release – 46.” (US Far East Command, August 12 1949, Joint Weekly Summary, No. 9).

(18.6%); 706 to seven years (42.6%); 13 to five years, 25 to three years and 22 to one year: two were not confirmed. Overall, it delivered tougher punishment than the 1948 Court-Martial did under martial law.

Out of 345 with death penalty records, 249 were shot to death on 2 October 1949. The official order of execution on this punishment was not confirmed, but US military documents have the following record:

At 9 a.m. on 2 October 1949, 249 members of the armed guerrillas confined in Jeju Police Station were executed on the coast of Jeju airfield after presidential sanction. The executor was Major Jo Yeonggu, general of the military police in Jeju. The information officer of the battalion, JAG officer and other officers of the battalion attended. Among the executed, there was one commissioned officer and five sergeants of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment. 15 other soldiers who dropped out of the Jeju-stationed 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment ('1948) and joined the Jeju armed guerrillas were also among them.<sup>167)</sup>

Out of 345 with death penalty records, 249 were shot to death and the rest seemed to get reduced sentences and escape punishment in the process of verification or reconsideration by the general court-martial later. It was confirmed by the fact that Kang Du-sam, Boo Eul-saeng, Kim Nam-hae, Huh Nam-hong, Kim Tae-gyeong, Kang Won-gi, Hong Cheon-pyo, Yang Gyeong-taek and Boo Seong-u, recorded as being sentenced to death, were in Mapo Prison.<sup>168)</sup> Likewise, Kim Min-hak with a record of capital punishment was confirmed that he lived in his hometown after serving his sentence at Mapo Prison and died 15 years ago.<sup>169)</sup>

The following is the testimony of Huh Gyun, a platoon leader of the 1<sup>st</sup> Separate Battalion who witnessed the scene of execution by firing squad:

“When our troops were stationed in Jeju airfield, one night I caught the scene

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167) KMAG, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 192, October 6 1949; Joint Weekly Summary, No. 17, September 30 – October 7, 1949.

168) Those inmates can be confirmed in *1950's Inmate list of Mapo Prison* and *Books of List of Mapo Prison Inmates*.

169) Jeju 4·3 Institute, *Now, I Can Speak*, Vol. I, Hanul, 1989, pp.47-48.

where insurgents were executed to death in two large circles in the airport. 200 – 300 were shot to death with their eyes blind-folded, and later their tombs subsided a little bit as far as I remember. Provost Officer Yoon Gi-yeol commanded the scene, (...) I was told the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment suppressed them ruthlessly and I felt terrible looking at many people confined in the small space at the police prison. I witnessed them being executed at Jeju airfield, and it would be difficult to distinguish innocent people among the detainees at that point.”<sup>170)</sup>

The families of the 249 shot to death don't know the exact place and date of death. Some families only heard through the grapevine that they were shot dead near the airfield in Jeju-eup on 2 October 1949 and buried in holes. None of those families collected the bodies of the victims. Except the 249 shot dead in Jeju, 1659 listed in the Court-Martial Order were separately put in Mapo Prison, Daegu Prison, Daejeon Prison, Mokpo Prison, Incheon Prison and Jeonju Prison.

The people listed for Mapo Prison in the Court-Martial Order were 223, all of whom were sentenced to life imprisonment. 96 people got reduced sentences from death penalty to life imprisonment and then sent to Mapo Prison, so the total number of inmates in Mapo Prison was 319. 297 people with sentences of 15 years were in Daegu Prison, 300 with seven-year sentences were in Daejeon and 215 with seven-year sentences were in Mokpo. Boys under 19 years old were in Incheon Prison, and out of a total of 194, 12 were imprisoned for life, 12 got 15-year sentences, and 170 got seven-year sentences. Women were put in Jeonju Prison and out of a total of 84, three got sentences of life imprisonment, 21 got seven-year sentences, 13 got five years, 25 got three years and 22 got one year.

As for regional distribution of subjects of the 1949 Court-Martial, few were from Jeju-eup or coastal villages, but the number of mountain residents was overwhelming. People from Ora-ri, Seonheul-ri, Wasan-ri, Myeongwol-ri, Uigwi-ri, Hannam-ri, Sumang-ri, Gasi-ri, Nansan-ri, Shinpyeong-ri were hardly listed in

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170) Huh Gyun (age 75, Seoul, former platoon leader of the 1<sup>st</sup> Separate Battalion), Testimony recorded September 27, 2001.

the 1948 Court-Martial, but in the 1949 Court-Martial dozens of people were listed from each village. The regions are mountain villages and it seems that the residents went to the mountain to escape the operation when tough anti-guerrilla action took place in October 1948. As pacification activities were performed after March 1949, people went down from the mountain and became targets of the court-martial.

Except for some members of the armed guerrillas, the subjects of the court-martial were ordinary people wandering in the mountain to save their lives. The anti-guerrilla force of the military and the police forcefully suppressed them after October 1948. And they were people who just followed the anti-guerrilla force's pacification work that "you can live if you come down".

The government, however, ignored the policy to pardon them and took a firm stand. At that time, the military's pardon policy was limited to: "Categorize women, children and elderly people as refugees and thoroughly search and educate battleworthy men before they are categorized as refugees."<sup>171)</sup> Anyone who hid in the mountain and went down from it among the young people aged more than 15 was labeled as an 'insurgent' or 'rioter' to be investigated and became subject to court-martial. The government and the military wanted to manage them instead of punishing them immediately, but Jeju didn't have enough prison space or detention camps, so sent them into prisons around the country away from Jeju. Then the only way to put all the 2000 people in prison at one time was to apply Article 32 and 33 of the National Defense Law. In summary, the subjects of the 1949 Court-Martial were victims who were sent to prison by the government and the military that tried to suppress the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident.

### 3) Legal Review of the Court-martial Trial

The truth of the court-martial told by people who were subjects of the court-martial and survived from prisons, revealed that there were many

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171) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 1097, April 1, 1949.

problems in its procedure. Survivors testified that they were put in prison without trial or the trial was without due process. If there was no court-martial, or if there was a perfunctory trial violating due process, calling the subject of court martial an ‘inmate’ would be wrong and serving time in prison could be ‘illegal confinement’. It is a very important matter, not only in screening court-martial victims among the 1443 applicants who reported themselves as victims in line with the Special Law for the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident, but also in investigating the legitimacy of using government power during the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident, which should be investigated without fail.<sup>172)</sup>

The Commission of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident investigated the testimonies of the then inmates involved in the court-martial trial for the Incident. They also investigated testimonies of soldiers and policemen involved in those court-martials. They examined all related documents, such as the lawsuit records related to court-martial trials, police documents, execution records, the National Assembly record, government records, newspaper reports and US materials. In addition, reviewing all this data, they paid attention to whether the court-martial followed the regulations regarding the National Defense Law that stipulates the judicial process for court-martial during the 4 · 3 Incident.

### ① Investigation of Testimony

After investigating the testimonies of Kang Sang-mun and another 29 inmates who survived, the results were divided into three categories. The first cases were to be put in prison after being questioned by the military and the police and notified of the name of the crime and sentence without any judicial process.<sup>173)</sup> The second was to be put in prison after being questioned by the military and the police and being named, attending the courtroom as a group

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172) At the 16<sup>th</sup> meeting of the Examination Subcommittee (President Park Jae-seung) for Jeju 4 · 3 Incident Victims under Commission of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident (October 25, 2002), a legal expert advisor of the Subcommittee reported ‘The result of fact finding on ‘Court-Martial Trial’’. This ‘The result of fact finding’ was written when Task-Force of preparing Investigation Report of Jeju 4 · 3 Incident shared all data and analyses collected through investigation. Therefore, legal review on the Court-Martial was largely based on ‘The result of investigation’.

173) Personal data of 10 witnesses are as follows :

and then being notified of the crime and sentence before being sent to prison.<sup>174)</sup> The third was to be put in prison after being questioned, being named and sentenced in the courtroom with a group and sent to prison.<sup>175)</sup> Overall, all survivors gave evidence of the absence of trial and perfunctory judicial process.

Next, the result of the investigation of the military commanders revealed

Name	Age	Address	Job at that time	Prison	Recording date
Kim Sang-nyeon	76	Mapo-gu, Seoul	Elementary school teacher	Mapo	26 March 2002
Oh Hui-chun	72	Harye-ri, Namwon-eup	Woman diver	Jeonju	4 April 2002
Kim Chun-bae	76	Jongno-gu, Seoul	Merchant	Mapo	25 August 2001
Boo Yeong-seong	84	Hado-ri, Gujwa-eup	Leader of Dai Dong Youth Corps	Mokpo	15 December 2000
Kim Gun-ha	80	Seoho-dong, Seogwipo-si	policeman	Acquittal	25 January 2002
Han Jung-won	74	Gangjeong-dong, Seogwipo-si	Farmer	Incheon	4 April 2002
Bu Seong-bang	86	Jocheon-ri, Jocheon-eup	Farmer	Daegu	12 December 2000
Han Hui-chang	72	Jocheon-ri, Jocheon-eup	Farmer	Daegu	18 December 2000
Lee Bo-yeon	72	Iho1-dong, Jeju-si	Farmer	Incheon	3 August 2001
Kang Tae-ryong	72	Yongdam2-dong, Jeju-si	Farmer	Incheon	11 June 2002

174) Personal data of 17 witnesses are as follows :

Name	Age	Address	Job at that time	Prison	Recording date
Ko Man-hyeong	72	Hahyo-dong, Seogwipo-si	Farmer	Incheon	20 December 2000
Oh Tae-ik	76	Donghong-dong, Seogwipo-si	Farmer	Mokpo	15 December 2000
Ahn Du-won	75	Samdo1-dong, Jeju-si	Newspaper staff	Mokpo	2 April 2002
Ko Yun-bo	86	Bonggae-dong, Jeju-si	Farmer	Mapo	18 December 2000
Jeong Gi-seong	79	Hogeun-dong, Seogwipo-si	Farmer	Mapo	14 December 2000
Kang Sang-mun	73	Wolpyeong-dong, Jeju-si	Farmer	Daegu	13 December 2000
Kim Sang-hyo	75	Bonggae-dong, Jeju-si	Farmer	Daegu	12 December 2000
Jin Dal-geun	79	Hogeun-dong, Seogwipo-si	Farmer	Daegu	20 December 2000
Ko Bong-won	72	Hannam-ri, Namwon-eup	Farmer	Daegu	14 December 2000
Song Yeong-jin	82	Hamdeok-ri, Jocheon-eup	Student	Daegu	18 December 2000
Kim Jeong-sik	70	Yeon-dong, Jeju-si	Farmer	Incheon	12 December 2000
Park Dong-su	68	Yongdam-dong, Jeju-si	Farmer	Incheon	15 December 2000
Yang Geun-bang	68	Waheul-ri, Jocheon-eup	Farmer	Incheon	15 December 2000
Jeong Paeng-jong	71	Sinrye1-ri, Namwon-eup	Farmer	Incheon	14 December 2000
Bu Won-hyu	73	Ildo1-dong, Jeju-si	Student	Incheon	20 July 2001
Oh Yeong-jong	74	Hannam-ri, Namwon-eup	Farmer	Daegu	9 May 2002
Yang Gong-ok	72	Geumak-ri, Hallim-eup	Office worker	Incheon	12 June 2002

175) Personal data of two witnesses are as follows :

Name	Age	Address	Job at that time	Prison	Recording date
Song Sun-hui	78	Gwangae-dong, Incheon-si	Housewife	Jeonju	28 March 2002
Kang Jeong-sun	71	Seogwang-ri, Andeok-myeon	Housewife	Jeonju	20 December 2000

that the deputy regiment commander of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, Seo Jong-cheol, and assistant chief of staff of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, Kim Jeong-mu, didn't know about the court-martial trials over civilians during the 1948 Court-Martial<sup>176)</sup> During the 1949 Court-Martial trial, the 1st Battalion commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment, Jeon Bu-il testified that he handled three members of the Seobuk Young Men's Association by court-martial trial but didn't know that 1,659 civilians were court-martialed.<sup>177)</sup>

Besides them, the Commission of the Jeju 4·3 Incident requested the National Defense Ministry confirm personal data and records of the presiding judge, judge, policemen, attorneys, investigators for pretrial and judge advocates related to court-martial trial to investigate them, but they received the reply that there were no related records.<sup>178)</sup> Therefore, the Commission itself traced military officials' personal data, but it was unable to confirm it for reasons of death and so forth.

The research on military officials involved in court-martial trials investigated a policeman who questioned subjects of court-martial and two policemen who escorted them to prison. The investigating police officer testified that he classified people confined in the Absolute Alcohol plant into A, B and C and sent them to prisons at one time without trial.<sup>179)</sup> After arriving in prison, they were formed into lines and notified of the name of the crime and sentence by prison warden or soldier, said the two police officers who escorted them to prison.<sup>180)</sup> Such verbal evidence of policemen matches up with those of survivors, so it is estimated that the trials ignored major judicial process of

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176) Seo Jong-cheol (age 79, Seoul, former vice-regiment commander of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment), Testimony recorded on September 10, 2002; Kim Jeong-mu (age 77, Seoul, former logistics officer of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment), Testimony recorded on September 25, 2002.

177) Jeon Bu-il (age 79, Gyeonggi-do, former 1st Battalion Commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment), Testimony recorded September 24, 2002.

178) Ministry of National Defense, *Reply for asking help about collecting data concerning Jeju 4·3 Incident* (Document No. Legal-33031-487, June 24, 2002).

179) Ko Yeong-jin (age 78, Jeju-si, former police officer), Testimony recorded on February 7, 2002.

180) Kim Byeong-gyu (age 75, Jocheon-eup, former police officer), Testimony recorded on February 30, 2002; Kim Du-sik (75, Jeju-si, former police officer), Testimony recorded on August 7, 2001.

court-martial stipulated in National Defense Law.

## ② Document Research

Documents, including lawsuit records related to court-martial trial, execution records, police documents, the National Assembly records, government records, newspaper reports and US materials were investigated.

Lawsuit-related records, such as indictment, statement of witnesses, investigation reports of preliminary trial, reporting of the trials and written judgment to prove the establishment of court-martial trials, were searched for but those documents weren't found. The Inquiry to the National Defense Ministry of the existence of related lawsuit records revealed that "They are not found in the military"; "The reason of nonexistence was not confirmed."<sup>181)</sup> Government Archives and Records Service also gave the answer "Jeju 4 · 3 Incident-related written judgment of General Court-Martial has not been filed."<sup>182)</sup>

The 'Inmate ID cards' contains all the execution records, including each inmate's written judgment. Therefore the Commission of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident searched for the 'Inmate ID cards of Masan Prison' of people who would be subject to court-martial, which are kept in the Government Archives and Records Service. The inmate ID cards of Ko U-gyeong, Ko Dae-song, Moon Ja-eon, Yang S-iu and Jin Dal-geun confirmed (18 December 1975) that, "this prison doesn't keep copies of written judgments". In general, all inmates' execution records should be kept as a set and transferred to another prison when the prisoner is transferred. Therefore, the fact that the written judgments weren't stored in Masan Prison tells us that the written judgment had not been attached since execution of the sentence.

Among the execution records, the '1948-1949 list of left-wing elements released from Mokpo Prison' contains Jeju inmates involved in court-martial trials. The 'summary of crime' section in this 'list' stated that the detailed

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181) Ministry of National Defense, *Reply for Asking Help about Collecting Data concerning Jeju 4 · 3 Incident* (Document No. Legal-33031-655, September 11, 2002).

182) National Archives of Korea, *Reply for inquiry of General Court-Martial Trial records* (Document No. Administrative-12307-3987, December 26, 2002).

criminal facts of general prisoners were based on written judgments. However, the sections of all Jeju inmates under court-martial were empty. There is no choice but to conclude that the written judgment was not drawn up during trial.

Further evidence of non-existence of the court-martial judgments is the case of Kim Chun-bae, inmate of Mapo Prison. As one of the subjects of the 1948 Court-Martial, he was put in Mapo prison in December 1948 without trial. He received notification of his 20-year sentence while in prison and was released during the Korean War in 1950, but he was again put in prison in 1962 after being arrested by soldiers to serve the remaining prison term.<sup>183)</sup>

Thereupon, his family filed an objection through ordinary court-martial to the Army Headquarters and the court-martial revoked the execution for the following reason:

“In case original court records are destroyed by calamity suddenly caused by nature and its certified copy or abstract can't be attached to an order-sheet of execution, the execution should be carried out with other evidential matter to make clear specifically the kind and scope of sentence. Despite this, evidential matter to clarify the contents of the crime is not attached to the dossier and the order sheet of execution, therefore the prosecutor's execution disposition for the remaining prison term is unfair.”

Looking at the police documents related to court-martial, there is no evidence of the military holding a preliminary hearing for court-martial and it seems that the court-martial trial wasn't normally held. When the Special Crime Investigation Unit of Jeju Police Bureau sent 1,021 prisoners and defectors to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment from 6 June 1949 to 3 August 1949, it wrote a confidential document, 'Report on inmates' which classified the subjects of the court-martial into the ranks of A, B, C, D. The confidential document that the chief of Moseulpo Police Station sent to the commissioner of Jeju Police Bureau on 5 June 1949, said, “A means death penalty, B means life im-

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183) Kim Chun-bae (age 76, Seoul, former business man), Testimony recorded on August 25, 2001.

prisonment.“ Considering that the dispatching date coincided with the alleged date of the ‘1949 Court-Martial’, it is estimated that the military in advance drew up the content of the ruling and judgments reflecting the police’s opinion without investigating or holding a preliminary hearing.

As for the two-time court-martial trials in Jeju, the South Korean Government and National Assembly didn’t mention them at all and domestic newspapers didn’t write related articles about them, either. When looking at documents such as ‘The Stenographic Records of the National Assembly’, ‘Proceedings of the Assembly’ and ‘File of Presidential Approval’, there were some discussions over the Jeju 4·3 Incident but there were no contents about court-martial. Domestic newspapers have reported about related articles about civilian trials and general court-martial trials, but articles about court-martial trials for Jeju people have not been found. In the case of the Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion, the National Defense Ministry officially announced the enforcement of court-martial and Kim Jang-ryeol and 63 members of the National Assembly submitted an urgent motion to the National Assembly regarding innocent people receiving undeserved rulings in court-martial trials. A proposal was therefore made to the president to request retrials or some other arrangements,<sup>184)</sup> as was reported in newspapers in detail.

In the court-martial trials for civilians, a total of 2,530 were sentenced as guilty, 384 were sentenced to the death penalty and 305 to life imprisonment. It was unparalleled in that so many civilians were arranged in court-martial trials due to a single case. However, neither the National Assembly nor government discussed it. Newspapers also did not report about it at all. So, these omissions raised doubts regarding whether the 2nd Regiment and the Jeju Martial Law Headquarters – as supervisors of court-martial trials - actually held trials or just held perfunctory trials, ignoring legal proceedings.

It is written that the 1948 Court-Martial declared 871 people guilty over 12 trials and the 1949 Court-Martial declared 1,659 guilty over 10 trials, but it is questionable as to how the court-martial could finish trial procedures for

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184) *Seoul Shinmun*, April 22, 1949.

over 100 or 200 defendants who all claimed innocence and sentence them as guilty in a day. Particularly, 200 were sentenced to death on 28 June 1949, 132 on 29 June, 13 on 30 June and 238 were sentenced to life imprisonment on 1 July 1949. It is also questionable to impose such a severe sentence as the death penalty and life imprisonment in all cases in a one-day trial that should guarantee defendants the right to attack the allegations and defend themselves, and answer, prove and disprove the facts as charged.

Against this backdrop, it is necessary to take note of the date of the court-martial trial. It is recorded that the 1948 Court-Martial held 12 trials from 3 December to 27 December 1948 and the 1949 Court-Martial held 10 trials from 23 June to 7 July 1949. Considering that the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment started to withdraw from Jeju on 29 December 1948 and 7 July 1949 respectively, the two court-martial cases seem to have been set up to deal with the remaining civilians who had escaped from summary conviction ahead of the withdrawal of the anti-guerrilla forces. So, the two court-martial trials were roughly handled, sentencing hundreds of people without investigation of preliminary hearing, court hearing, and discussion of sentence or written judgment. These are specific examples to show that the trials didn't follow procedures of the National Defense Law.

The 1949 Court-Martial sentenced 1,659 civilians as guilty over a short time of 10 days without holding trials to check whether or not the person was guilty of the crime, and imposed sentences much tougher than the 1948 Court-Martial, which is questionable. For those civilians, Article 32 and 33 of the National Defense Law 'Crime of aiding the enemy and communicating with the enemy and the crime of espionage' were applied to them but it is doubtful whether this law was uniformly applied to mountain residents who just came from the mountain after sheltering there.

The execution of people who were sentenced to death by two court-martials were carried out 'behind closed doors' and also their bodies were buried in secret, which raises suspicions about the legitimacy of the trial. According to US data, the 1949 Court-Martial executed 249 death-row inmates with "presidential approval"<sup>185)</sup> but there is no relevant document in the 'File of Presidential

Approval' that is stored in the Government Archives and Records Service. Article 66 of the National Founding Constitution of 1948 states "The President's deed on state affairs should be documented and all documents should have countersignatures of the Prime Minister and relevant Cabinet Members. The same holds true for the military", but the documents in accordance with that provision cannot be found, which leads to suspicion around the court-martial trial and the execution of the sentence.

Up to now, no records have been found of lawsuits, such as written judgments, protocol of trials and investigation papers of preliminary trials, to prove that the 1948 and 1949 Court-Martial trials in Jeju followed normal legal proceedings. Particularly, it is noteworthy that in the Army Headquarters' Ordinary Court-Martial trial (20 August 1963) of Kim Chun-bae, there was no revocation of remaining execution for the reason of nonexistence of documents of court-martial trial. In addition, testimonies from soldiers, the police and victims showed that there wasn't a trial or, if any, it was just perfunctory to notify of the prison sentence. All the documents that prove the judgment should be preserved for permanent reference, but these weren't written from the start. Furthermore, hundreds of people were handled per day without any hearing and 345 were sentenced to death in just three days with no press coverage. All this evidence suggests that trials didn't follow legal procedures. In conclusion, the court-martial for the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident was not a trial that followed legal proceedings.

#### 4) Outbreak of the Korean War and the Execution of Prison Inmates

##### ① Transfer of Prison Inmates

The people sentenced to prison for the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident were separately put in prisons across the country by ordinary trial and court-martial. Inmates of ordinary trials were mostly put in Mokpo and Gwangju Prison and subjects of court-martial were sent to Seodaemun Prison, Mapo Prison, Daejeon Prison,

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185) KMAG, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 192, October 6, 1949.

Daegu Prison, Mokpo Prison, Incheon Prison and Jeonju Prison. Inmates in Mapo, Daejeon and Incheon Prison were rarely transferred, but inmates in other prisons were transferred according to circumstances in prison and other reasons.

Among the prisoners who were put in Mokpo Prison under the 1948 Court-Martial, 24 sentenced to life were transferred to Daegu Prison on 4 March 1949.<sup>186)</sup> Another 202 with 15-year sentences were transferred to Daegu Prison soon after being imprisoned in Mokpo Prison.<sup>187)</sup> Some prisoners with 10-year and five-year terms were transferred to Gimcheon Prison and again moved to Bucheon Prison on 28 April 1950.<sup>188)</sup> Some were transferred to Jinju Prison from Mokpo Prison.<sup>189)</sup> About 10 from Daegu Prison were transferred to Busan Prison over two days: 14 and 17 January 1950.<sup>190)</sup> Some inmates in Jeonju were transferred to Andong Prison in April of 1949 due to limited space.<sup>191)</sup>

Most of the 300 inmates imprisoned in Daegu Prison under the 1949 Court-Martial were transferred to Busan Prison on 17 and 20 January of 1950.<sup>192)</sup> On 3 October after the outbreak of war, 150 were moved to Masan Prison again.<sup>193)</sup> Of about 200 female inmates in Jeonju Prison, most were transferred

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186) *1949 Inmate List of Daegu Prison* (housed at the National Archives of Korea).

187) It is written in the '*1948 and 1949 inmate List of Daegu Prison*' (housed at the National Archives of Korea) that they were in Daegu Prison.

188) Based on the postcard that Ko Du-jeong from Iho-ri, Jeju sent to his father, Ko Byeong-ho, May 22, 1950 (Jeju 4 · 3 Research Institute, '*Jeju 4 · 3 and history*', First issue, p.234) ; based on the postcard that Ko Gyeong-ok from Donam-ri, Jeju-eup sent to his wife Kang Deok-hwa, June 18, 1950 (the above mentioned book, p.250).

189) Hyeon Gwi-chan (other name: Hyeon Seong-chan) from Hwabuk-ri, Jeju-eup sent postcards in Mokpo Prison and later in Jinju Prison. (4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *Jeju 4 · 3 Incident Speaks*, Vol. 4, p.102). Kim Byeong-ro from Odeung-ri, Jeju-eup was sent to Jinju Prison from Mokpo Prison (*The 4<sup>th</sup> National Assembly Investigation Report on Massacres of Citizens*, report from Ohdeung-dong, Jeju-si, 1960).

190) The list confirmed by execution records is as follows: Ahn Du-seon, Park Jung-don, Lee Won-hwa, Shin Jae-un, Kim Sam-hyeon, Kim Chi-ok, Hyeon Myeong-hwa, Hyeon Bo-ha, Park Mun-ok, Lee Yeo-bae, Lee Il-man (housed at the National Archives of Korea, *Register of prisoners serving life of Daegu Prison; Inmate List of Daegu Prison; Inmate List of Busan Prison*).

191) The above testimonies of Kang Jeong-sun and Song Sun-hui.

192) *Inmate List of Daegu Prison; Inmate List of Busan Prison* (housed at the National Archives of Korea).

to Seodaemun Prison after one month of imprisonment.<sup>194)</sup>

Most prisoners sentenced by ordinary trial were imprisoned in Mokpo and Gwangju Prison and rarely transferred to other prisons. After 25 June 1950, no one came back from the two prisons. The only exceptions were Yang Gyuseok and Ko Yun-seop, who were transferred to Daegu Prison from Gwangju and again transferred to Busan after the Korean War. In the midst of the war, they had a narrow escape from death and returned to their hometowns after serving out their sentences.

## ② Prisonbreak in Mokpo Prison

In Mokpo Prison, at 5 p.m. on 14 September 1949, about 400 inmates attacked the armory in the prison, armed with weapons they broke out of prison. According to the announcement of 15 September by Joint Headquarters of the Military and the Police, “Inmates were 1,421 at the time of the incident and 1,000 joined the riot, and after that 500 were suppressed on the spot by joint attack of the military and the police and 353 escaped.”<sup>195)</sup> Then domestic newspapers and documents sent by the US Embassy in Seoul to the US State Department said, “Most prisonbreakers are political prisoners imprisoned due to the 4 · 3 Incident.”<sup>196)</sup>

When the incident happened, two companies of army, local police and naval detachment carried out a joint operation to trace escapees.<sup>197)</sup> After suppressing the incident, the Ministry of Justice reported in a cabinet council, as of 19 September, three had given themselves up, 286 had been shot (228

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193) *Books of the List of Masan Prison Inmates* (housed at the National Archives of Korea). Books of the list of 134 inmates transferred to Masan Prison from Busan Prison are housed at the National Archives of Korea.

194) Lee Jae-ok, Lee Jeong-suk and Lee Jeong-saeng is confirmed in the ‘*Inmate List of Seodaemun Prison*’ (housed at the National Archives of Korea). Huh Du-heon, who survived from Jeonju Prison, witnessed in person the transfer scene. Huh Du-hyeon (age 72, Jeju-si, a student at the time), Testimony recorded on December 13, 2000.

195) *Hanseong Ilbo*, September 17, 1949.

196) *Kyungghyang Shinmun*, September 6, 1949; Intelligence Summary, No. 2573, September 25, 1949, GHQ, Far East Command, RG 6 : Records of General Headquarters, Far East Command, reel 657, MacArthur Memorial Library, U.S.A.

197) Joint Weekly Summary, No. 14, September 9-16, 1949.

escaped out of prison, 59 escaped from their cells but couldn't escape the building), 85 were arrested and 37 were not arrested. Six prison officers were killed and five were seriously injured.<sup>198)</sup>

Minister of Justice Kwon Seung-ryeol pointed out the cause of the incident as follows:

“The first reason for the incident was bad treatment given to prisoners in Mokpo Prison. The prison then accepted 1,421, beyond its capacity of 600. For that reason, inmates slept sitting down instead of lying down. One cell even had as many as 30-40 inmates. Under these conditions they couldn't sleep and eat, and they seemed to choose to escape rather than to pass away without trying.”<sup>199)</sup>

The problem of overcrowded cells was not limited to Mokpo Prison. As of August 1949, about 24,000 inmates were put in 19 prisons across the country. A Seoul Shinmun reporter visited seven prisons, such as Daegu, Busan, Gwangju, Mokpo, Jeonju, Gunsan and Daejeon to cover them and he showed as a result that all prisons held 40-50% more inmates than their capacity and each cell had six-to-eight inmates on average. In the case of Daegu Prison, with a 1,500 capacity, it held 3,068 and used the hall, warehouse and working areas as cells.<sup>200)</sup> The US also said, “Mokpo Prison isn't the only overcrowded prison, and the incident shows that if there is no improvement in the prison environment, such a riot could happen again, which led me to think that political prisoners should be separately imprisoned.”<sup>201)</sup>

There were 600 or so Jeju inmates in Mokpo Prison.<sup>202)</sup> There's no accurate

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198) The 84 Minutes of State Council, September 20, 1949. The final count reported by Mokpo Police Station on September 20 is as follows: of 413 prison breakers, 85 were arrested, 298 were executed, 10 gave themselves up, 23 were not arrested and 10 weapons were recovered. (*Honam Shinmun*, September 24, 1949).

199) *National Assembly Stenographic Records*, the 5<sup>th</sup> National Assembly, No. 13, October 4, 1949.

200) *Seoul Shinmun*, August 7, 1949.

201) “Summary of Political Affairs of the Republic of Korea, September 1949,” Enclosure 1 to Despatch No. 621, dated October 7, 1949 from American Embassy to State Department, Seoul, Korea.

202) *National Assembly Stenographic Records*, the 5<sup>th</sup> National Assembly, No. 13, October 4, 1949.

data about how many people were victimized by involvement in the prisonbreak incident. When looking at ‘The List of Terminated Identification Cards of Mokpo Prison’ and ‘The List of Released Leftist Prisoners of Mokpo Prison’ currently kept in Government Archives and Records Service and Mokpo Prison, the total Jeju inmates released on the day of the incident were 51. It is estimated that they were victims involved in the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident who were killed after the prisonbreak.

### ③ Victims of Massacre Right after the Korean War

With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the government urgently conveyed ‘The Black List Crackdown and the Security of Prisons’ to each Police Department in the name of the Director of Public Safety by telephone message at 2:25 pm on 25 June.<sup>203)</sup> The government, however, retreated to the south without establishing security guard measures for prisoners in Seoul, Incheon and so forth. But on the way south, the inmates of prisons in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi and southward became targets of massacre.

At the outbreak of the Korean War, inmates numbered 37,335 across the country and among them, 20,229 were in Pyeongtaek and southward.<sup>204)</sup> Right after the Korean War, about 2,350 people involved in the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident were imprisoned, except 200 who received ordinary trials and the subjects of the two-time court-martial, who served out their sentences.<sup>205)</sup> About 2,500 people didn’t return to Jeju and went missing. The result of investigation of the disappeared in prison is as follows:

#### □ Seodaemun, Mapo and Incheon Prison

The prisoners of Seodaemun, Mapo and Incheon Prison were released and dispersed across the country as the North Korean Army took the prisons. Kim

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203) *April 3, Those Who Never Returned*, Jeju KBS Documentary film aired on March 30, 2000.

204) War History Compilation Committee of Armed Forces Information and Education Division of Ministry of National Defense, *Record of the First Year of the Korean War*, 1951 (quoted in *Jo Bongam and 1950s*, Vol. 2, Seo Jung-seok, Yeoksa-Bipyongsas, 1999).

205) Of the Subjects of the 1948 Court-Martial, 180 were sentenced to one year in prison: 90 in Mokpo Prison, 52 in Incheon Prison, 38 in Jeonju Prison.

Sang-nyeon, survivor from Mapo Prison was enlisted into the volunteer army by force and then taken to Gwangju Police Station and set free after the South Korean Army recaptured Seoul. Later he became a soldier to make his living.<sup>206)</sup> Jeong Gi-seong was in Mapo prison with his brother and after coming out of prison, his brother went for volunteer army and he went to Jeju after five years living in Mokpo. In Jeju, he was again put in prison and served 15 years.<sup>207)</sup>

In the case of Incheon Prison, 300 Jeju inmates were dispersed when employees escaped to Suwon on June 30. Most inmates went to Suwon and were again imprisoned under military orders. As the North Korean Army took Incheon on 3 July, employees again fled and the prison came under control of the North Korean Army and officers from North Korea were assigned to the prison. Remaining inmates were mostly incorporated into the volunteer army.<sup>208)</sup> Some inmates of Incheon Prison went to the north following the North Korean Army when the South Korean Army recaptured Seoul on September 28; some returned to Jeju and a considerable number of people went missing. Park Gyeong-ju was shot to death along with preliminary imprisoned subjects after being arrested by the police when he arrived in Jeju in the morning.<sup>209)</sup>

#### Daejeon Prison

In Daejeon Prison, 300 of the 1949 Court-Martial subjects were imprisoned. But none of them returned to Jeju after the Korean War. At the outbreak of the war, there were about 4,000 inmates, including political prisoners involved in the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident and Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion in Daejeon Prison.<sup>210)</sup> Without exception, they were executed in Golryeonggol, Nangwol-ri, Sannae-

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206) Kim Sang-nyeon (age 76, Seoul), Testimony recorded on March 26, 2002.

207) Jeong Gi-seong (age 79, Namwon-eup), Testimony recorded on December 14, 2000.

208) Jeong Paeng-jong (age 71, Namwon-eup), Testimony recorded on December 14, 2000; Park Dong-su (68, Jeju-si), Testimony recorded on December 15, 2000; and Lee Bo-yeon (age 72, Jeju-si), Testimony recorded on August 3 2001.

209) Lee Bo-yeon, Testimony.

210) Ministry of Justice, *History of Rehabilitation of Offenders in Korea*, 1987, p.515.

myeon, Daedeok-gun, Chungcheongnam-do (present-day Nangwol-dong, Dong-gu, Daejeon Metropolitan City) for three days in the first week of July. 18 photos of the shooting scene that the US National Archives and Records Administration revealed show the miserable truth. The pictures were taken by Major Abbott, liaison officer of the US Far East Command and the document attached to them had a report written by Lieutenant Colonel Bob Edwards, a military attaché of the US Embassy in Seoul. It said, “Without doubt, the top brass issued an order to shoot them down. It took three days to execute 1,800 political prisoners in Daejeon Prison, which happened in the first week of July 1950.”

The fact can be confirmed by testimonies of then prison officer Kim Hyeong-sik and Sannae-myeon residents, Lee Gyu-hui and Kim Jong-seok. Kim Hyeong-sik handed prisoners over to the military and witnessed the massacre scene on the spot, and Kim Jong-seok was taken to do forced labor along with other residents and dug the mass grave in person.<sup>211)</sup> There are related testimonies in the book ‘I was a captive in Korea’ (1953) written by Philip Dean, a British war correspondent of the ‘Observer’, London. The book contains accounts of the Daejeon massacre by French priest Kadar and Wanington of the ‘Daily Worker’, whom he met while he was a captive in North Korea. Priest Kadar said he witnessed that 1,700 inmates of Daejeon Prison were carried by truck and shot next to his church. After that execution by a firing squad, Wanington visited the scene where more than 7,000 men and women were buried in six large holes and the big one was as large as 200 yards. He said the massacre of inmates happened between 4-6 July.

It was confirmed that 300 inmates from Jeju were in Daejeon Prison before the Korean War,<sup>212)</sup> but after that they went missing. It is estimated that they

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211) Sim Gyu-sang, *Remember Nangwol-dong on July 8, 1950, Mal* (a monthly magazine), February Issue, 2002.

212) There are postcards that inmates of Daejeon Prison sent to their families before the war. A postcard from Moon In-gi from Ara-ri, Jeju-eup (April 3, 1950); A postcard from Yang Du-chang from Yeondong-ri, Jeju-eup (April 4, 1950) ; A postcard from Ko Byeong-su from Hamdeok-ri, Jocheon-myeon (June 1, 1950). The copies of the postcards were printed

would be buried in Golryeonggol, Nangwol-dong as mentioned earlier.

#### □ Daegu Prison

At the outbreak of the Korean War, about 4,000 inmates, including 200 involved in the Jeju 4·3 Incident, were in Daegu Prison. Out of them, 1,402 inmates involved in rebellion, murder, violation of National Security Law and National Defense Law were handed over to the military from 7 July to 30 July 1950. The 1950 Inmate List of Daegu Prison, stored in Daegu Prison, has a stamp of ‘delivery to the military and the police’ in the section for 1,402 inmates.<sup>213)</sup>

According to the results of the Special Committee on Massacres of Citizens, carried out from 2 – 6 June 1950, it was concluded that 1,402 inmates of Daegu Prison were ‘not accounted for after arriving at the prison’. The ‘Daegu Maeil Shinmun’ published their list and reported the shooting massacre as follows:

The list of 1,402 inmates delivered to the military and the police from Daegu Prison, as convicted or unconvicted prisoners, was revealed right after the Korean War. If the people, who prison officers delivered to the military and the police, were not alive, they had been shot dead on the outskirts of Daegu and the day of delivery would be the anniversary of their death. If all of them had been shot to death, they would have been executed without being properly sentenced.<sup>214)</sup>

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in the first Issue of *Jeju 4·3 and History*, Jeju 4·3 Research Institute.

213) When closely looking at this list, the stamp which reads ‘Delivery to Jinju’ was overlaid on the stamp which reads ‘delivery to the military and the police’. It seems that Daegu Prison stamped additionally to cover the fact of delivering the inmates to the military and the police. Kim Byeong-hun who was son of Kim Chang-su, victim of Daegu Prison, received an official document from Daegu Prison in 1999 written, “Kim Chang-su was sent to Jinju Prison on July 23, 1950”, but it was not true.

214) *Daegu Maeil Shinmun*, June 7, 1960.

Delivery Date for Date Court- Martial	1948 Court-Martial	1949 Court-Martial
July 9	Kim Yong-gyu, Kim Yong-sik, Park Bong-gyu, Jin Seong-bo	
July 27	Kang Gun-pyo, Kang Kwon-do, Kang Mun-gu, Kang Bo-yeo, Kang Sang-eon, Kang Su-man, Kang Yeong-gu, Kang Yeong-ok, Kang Wi-mun, Kang Wi-su, Kang Wi-chun, Kang Ik-man, Kang Jeong-su, Kang Chan-pyo, Kang Chang-ha, Kang Pyeong-ryong, Ko Myeong-sun, Ko Byeong-gu, KO Seon-jo, Ko Ye-bong, Ko Won-ahn, Ko Yun-ju, Ko In-pyeong, Ko Chang-un, Ko Tae-hong, Kim Yeo-heup, Kim Mun-su, Kim Sang-ho, Kim Seok-gu, Kim Seok-ryong, Kim Seung-man, Kim Yang-saeng, Kim Yeong-du, Kim Yeong-ok, Kim Yeong-chan, Kim Won-ha, Kim Eun-hu, Kim Eung-su, Kim Jae-jun, Kim Jae-ha, Kim Jung-yeon, Kim Chang-su(Ara), Kim Chi-gwan, Kim Tae-ho, Kim Paeng-sik, Kim Hae-bong, Kim Hui-gil, Moon Du-seung, Moon Byeong-hui, Moon Suk-hyeon, Moon Won-do, Moon Jae-eon, Moon Jung-hui, Moon Tae-bo, Moon Ha-ryong, Park Gi-yeong, Park Du-sin, Park Sang-u, Park Ji-ho, Park Chang-ju, Park Hong-gi, Byeon Gwang-hui, Bu Eon-jong, Seo Sang-chi, Seo Yong-eun, Son Seok-ju, Song Du-rim, Song Du-chang, Song Du-haeng, Song Byeong-mu, Yang Gun-sam, Yang Gun-seok, Yang Mun-hwa, Yang Sang-won, Yang Jeong-sam, Oh Yeong-gwon, Oh Yong-du, Oh Im-gil, Oh Jeong-gyu, Oh Tae-hae, Oh Hyeong-ryul, Oh Hyeon-gyun, Oh Hyeon-gun, Lee Gun-hyeong, Lee Geun-taek, Lee Deok-sin, Lee Man-heung, Lee Sang-hyeop, Lee Seok, Lee Si-chun, Lee Hong-bae, Lim Chan-gyun, Lim Tae-hun, Jeon Gi-nam, Jeon Gi-jip, Jeon Byeong-bu, Jeon In-bong, Jeon Jun-bu, Jin Hui-in, Han Sang-seop, Han Jin-saeng, Han Hong-beom, Huh Seung-ik, Huh In-cheol, Hong Won-pyo, Hong Chang-sik	Kang Bang-ok, Kim Byeong-gu Kim Sang-hwa, Kim Seong-sik Kim U-gyu, Kim Won-seok Kim Chan-ok Kim Chang-su (Jungmun) Song Gap-jeong, Song Du-seon Song Du-ha, Yang Geun-si Yang Nam-gi, Yang Bo-hyeon Yang Seok-bong, Yang Seok-jung Yang Chi-baek, Yang Tae-ho Oh Do-gyun, Oh Hyeong-man Han Tak-seop, Han Chi-hwa, Hyeon Deok-hong, Hyeon Sang-ho
July 28		
July 30		Ko Gi-won, Kim Chang-hui

Out of 1,402 listed people, there are 142 inmates involved in the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident. Of them, 116 were subject to the 1948 Court-Martial and 26 to the 1949 Court-Martial. The delivery was done over four days, on 9, 27, 28 and 30 July. The list is in the table above.

Out of 142 people, none were confirmed to survive after the date of delivery to the military and the police. And investigation confirmed that most of them were shot to death in Gachanggol, Gyeongsan, Gyeongbuk or a cobalt mine. Lee Boknyeong, who took part in the Special Committee on Massacres of Citizens in June 1960, testified that Gachanggol was filled with abandoned remains and numerous empty shell casings were scattered and thousands of skulls were buried underground when he went to Gachanggol for field investigation.<sup>215)</sup>

#### Busan Prison

300 Jeju inmates were put in Daegu Prison by 1949 Court-Martial and most of them were sent to Busan Prison on 17 and 20 January 1950. When looking at the ‘Daily Inmate List of Busan Prison’ and ‘Revised Statistical Table of Busan Prison’ stored in the Government Archives and Records Service, it is confirmed that about 2,000 prisoners from January to July 1950 increased to about 4,000 at the end of August and about 5,500 at the end of September. One cell with a size of 10-13 m<sup>2</sup> held as many as 42 inmates.<sup>216)</sup>

At the outbreak of the Korean War, inmates with more than three year sentences were convened in the grounds and moved by truck to be executed.<sup>217)</sup> Jeju inmates transferred from Daegu Prison were put into the second building of the prison, and except for the rooms of 28, 29 and 30, where Jeju inmates were imprisoned, all inmates of the other rooms were taken out of the prison.<sup>218)</sup> Based on the ‘Inmate List of Busan Prison’, there were 255 Jeju inmates, of

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215) *Kukmin Ilbo*, April 11, 2002.

216) Kang Sang-mun (age 73, Jeju-si), Testimony recorded on December 13, 2000.

217) Ko Seong-hwa from Jeju was imprisoned at Busan Prison at that time and he remembered that all of his cellmates with more than 3-year sentences were taken to be killed. (Ko Seong-hwa, *My Memorandum*, Hanul, 2001, p.153).

218) Kang Sang-mun, Testimony.

which 162 survived the war and their records remain, such as the dates of their transfer to Masan Prison and Jinju Prison, and their death in prison. But, the remarks columns of Ahn Du-seon, Park Mun-ok and Han Seung-taek had stamps of ‘delivery to the military police,’ while those of another 90 inmates had no content.

In ‘Statistical Reports of Inmates’, 231 involved in the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident were imprisoned under the National Defense Law as of the end of June 1950 and the number decreased to 119 at the end of July, with 112 missing. In the ‘Daily Inmate List of Busan Prison’ (1950) which recorded the number of inmates by date, the inmates under the National Defense Law decreased on 27 and 29 July 1950.

As a result of investigating 93 identified people in the above records, investigators found that no one survived. Therefore, about 110 Jeju inmates found in the records of Busan Prison are estimated to have been removed from prison and executed over 27 - 29 July 1950.

#### Other Prisons (Gwangju, Jeonju, Mokpo Prison)

At the outbreak of the Korean War, inmates involved in the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident were scattered around Gwangju, Jeonju, Mokpo, Jinju and Bucheon prisons, in addition to the already mentioned prisons. By a lack of data, it is unclear how many inmates were in each prison and how they were handled after the war. But, of those who were confirmed to be imprisoned in each prison, with the evidence of visitors, letters and testimonies, there were no survivors.

Inmates involved in the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident at Gwangju, Jeonju and Mokpo Prisons are estimated to have been dead right after the Korean War based on the following record:

Punish immediately the inmates of Gwangju, Jeonju and Mokpo Prison, officials of the Citizens’ Guidance Federation and other arrested people, after discussing with each region’s Chief of Police, Prison Warden and Chief Prosecutor. As for thieves and other petty criminals, parole them from prison or deal with them by the existing state of things. And for those who are detained at police stations, execute them like members of the Citizens’ Guidance Federation and other inmates.<sup>219)</sup>

This order was what Provost Marshal Song Yo-chan issued to the chief of Gwangju Provost Guard. In line with such an order, of the inmates in Honam area prisons, people involved in the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident presumably would be executed. In Jeonju Prison, inmates with more than a three-year sentence were shot dead and buried in a hole dug in the cemetery behind Jeonju Prison, from the night of 27 June to dawn of 28 June. In the case of Gwangju Prison, from 7-23 July 1950, the military and the police rushed the prison, carried inmates to a mountain by truck and shot them after making them line up in front of pre-dug holes. There were five execution places: Bulgaengi hill, Geukrak-myeon, Gwangsan-gu, Gwangju-si; Janggo peak, Jisa-myeon, Gwaangsan-gun; Dodeung hill, Seokgo-myeon; Hantot ridge, Daecheon-myeon; Milyang-dong hill, Hakdong 3-gu, Gwangju-si.<sup>220)</sup>

According to the testimony of Kang Wi-ok, who was released from Gwangju Prison on 23 June 1950, just before the Korean War, inmates with more than a three-year sentence were all killed. He also remembered that out of Gwangju prisoners, a person surnamed Hyeon from Euigwi-ri, Namwon-myeon survived after burial.<sup>221)</sup>

#### ④ Victims Who Died in Prison

There were several cases where Jeju 4 · 3 Incident inmates died of sickness due to the poor prison environment, and there are cases of unconvicted prisoners dying from the aftereffects of torture while waiting for trial.

Dysentery spread in Incheon Prison, which killed many prisoners. According to the testimonies of survivors from that prison, Yang Sang-won from Susan-ri, Aewol-myeon and Kang Bong-nam from Yeondong-ri, Jeju-eup died from the disease.<sup>222)</sup> Moon Dal-cheon was transferred to Incheon Juvenile Prison from

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219) *Chosun Inminpo*, September 5, 1950.

220) As for the truth of victimized inmates at prisons in the Honam regions, *Civilian Massacres through the Eyes of a War Correspondent* by Shin Gyeong-deuk, Sallimteo, 2002, pp.165-186 was used for reference.

221) Kang Wi-ok (age 86, Jeju-si, former member of a leftist organization), Testimony recorded December 15, 2001.

222) Park Dong-su, Testimony; Kim Jeong-sik (age 70, Jeju-si), Testimony recorded December

Gwangju Prison on 24 February 1949 and died in prison on 3 May 1949 while getting treatment for heart failure, from 5 March 1949.<sup>223)</sup> Kim Tae-gyeong (15 October 1949), Kim Yong-saeng (13 August 1949) and Kim Yun-bok (8 September 1949) are confirmed as dead in Mapo Prison through the ‘List of Inmate ID Cards of Mapo Prison’ and the ‘Inmate List of Mapo Prison’. (The figure in parenthesis is the date of death.)

In Daegu Prison, many people died from disease, with the following confirmed in the ‘Inmate List of Daegu Prison’, ‘Register of lifer in Daegu Prison’, ‘Register of Prisoners Serving Life in Daegu Prison’ and the ‘List of Inmate ID Cards of Daegu Prison’. (The words in parenthesis are the date of death, arranged in Korean alphabetical order.)

1949	1950
Kang Du-chil (22 August), Kang Yeon-su (October 21), Ko Byeong-hwa (1 June) Ko Hwa-chun (December 14), Kim Myeong-jip (13 August), Kim Bong-su (Apr. 5), Kim Seong-su (27 March), Kim Yeong-gyu (July 22), Kim Eui-hyeong (Date is unknown), Park Sang-hun (18 July), Bu O-gyeong (8 November), Bu Wang-saek (25 July), Oh Byeong-chun (13 August), Lee Cheol-su (27 June)	Kang Gi-u (10 May) Ko Seok-jin (May 1), Ko Wan-cheol (3 June), Kim Cha-hwan (March 4), Mun Chan-gu (22 March), Mun Cheol-hui (13 January), Byeon Gi-sang (April 4), Bu Sam-rim (3 April), Oh Jae-ho (April 14), Chae Hong-hun (3 June), Hyeon Ji-ok (July 15), Hyeon Tae-hun (28 January) ※ Byeon Gi-sam (7 May 1951)
Total 14	Total 13

Busan Prison was saturated as 500 or so inmates came by the end of September from the outbreak of war in 1950. About 40 inmates were in a cell that could hold four-to-five people, even in sultry summer, which showed that their physical conditions must have been critical. Jeju inmates died of illness in this prison, too. The dead confirmed in the ‘Inmate List of Busan Prison’ are as follows (The year of death is all 1950. The date of death is in parenthesis and they are arranged in Korean alphabetical order.):

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12, 2000.

223) *1949's Established Rule for General Affairs of Gwangju Prosecutors' Office* (housed at the National Archives of Korea).

Kang Gun-hyo (9 November), Kang Sam-ryong (1 October), Kang Sang-chu (2 November), Kang Yeong-ban (5 December), Ko Gyeong-ok (18 October), Ko Du-sik (7 November), Ko Hui-yeong (3 October), Kim Bong-su (27 October), Kim Seong-ik (13 May) Kim In-sik (29 October), Kim Chang-hui (29 August), Kim Hong-yeong (27 October), Boo Tae-jin (28 May), Yang Seong-jun (26 October), Yang Jip-jung (10 October), Oh Du-chan (9 October), Yoon Chi-man (6 November), Lee Gyeong-su (15 September), Hyeon Yang-hyu (19 July).  
Total 19

About 150 inmates of Busan Prison were transferred to Masan Prison and most of them died from malaria, tuberculosis and malnutrition. The list of 53 Jeju inmates who were ‘released from prison by death’ over the two years of 1951 and 1952 can be confirmed in the ‘List of Inmate ID Cards of Masan Prison’. The dates of their release from prison by death are as follows. (The words in parenthesis are date of death and it is arranged in Korean alphabetical order.)

1951	1952
Kang Gun-pyeong (25 February), Kang Dong-jin (5 August), Kang Jun-pyo (29 November), Kang Cheol-mun (9 October), Ko Sang-bin (9 February), Ko Sun-hak (18 December), Ko Jong-kwon (24 December), Kim Gi-taek (14 March), Kim Du-man (29 June), Kim Byeong-guk (21 March), Kim Bong-ok (26 August), Kim Sang-eon (21 March), Kim Seok-hun (26 March), Kim Tae-bu (27 January), Moon Gyu-eop (14 June), Park Gwan-sik (1 June), Park du-sam (4 October), Bu Seong-sik (14 November), Seo Su-nam (20 August), Seo Tae-yeong (27 June), Song Chang-dae (8 September), Shin Ho-geun (26 May), Yang Dong-hwan (9 August), Yang Bong-ok (11 March), Yang Sin-seok (9 March), Yang Won-gyu (8 April), Yang Chang-rim (18 February), Oh Neung-ju (4 June), Oh Mun-ok (29 March), Oh Seong-yong (3 October), Oh In-pyo (27 July), Oh Tae-wan (6 June), Lee Myo-saeng (25 December), Lee Yeong-du (27 May), Lim Tae-kwon (10 July), Jin Song-ha (10 July), Han Gi-seop (19 March), Han In-su (19 April), Han Jae-chu (21 September), Han Jeong-saeng (29 October), Hyeon Gyeong-ho (19 March), Hyeon Sang-seon (17 March), Hyeon Sang-seop (4 June), Hyeon Sang-yeon (7 June), Hyeon Sang-ho (25 July), Hyeon Chan-gu (23 June), Hong Sul-saeng (29 July), Hong I-pyo (8 May)	Kang Sang-bu (20 February) Ko Byeon-gil (8 March) Kim Seong-bang (25 April) Kim Seung-gyun (10 February) Lee Gap-saeng (21 March)
Total 48	Total 5

There were cases that, out of the unconvicted prisoners involved in the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident who were scheduled to go on trial in Gwangju Provincial Court, some died from aftereffects of torture in prison while awaiting trial in Gwangju Prison and Gwangju police station. Therefore, Gwangju Provincial Court decided to dismiss these cases. The following are the inmates who died in Gwangju Prison and Jeju Police Station based on the records of trial:

Kim Du-yun (The case was dismissed because of death in the prison of Jeju Police Station on 10 January 1949)

Yang Cheon-jong (The case was dismissed because of death in Gwangju Prison on 19 January 1950)

Kim Won-seon (The case was dismissed because of death in Gwangju Prison on 19 January 1950)

Kang U-song (died in Gwangju Prison on 9 January 1950)

Kim Bu-saeng (died in Gwangju Prison on 10 January 1950)

Oh Won-bo (died in Gwangju Prison on 22 January 1950)

### **C. Actual Conditions of Torture**

The young adults and middle aged men who hadn't joined the right-wing groups at the time of the 4 · 3 Incident were frequently taken and interrogated at military bases, police stations or the offices of right-wing organizations. Many innocent people had to go through severe torturing. No torturing of civilians by the police had happened and hadn't become an issue in Jeju society until 3 · 1 Independence Day that year. But after the 3 · 1 Independence Day incident, arrests, detainments, and interrogations of the leftist by police and the Seobuk Young Men's Association became usual daily affairs for the people of Jeju. Many young leftists on the island had to escape to Japan or the mainland to avoid arrests, detainments and interrogations in order to survive from the unfair torturing.

The police's suppression of leftist members of organizations intensified through the 1948 2 · 7 Incident. During that particular period, Kim Yong-cheol and Yang Eun-ha were tortured to death on April 3 at a police station and

their deaths directly became the main cause of the further armed uprisings by the people. The autopsies and sufficient witnesses pointed to, and proved, the cruel torturing by the police. Kim Yong-cheol was hung upside down and beaten to death, and Yan Eunha died from the shock and pain in his testicles which had been poked repetitively with sticks as part of his torture. The US Army Military Government in Korea tried to avoid any backlash from the involved as much as possible by forwarding the involved police officers to U.S Military Government Court under an imprisonment decision.

After the occurrence of the 4 · 3 Incident, the punitive force among the military and police arrested and interrogated villagers in the mid-mountainous area beforehand to crackdown on civilian involvement with the guerillas. Each interrogation involved severe torture. The torturing was a preliminary phase procedure to determine whether to pass the suspect for a summon decision process or to submit him for a criminal trial. With their enormous fear mongering and the overwhelming governmental authority's interrogations, people helplessly agreed to the forced and fabricated confessions and the untrue pre-filled interrogation papers. With such intensive torturing, people lost their will to defend themselves and felt physical helplessness with the associated psychological anxiety. Names with no relation to the case or the situation sometimes popped up *unconsciously*: *During the 4 · 3 Incident period, torturings were mainly delivered by police officers who had acquired skills of torturing from Japanese high detectives.*

The high level detectives were the advance guards from the Japanese colonial era and their inherent duty had had been to suppress and observe the same people. It was common knowledge that the high level Korean detectives during the Japanese colonial period were worse to their own people than the Japanese, and those officers frequently manipulated the cases and didn't hesitate to fabricate the background of the organizations of the Korean independence movement and any charges against the involved. These methods of torture were passed down to the front line police structure after Korean Independence and were utilized in handling criminal cases. During the 4 · 3 Incident period, the tortures and arrests were exercised on innocent people

without any charges, having communication channels with guerillas rather than for a suspect rather than filing out a protocol for a public trial. Many victims of the 4 · 3 Incident were sacrificed by the guerilla attacks, and the scorching tactics on various mid-mountainous areas were committed by the punitive force, including personal revenges by some members on many villages with massive killing. Those sacrifices of innocent people were committed with indiscreet summary decisions and without any proper interrogations or investigations by government.

The rest of the victims, those aside from the above mentioned, were mostly killed after being separated and interrogated by authorities of the military and police and only a few victims were submitted for trials through the investigations. Of course, a few were acquitted and released, but always after severe torturing. Article 3, of the Geneva Convention dated on August 12, 1949 in regards to ‘Civilian Protection during Wartime’ clearly states about the torturing on civilians by a nation as follows.

1. For the nations directly involved with any non international conflict of arms within its territory must, at least, comply with the following. The below actions are forbidden regardless of time or place.

- 1) Physical and life assault, including all types of murder, injuries, abuses and torture
- 2) Holding of hostages
- 3) Assault on human dignity with any degrading or insulting treatment
- 4) Any judgment, sentencing, or execution of judicial judgment by non granted legal practices. Such necessity of civilized citizens was formally agreed upon by the official and legal court system.

The 4 · 3 Incident, a non-international conflict of arms still forbids all and any type of murders, injuries, abuses and torture. Yet, no case was found, honoring the international convention if not completely, then partially at least. Torture is a clear violation of human rights and a despotism committed by national level authorities. Torturing is not only a personal matter but an immoral crime committed by a nation. With any evidence remaining in any type of torture, or victims from previously committed tortures, any democratic

nation's claim with human rights would stay as a blank echo. A fundamental skepticism would rise, regarding the purpose of a nation with any unresolved legacies of tortures remaining within its structure, and if a country is truly needed to protect its own people.

Many victims were found from the tortures committed by its own national level authorities during the 4 · 3 Incident. The Victims' Declaration of the 4 · 3 Incident shows enough damage and evidence from the tortures. 40 victims out of 142 reported survivors still report having constant pain from the after effects of their experiences. The investigation report by the Testimony Research Committee shows clear testimony of damages caused by the tortures. These cases of torture reveal clear evidence of both physical and mental pain for the victims who suffered these tortures.

The cases have been separated by the type and nature of the torture along with the victim's voices in the testimonies. By reprinting declarations of the survivors, the true conditions and ongoing suffering and remaining disabilities of the victims will be delivered, and will also become a textbook, illustrating how the human right violence and violations were committed in the past.

## 1) Types of Torture

### ① Procedures for Summary Convictions

Torturing, in real terms, during the 4 · 3 Incident period meant the summon decision process for detainees to confess and confirm his or her charged suspicions being true by the suppression. Every detainee, by illegal proceeding or mis-arrest by the military, police intelligence or any investigator, frequently were judged as criminal and faced death penalties after dealing with an unspeakable amount of torture.

- The Case of Kang Do-hwa's mother -in-law and brother-in-law
  - Detained and tortured mother and sister for communicating with the son, hiding out in the mountain

My mother-in-law and brother-in-law were beaten severely, and their bleedings went on like a water stream from the beatings all over their bodies. Even today, I still can't get it out of my memory. I, the daughter-in-law couldn't even help her with her bleedings because of my fear. The people around us were inhuman and they were nothing but mad dogs. My mother-in-law and brother-in-law were taken to Yeolli (Jungmun-myeon Yere-ri) and were killed on the same day which was the third day since their arrests. My brother-in-law was 24 years old and my mother-in-law was 54. They were innocent and they were killed for no reason. Even today, I still feel it was unfair.<sup>224)</sup>

○ The Case of Song Ja-eun (Testimony by Song Hui-eun)

- Early November 1948 at Sinsan Police Police Box, a young man from Onpyung-ri was arrested and was tortured to death

He was arrested at Sinsan Police Box initially, and was killed in Seongsanpo within 4-5 days. Two people were arrested and killed together. Both young men's bodies were handled together. The face condition of Song Ja-eun was unspeakably horrible. I couldn't tell if the face was cut with a knife, but my brother was killed with one shot in his chest. Seeing the body of Song Ja-eun, the amount of torture was obviously visible and evidential itself. I didn't know what he went through but the palms of the corpse showed the nailing evidence.<sup>225)</sup>

② Procedures for Trial Submission

The detainees during the 4·3 Incident were usually kept within the military base (elementary school facility), CIC interrogation office, police stations, Police Boxes and the Right Wing Youth Association office. The additional detainees through the special arrests from November - December in 1948, December Grand Arrest period and homecoming fugitives from the mountain area were kept within the temporary camps, consisting of tents at the Agriculture School, an alcohol extract factory and at sweet potato storages at various temples.

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224) Kang Do-hwa (age 80, Andeok-myeon, housewife at the time), Testimony recorded on July 11, 2002.

225) Song Jae-eun (age 70, Seongsan-eup, a student at the time), Testimony recorded on March 20, 2002.

For some detainees who successfully avoided the summary decision, they were submitted for trials. However, fabrications on individual statements and evidence by the police with torturing were committed during the report filing processes. All testimonies of those survivors indicate that the acknowledgements to the false facts were made under the pressure of torture. Despite the confession of false facts under the pressure of torture regarding the 4 · 3 Incident trials, there hasn't been a case showing a reduction in commutation or being acquitted and released free.

Tortures at a Police Station

The Case of Park Dong-u

- Dismissal case at Supreme Court despite the statement of the confession was made under the pressure of torture

I was tortured by the detectives. The authorities, six detectives, tortured me in turns with an electric torture and an airplane torture called Kim Il-seong for 5 sleepless days and nights which made me sick to eat anything. The statement was plotted despite my denials. I was examined by detective Kim Chung-yong as a witness before the defendant, but the report was deliberately omitted with my first trial. I hired attorney Kim Tae-jun to request the following. I argued to dismiss the submitted report and requested new witnesses, but no witness who could back me up was ever questioned. A prosecutor troubled himself coming down to the detective's office and interrogated me. I didn't answer him but kept denying any wrongdoing. He went back after hearing me two to four days. Five to six detectives showed up the same night and tortured me with electricity and water simultaneously to write out a confession. I told the officers that I was too sleepy to write, but they had me wash my face, forcing me to copy down an interrogation report. I had no choice under the pressure. Afterward, I was interrogated, surrounded by the detectives and the presence of the deputy prosecutor Jin. With the fear and torturing over 5 sleepless day and night, I still can't remember what I said at all. I denied my charges at the prosecutor's interrogation after my transfer. However the secretary of the public prosecutor insisted that he as a police officer saw me at the attack site of Hallim and started to yell at me full of hostility. I lost consciousness continuing the insistent interrogation.<sup>226)</sup>

○ The Case of Ko Yun-seob

- Case No 1 (Judged guilty based on a false confession by torture during imprisonment)

I was hiding out in a cave in Daena Oreum (parasitic volcano) for fifteen days. But I was among the captured and arrested by the armed military shortly after I heard the rumor that it was safe to return home. At first, I was detained at the Ildori Public Hall after passing the identity inspection with no fault by the military police, but then was taken to the inspection department the next day. A secret agent who was not in favor of my older brother had reported me from his personal bitter feeling. I was tortured over ten days even after other people were released. The repeating tortures on the gunshot wounds made my condition much worse. I wasn't aware of what was going on at that time. I was detained about 1 year at Jeju Police Station Satellite Station No 1. I was sentenced to a 7 year jail term in February, 1950 at Gwangju district court. I was transferred to Daegu Prison after filing an appeal at Daegu High Court. I was transferred to Busan Prison after the Korean War broke out and once again transferred to Daegu after the Recapture of Seoul. I was released in June 1956 at Jinju Prison after serving the full period of punishments. I gave up appealing due to the ongoing war.<sup>227)</sup>

○ The Case of Yang Gyu-seok

- Case No 2 (Judged guilty based on a false confession by tortures during the imprisonment)

I was detained about a month at Seogwipo Police Station before I was transferred to the Jeju Police Station. I was forced to give a confession again at the Jeju Police Station, and I only told the police the truth again. My truth wasn't respected anyway. Anyone irritating the inspectors in any way was brought into the police station and beaten. I had stayed at the Jeju Police Station around one month then was transferred to Gwangju court. At Andeok Police Box, I was beaten like a dog with a club. My body turned black from the bruises. I also experienced a type of torture, involving a piece of firewood placed between my legs, and the electric torture at Seogwipo Police Station. With the electric torture, I felt as if my internal organs were set on fire after

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226) Supreme Court, Sentence, Criminal Trial No. 326, November 29, 1955.

227) Ko Yun-seob (age 75, Jeju-si, a farmer at the time), Testimony recorded on June 29, 2001.

the button, which was connected to the electrical rings, was pressed. And a separate room was used for the water torture. The police put people's faces into the big container filled with water.<sup>228)</sup>

○ The Case of Kang Seo-su

- Long term prisoner for a pending trial detained and tortured

As soon as I returned from the Bukchon-ri cave hideout, I was arrested. I was handcuffed, hung upside down and was being stepped on. The water mixed with chili pepper powder was poured on me in the upside down position. The torturing almost killed me. After I was transferred to Jeju Police Station jail, I was ordered to come out. I sat kneeling on the harpoons and the police continued stepping on me. After the torture, they kicked me back into the cell. The few hour processes went on for between 3 to 4 months. At the Jeju Police Station, I was asked whether I was married or had children before the beginning of the beatings. I also experienced the raccoon torture and airplane torture.<sup>229)</sup>

○ The Case of Ko Man-hyeong

- Case No. 1(Signed the fabricated false report as a result of torturing)

I was detained at Seogwipo Police Station and went through severe beatings and the water torture. I wasn't aware of what was going on around me. I was able to figure out that my report had been filled out by the police in the way the police wanted anyway, saying that I had received a lot of help from the communists. More water torturing incidents were committed in Seogwipo. I was tied and forced to drink the provided water and then was beaten heavily with a rubber stick. The beating with a metal wired club was one of the worst for human skin and flesh. I was transferred to Jeju Police Station and still experienced the constant beatings, but I was never allowed to sleep. Many deaths occurred at Jeju Police Station, including the death of a person whose last name was Song from Hahyo. At the time, the police evaluated each case and passed it onto General Court-Martial. The police passed cases with their newer reports without even questioning what was committed and the prison term, etc. At Jeju Police

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228) Yang Gyu-seok (age 79, Andeok-myeon, a farmer at the time), Testimony recorded on December 15, 2000.

229) Kang Seo-su (age 77, Jocheon-eup, a farmer at the time), Testimony recorded on December 13, 2000.

Station, I wasn't allowed to sleep or be fed, but continued with interrogations, beatings and the water torture. Whenever I tried to sleep, I was beaten with a metal wired club. My fingers lost their original shape from the torturing at the Jeju Police Station. I didn't have anything to hide. The police forced me to sign the accusations, agreeing with my charges and crime that I didn't even commit.<sup>230)</sup>

○ The Case of Kang Jo-haeng

- Case No 2 (Signed the fabricated false report a result of torturing)

Fifty villagers from Goseong-ri were detained at Jeju Police Station. I located myself farthest inside the jail cell as soon as I got out of the car. The people standing near the entrance were beaten by the enormous foot traffic. Each investigator beat someone five times with a club then another investigator took his or her turn. One of the usual common questions of the daily interrogation included the unfair accusation of attacking the Shineom Police Police Box, arsons and murders. I was forced to confess about the attack. I had nothing to say because I didn't commit any of terms on the accusation and I simply couldn't tell what was going on around me. I was beaten severely and went through the electric torture. I merely remembered seeing my fingers being wrapped around with the electric wires and lost consciousness afterward, till the villagers told me that I must have risen from the death after my release. The villagers told me the US investigator who entered into my electric torturing site must have helped me to survive, but I couldn't remember it at all. I had fainted. The interrogation continued for 15 days. Afterward, I was forced to sign a document which had been prepared previously by the investigators. By signing the paper, I immediately became one of the involved suspects for the attack of the Shinum Police Police Box. I learned my lesson through the process, held my will and never gave in again with later interrogations by a prosecutor. I insisted that I only obeyed the police and his order to sign. The prosecutor reported as I said.<sup>231)</sup>

○ The Case of Kim Ok-nyeo

- Case No 3 (Signed the fabricated false report as a result of torture)

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230) Ko Man-hyeong (age 72, Seogwipo-si, a farmer at the time), Testimony recorded on December 20, 2000.

231) Kang Jo-haeng (age 78, who was imprisoned at Gwangju Prison at the time), Testimony recorded on August 23, 2001.

I didn't think I could endure my trial. I thought I had to repeat myself from the interrogation. I wish I had known better for it would make my situation better and the charges lighter if I reported that my confession was made under torture. In a situation like that, I couldn't think that far and only went along with the interrogation. I only thought I can't lie base on the report. I agreed to "I did it all." I would have said "Yes, I killed that person." if they asked. I was foolish back then. I was heavily tortured, naked, and I just was not in the position to disagree or argue. With my mom's dedicated help and taking care of my condition with herb medicine, I, at last, was able to bear a child. The severe beating during my interrogation made my side waist bones to stick out. Both sacral areas still suffer from great pain.<sup>232)</sup>

○ The Case of Jang Dong-seok

- Didn't agree with the false accusations despite the police torture

I was placed in Jeju Police Station jail cell no 5. About thirty detainees were placed in that 6.6m<sup>2</sup> cell. Everybody sat with their knees pulled up. It was mid-June in 1948. It was hot, and I had to breathe with my mouth. My interrogation included beatings with sticks made from the electric poles at Gwakji-ri and the electric torture. About fifty experienced investigators from the Japanese colonial period were sent to Jeju from Seoul and they handled my interrogation for one week. I was hung and water was poured, my hands were tied with electrical cords for the electric torture and I was beaten heavily with sticks. I was healthy and had a strong figure. I don't think I would have survived through the beatings if I had been an ordinary man. My interrogation was conducted at a judo court and the place, during my interrogation, was filled by my bleedings and the smell of my blood. Wounded people were covered with straw bags. It was simply miserable. I answered in truth only and couldn't figure out what was going around me.

Because I was living in Jeju-eup, I wasn't aware of the road blockings at Gwakji-ri side and the street electric poles were pulled out and cut into smaller pieces. I was charged for the crime, and the level of pain from the torturing was unbearable. My whole body was infected and turned black by the blood infection. Two spots with serious infection developed an inflammation. I had surgery at the Red Cross Hospital (former Junggang Motel) to take care of the inflammation, and then I was subjected to more torture in the hospital bed.<sup>233)</sup>

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232) Kim Ok-nyeo (age 76, Jeju-si, a housewife at the time), Testimony recorded on June 11, 2002.

## □ Tortures at Detention Center (the Agricultural School and the Alcohol Extract Factory)

Non-trial court martial esque batch processes were applied on detainees at the agricultural school tents, alcohol extract factory, and the sweet potato storages of temples during late 1948, and from March to June in 1949. Without any legal trials, the detainees who confessed during torture to fabricated reports were held as criminals. The interrogations at the temporary provisional camps were handled directly by military intelligence investigators. The police produced a ‘Prisoner Status Report’ based on the results of the interrogations. A separate inspection office was set up for the detainees who came down from the mountains at Jeju-eup Alcohol Extract Factory and the sweet potato storages of the temples. The police officer who was in charge of the interrogations at the alcohol extract factory was also the chief of the special investigation team and testified: “The investigators from Jeju tried to avoid torturing assignments involving people from their hometowns. But the investigators from the mainland were remorseless. Some officers hung women naked while they tortured them.”<sup>234)</sup> The police tortured detainees in many ways to produce fabricated reports of civilian association with the guerillas and then passed them on to the military.

## ○ The Case of Kang Sang-mun

I fainted a few times during my interrogation. The interrogations were little more than random beatings based on the investigator’s mood since the reports got written up the way he or she wanted anyway. The police interrogated and reported the way they wanted while under the military’s surveillance. Even today, I don’t believe the punishments were given fairly. There were no clear guidelines for separating between the guerillas in the mountains and the ignorant farmers. I suspect the interrogations were mainly done to meet quotas.<sup>235)</sup>

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233) Jang Dong-seok (age 73, Jeju-si, a middle school student at the time), Testimony on September 21, 2001.

234) Kim Byeong-taek (age 77, Jeju-si, a policeman at the time), Testimony recorded on February 8, 2002.

235) Kang Sang-mun (age 73, Jeju-si, who hid in the mountain at the time), Testimony recorded

### ○ The Case of Kang Sun-ju

The detained villagers at the agricultural school reported to me when they couldn't handle the torturing. Later, during my interrogation at Dongcheok Company, the investigators looked as if they were following orders from their god of the underworld to fetch people. I insisted my innocence for what I wasn't engaged in. Then the investigator accused me of lying. When I said "Why should I lie when I'm innocent?", the investigator hung me over the table, only to torture me by pulling out the table. I was hung in the air and then followed electrocution. Even with the harsh electrical torturing, I couldn't confess to any of their accusations because I didn't do anything. I told them to kill me instead because I wouldn't confess to any accusations.<sup>236)</sup>

### ○ The Case of Kim Chun-bae

I was arrested around October 1948. It was a very scary time. Police set up tens of tents to keep detainees in custody. I witnessed many deaths caused by the torturing. Once people were returned back to the tent after such horrible interrogations, the victims hardly were able to get up and move around, and many people ended up dying. All detainees, including myself suspected the examining officials were drunk all the time because they just appeared abnormal. The investigators smelled like alcohol and it seemed that Captain Tak was in charge. The investigators questioned me about giving out fliers. I had my share of torturing, and I wasn't able to get up for two days. I thought I was dying. I decided I had to lie and admitted during the torturing that I had joined the Joseon Democratic Youth League.<sup>237)</sup>

### ○ The Case of Yang Gong-ok

(At Jeju Police Station) I suffered severely from the electric torture. My waist is still suffering from the after effects and I am still under rehabilitation therapy. I was tied up and was beaten with cables. In such torturing, wires were wound

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on December 13, 2000.

236) Kang Sun-ju (age 70, Pyoseon-myeon, who hid in the mountain at the time), Testimony recorded on May 29, 2002.

237) Kim Chun-bae (age 76, Seoul, who was engaged in business at the time), Testimony recorded on August 25, 2001.

around my body and then electric current was applied, paralyzing all nerves and internal organs of my body. About one hour of interrogation was enough to exhaust anyone. I wasn't able to move. While some people managed to put up with the unbearable torturing, others couldn't survive the unfair beatings. Some people were beaten to death, insisting his or her innocence. I was accused of lying, and was told that lying would cost my life. I ended up confessing falsely, to the investigator's satisfaction, in order to survive.<sup>238)</sup>

### ③ Arrestment Procedures for Those Under Suspicion

#### Interrogations to Arrest Fugitives

- The Case of Kim Gye-sang (Younger brother Kim Gap-gil's testimony)
  - Interrogated to locate her younger brother who was believed to have escaped to Japan

My sister (Kim Gye-sang) pleaded innocent despite her flesh being cut out in sections. Her body was torn to pieces then she was taken to Jeongbang Water Fall where she was killed. I found pieces of her flesh that had been slashed out. When I saw it in person, I was speechless. I couldn't tell what had been used but her thigh and various parts of her body were cut out.<sup>239)</sup>

#### Interrogation to Gain Names of the Involved

- The Case of Yang Gyeong-su

After my return home, I decided to join the police force. At that time, I knew one of the high ranking officers in the Seogwipo Police Station and he encouraged me to join the force. I visited him immediately. As soon as I arrived at the station, the screams of those being tortured filled my ears and I couldn't bring myself to watch what they were doing. So I gave up my plan to join the force. I saw women forced to strip naked before being tortured. At that time, "Don't let your name be robbed!" was the phrase on everybody's lips. What it meant was that should you witness a person being dragged to the police station,

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238) Yang Gong-ok (age 72, Hallim-eup, a company worker at the time), Testimony recorded on June 12, 2002.

239) Kim Gap-gil (age 79, Jeju-si, a Buddhist at the time), Testimony recorded on April 23, 2002.

you shouldn't stay nearby otherwise he or she might remember you. There's nobody strong enough to handle the kind of torture these people suffered. When people are under such extreme torture, they will call out any name in their memory, which would label you as a rioter immediately.<sup>240)</sup>

#### ④ Means of Torturing

##### Various Means of Torturing

###### The Case of Kim Saeng-min

I was arrested around January 1948. I believe I was one of the victims who suffered the worst from torture. It's a miracle that I am still alive. I was tortured for seven days straight. Between my legs was a log, on each end of which sat two officers, who, as they tortured me, sat as if they were playing on a seesaw. My whole bone system was damaged when I was made to sit on the conch shell covered floor. After I was transferred to the Jocheon Police Police Box, they beat me with the nozzle of a hose: I was near death during the water torturing. The varieties of torture that they performed, to my memory, included aircraft flying, electrical torture, hot water torture and on and on. They never used the torture methods together but they never skipped a day. At the end, my skin became so swollen that it could be torn off easily if pulled.<sup>241)</sup>

##### Water Torture

###### The Case of Kim Bong-ik

I was jailed for 40 days at the police station. The torturing was really bad. I was hung upside down and water was poured into my nose. Although I was not engaged with the leftist activities, I had to confess falsely to escape from the pain even for a short moment. It was to avoid the pain.<sup>242)</sup>

###### The Case of Kim Gyu-baek

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240) The 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4 · 3 Incident Speaks*, Vol. 5, 1998, pp.158-159.

241) Kim Saeng-min (age 77, Jeju-si, a contact of the Jeju Chapter of the South Korea Labor Party at the time), Testimony recorded on July 13, 2001.

242) Kim Bong-ik (age 79, Seongsan-eup, a teacher at the time), Testimony recorded on March 19, 2002.

I was arrested three days after my return to Ora 3-gu. I was transferred to the Banjjum police squad at Chilseongtong. I was tortured with water at the squad. In my opinion, dying from a gunshot would have been better than the water torture. Water was poured into my nose. More than 100 detainees were beaten one after the other with bats. The investigators didn't even question detainees about what wrong doings they had been engaged previously.<sup>243)</sup>

#### Electrical Torture

##### The Case of Baek Chang-won's wife (Testimony from Kim Gye-sun)

There was Baek Chang-won, a leftist activist from Shinum. His wife gave a birth to a daughter, and he stayed in the mountains. Baek Chang-won was shot to death, and his wife was brought captured. Police interrogated her outrageously. They stripped her down and committed electrical torture almost every day. No one can be sure if any human being can survive two or three times of electrical torturing a day.<sup>244)</sup>

##### The Case of Shin Tae-ho

I was taken to Hamdeok by five to six soldiers. The electrical torture that night involved metal wire tied on the fingers, unlike modern electrical torturing which utilize the actual electric cords. Once the metal wire gets loose and turned, he or she helplessly falls down and will spin.<sup>245)</sup>

##### The Case of Shin Su-yong (Testimony from Shin Su-yong)

My older brother suffered the electric torture when he was arrested at 3 · 1 Independence Movement Day. The electrical torture utilized the military phone receiver model 228 which is different from the current phone system. After I was tied around with the electrical cords and spun, electricity rolled around my entire body.<sup>246)</sup>

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243) Kim Gyu-baek (age 76, Jeju-si, a member of the Self-Protective Society at the time), Testimony recorded on August 6, 2001.

244) Kim Gye-sun (age 70, Aewol-eup, a member of a right-wing organization at the time), Testimony recorded on August 22, 2001.

245) Shin Tae-ho (age 72, Jeju-si, who hid in the mountain at the time), Testimony recorded on October 17, 2001.

## ○ The Case of Kang Tae-jung

There were various types of tortures. I have suffered from many types of tortures myself. In Lunar Calendar New Years day in 1949, I was arrested, was sent to Hagwi Police Box and was ordered for an electrical torture. The investigators pulled out a phone line. The phone line of night phone lines was used on me. I figured it must be the electric torture that I had heard of previously. I asked to use the washroom prior to my torture. I wanted to be careful for I did not want to make a mistake. Electrical current floating in a body for one minute would sufficiently bring people down. Most people would bite on their tongue when they fall down. The investigators woke me up in about 5 minutes and repeated the same procedure again for five to six times.<sup>247)</sup>

## □ Assault

### ○ Testimony of Kim Chang-seok

I was arrested and sent to the Andeok Police Box. The police reserve was in charge of my interrogations. My teeth broke out from the beatings on my cheek. One of my back teeth fell out and bled badly. The people at that office used pine tree logs for the beatings. The platoon leader pulled one of the logs and bashed at me. My neck area was broken, the office was splashed with my blood and I, as a result, fainted out. I was put in the jail, but couldn't even move a finger or toe on my own. Even these days, I am not able to use this side leg and one arm. It was all right back then, but with a cerebral infarction, I have difficulties using my arms and legs, and I still often feel dizzy.<sup>248)</sup>

### ○ Testimony of Kim Gi-saeng

I was held tight by the policemen while I was getting beaten up with a larger size cable at Dongchuck Company during the torture. I was beaten all over my body. Some people were beaten near death.<sup>249)</sup>

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246) Shin Su-yong (age 69, Jeju-si, a student at the time), Testimony recorded on May 16, 2002.

247) Kang Tae-jung (age 70, Aewol-eup, a student at the time), Testimony recorded on May 16, 2002.

248) Kim Chang-seok (age 82, Andeok-myeon, a member of a right-wing organization at the time), Testimony recorded on July 10, 2002.

### ○ Testimony of Kim In-pyeong

I was arrested in the night of January 22, 1948 by police and was taken to the prosecutor's office. I was almost beaten to death. I was detained for ten days and my younger brother stayed fifteen days. I believe that I experienced every kind of existing torture around us. After the torture named Russian airplane, I was forced to answer if I had voluntarily joined the The South Korean Labor Party. I saw the membership application of the party for the first time, and I didn't even know the difference between the South Korean Labor Party and the North Korean Labor Party. I was beaten near death with pine tree fire wood based on the fake stamped application. I still have a deep resentment regarding my situation. I only was able to survive because my shoulder was broken first. Beatings with firewood caused a fracture in my bone and I suffered for a long time from it.<sup>250)</sup>

### ○ The Case of Yang Gwan-pyo (Testimony of Ko Gyeong-heup)

Yang Gwan-pyo didn't hide in a mountain, but the rest of the people ran away and escaped to Japan. However Yang Gwan-pyo was arrested by a special squadron formed by the Seobuk Young Men's Association. I was arrested at the same time. Every classroom in the elementary school was partitioned and divided for the interrogations, but I still could hear the other rooms. There were many suspects unable to move their body from the beatings. I saw the site myself and it still makes me weep. If I describe the scene a little bit, no human can do such harm to their own people. People's bones cracked and broke easily with the massive enormous club beatings by members of the Seobuk Young Men's Association. People breathed in such pain and anger. People couldn't even hold their arms out but slipped down instantly when they were dying from the beatings. All of Yang Gwan-pyo's bone structure was broken from the beatings with live tree clubs. Yang Gwan-pyo was killed by the tortures.<sup>251)</sup>

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249) Kim Gi-saeng (age 73, Jeju-si, a housewife at the time), Testimony recorded on April 2, 2002.

250) Kim In-pyeong (age 77, Jocheon-eup, a captain of a cargo ship at the time), Testimony recorded on October 11, 2001.

251) Ko Gyeong-heup (age 88, Hallim-eup, former government employee), Testimony recorded on December 14, 2001.

## □ Airplane Torture

### ○ The Case of Kang In-ok

I was taken to a temple sweet potato factory run by Han Jae-gil. I was accused of being the leader and hung upside down wearing only my underwear, from the ceiling for the torture named Stalin Airplane, totally different from the Kim Il-seong Airplane Torture. The severe beating caused heavy bleeding and I'm still under medical treatment. The frequent dizziness came from the bleeding, too. I was young and managed somehow with the beatings on legs or back but not on my head. I still suffer from the aftereffects.<sup>252)</sup>

## ⑤ Female Torture

### ○ The Case of Lee Chun-hyeong

I was arrested around January 1949 and taken to the police station and military police. At the police station, I was beaten with my hands tied behind my back and hung from the ceiling. After my transfer to the military police station, I was tortured with the electric cords on my chin or thumb.<sup>253)</sup>

### ○ The Case of Ko Nan-hyang's daughter-in-law

I was 42 years old. The police bullied me asking for my husband's where about and connected his vacancy with a riot occurrence. My husband had lived in Japan. The officer didn't want to listen to me but instead kept beating me. My daughter-in-law was scared to death and hid in a closet. The police placed my daughter-in-law on a table and put a long piece of log on her stomach. Two officers sat on each side of the log, torturing her for my son's where about. I protested and asked them to take me instead of for her. The investigators hit me on my face and still continued the torture. It was awful.<sup>254)</sup>

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252) Kang In-ok (age 86, Seongsan-eup, a head of the Minbodan in Siheung-ri at the time), Testimony recorded on March 28, 2002.

253) Oh Geum-suk, *Cases of Women's Rights Violation through the eyes of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident, Peace and Human Rights in East Asia*, Jeju 4 · 3 Research Institute, Yeoksa-Bipyongsu, 1999, p.239.

254) *Ibid.*, p.241.

### ○ The Case of Jwa Bong

May 30, 1948 Eungwon police squad ambushed 2-gu, Chungsu Hallim-eup. The police called the villagers ‘children of communists’, dragged down villagers to the elementary school yard and beat the innocent villagers heavily. “The punitive force hit villagers severely. Then, they ordered the villagers to be naked regardless their gender. I was matured 40 years old but had no choice but to follow the order. The punitive force kept beating the naked villagers with sticks. Sometime after, they were bored with the same process. They picked out a young man and a girl, forcing them to do the unspeakable act in public. They were inhuman. After the sundown, they dragged 4 villagers out and shot them to death”.<sup>255)</sup>

### ○ The Case of witness Kim Ho-gyeom

November 1948, I was on night duty at the police station. I couldn’t get to sleep with the ongoing screaming of a female nearby. I went down to the interrogation room and saw a naked woman hung upside down and being tortured. I expressed my anger with a Japanese sword, and the investigator ran away.<sup>256)</sup>

### ○ The Case of Jeong Sun-hui

After my second older brother went missing, my family was pointed as a ‘living rioters’ family’. My mother, sister and me were dragged down to the punitive force, and went through an unspeakable amount of torturing. The officers hung me naked upside down and kept pouring water mixed with chili pepper powder into my mouth and nose. If any officer saw me with my mouth closed, I was forced to open my mouth again with a metal stick between my teeth. In the end, all my teeth were broken.<sup>257)</sup>

### ○ The Case of Cha Gyeong-gu

I was detained and tortured in a tent nearby ‘Geuseunsaemi Oreum’ for fifteen days. I was forced to sit on my knees with a club between my back side legs,

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255) Ibid., p.242.

256) Ibid., p.243.

257) The 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4 · 3 Incident Speaks*, Vol. 5, Jeonyewon, 1998, p.194.

and the investigators continued stepping on the club. I still suffer to walk. I begged for a mercy for I was a pregnant back then. I ended up having a miscarriage.<sup>258)</sup>

○ The Testimony Case of Hong Gyeong-to

A large number of villagers from many villages were kept in the storage together, were suffering from the unspeakable beatings, and had to witness such unbearable scenes themselves. Usually a pair, a man and woman, was picked out together getting beaten up together and were forced to have sexual intercourse in public. Sometimes, the woman's private parts were burned as a method of torture. People had great difficulties sleeping at night from the rotten smell. I didn't think the investigators were human beings with a human soul.<sup>259)</sup>

○ The Testimony Case of Ko Seong-jung

Near Seongsanpo Alcohol Extract Factory, the area was filled with screaming sounds from many women. After such enormous rapes, the members of the Seobuk Young Men's Association stuck sweet potatoes into women's private parts, giggling.<sup>260)</sup>

○ The Case of Han Gyeong-ja (wife of Kim Min-hak)

The Seobuk Young Men's Association took her in and tortured her breast with fire.<sup>261)</sup>

○ The Case of Lee Sam-yong's wife (Testimony of Lee Sam-yong)

Around the same time of my arrest in February 1948, my wife was taken into the police, suffered the torture and gave birth to a stillborn.<sup>262)</sup>

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258) Oh Geum-suk, *Cases of Women's Rights Violation through the eyes of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident, Peace and Human Rights in East Asia*, Jeju 4 · 3 Research Institute, Yeoksa-Bipyongsu, 1999, p.244.

259) *Ibid.*, p.246.

260) The 4 · 3 News Team of Jemin Ilbo, *The 4 · 3 Incident Speaks*, Vol. 5, Jeonyewon, 1998, p.69.

261) Jeju 4 · 3 Research Institute, *Now I Can Speak*, Vol. 1, 1989, p.59.

## 2) The Aftereffects of Torture and Beatings

Among 135 reported the aftereffect of being disabled, and 40 victims still suffer from the tortures and beatings they received. Listed below, are the typical cases with the victims' names, and address (at that time) and birth year.

- Chae Gye-sun (Yido 2-dong Jeju-si, 1925): I was told to gather at the school for a public speech in December 1948. I was immediately arrested for supplying food and information for guerillas and was tortured. I was 6 months pregnant at the time, and lost my baby in the 8<sup>th</sup> month from the severe tortures and beatings. I still have aftereffect pains and suffer both physically and mentally.
- Jung Taehwa (Goseong-ri Seongsan-eup, 1930): My family lived in Sinyang-ri, farming. January 1948, investigators arrested me at my house. I was accused of being a liaison for the Namro-dang, and interrogated 52 days. My physical condition weakened a lot, developing the incurable disease called tuberculosis. I've been treated the last 5~6 years, but it keeps reoccurring and I'm still suffering from the aftereffects.
- Lim Bok-sun (Gimnyeong-ri Gujwa-eup, 1923): At that time, I was operating a convenient store. November 21, 1948, I was arrested and placed at Gimnyeong Police Box by members of the Seobuk Young Men's Association. I was beaten severely and had a gun shot in my left leg.
- Lee Yeong-ho (Gwideok-ri Hallim-eup, 1928): I was in charge of the organizational communications for Minbodan at that time. December 5, 1948, I went to Hallim Police Station to pass the news of the guerrillas' attack. But the punitive force accused me of being a stool pigeon of the guerrillas and tortured me instead. December 8, 1948 at the south-west side field of Suwon Elementary School, I was fortunately shot only in my hand and was able to survive.
- Lee Bok-hui (Hamo-ri Daejeong-eup, 1932): At Satal Oreum, my deceased younger brother Lee Dong-won became missing, and the military dragged me into the Daechonbyungsa. The officers beat me, demanding my brother's whereabouts, poured water with chili pepper powder into my nose and added the electric torture. I suffered for 10 days in the Daechonbyungsa prison, and

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262) Lee Sam-yong (age 79, Japan, a member of a left-wing organization at the time), Testimony recorded on July 11, 2002.

for the aftereffects, I still suffer from the torture, including physical trembling and stiffness whenever I feel something is crawling on me.

- Shin Chun-do (Dongbok-ri Gujwa-eup, 1933): I was arrested in 1948 by police. I was shot in my leg and went through severe tortures and beatings. I'm still suffering from leg pains and I am going through daily rehabilitation treatments, even today.
- Kim Oknyeo (Hamdeok-ri Jocheon-eup, 1927): I was living with my mother, producing in Hamdeok-ri during the 4 · 3 Incident. One day, 4 people, including my mother, a village granny and her son and myself were taken by Hamdeok sub-police station. My mother and I were accused of providing food for my uncle in the mountain side. We were interrogated for my uncle's location and were tortured, naked. The torture I suffered includes the electric torture on fingers and nipples, the water torture and beatings all over. I was sent to Kwandeokjung Police Interrogation Dept. when I was in a swoon. I had my trial on November 14, 1950, violating National Security Law, and was sentenced to a three year imprisonment at Mokpo Prison.
- Kim Bok-nam (Onpyeong-ri Seongsan-eup, 1940): Around Lunar calendar day December 25, 1948, I was caught by the military regiment unit 9. I lost my left eye with a butt stroke to my face.
- Kang Sun-deok (Jocheon-ri Jocheon-eup, 1940): I was 8 years old around the 4 · 3 Incident. My family was staying at an oreum cave when we were attacked by the punitive force. I was being evacuated, but soon was covered and stepped on by the people running away. My left arm and leg were paralyzed from the crush but the army still took me in, beating me, which brought aftereffects with numbness in my left leg and arm.

## **D. Damage by the Guilt-by-association System**

### **1) Status of Damages by the Guilt-by-association System**

Another agony of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident involves the innocent people's sacrifices, including death and missing people, which inherits down rather than stopping the facts. Despite the ongoing Incident, the family members of innocent victims who were either killed by the militants or the police punitive forces or involved with any judicial action were under surveillance, had limited access to social activities and remained banded under the Guilt-by-association

System. The battle scars and the nightmare of the 4 · 3 Incident within the Jeju community were passed down almost a half century. Both people of Jeju and the victims' family members, rather than sustaining their ordinary social activities, suffered through a social phenomenon called Red Complex caused by the Guilt-by-association System with no legal grounds. The current modern criminal law clearly limits the penal responsibility of any criminal and is applied only to the offender. The Guilt-by-association System was practiced before modern law was established in traditional societies, and meant the offender's parents, spouse, children, sisters and brothers had to bear the punishments as well for their family member's crime.<sup>263)</sup> The Guilt-by-association System in Korea was abolished systemically during the Kabo Reform 1894 process. However, the Guilt-by-association System has been practiced as a folkway within our society, and the system originated from the surveillance on the 『Blacklist』 during the Japanese colonial period then changed into the filtering process of odd ones through background checks during the inter-Korean confrontation period. The Guilt-by-association System brought disadvantages on status and the constant surveillance always caused serious obstructions for the party. The Guilt-by-association System was applied to the victim's family members of massacred civilians such as the 4 · 3 Incident, defectors to North Korea, family members of a quisling, and espionage involvement against national security. Victims of the Guilt-by-association System with no legal grounds stand as the worst victims under the divided national structure. With the 4 · 3 Incident case, 27,000 reporting federation members and 50,000 related family members as of August 1950 were reported, being under the separate management of an inspection unit. Police and the administrative departments of Jeju province referenced the separate list for various background check ups.

The recent leaked record by police titled 『List of inmates on death row』 and the 『List of ex-convicts』 from eup and myeon administrative offices are good examples around us. 『List of inmates on death row』 consists of the list

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263) Kim Yeong-beom, *Guilt by Association System - Its historic meaning and process in the Joseon Dyansty*, Collection of Dissertations of Korea Society History Research Association, Vol. 24, 1990, p.324.

of the dead by being shot, through imprisonment, being taken and through purges, with the date and place and separate bereaved family conditions recorded in detail. The purpose of the list is to control the bereaved family members of the 4 · 3 Incident and that's how the Guilt-by-association System was applied. The first disclosure of any damage by the Guilt-by-association System was revealed per investigation mission of the 4 · 3 Incident by the National Assembly Massacre Investigation Commission on 6<sup>th</sup> of June, 1960. Jang Gap-sun, one of bereaved said "I was discharged with honor from the student army troop on November 24, 1951. I needed my reference check for my teacher license from the police. But I realized both my identification registry and family registry were marked with 'son of a leftist'. Of course, I wasn't able to submit my reference check.

A majority of Jeju people have experienced losses from the Guilt-by-association System. A survey of over 75 bereaved families of the 4 · 3 Incident showed that 86% of the families have experienced damages from the Guilt-by-association System. The survey was conducted by the People's Band for the 4 · 3 Incident Truth and Honor Recovery on August 13, 2000. Below is a list of damage cases the families experienced under the Guilt-by-association System (Total exceeds 100% due to multiple responses).

Damage Cases	%
Public servant recruitment test	26
Various tests including military academy	23
Employment/promotion-national or public industry	18
Disadvantage in promotion-army, police	16
International travelling and immigration process	8
Surveillance in daily life	30
Various background check up	60

By applying the Guilt-by-association system, it only reproduced more victim mentality among the bereaved by adding more vivid suffering on their painful memories. Jeju, known as a community of strong blood ties has suffered immensely, and the negative influence that the Guilt-by-association system has

played is beyond our imagination. Much belated acknowledgement by national government on the Guilt-by-association system took place. On August 1, 1980, the Standing Committee of National Defense Emergency Policy Committee announced the immediate discontinuation of the Guilt-by-association system and all records of identification to be readjusted.<sup>264)</sup> The announcement was to target the following:

- ▲ Records of any rumor without confirmation, and records in error
- ▲ Treachery act under an enemy ruling to survive or minor crimes
- ▲ With the above history, to reinstate himself loyally for family and country
- ▲ Any additional records judged to contain harmful information

On March 24, 1981 the Ministry of Home Affairs followed up with the announcement to the official discontinuation of the Guilt-by-association system. Jeju police announced that all related documents on the 4 · 3 Incident were disposed of, following the announcement.<sup>265)</sup> “No citizen will account any disadvantage for his or her relative’s crime” is provided in term 3 article 12 of constitution of 5<sup>th</sup> republic and clearly bans a Guilt-by-association system.

The term 3 article 13 with slight adjustment, the constitution of 6<sup>th</sup> republic reconfirmed the banning of the Guilt-by-association system. Despite the legal and systematic prohibition rules, there still exist harmful effects of the Guilt-by-association system. The public worker recruiting procedure still requires back ground check, and Jeju people among victims of the 4 · 3 Incident still doubts if the Guilt-by-association system has truly been demolished. Hong Munpyung, his son and nephews were affected by the Guilt-by-association system, especially with his son’s experience during the civilian government regime, believes the system still exists.

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264) *Chosun Ilbo*, August 2, 1980.

265) In 1999, Assemblyman Chu Mi-ae demanded that the Jeju Police Agency should submit the lists of the executed involved in the 4 · 3 Incident, arguing that many innocent citizens still receive unfair treatment by the guilt-by-association system based on those lists. Upon this, the Jeju Police Agency replied to the Assemblyman as above (*Report of the Results of the Parliamentary Inspection of the Administrative in 1999* written by the 1<sup>st</sup> Security Department of the Jeju Police Agency).

He said “My son, during President Kim Youngsam’s term, wanted to join the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) but was held for a background check under the Guilt-by-association system. Three generations of my family suffered overall. My father was killed, I had to quit my pilot position and my son failed to join the ROTC. I haven’t been informed of the Guilt-by-association system being discontinued yet. In addition, I had to stop my oldest nephew’s dream to enroll in the Naval Academy. I had to try all means for my overseas travelling before as the Guilt-by-association system forbids my trip. Some say the system now is extinct but any background check will prove that this has been mis-interpreted. The description in red on the record won’t be erased for good”.<sup>266)</sup>

Up until recent days, visa process for the 4 · 3 Incident victims was difficult, showing the Guilt-by-association system still exists within Korean society.

I was going to visit Beijing in 2001 with colleagues from my Senior College, and it was unfair. Everybody had his or her visa issued except me being a political offender during the 4 · 3 Incident. I protested in anger and questioned how serving five years in the army identified me as a political offender.<sup>267)</sup>

The directly damaged parties by the Guilt-by-association system still believe those records still remain, and only the complete discarding of related documents can allow such prior settlements to regain their honor.

One thing still bothers me. It is the red line still remaining in my brother’s and my records. Once our honor being recovered and for we have suffered lifelong, I believe we have to be compensated somehow.<sup>268)</sup>

The damage case of Guilt-by-association system shows another task in basic human rights protection and recovering the victims’ honor of survivors as well as the honor recovery of the deaths during the 4 · 3 Incident. The study has

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266) Hong Mun-pyeong (age 71, Jeju-si, a student at the time), Testimony recorded on October 31, 2001.

267) Jeong Nam-jin (age 76, Seogwipo-si, who hid in the mountain at the time), Testimony recorded on June 20, 2002.

268) Yang Geun-bang (age 68, Jocheon-eup, who hid in the mountain and later was imprisoned at Incheon Prison), Testimony recorded on December 15, 2000.

recorded the true damages of the Guilt-by-association system within the testimonies of families and directly involved parties. Through the vivid case studies and self reflecting on violations that were made on human rights, the remainders of the Guilt-by-association system will face a turning point and get rid of the leftovers in the Guilt-by-association system.

## 2) Damages Under the Guilt-by-association System

### ① Damages by ‘Security Inspections’ and ‘Watch Lists’

People who served a jail term or who were involved in any trial, regarding the 4·3 Incident were marked for ‘Security Inspection’ or placed on a ‘Watch List’. It involved much tighter surveillance for the involvement with suspected rebellion activity, National Security Laws or National Security Acts. The detainees suffered more than enough through their prison term incarcerations and finally were able to return to the families. However, with constant surveillance by the public security bureau, the victims still couldn’t be assimilated within the ordinary social networks, thus leaving scars for the family members.

### ○ The Case of Kim Chun-bae

I was released and became free on August 20, 1963 after my second arrest. I was told to pre-report at all times by the police. I remember questioning about the expiry of such policy and being clarified (by the authorities) to continue until my death. Two detectives in a pair visited me every three days asking where I had been, how I was doing, and what I was up to, etc.<sup>269)</sup>

<Testimony of daughter Kim A-ja >

It went on since I was very little. My family was under police surveillance. My mother protested for grounds why we, proven innocent and free, were being watched. My family was recorded ‘For security inspection’ in the document in 1982. I still have the original document (Refer the below annex). We received the paper after aggressive protesting. In it, I saw a description saying that I

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269) Kim Chun-bae (age 76, Seoul, who was engaged in business at the time and later imprisoned at Mapo Prison), Testimony recorded on August 25, 2001.

joined the Joseon Democratic Youth League.

<Annex: Request of security reprimand>

The claimant, Kim Chunbae, was born on February 10, 1926, the oldest among 2 sons and 2 daughters. The home address was 2067 Bongkye-dong Jeju-si, as of 1941. Kim completed 4 academic years at Jeju-si Dongboseosook then operated a fuel wood and timber business afterward. He joined the Joseon Democratic Youth League at Ildo-ri 2-dong Jeju-si and was arrested for criminal act involvement within The 4 · 3 Incident riot and was sentenced 20 years imprisonment for rebellion by an Army Headquarter Ordinary Court Martial on December 13, 1948. He escaped in a jailbreak during the Korean War while in Mapo prison. He hid and managed to survive with laboring at Sahyeon-ri Jeongan-myeon Gongju-gun Chungnam Province until his re-capture by the military. The remaining term was canceled by an Army Headquarter Ordinary Court Martial on August 20, 1963. He was released but placed on the security check list. His history consists of the 20 year prison term judgment, and he is an escaped prisoner during the Korean War, and didn't turn himself in even after the 9 · 28 Recovery; he kept hiding until he was recaptured. Kim never had a secured job but was a fruit vendor, making his life precarious. He hardly attends anticommunism rallies or complies with national policy, and still resents and complains for the past execution. Overall, he shows a high potential for a second conviction, and is recommended for the security measurement.<sup>270)</sup>

### ○ The Case of Yang Geun-bang

After my release, I came back to my hometown, Wasan. While settling, the damage I faced was beyond any imagination. Investigators from Hamdeok Police Box, Jocheon Police Box and Jeju police inspection department and intelligence department visited me once a week. Any news of a spy reaching Seoul, I was their first one to check with. Jeju investigators handled people very poorly. With nationwide labeling, I had no one to complain to, and such limitations on my status naturally limited my family and relatives in looking after me even if I starved to death. Police always put a strict watch on me and I had to report wherever I was going.<sup>271)</sup>

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270) Seoul District Prosecutor's Office, *Request for Security Measures against (Kim Chun-bae)*, Case No. 12, February 12, 1982.

271) Yang Geun-bang, Testimony.

○ The Case of Ko Dae-seop (Testimony of Ko Bong-won)

It would have been better that I died. If I had died in prison, I wouldn't have had to go through such pain. In the same company with me was Ko Daesub from Namwon-ri who, in the end, committed suicide, hanging himself by the neck for being harassed frequently after his release. He was a clansman and my wife's uncle. He had reported twice with the police and kept complaining that the harassment was unbearable.<sup>272)</sup>

○ The Case of Lee Mun-gyo

I joined the army afterward but I was still under the watch list even when I was placed as a foot soldier at the frontline of Division 3. The army counterintelligence visited me from time to time, asking if I had any difficulties. The true purpose was to check on me on a regular basis.<sup>273)</sup>

○ The Case of Yang Gyu-seok

Because I served a jail term, my relatives have always suffered from it with their new trial in business. I thought I had suffered enough with the imprisonment, but I had to report to the Seogwipo police station monthly until the President Roh Tae-wu period. Otherwise, I received a letter, requesting my appearing at the police station. For the face to face meetings, questions were nothing meaningful but mostly about if I did commit the crime in the past as written in my record. I protested with anger!" "I suffered enough in the past, I don't have to repeat myself every time, and if the inspectors try to set me up again". The officers never liked my disobeying attitude.<sup>274)</sup>

○ The Case of Park Nam-jin

Any slight changes around me meant a lot of checking, which I protested for each case. I yelled "Are you really going to check on me again and again?"

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272) Ko Bong-won (age 72, Namwon-eup, who hid in the mountain and later was imprisoned at Daegu Prison), Testimony recorded on December 14, 2000.

273) Lee Mun-gyo (age 65, Jeju-si, who was involved in movements for investigating the 4·3 Incident right after the 4·19 Revolution), Testimony recorded on May 16, 2002.

274) Yang Gyu-seok (age 79, Andeok-myeon, who was a farmer and later was imprisoned at Gwangju Prison), Testimony recorded on December 15, 2000.

What's your real target, checking on deceased parents when I little? I fulfilled my duty with military service, and I am currently looking after my village in various public matters. From now on, I won't help you." The checking was stopped after I finished my term as the head of my village from 1970 to 1974. That made me real mad. Each time, I was asked what had happened to my parents in fine detail. My third son had to give up on his dream of going to the military academy preparatory school for I knew for a fact that he wasn't going to be accepted. He is a school teacher, teaching physical exercise.<sup>275)</sup>

#### ④ Background Check Suffering with Various Examinations and Work

##### ○ The Case of Kang Tae-jung

I can talk about it now after all these years; the Guilt-by-association system even caused difficulties for my children's education. My oldest son passed the Army Military Academy examination in 1978, but was filtered out by the background check. Two more students experienced the same situation by the background check. I asked my son not to join the military academy. However, my oldest daughter didn't have any barriers in becoming a public worker in the national administration. Afterwards, my children joined government enterprises for much easier procedures rather than applying to government offices.<sup>276)</sup>

##### ○ The Case of Oh Yong-seung

My older brother was arrested while he was constructing his house during the 4·3 Incident. My family didn't worry much about him, knowing his innocence, but heard of his death shortly after the arrest. Seeing my mother weeping a lot with the news, I wondered why he had to die when he was building his own house. I had to go through the Guilt-by-association system background check once a year in great detail when I was in a public official position. It caused me great inconveniences in my job, and disadvantages for getting a promotion, hurting me a lot.<sup>277)</sup>

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275) Park Nam-jin (age 67, Hallim-eup, a student at the time), Testimony recorded on November 27, 2001.

276) Kang Tae-jung (age 70, Aewol-eup, a student at the time), Testimony recorded on August 22, 2001.

277) Oh Yong-seung (age 61, Hallim-eup, a student at the time), Testimony recorded on December 27, 2001.

### ○ The Case of Kim Hong-seok

I experienced such an unusual case. My oldest son, after graduating Jeju National University, was applying for a public worker position. One day, he informed me that he wasn't accepted to take such a test. I accepted his position without further questioning my son. Sometime after, I was shocked to hear my name was on the list of Guilt-by-association system by Yang Bong-cheon, my neighbor who also explained me that I was tied under the Guilt-by-association system. The Guilt-by-association system didn't apply to my father, and my own family only consisted of myself, my wife, a son and a daughter who wasn't even named yet. Somehow even my daughter was on the list as Kim No name. I still do not understand why and what went on with my case.<sup>278)</sup>

### ○ The Case of Ko Seong-hwa

The Guilt-by-association system has followed me. My cousin had transferred as a junior at Jeju Middle School when I was joining the army. Later, when my cousin commissioned as an officer, he reported the date of his father (Ko Yong-hwa)'s death as 20 years earlier than the actual date. The chief of his dong office at the time helped with it. It would have been difficult to survive without quiet help from neighbors.<sup>279)</sup>

### ○ The Case of Che Se-byeong (Testimony of Ko Nam-jun)

None of my direct family was damaged at least, except my brother-in-law, Che Se-byeong being framed. He was a definite and brave rightist crying "Hurray Korea", and yet he was killed at Jawoondang, Kone, Aewol-eup in December 20, 1948 with 13 other people. He was 35, a supervisor of school affairs within the provincial government. He was arrested as the Regiment Unit 9 was leaving the place. He was detained for about two weeks at the agricultural school. He was supervising the human resources affairs in the elementary school division and was believed to be framed and set up for not offering favors for positions from the right-wingers. He had no trial or an investigation. He had graduated summa cum laude from the Agriculture School, passed Type II of the elementary

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278) Kim Hong-seok (age 65, Namwon-eup, a child / who hid in the mountain at the time), Testimony recorded on April 2, 2002.

279) Ko Seong-hwa (age 71, Jeju-si, a student at the time), Testimony recorded on July 10, 2001.

school license examination and served the principal position at Jaeneung Elementary School. His two sons who were marked and targeted as 'Sons of a commie' lost their opportunities to get their jobs at The Blue House from the background check procedure. They were not able to obtain any public position. It all happened in the 1970s.<sup>280)</sup>

#### ○ The Case of Kang Tae-ryong

I or my son were able to find a job at all. It wasn't until President Chun Doo-hwan's regime that I could do any social engagement. My children suffered a lot for their father. Whenever my son, who studied up to Jeju Middle school, applied for a job, his resume was turned down from the background check. I had worked for 12 years at the Jeju Volunteer Fire Department after I was released from my prison term. Jeju Volunteer Fire Department got promoted as Jeju Fire Station in its 13th year. I had been working for one year under the supervision of Chief Ko Seung-ok when I was selected for outstanding work. Within one month, Chief Ko Seung-ok called upon me, asking if I had any conviction in the past. Despite my explanation, I had to leave my job from the different legal aspect of conviction. I lost my opportunity within my first year to become an official public fire fighter.<sup>281)</sup>

#### ○ The Case of Mr. Kim (Testimony of Hyeon Gi-man)

I know a quiet man who survived the imprisonment and never talked about his experience in prison. He's rich and has seven sons. His imprisonment became a big fault, and blocked his children's job opportunities. From his experiences with his seven sons' failures with job seeking with background checks, he keeps telling me not to report any death during the 4 · 3 Incident. None of his smart sons with good academic achievement found a job, and their visa for a trip to Japan got turned down. All were concluded by the same reason, the background check. He had survived the incident by hiding out in the mountains. When he had no choice but to eat anything to survive, he had fed himself by killing a cow or a horse of some residents.<sup>282)</sup>

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280) Ko Nam-jun (age 78, Jeju-si, a student at the time), Testimony recorded on August 8, 2001.

281) Kang Tae-ryong (age 72, Jeju-si, a farmer who was imprisoned at Incheon Prison), Testimony recorded on June 11, 2002.

282) Hyeon Gi-man (age 95, Namwon-eup, who hid in the mountain at the time), Testimony recorded on May 3, 2002.

### ○ The Case of Jang Chang-won

The 4·3 Incident damaged a lot for those directly involved and us, the bereaved. I fulfilled my military duty at the Marine Corps after graduation from Aewol Commerce High School. My cousin helped me to find a job at The Central Intelligence Agency, but I was let go within a week due to my philosophy. One of my friends was Commissioner General at the police station during President Kim Young-sam's regime, and I asked if the police still had the interrogation documents for the inevitable fact finding wills with Korea's democratization. My friend gave me a vague statement saying "You can say yes or no."<sup>283)</sup>

### ○ The Case of Lee Sun-jeong

Only two girls from Aewol made it into a girl's high school which must have been the same as being accepted in a college level at that time. My mother, with a sufficient education, believed I had to continue my education no matter how hard it was. Some people enrolled at teacher training school after the school, and a background check was a part of their enrollment process. Due to my father's death during the incident, I started as an instructor at Aewol Elementary School until I was appointed officially. I was called in by the Chief of Police and was told that I was turned down because of my father. I couldn't bear my anger, knowing how my father suffered and died, and yet his children suffer more under the Guilt-by-association system. I told my younger brothers they didn't have to study with such a social structure.<sup>284)</sup>

### ○ The Case of Hong Mun-pyeong

Suddenly, I was transferred to the rear and suspended (from flying). One of the captains, who was a colleague in Gwangju said "You are done with flying!" It was after my one year serving at Jeju Meseolpo Training Center as a company commander that I was marked under the Guilt-by-association system. I was excluded as I might defect with the plane. I wondered if it was because of my father. I protested sternly "I'm a veteran of the Korean War, and am still serving my country as a pilot. I don't deserve such treatment! I'd rather be dead by a

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283) Jang Chang-won (age 61, Japan, who was from Aewol-ri, Aewol-eup), Testimony recorded on July 12, 2002.

284) Lee Sun-jeong (age 68, Aewol-eup, a student and daughter of Pricipal Lee Gwan-seok at the time), Testimony recorded on September 14, 2001.

gunshot or be sent to North Korea by my country!” I was ordered to The Counter Intelligence Corps under doubtful philosophy. I was discharged on February 5, 1956 without the discharge certificate or any severance pay. I wanted to take the police force examination, but was turned down because of the background check.<sup>285)</sup>

#### ○ The Case of School Teacher Jeong

He is one of the bereaved while in (police) custody. He served as a military officer by circumventing the identity check. While he was teaching at one of the high schools in Jeju, he was accused, falsely, for a classroom arson incident and his identity revealed. He was immediately taken to The Central Intelligence Agency, and suffered bitterly. The only way he was set free from the torture and pain was after the real arsonist (a student) was caught in the act in a second attempt.<sup>286)</sup>

### ⑤ Suffering as a Result of Limited Immigration Services

#### ○ The Case of Lee Bo-yeon

I did my best serving my village to avoid the Guilt-by-association system after my release from imprisonment. It was a hope, believing my outstanding contribution someday would free me from the false charges. I sacrificed myself for the causes, and still am very poor, but proud. My older sister invited me to Japan in 1981, but my visa request was put on hold for two to three years due to the background check. One of my close friends in the police had me list records and history of my age since 17, including community services like being a village leader, captain of the youth association, director of social purification, etc. and any award certificates. I listed 10 full pages of my history then turned it in with The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Headquarter of National Police (HNP) after CIA’s reply to forward my request to the proper authority at HNP. A few days later, I received a postcard with a simple description “Apply (for) your passport”. My passport authorization took that long before the release of the Guilt-by-association system. However, my son was declined for his commission with ROTC at Jeju National University due to the background

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285) Hong Mun-pyeong, Testimony.

286) Lee Do-yeong, *Deathly Preventive Custody*, *Mal*(monthly magazine), 2000, p.80.

check. I am embarrassed to face my own son for that reason.<sup>287)</sup>

### ○ The Case of Moon Chang-hae

I wasn't affected severely with the Guilt-by-association system but my cousins were. I wanted to see EXPO 1970 in Japan, but was denied with my passport request. I visited the Central Intelligence Agency complaining "I must visit a foreign country. If I can't, my descendants can't either. I am a national merit but I will return my medal. No Jeju person is free from the Guilt-by-association system, and nobody will be involved with social activities under these circumstances." After much complication, I made it to EXPO a few days before the end. My cousins suffered afterwards though. One of my cousins smuggled himself to Japan for a better life, but was constantly picked on with questioning if he had engaged with his other cousins in the pro-North Korean residents' league in Japan. I visited the Jeju Police Anti Communist Division, *and argued "I deserve respect from my country. I'm the one with frequent visits to Japan and know more Japanese. But you keep picking on a poor man who was trying to make his living without sufficient education background and never met such individuals instead of asking me."* It was stopped after that.<sup>288)</sup>

### ○ The Case of Jang Si-yeong

The war was finished, and I was discharged from the army in 1955 and the 5 · 16 Coup d'Etat occurred after 5 years of practice from 1956. I conducted my activities fare and square before the 5 · 16 Coup d'Etat since I was the only doctor who served in the army. I was ordered to appear at the police when the 5 · 16 Coup d'Etat occurred. I went down to the police wondering why. I was asked if I had been in contact with my brother. Since then, I had to pre-report my travels with the police first, and was given assignments from the Korean Central Intelligence Agency with my trip. I resented doing such assignments after the coup and requested the true blame I was under with the chief of the CIA. The answer in the file showed that my older brother was killed under the accusation of being an agent for the South Korean Labor Party. That theory without any proof or grounds was one of the enormous blames killing innocent

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287) Lee Bo-yeon (age 72, Jeju-si, a farmer who was imprisoned at Incheon Prison), Testimony recorded on August 3, 2001.

288) Moon Chang-hae (age 69, Jeju-si, a student at the time), Testimony recorded on July 12, 2001.

people. For the smarter ones who had protested for unfair blames ended dying, and the detectors covered up their unlawful actions with ‘a member of the South Korean Labor Party. I of course appealed firmly and had that accusation cleared off from his record with authority of the chief.<sup>289)</sup>

#### ○ The Case of Lee Do-yeong

Lee Do-yeong was a son of Lee Hyeon-pil, the victim of preventive custody. His student visa requests to the US never were possible, for his passport wasn't issued because of the background check. His wife Ko Chunhee went insane and died from severe depression.<sup>290)</sup>

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289) Jang Si-yeong (age 81, Jeju-si, a doctor at the time), Testimony recorded on October 19, 2002.

290) Lee Do-yeong, *Deathly Preventive Custody*, p.80.

### 3. Property Damages

#### A. Damages to Village Communities

##### 1) Actual Damages

The 4 · 3 Incident has brought enormous damages to village communities in Jeju. Quite a few attacked villages, without restorations, in the mid-mountainous area became dead villages. Even among those restored villages, many residents didn't return to their old homes. The guerillas based around the mountain and hilly mountainous areas, and the villages in the hilly mountainous area were affected unavoidably during the fights between guerillas and the police and military. The damages became even worse with the declaration of house evictions for the people on the mid-mountainous area on October 17, 1948 by the commander of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment. The official record of US Armed Forces in Korea describes the situation as follows.

Under the assumption that all village people were engaged and provide help for the guerilla units, the massacre over the mid-mountainous areas was adopted to eliminate any and all resistance. The majority of massacre was committed until December 1948 during the occupation of Regiment Unit 9. (...) About 1/3 of houses on the island were destroyed, and about 1/4 of 300,000 residents evacuated in coastal areas after their villages were destroyed. All refugees from 45 villages with complete destruction and 43 villages with partially destroyed villages were moved to the refugee camps on the coasts.<sup>1)</sup>

It is clearly indicated that each village was burned down with its residents' removal to the camp. There were a few case of guerillas' revenge toward the house evacuation by setting fire to the houses on the coastal area. The Governor of Jeju province explained as follows.

The number of houses lost from the rioters' arson totaled 3,000. 300 houses

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1) Hq. USAFIK, *G-2. Periodic Report*, No. 1097, April 1, 1949.

in Namwon and 400 in Wimi-ri Namwon-myeon were burnt down by the rioters' arsons around late November and that is believed to be the worst situation. Burning down Seogwipo Middle School, town office buildings and 1,100 houses on the coast were committed in November showing the worst barbarity of those rioters.<sup>2)</sup>

There are various statistic reports in seasons and data, showing damages to village communities during the military collisions and suppressions. The following are two overall comprehensive reports: Jeju Provincial Statistics (1953) and Resettlement of Refugees – Investigation of damages from The 4 · 3 Incident (1955). The following data shows within those two reports reveal the damages occurred on village communities as follows.

Victim Condition and Breakdown

Type	Pre incident		Victim		Detail of victim				Lost bldg
	Family	Person	Family	Person	Farm Family		Non farm		
					Family	Person	Family	Person	
BukJeju-gun	39,919	197,379	12,991	58,373	12,436	55,272	555	3,101	26,556
Nam-Jeju-gun	20,712	102,372	6,943	33,359	6,703	32,518	171	841	12,729
Total	60,631	299,751	19,934	91,732	19,139	87,790	726	3,942	39,285

Reference: Jeju Provincial Statistics (1953)

Status of Damages Per Each Eup and Myeon

Type	Status of Damage					
	Destroyed		Evacuated		Total	
	Family	Person	Family	Person	Family	Person
Jeju-eup	4,441	20,639	.	.	4,441	20,639
Aewol-myeon	1,644	7,009	522	1,907	2,166	8,916
Hallim-myeon	1,811	7,350	300	1,400	2,111	8,750
Gujwa-myeon	865	4,083	.	.	865	4,083
Jocheon-myeon	1,156	5,945	13	68	1,169	6,013
Daejeung-myeon	522	2,150	.	.	522	2,150
Jungmun-myeon	189	646	570	2,825	759	3,471
Namwon-myeon	485	2,493	319	1,506	804	3,999
Seogwi-myeon	249	1,268	472	2,224	721	3,492

2) *Seoul Shinmun*, December 9, 1948.

Andeok-myeon	743	3,529	269	1,271	1,012	4,800
Pyoseon-myeon	42	203	69	367	111	570
Seongsan-myeon	123	568	211	1,037	334	1,605
Total	12,270	55,883	2,745	12,605	15,015	68,488

Reference: Resettlement of Refugees – Investigation of Damages from the 4 · 3 Incident

## 2) Restoring Villages and the Refugee Resettlement Program

The residents of the mid-mountainous area didn't have any other alternative but to move to coastal villages due to the operation of house evacuations. They were relocated to the classrooms of elementary schools or community halls and warehouses in groups or some refugees depended on their relatives. These victims suffered from snubbiness from the original coastal villagers, lack of food, and surveillance from military and the police. National congressman Joo Gi-yong contributed an article in the *Jayoo Shinmun* titled "Exploring Jeju" after his 10 day visit in March 1949.

Regarding victim status: number of damaged houses over mountains, ranches and coasts in Namwon, Bukchon, Dongbok, Seogwipo after the 4 · 3 Incident reached each 16,177 and 30,461. Reported casualties were 1,193, and 419 wounded. Victims were 86,797. The graded victims had evacuated in such a hurry without bringing their own food or clothing. Their shelter, barely covered with dry grass on the floor, was like a pig house filled with bad odors. They were barely surviving on seaweed and Chinese pepper and everybody was moaning from hunger. No one could bare the pain, witnessing victim's tears and pain.

Jeju's annual grain yield including potatoes stays under 36 ton and about 8.6 tons of grain per year is bought from the mainland to feed Jeju. If we calculate the total grain needs to manage the current stage by adding the grain loss of 8.4 tons, the incident and 4.2 tons to supply 80,000 refugees for the next 3 months, about 20 tons of grain is urgently needed to survive till summer season harvest. Without such provisions, people might starve to death. Epidemic is another threat and pain for these people without food, clothing and beddings.<sup>3)</sup>

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3) *Jayu Shinmun*, March 23, 1949.

May 15, 1949, Jeju Area Battle Headquarters was disbanded, and May 18, withdrawal of Supportive Police was ordered, settling down Jeju incident a little bit. From that point, a full scale of settlement projects for refugees from the mid-mountainous area got kicked off. A journalist from Seoul Shinmun reported the following: 35 reconstruction villages were built by the end of August 1949 to accommodate 7,379 defectors and 97,703 victims, but only 30,000 utilized the facilities.<sup>4)</sup>

However the operation of the reconstruction project was not easygoing. The primary object to reconstruct a village with complete destruction faced difficulties in timbering and the transportation of timbers, and had to build the temporary houses with grass or tin to accommodate residents. The reconstructed villages were not rebuilt at the original place but at a strategic spot to block the guerilla's attack and to isolate the guerillas from the village. And for that purpose, people were forced and mobilized in stone fence buildings to enclose the village. A journalist's coverage on Georo village shows the hardships of people in various aspects.

People with constant deficits of food have consumed millet, bean, sweet potato and barley if not in whole grain then in the porridge type. The refugees that had nowhere to go because of the destruction of their homes and villages, they had to move into an assigned construction village by the government. How would these people survive without grain?

I have visited Georo construction village with 1,000 victims over 200 households. Their hand built house used materials including dirt and stone for walls and an unstable roof merely holding its purpose. The floor is covered with straw, plants and trees or dead leaves, functioning as a kitchen and bedroom together.

This is not a house for civilized humans but cavemen. They feel fortunate to eat one or two meals a day with grain porridge or sweet potato porridge.<sup>5)</sup>

On December 20, 1949, the Jeju Restoration and Revival Committee was launched, appointing the governor as the director. The committee consisted of 4 subcommittees covering marine, industry, cultures and security fields, and

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4) *Seoul Shinmun*, September 1, 1949.

5) *Hanseong Ilbo*, February 16, 1950.

their tasks included planning the Reconstruction Project and securing sufficient budgets through negotiations with the government.<sup>6)</sup>

With the breakout of the Korean War on June 26, 1950, Jeju was flooded with new refugees from mainland Korea, and it was before completing the reconstruction. About 10,000 refugees landed on Jeju through the ports of Hallim, Seongsan and Hwasun on July 17, 20 days since the occurrence of the Korean War. Tens of thousands of refugees from North Korea evacuated to Jeju to the 1.4 Retreat in 1951. The total number of refugees reached no more than 16,000 on January 3, 1951 but reached to 87,000 by January 15 and soared to 148,000 by May 20, recording more than half of Jeju resident statistics.

The rapid increase of refugees caused shortages of housing and food. The food-shortage phenomenon between autumn 1952 to spring 1953 put Jeju society into a crisis. About 30,000 people in BukJeju-gun were reported as starving. Some cases of fighting over government food aid between refugees of Korean War and The 4 · 3 Incident were reported.

The Reconstruction Project was influenced and delayed by the Korean War refugee relief project, village attacks by the remaining guerillas and constant station settings and operations dealing with guerillas by the police. Despite the delays, the reconstruction still continued, and the residents in Dong Village, located over 57 dwellings accommodating 270 people at Sanghyo-ri Seogwi-myeon returned to their homes.<sup>7)</sup>

The Reconstruction Project sped up in its progress as the Korean War was over. Residents of Nohyeong and Dopyeong submitted their petitions to return home with municipal administrative offices of Jeju-eup which then was filed with BukJeju-gun and the police by Jeju-eup. Residents of Nohyeong and Dopyeong had stayed at the congested temporary camp over small sites for 5 yrs since the 4 · 3 Incident.<sup>8)</sup> The Approvals stayed on the authority's shelf

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6) *Jayu Shinmun*, January 21, 1950. On February 10, 1950, the chairperson of the Jeju Restoration and Revival Committee (Governor Kim Chung-hui) made a request for the central government's loan of 4.8 billion Korean won to Prime Minister (Jeju Province's Request for financing its restoration projects, document at Prime Minister's Office, February 10, 1950).

7) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 14, 1952.

for security reasons but the department started to accept petitions from January 1954.

The residents at Jeoji-dong Josu-ri Hallim-myeon held their ceremony to commemorate their return on January 28 1954.<sup>9)</sup> Victims from Myeongri-dong Jeoji-ri Hallim-myeon petitioned their return and reconstruction with BukJeju-gun on March 8.<sup>10)</sup> Residents of Deokcheon-ri Gujwa-myeon returned home from March 12 after a 7 year refugee life.<sup>11)</sup>

Provided below, the statistics chart shows the current status of total island-wide return & reconstruction per villages as of end of 1953.<sup>12)</sup>

Status of Total Island-wide Return & Reconstruction

eup-myeon		Type	Returned households				Total no. Settled household	
			Permanent Building finished	Permanent Building unfinished	Temporary Housing	Rent		Total
North Jeju-gun	Jeju-eup		341	456	1,345	22	2,164	3,261
	Jocheon-myeon		217	280	281	43	743	1,327
	Gujwa-myeon		180	60	191	10	441	598
	Aewol-myeon		596	614	393	85	1,188	2,180
	Hallim-myeon		476	160	50	76	1,462	2,125
South Jeju-gun	Seogwi-myeon		102	123	102	39	367	533
	Jungmun-myeon		83	139	90	75	387	665
	Andeok-myeon		196	211	116	69	592	933
	Daejeung-myeon		55	235	36	0	326	717
	Pyoseon-myeon		57	269	178	118	622	966
	Seongsan-myeon		24	80	10	58	172	311
Total			2,327	2,627	2,792	595	8,341	13,616

As indicated above, 8,341 families, 61% of total victim families 13,616 returned to their village as of end of 1953. With un-returned families of 5,725 reviled the difficulties of a complete reconstruction. On April 1, 1954, Jeju

8) *Jeju Shinbo*, November 3, 1953.

9) *Jeju Shinbo*, January 31, 1954.

10) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 13, 1954.

11) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 15, 1954.

12) *Jeju Shinbo*, January 22, 1954.

police decided the below policy allowing victims return to their original mid-mountainous homes.

Regarding move-in: With the complete liquidation of red guerillas drawing nearer, the Department approves the policy to extend for the home returns to the mid-mountainous area or island-wide as of April 1, targeting to overcome people's miserable livelihood conditions island-wide. Move-in requests are suggested to be submitted as of March 25 with the Chief of Police, and all villages, including both existing and new are requested to strengthen their self guarding in cooperation between civilians and police.<sup>13)</sup>

Chief of Jeju Police, Shin Sang-muk announced the relief of a standstill order and open policy of Mt. Halla on September 21, 1954 - 6 years and 6 months since the occurrence of the 4 · 3 Incident. Guard duties of residents for their village fence discontinued, and the reconstruction project, moving-in and settlement projects in mid-mountainous areas enhanced the progressing speeds.

Each town and village was asked to turn in a preliminary research result by November 17, 1954 to establish the 1955 Victims' Settlement Plan.<sup>14)</sup> Questions below were utilized as prior basic data of the joint on-site investigation scheduled for the beginning of December by Jeju Province Government and Korea Civil Assistance Command (KCAC).

1. Distribution of population and household prior to the 4 · 3 Incident
2. Distribution of current population and household as of October 31, 1954
3. Condition of reconstruction
4. Data research for the necessary reconstruction project
5. Material distribution status for settling returners

The chart below indicates the total damages per village and number of households and population in need of reconstruction.

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13) *Jeju Shinbo*, March 18, 1954.

14) All documents regarding the displaced settlement projects between 1954 and 1955 are housed at the National Archives of Korea in the file titled *Settlement of the Displaced - 4 · 3 Incident Damage Investigation* (Jeju Province, 1955). The following description is based on those documents.

Data Research in Planning the Necessary Reconstruction Project

Type	Status of Damage						Reconstruction Plan		Cultivation Acreage
	Destroyed		Evacuated		Total		Family	Person	
	Family	Person	Family	Person	Family	Person			
Jeju-eup	4,441	20,639	.	.	4,441	20,639	2,424	10,965	12,325
Aewol-myeon	1,644	7,009	522	1,907	2,166	8,916	1,023	4,992	9,404
Hallim-myeon	1,811	7,350	300	1,400	2,111	8,750	659	3,000	3,749
Gujwa-myeon	865	4,083	.	.	865	4,083	410	1,734	1,628
Jocheon-myeon	1,156	5,945	13	68	1,169	6,013	398	1,847	3,605
Daejeung-myeon	522	2,150	.	.	522	2,150	71	290	6,670
Jungmun-myeon	189	646	570	2,825	759	3,471	396	1,426	23,250
Namwon-myeon	485	2,493	319	1,506	804	3,999	473	2,231	8,681
Seogwi-myeon	249	1,268	472	2,224	721	3,492	279	1,318	38,650
Andeok-myeon	743	3,529	269	1,271	1,012	4,800	469	2,152	2,060
Pyoseon-myeon	42	203	69	367	111	570	64	291	457
Seongsan-myeon	123	568	211	1,037	334	1,605	218	1,129	142,960
Total	12,270	55,883	2,745	12,605	15,015	68,488	6,884	31,375	253,439

Reference: Settling Refugees-damage investigation from the 4 · 3 Incident

On February 1955, Jeju Province Government prioritized and pushed ahead with a settlement project for the returning victims of the 4 · 3 Incident house evacuation for 2,074 households from 6,884 in total. Jeju requested supports for relief rice, building materials and agricultural equipment with the Minister of Health-Welfare, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry and Chief of KCAC. The chart below details the distribution of 2,074 benefitting households.

Table of Victims Requiring Settlement Support Per the 4 · 3 Incident

Type	No of ri	Village	Family	Person	Land size	
North Jeju-gun	Jeju-eup	8	12	312		
	Aewol-myeon	5	8	489	2,137	
	Hallim-myeon	.	.	.	.	
	Gujwa-myeon	3	5	199	808	852
	Jocheon-myeon	8	13	154	719	1,914
	Total	24	38	1,154		
South Jeju-gun	Daejeung-myeon	.	.	.	.	
	Andeok-myeon	8	8	343	1,573	1,473
	Jungmun-myeon	2	2	57	241	290
	Seogwi-myeon	.	.	.	.	.

Namwon-myeon	10	13	456	2,164	
Pyoseon-myeon	2	2	64	291	
Seongsan-myeon	.	.	.		
Total	22	25	920		
Total	46	63	2,074		

According to the report ‘The 4 · 3 Incident Victims’ Return to Permanent Residence’ by Kim In-hwa, section chief of provincial social affairs division in Jejudo-volume 8, 1963 reported 7,524 households (39,916 persons) out of 13,616 households (80,065 persons) returned independently by 1962 and the 3,965 households (17,915 persons) applicants to return to the permanent residence from 7,704 households (40,149 persons) would receive supports over the next 2 years from Jeju Province Government with their settlement project. Over 15 yrs of continuing damage within communities is self evident.

### 3) Researching ‘Lost Villages’

A large number of mid-mountainous people returned to their permanent residence with the lift of the Hallasan Standstill Order in September 1954. It was not an easy task for villagers to cultivate wastelands and build a new house to live in. Some victims hesitated to return because of the frequent alert evacuations drills against the red guerillas and traces of community sacrifices. The complete return to the original status was harder for a few already being deceased and many were dispersed with their first evacuation in the coastal area. 40,419 persons or over 7,704 household victims didn’t return to their permanent residence by 1962;15 years after the 4 · 3 Incident. Despite the aggressive settlement project by Jeju Province and National Government, about 1/2 of victims hesitated to return home. No data showing the further returning of those people is available. Instead, under the government’s reconstruction projects, new type of residents started to fill the hilly areas by unreturned families from North Korea.

Despite the long time reconstruction projects after the 4 · 3 Incident, many

villages throughout Jeju were left ruined with no returns by original villagers to their homes. These villages are called ‘Lost Villages through the 4·3 Incident’. Lost Villages refers to the extinct villages, holding no significance of existence. Lost Villages most affected and damaged during the 4·3 Incident, became abandoned with no return of villagers, and some villages turned into ordinary farmlands.<sup>15)</sup>

84 Lost Villages through Jeju were confirmed by the Jeju 4·3 Practices Committee in 2001 and 2002. The table below indicates the number of villages per town.

Present Condition Per City and County

Total	Jeju-si	Seogwipo-si	Buk-Jeju-gun	Nam-Jeju-gun
84	31	4	35	14

The table below indicates the number of households, resident and victims of current condition at the period.

Status of Villages

District	Eup/myeon/dong	Tong/ri	Village	Family	Person	Victim	Remark
Total	16	30	84	2,038	8,360	966	
Jeju-si (31)	Ildo 2-dong (4)	Donam-dond (4)	Mot village	20	30	7	
			Seot village	10	20	2	
			Al village	40	60	-	
			Wut village	20	35	6	
	Hwabuk-dong (2)	Hwabuk-dong (2)	Gonheul-dong	30	200	23	Stone
			Keuntaewat	10	70	4	Mark
	Ara-dong (4)	Odeung-dong (3)	Jukseong village	60	300	-	
			Minbat village	5	20	-	
			Keunkareum	20	40	-	
	Ora-dong (5)	Ara 1-dong (1)	Wutindara	20	100	-	
Eowunul			23	100	13	Stone	
		Gojire	14	70	4	Mark	

15) *Searching for the Lost Villages* edited by the Jeju Citizens’ Committee for Promoting Academic and Cultural Businesses of the Jeju 4·3 Incident, Hakminsa, 1998, p.9.

		Sundalbaengdi	7	35	1		
		Haesan	15	40	3		
		Yeonmi Maeul-Seotdongne	44	220	40		
	Yeon-dong (2)	Jusu-dong	23	100	12		
		Samdong-dong	50	150	10		
	Nohyeong-dong (10)	Haean-dong (2)	Risaengyi	120	500	50	Stone Mark
			Haeandong dongne	80	350	20	
		Nohyeong-dong (2)	Deureugureung	16	80	-	Stone Mark
			Hambakyikul	32	110	-	
			Bankil-ri	30	120	-	
			Kaejini	26	100	-	
			Gwaengyisul	41	150	3	
			Mulwukyi	19	80	3	
	Betbat		30	130	14		
	Sukyimot	20	80	-			
		Seotgareum	15	100	20		
	Oido-dong (1)	Dopyeong-dong (1)	Wapyeong Village	15	70	13	
	Iho-dong (2)	Iho 2-dong (2)	Hobyeongbat	18	130	75	
			Metbat	19	133	80	
Seogwipo-si(4)	Daecheon-dong (1)	Daecheon-dong (1)	Yeongnam village	16	90	50	Stone Mark
	Jungmun-dong (1)	Jungmun-dong (1)	Sadan village	15	60	30	
	Yerye-dong (1)	Sangye-dong (1)	Eoemke	20	50	4	
			Saekdal-dong (1)	Chunseo-dong	30	70	10
Buk Jeju-gun (35)	Hallim-eup (7)	Sangdae-ri (2)	Gohani	23	100	2	
			Hansanyiwat	15	60	4	
		Geumak-ri (2)	Ildongyimot	13	61	6	
			Wutdongne	38	141	8	
		Byutjinbat	7	21	1		
		Myeongwol-ri (1)	Billmot	25	130	20	Stone Mark
		Dongmyeong-ri (1)	Kaewat	25	100	30	
	Aewol-eup (13)	Bongseong-ri (6)	Jariwat	30	150	1	Stone Mark
			Malbat	15	75	2	
			Sangsumoreul	10	50	-	
			Yeollyuwat	20	100	-	
			Godoriwat	11	50	-	
			Jireumki	20	100	3	
	Eoem1-ri (1)	Gojiwunyeong	15	80	14		

Nam Jeju-gun (14)		Yusuam-ri (1)	Beommiwat	19	71	11	
		Sokil-ri (1)	Wondong village	14	60	40	
		Gwangryeong 1-ri (1)	Dennambat	12	60	-	
		Sangkwi-ri (1)	Bucheomul	12	50	4	
		Hagwi 1-ri (1)	Gwang-dong	37	70	2	
		Goseong 1-ri (1)	Wutkareum	20	65	15	
	Hankyung- myeon (2)	Jeoji-ri (1)	Haneuikol	10	25	-	
		Sanyang-ri (1)	Dariwatkol	10	40	3	
	Gujwa-eup (8)	Sehwa-ri (1)	Darangshi	10	40	-	Stone Mark
		Deokcheon-ri (2)	Hwajeon-dong	10	50	10	
			Daerim-dong	10	50	3	
		Pyeongdae-ri (1)	Taljeon-dong	11	36	1	
		Songdang-ri (1)	Jangki-dong	26	100	-	
	Ilsongdang		30	120	-		
	Gwangjeon-dong		20	80	-		
	Gasinam-dong		12	60	-		
	Jocheon-eup (5)	Seonheul 1-ri (3)	Multeojinkol	12	50	40	Stone Mark
			Saedongne	10	60	-	
			Keunkulwat	20	110	-	
	Seonheul 2-ri (1)	Baekhwa-dong	20	110	-		
	Wasan-ri (1)	Wutdongne	20	100	-		
	Namwon-eup (5)	Shinheung-ri (1)	Shindolseonbat	20	92	-	
			Eukwi-ri (1)	Wutmultong	13	50	7
		Hanman-ri (1)	Billigareum	24	130	6	Stone Mark
		Namwon 2-ri (2)	Banwol-dong	26	100	3	
	Gonengyibat		25	150	20		
Daejeong-eup (1)	Shindo 3-ri (1)	Saenamogot	20	160	4	Stone Mark	
Andeok- myeon (7)	Donggwang-ri (3)	Mudeungyiwat	130	400	100	Stone Mark	
		Sambat corner	50	150	50		
		Josukye	6	30	6		
	Seogwang-ri (2)	Gwanjeonbat	30	120	-		
		Jinjeonbat	20	90	-		
Sangcheon-ri (1)	Oridonmul	40	70	40			
Gwangpyeong-ri (1)	Joga-dong	25	120	15			
Pyoseon- myeon (1)	Gasi-ri (1)	Saekareum	22	80	25	Stone Mark	

The accurate investigation on ‘Lost Villages’ per each eup or myeon was delivered by the Jeju 4 · 3 Practices Committee. Twice, the stone posts were built, representing the Lost Villages by the committee. The first set of 6 stone posts were built between March 29 – April 3, 2001 at Ora-dong Eowoonul Jeju-si, Nohyeong-dong Deureugureung Jeju-si, Youngnam village Daecheon-dong Seogwipo-shi, Darangshi Sehwa-ri Gujwa-eup, Kwitureu Wahung-ri Jocheon-eup, and Moodeungyiwat Donggwang-ri Andeok-myeon. The second set of 6 stone posts were built between March 27 – April 2, 2002 at Risangyi Haeon-dong Jeju-si, Billemot Myeongwol-ri Hallim-eup, Jariwat Bongseong-ri Aewol-eup, Billekareum Hannam-ri Namwon-eup, Saenamugot Shindo3-ri Daejeong-eup and Saekareum Gasi-ri Pyosun-myeon. Each stone post is inscribed with the background information of village development, dwelling circumstances, resident damages from The 4 · 3 Incident and details of the dead village. The below provided extractions are from each village’s damages and the details of the dead villages.

- Yeongnam-dong: “total of 90 villagers who couldn’t evacuate in time were victimized among 16 households with a reported total population at the time was 90.”
- Mudeungyiwhat: “The entire village Mudeungyiwhat in Andeok-myeon Nam Jeju-gun was burned down on November 21, 1948 during the 4 · 3 Incident. The reported casualty consists of 100 victims from 130 households in Mudeungyiwhat, about 50 victims from 46 households in the corner of Sambat and 6 victims from 6 households in Josukoye.”
- Deurugureung: “The villagers in Deurugureung had to relocate their village during the 4 · 3 Incident and went through unspeakable levels of pain, seeing their family members and neighbors being sacrificed.”
- Eowunul: “This was the site of the village Eowunul in the rural Ora-dong and was totally burned down in the early winter season of 1948. (...) Total reported population at the time was 100 people among 23 households, and 13 villagers were reported with sacrifices.”
- Koeteureu: “Houses were burned down and villagers had to relocate to the coastal village site or hide in the mountain side on November 13, 1948 during the 4 · 3 Incident. Many villagers were sacrificed during the procedure..”

- Darangshe: “This site of the village of Darangshe in Gujwa-eup Buk Jeju-gun was burned down and reported for total lost around November 1948.”
- Risangyi: “This site of Risangyi village was burned down and reported for total lost during the 4 · 3 Incident. The gust of wind didn’t miss this village. The House Evacuation Order was activated on November 20, 1948, and villagers had to move to a lower area village without being given enough time to bring their personal belongings. The village was burned down afterward. During the procedure, 50 villagers were killed with no reason. The survivors consecrated their place in Haean-ri and never returned to this original village. This weedy and empty house sites with bamboo trees are left alone, revealing their painful history.
- Billegareum: “The site of village Billegareum in Hannam-ri Namwon-eup Nam Jeju-gun was burned down on November 7, 1948 during the 4 · 3 Incident. The gust of wind didn’t miss this village. The village was burned down and the devastated villagers in fear had to hide around Georin Oreum or Seojung- cheon area. 25 lives were wasted for no reason, and 5 families lost their descendent posterity line. The survivors didn’t want to revive the painful memory ever again, returning at their home village Billegareum. The reconstruction of the village Billegareum with 100 survivors was set near the current town office in Hanam-ri in 1953.”
- Billemot: “The site of village Billemot in Myeongwol-ri Hallim-eup Buk Jeju-gun was burned down during the 4 · 3 Incident. The gust of wind from the 4 · 3 Incident didn’t miss this village. The houses were burned down to ash by the House evacuation Order around November 20 and villagers were scattered around the villages in the coastal area. This was not the end. 20 precious lives were sacrificed and died in vain. The villagers didn’t return to their home village Billemot but reconstructed their village at Gorim-dong in Myeongwol-ri in spring 1949. The old pond site and bamboo trees around the house lots evidence the residencies of the past.”
- Saekareum: “The site of village Saekareum in Gasi-ri Pyosun-myeon Nam Jeju-gun was burned down on November 15, 1948 during the 4 · 3 Incident. The gust of wind from the 4 · 3 Incident didn’t miss this village. The houses were burned down and villagers were scattered around the nearby, struggling to survive. Total of 25 villagers were victimized, including 17 deaths from settlers at Pyoseon Elementary School were committed near the Beodeulmot site during the 4 · 3 Incident. The town Gasi-ri was reconstructed around the current town office from February 1949, and 2 households returned but left soon again for they couldn’t bear the loneliness. That was the end of the existence of their village.”

- Saenamugot: “The site of village Saenamugot in Shindo-ri Daejeong-eup Nam Jeju-gun was burned down, leaving no trace of existence in any form during the 4 · 3 Incident. The gust of wind from the 4 · 3 Incident didn’t miss this village. To maintain the security level, villagers of Saenamugot were removed forcefully to Shindo 1-ri in November, 1948, and 4 villagers were sacrificed. The villagers settled at the new location, guarding themselves with a self built fortress. The villagers didn’t return to their home village Saenamugot with the Restoration Order in 1950, marking the village “Lost Forever Village”.
- Jariwat: “The site of village Jariwat in Eodo 2-ku Aewol-eup Buk Jeju-gun was burned down during the 4 · 3 Incident. The gust of wind from the 4 · 3 Incident didn’t miss this village. The House Evacuation Order was affected in November, 1948, and the villagers had to move to the lower area village. The village was burned down, and 5 villagers were sacrificed during the procedure. The villagers settled at the entrance part of Shinmyeong-dong Bongseong-ri, and never returned to their home village Jariwat.”

The stone marks of listed above 12 villages describes the damages on the village and the detail of the dead village. However, some of those stone marks are missing the approximate time of the incident and descriptions of the dead village in detail. However there still lies for the villages a description of the dead village. Each description only states whether the village was burnt down to ash or burnt down following the House Evacuation Order, missing the responsible party of conducting the House Evacuation order and the village burning. The family members of victims from Gonheul village in Hwabuk-dong opposed throughout the installation process of the stone mark with these issues, concerning the details and the causes of the dead village being underestimated.<sup>16)</sup> Charted below are the approximate times and the causes of the dead village, number of victims and conducting perpetrators based on all data from existing investigations and testimonies for supplements. Although Gonheul village did not have a stone marker installed, it is still included in the report for when the 4 · 3 Incident Committee conducted their investigation, objecting the installation of a stone marker at Gonheul village.

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16) Ahn Myeong-bo (age 70, Jeju-si, a member of the Minbodan at the time), Testimony recorded on August 12, 2002.

□ Stone Mark- Status of Damages with ‘Lost Villages’

Village	Time	Reason	victims	Committed by	Evidence
Eowunul	November 1948	House Evacuation	13	Regiment Unit 9	Investigation /Testimony
Deurugureung	November 19 1948.	House Evacuation		Regiment Unit 9	Document
Youngnam village	November 1948	House Evacuation	50 Female	Suppression Troop	Document /Testimony
Darangshe	November 1948	House Evacuation	NIL	Suppression Troop	Document /Testimony
Koeteureu	November 13 1948	House Evacuation	40 Female	Regiment Unit 9	Document
Mudeungyiwhat	November 21 1948.	House Evacuation	10 Female	Suppression Troop	Document
Risangyi	November 20 1948	House Evacuation	50 Female	Suppression Troop	Stone Mark /Document
Billemot	November 13 1948	House Evacuation	20 Female		Stone Mark
Jariwat	Mid November 1948	House Evacuation	5	Suppression Troop	Stone Mark /Document
Billegareum	November 07 1948	Entire village burned down	25	Police, Stationed army at Taeheung-ri	Stone Mark /Investigation
Saenamugot	November 1948	House Evacuation	4		Stone Mark
Saekareum	November 15 1948	Entire village burned down	25	Military-Police	Stone Mark /Investigation
Gonheul Village	January 4 1949	Entire village siege burned down	30 Female	Suppression Troop- 1 platoon	Document /Testimony

Reference ※ Stone Mark (Committee built stone mark), Investigation (Data from Committee Research), Document (Book “Lost Villages” / “The 4 · 3 Incident Speaks”), Testimony (Deposition record from 4 · 3 Investigation Committee)

Further research locating more lost villages is needed on top of the 84 reported ‘Lost Villages’ from the 4 · 3 Incident together with detailed and systematic investigations for actual damages and conditions of each village. Further systematic and detailed investigations for more truth finding should follow once the comprehensive overall report is finished.

## B. Damage to Public Facilities

Damages to public facilities including schools, public offices, police stations, etc. were mostly committed by guerillas during the 4 · 3 Incident. The worst was with schools, being utilized for their billeting purposes. On the other hand, the schools and public facilities in the mountain area were burnt down and destroyed by military troops during the civil disturbance repression operation from November to December in 1948.<sup>17)</sup>

### Status of Damages on Public Facility

Type	Facility	Complete destruction			Partial destruction			Amount
		unit	no	amount	unit	no	amount	
Public Facility	Elementary School	school	45	440,370,000				440,370,000
	Middle school	school	1	43,730,000				43,730,000
	High school	school	1	18,740,000				18,470,000
	Library and books	book	1,350	10,940,000	bldg	1	5,000,000	15,940,000
	Seawater wall and revetment	meter	500		meter	500	50,000,000	50,000,000
	Ship basin				Small	25	100,000,000	100,000,000
	Oil tank facility				Small	1	1,500,000	1,500,000
	Salt area and storage	Bldg	15	3,000,000	Small	15	3,000,000	6,000,000
	Trusted store and storage	bldg	8	6,000,000	bldg	10	4,000,000	10,000,000

17) With regard to the damage done to elementary schools, schools located in coastal areas such as Taeheung Elementary School, Wimi Elementary School, Namwon Elementary School, Sehwa Elementary School, Gueom Elementary School, Dodu Elementary School, Oedo Elementary School, Samyang Elementary School, Hagwi Elementary School, Hwabuk Elementary School, Sinchon Elementary School, and Hado Elementary School were burnt down by the armed guerillas. Meanwhile, schools located in mid-mountainous areas such as Gwangryeong Elementary School, Nohyeong Elementary School, Bonggae Elementary School, Songdang Elementary School, Seonheul Elementary School, Daeheul Elementary School, Gasi Elementary School, Gueok Elementary School, Yeongpyeong Elementary School, Seogwang Elementary School, Donggwang Elementary School, Geumak Elementary School, Ara Elementary School, Jangjeon Elementary School, Goseong Elementary School, Dopyeong Elementary School, and Ora Elementary School were destroyed by the punitive forces. (Yoon Seok-chan, 4 · 3 Incident's Impact on the Jeju Education - Damage inflicted on Educational Facilities, master's thesis of Graduate School of Education, Jeju National University, 2001, pp.61-85).

Ice-plant machine				Case	50	8,000,000	8,000,000
Port facility				Case	1	1,000,000	1,000,000
Daycare center	Bldg	2	5,000,000				5,000,000
Daycare center equipment			740,000				740,000
Water plant	Small	4	240,000,000				240,000,000
Water pipe	M	30	120,000,000				120,000,000
Drain work line	M	50	120,000,000				120,000,000
Orphanage	Bldg	7	16,975,000				16,975,000
Orphanage Supply			2,500,000				2,500,000
Power plant				Pyung	50	2,500,000	2,500,000
Power line						5,000,000	5,000,000
Total			1,030,495,000			177,500,000	1,207,995,000

‘General Damages Caused by Jeju Riot’ shows the damage to public facilities by the 4·3 Incident, and the first date taken after the Incident settled down. They were submitted for the economic recovery subsidy request on February 10, 1950 by Governor Kim Chung-hui to Prime Minister. Damage to public facilities is as follows.

In 1953, the determined damage by the Damage Determination Team of Jeju Province was included in Jeju Province Brochure, describing the damages to public facilities and schools as follows.

Status of School Damage

		Status of Damages				Remark
		School	Classroom	Degree of damage	Total	
Elementary School	N.Jeju-gun	31	134	Total destruction 30 Demolition 1	312,340,000	
	S.Jeju-gun	45	180	Total destruction 43 Demolition 2	379,713,000	
	Sub total	76	314	Total destruction 73 Demolition 3	692,053,000	
Middle School	S.Jeju-gun	1	7	Total destruction 1	12,386,000	Seogwi Middle School
	Sub total	1	7	Total destruction 1	12,386,000	
Grand total		77	321	Total destruction 74 Demolition 3	704,439,000	

The damages to school facilities as in the index may not be accurate. It's because Jungmun School and Namwon High Public School were burnt down on top of Seogwi Middle School in the middle school category.<sup>18)</sup> Due to the destruction of school facilities, schools had to close and discontinue its education, causing enormous educational loss.

Besides the destruction of school facilities, multiple police stations and public offices were destroyed during armed conflicts between the Guerrillas and the Military and Police, causing paralysis of security and public administration. Especially, the offices of Andeok-myeon, Gujwa-myeon, Jungmun-myeon and Jocheon-myeon were incinerated, losing birth records of people,<sup>19)</sup> and at a high cost in manpower and budget for restoration. Besides the destruction of public facilities, property damage was enormous as well by blockages and destruction of roads, destroyed electric poles and damage to the means of transportation.

### **C. Industrial Damage**

The frequent attacks and the Suppression Operations by Military and Police throughout the 4 · 3 Incident caused multiple destruction and shutdowns of various industrial facilities. Due to armed conflicts, Jeju people experienced enormous property damage, including limited agricultural produce, loss of

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18) Yoon Seok-chan, *ibid.*, pp.60-61.

19) Jungmun-myeon office and Jocheon-myeon office were burnt down by the armed guerrillas on November 5, 1948 and November 11, 1948 respectively. Family registers and other documents were lost with the fires (Republic of Korea Gazette no. 98, May 27, 1949, Supreme Court Notice no. 11; Republic of Korea Gazette no. 168, September 2, 1949, Supreme Court Notice No. 21). Prior to these fires, at the same time of the 5 · 10 General Election, the armed guerrillas attacked and burned Andeok-myeon office, causing the loss of family registers there (Song Mun-su from Deoksu-ri, Andeok-myeon, Testimony recorded on July 19, 2002). On May 11, the armed guerrillas also burned down Gujwa-myeon office and family registers were lost (Kim Byeong-su from Pyeongdae-ri, Gujwa-myeon, Testimony recorded on November 20, 2001). Meanwhile, 14 volumes out of 20 volumes of family registers kept in Daejeong-myeon office were stolen on May 24, 1948 (Republic of Korea Gazette No. 99, May 30, 1949, Supreme Court Notice No. 13).

pasture raising cows and horses, bans of catches of fishermen and diving women. Further property damage occurred because Jeju people had to join Minbodan or Youth Defense Corps to participate in the suppression or guarding of their village, which made them unable to take care of their own livelihood. The industrial damage reflects as follow from the ‘General Damages Caused by Jeju Riot’ of February 1950.

Status of Damages on Industrial Sector

Class	Facility	Complete Destruction			Partial Destruction			Total Damage
		Unit	Number	Amount	Unit	Number	Amount	
M A R I N e	Whaling work area					3	5,200,000	5,200,000
	Trawler & fishing gear	Ship Case	1	27,000,000				27,000,000
	Trail net & fishing gear	Ship Case	3	51,000,000				51,000,000
	Ring net &	Ship Case	6	30,000,000				30,000,000
	Steamer &	Ship Case	90	135,000,000				135,000,000
	Diver Boat	Ship Case	3	2,100,000		2	900,000	3,000,000
	Sailboat	Ship Case	200	140,000,000		130	75,000,000	215,000,000
	Gillnetter &	Ship Case	30	12,000,000		20	300,000	15,000,000
	Squarenetter		30	15,000,000		30	6,000,000	21,000,000
	Sweep line vessel & gear		30	9,000,000		30	3,000,000	12,000,000
	Man line Vessel & gear		15	9,000,000		15	1,500,000	10,500,000
	Net vessels & fish gears		50	7,500,000		560	7,500,000	15,000,000
	Packing com & machine		10	10,000,000		10	5,000,000	15,000,000
	Seaweed processing factory					10	5,000,000	5,000,000
	Shell processing factory		20	5,000,000				5,000,000
	Shell factory & machine		5	2,500,000				2,500,000
	Live fish carrying vessel		2	9,000,000		3	6,000,000	15,000,000
	Live fish carry		20	1,000,000				1,000,000

	Fish carry vessel		2	1,050,000		3	4,500,000	5,550,000	
	Command Ship		5	5,000,000				5,000,000	
	Diving suit equipment		12,000 36,000	24,000,000 156,000,000				24,000,000 156,000,000	
	Deficit-union		6	15,000,000				15,000,000	
	Deficit-contingent		6	45,000,000				45,000,000	
	Total			956,150,000			169,400,000	1,125,550,000	
A g r i c u l t u r e	Food crop		164,016	423,674 · 347				423,674,347	
	Raw Cotton		62,449	30,572,450				30,572,450	
	Pyrethrum		181,159	181,159,000				181,159,000	
	Shigyul		578,000	289,000,000				289,000,000	
	General farm tool		193,318	124,640,000				124,640,000	
	Public farm tool		7,021	50,901,000				50,901,000	
	Self-sufficient manure plant		41,584	419,880,000				419,880,000	
	Country public facility		905	116,320,000				116,320,000	
	Sericulture equipment		200,484	23,262,880				23,000,000	
	Rural dwells		37,951	5,692,650,000				5,692,650,000	
	Total				7,352,059,677				7,352,059,677
	O t h e r	Store		560	672,000,000				672,000,000
Selling good				504,000,000				504,000,000	
Equipment				56,000,000				56,000,000	
Garment Furniture				168,000,000				168,000,000	
Total					1,400,000,000			1,400,000,000	
L i v e s t o c k	Cow		17,856	892,800,000				892,800,000	
	Horse		6,009	180,270,000				180,270,000	
	Milk cow		31	3,100,000				3,100,000	
	Sheep		127	1,900,000				1,900,000	
	Goat		72	1,080,000				1,080,000	
	Pig		2,387	230,870				230,870,000	
	Chicken		25,350	25,350,000				25,350,000	
	Milbong		12,000	180,000,000				180,000,000	
	Manager		131	78,600,000				78,600,000	
	Observing dwelling		131	13,100,600				13,100,000	
Total		131	6,550,000				6,550,000		
W o o d  c r o p s	Forest tree		700	126,000,000				126,000,000	
	Forest tree		2000	6,000,000				6,000,000	
	Charcoal		68	714,000				714,000	
	Charcoal storage		34	1,700,000				1,700,000	
	Lumber		100	150,000				150,000	
	Gallnut		4,000	280,000				280,000	
	Acorn		50	150,000				150,000	
	Arrow-root		5,500	3,300,000				3,300,000	
	Geongweol		40,000	6,000,000				6,000,000	

Medicinal herbs		40,000	6,000,000				6,000,000	
Mushroom		10,000	760,000				760,000	
Chesnut		5	100,000				100,000	
Camilia		50	350,000				350,000	
Chungmo		10,000	2,000,000				2,000,000	
Yoooh		20	120,000				120,000	
Jeom		130,000	8,320,000				8,320,000	
Yellow berries		150,000	75,000,000				75,000,000	
Tea plant		111	22,200,000				22,200,000	
Myopo & office		1	2,000,000				2,000,000	
Myopo dormitory		1	700,000				700,000	
Myopo storage		1	500,000				500,000	
Guard box		1	450,000				450,000	
Office		1	320,000				320,000	
Workman dormitory		36	10,800,000				10,800,000	
Drying room		21	73,500,000				73,500,000	
Storage		7	700,000				700,000	
Bamboo grove		27	6,480,000				6,480,000	
Cnidium officinale		5	7,500,000				7,500,000	
Korean angelica root		5	3,500,000				3,500,000	
Sayssyrea root		5	4,500,000				4,500,000	
Fennel seed		5	10,000,000				10,000,000	
Rehmannia root		10	45,000,000				45,000,000	
Nepta herb		2	15,000,000				15,000,000	
Cassis seed		3	2,500,000				2,500,000	
Safflower		5	7,500,000				7,500,000	
Peony		5	25,000,000				25,000,000	
Pinellia ternate		5	12,500,000				12,500,000	
Total			3,224,210,000				3,224,210,000	
I n d u s t r y	Food process factory facility			bldg	1	9,768,970	9,768,970	
	Baking factory facility			bldg	3	10,839,660	10,839,660	
	Starch factory facility			bldg	3	112,412,057	112,412,057	
	Shell factory facility			bldg	1	10,000,000	10,000,000	
	Shipyard facility			bldg	1	12,436,527	12,436,527	
	Trade ship yard facility			bldg	3	3,257,450	3,257,450	
	Machinery factory facility			bldg	3	10,050,400	10,050,400	
	Lumberjack factory facility/wood		250	2,500,000	bldg	3	8,000,000	8,000,000 2,500,000
	Fat and oil factory facility				bldg	1	4,500,000	4,500,000
	Total			2,500,000			181,265,064	183,765,064

The Livestock Damage report by Jejudo (1953) and damages on livestock, forest and produce due to the 4 · 3 Incident filled by Section Chief of Society, Kim In-hwa (1963) show the following.

Livestock Damage

Type	Cow	Horse	Pig	Sheep	Total	Honey	Total
Numbers	9,000	6,546	14,876	90	22,342	743	53,957
Amount (unit: 1,000 won)	7,200,000	1,963,800	1,487,600	13,500	223,420	111,450	10,999,770

From: *Jeju Province Brochure*(1953)

Forest Damage

Livestock				Forest	Produce			
Cow	Horse	Pig	Other	Tactical lumber. Set fire	Rice (Unit: ho)	Potatoes (Unit: Gwan)	Raw cotton (Unit: Geun)	Vegetable (Unit: Gwan)
17,860	6,009	22,989	25,413	1,173	135,415	4,196,113 (1,565 ton)	97.356 (36t)	899.86 (336t)

From: Kim In-hwa (1963) ‘Victims of the 4 · 3 Incident Return to Home Status’ included in *Jejudo the 8<sup>th</sup>* issue

The suspensions of production lines and exchanges over various industries affected the unemployment rate of Jeju directly. The situation continued for long periods, and the unemployment rate of Jeju worsened by people’s hiding in the mountain, coastal camp living conditions, guarding villages and being recruited for suppression operations. Such factors are clearly demonstrated in the following statistics on unemployed per industry and province by the Labor Bureau, the Ministry of Society as of May 1949.<sup>20)</sup> The farming category reached over the national average, and fishery, manufacturing and commerce show high rates compared to other areas. The population of Jeju at that time totaled 1.26% of the national population,<sup>21)</sup> but 73,263 unemployed represented

20) Republic of Korea. Statistical Summation. No. 5. May 1949. American Embassy Despatch No 416. July 6, 1949.

8.24% of the national rate. Approximately thirty percent (28.8%) of the entire Jeju population was unemployed. In other words, together with the victims of the 4 · 3 Incident, the survivors still suffered through the extreme hardships of life.

□ From the Labor Bureau, the Ministry of Society (May 1949)

Province	Farm	Fishery	Mining	Factory	Trade	Transport	Other	Total
Seoul	13,904	2,206	2,601	14,791	19,013	3,239	27,387	83,141
Gyeonggi	20,818	1,272	3,788	8,901	7,204	2,189	14,338	58,510
Chungbuk	21,696	511	3,414	1,647	2,572	378	3,607	33,825
Chungnam	40,304	1,954	7,349	6,292	8,479	1,205	8,475	74,058
Gyeongbuk	59,974	2,118	10,178	13,043	17,819	4,479	17,702	125,303
Gyeongnam	82,260	11,843	7,580	24,188	37,803	8,824	35,992	202,985
Jeonbuk	82,396	2,200	5,051	5,122	12,808	1,901	7,967	117,445
Jeonnam	63,440	4,815	6,245	10,024	8,509	1,651	8,562	103,246
Gangwon	11,690	1,057	920	798	1,194	103	1,631	17,393
Jeju	65,934	994		1,573	4,762			73,263
Total								889,169

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21) As of May 1, 1949, the total number of the population in Korea was tallied as 20,188,641. The total number of the population in Jeju was 254,589, accounting for 1.26% of the total population in Korea.



## V. Conclusions of the Investigation Report

Excluding the Korean War in modern Korean history, the 4 · 3 Incident was the most tragic incident that happened in Jeju during the US Military Government regime, recording the most number of human victims. However, there hasn't been any detailed or comprehensive truth finding attempts over the past 50 years, bringing many complaints. With the Jeju 4 · 3 Special Law enactment on January 12, 2000, the national level investigation finally has taken off.

The background of incidents is complicated from various reasons, making it difficult to explain. Around the end of The Pacific War, hub of Northeast Asia Jeju Island experienced an extreme population increase by 60,000 returning Japanese army to block the US Army's landing in Korea. Quite different from the expectations, many negatives influenced the society, including high unemployment rate of returned residents, lack of necessities, hundreds of people suffered from Cholera, extremely bad crop harvests and social issues like failure of Rice Policy, structural shift change of Japanese police into military police and military commanders' profiteering. The 3 · 1 Shooting Incident (1947) within such social atmosphere worsened the social sentiment.

Six people were dead and eight were seriously wounded in the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident by the police. The police fired at the demonstrators but it turned out that the victims were mainly bystanders who just went out to watch the parade. This shooting incident later led to the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident. After the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident, the Jeju chapter of the South Korean Labor Party began to mount a systematic opposition against the police. The 3 · 10 General Strike against the Police Firing was participated by over 95% of Jeju businesses including public agencies and civic enterprises, marking an unprecedented history of demonstration.

Acknowledging its seriousness, the US Military Government dispatched an investigation team to Jeju and concluded the general strike of residents was

caused from antipathy and people protested against the Police firing at civilians and the instigations of the South Korean Labor Party increased the ongoing antipathy.

But the after measure took a strong offensive policy by placing more blame on the ‘Instigations of the South Korean Labor Party’ than the ‘Police Firing’. Every military commander and the Governor of Jeju were replaced by outside personnel, and the Support Police and members of the Seobuk Young Men’s Association came down to Jeju to arrest the leaders of the strikes. Five hundred were arrested within one month, and 2,500 were imprisoned within one year until right before the 4·3 Incident. Terrorism and torturing continued. In March 1948, 3 deaths caused by torture occurred in front line police stations. Jeju society soon faced a simmering crisis. The Jeju chapter of the South Korean Labor Party was going through a crisis from exposure of its organizational structure.

The new defensive leaders of the Jeju chapter of the South Korean Labor Party exploited public sentiment against the military government for two objectives reasons: as their means for structural guard and defense, and two, as a tool to form their armed struggle, claiming it was a patriotic struggle to oppose blockages in the ongoing political situation. The armed uprising began with 350 guerrillas attacking 12 frontline police stations and the Right-wing Organizations at 2am, April, 1948. The Guerrillas demanded the stop of oppression by the Police and the Seobuk Young Men’s Association, and opposed the blockages and requested a unified government. The US Military Government thought it was a security situation in the beginning and wanted to prevent the situation by increasing the Police and the Seobuk Young Men’s Association. The situation didn’t get any better, so Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, US Commander and director William F. Dean, Military General ordered the Guard to mobilize the repression operations. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Kim Ik-ryeol, Chief of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment reached for peace negotiations with the leader of Guerrilla Kim Dal-sam via 4·28 Peace Negotiations. However, Peace Negotiations were broken by the ‘Ora-ri arson incident’ delivered by the Right-wing Organization Youth. The US Military Government

tried to succeed the 5 · 10 Elections by assigning Colonel Rothwell H. Brown, Chief of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel M W. Schewe, Operations Staff of Corps 24 to Jeju and replacement of the Chief of Guard the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment. Only 2 election districts in Jeju out of 200 national districts were voided for majority of under rule for the 5 · 10 Election. The US Military Government appointed Colonel Rothwell H. Brown as Top Commander of Jeju and tried to hold the 6 · 23 re-elections with intense repression operations but failed. On May 20, 41 guards escaped and joined the guerrillas, and the incoming Chief of Regiment, Colonel Park Jin-gyeong, was assassinated on June 18. The Jeju situation entered a brief lull period.

Guerrilla forces reorganized threw structure, attending the Haeju Conference held by leader Kim Dal-sam and his cabinet. The military and police oppression troop deployed loose repression operations. The lull status was at its end. The Jeju Incidents were now beyond the boundary of local issues and recognized as a challenge to the legitimacy of the regime. The Rhee Syng-man government established the Jeju Defense Patrol Headquarters on October 11<sup>th</sup> and dispatched additional army personnel from the mainland to Jeju. However, The 14<sup>th</sup> Regiment of Yeosu opposed the decision to go to Jeju and the situation got tangled. Martial Law was proclaimed in Jeju on November 17<sup>th</sup>. Song Yo-chan, the Chief of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment had announced the policy for any pedestrians through the mountainous area more than 5km inward from the coastal line would be assumed to be a mob and would be shot to death. The extreme repression operations, and devastation to the mountainous villages started from this point.

The US Army Information Reports clearly reveals the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment decided on a mass slaughter plan of villagers under the presumption that all villagers located in the mountain area must have contacts with guerrillas and be helping them. After the proclamation of Martial Law, an enormous number of mountainous villagers suffered. Mountainous villagers and civilians who even went down to the coastal villages were killed for cooperating with the guerrillas. More refugees evacuated into the Mt. Hallasan area to survive, but the refugees were shot to death or sent to prison once caught in the cold winter season. The

battling military and police killed immediate family members if any family member was missing for a check, accusing them of being a ‘fugitive’s family’. By the end of December, the Riot Troop was transferred from the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment, but Ham Byeong-seon, the Chief of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment continued the oppression.

Many civilians were killed without proper trial procedures. The Bukchon Incidents resulting in the most victims were committed by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment. In March 1949, Jeju Area.

Battle Headquarters was established, operating the combination of tasks between the oppression and the pacification. The new commander Yoo Jae-heung announced his amnesty plan, forgiving the returned people from Mt. Hallasan hideouts. Many civilians returned. On May 10, 1949, the re-election took place successfully. In June 1949, the head of the guerrillas, Lee Deok-gu was shot to death, destroying of the guerrilla force. However, a newer tragedy followed the Korean War. Members of the Report Union, people on black lists and family members of runways were separated as preventive custody and were killed. Summary convictions were applied for the nationwide prisoners who were involved in the 4 · 3 Incident. About 3,000 victims were estimated being affected under the preventive custodies or imprisonments. The bereaved families are still not able to locate the remains of most victims. There were slight resistance attempts from guerrillas. The Mt. Hallasan banned areas were reopened on September 21, 1954. The 4 · 3 Incident was finally finished, taking 7 years and 7 months from the time of the 3 · 1 National Independence Day Incidents (1947), and which was triggered by the 4 · 3 Armed Incident (1948). The 4 · 3 Incident resulted in significant numbers of civilians being killed during the conflicts between guerrilla forces and the Search Teams. The time frames originated from the Police Firing on March 1, 1947, and the Jeju South Korea Labor Party Guerrillas started armed uprisings against the oppression of the Seobuk Young Men’s Association on April 3, 1948 and, finally, when the Mt. Hallasan ban was removed on September 21, 1954. The following list includes the main controversies regarding the investigation.

- Multiple factors have caused the incidents. First of all, Jeju society was highly sensitive to the shooting incidents on March 1, 1947. Prejudiced administration enactments by the non Jeju born Governor, frequent arrests by police and the Seobuk Young Men's Association, terrorism and torture, and deaths followed. It could be argued that the 4·3 Incident was triggered by the defensive Jeju South Korea Labor Party's attempt to integrate such a situation with their anti-movements against the 5·10 General Election by attacking police stations, etc.
- No direct evidence of the Central South Korean Labor Party's involvement in the 4·3 Incident has been found. However, it is clear wrongdoing of the armed guerrillas under the control of the Jeju chapter of the South Korean Labor Party that they killed military, police, election managers and civilians, including families of military and police. Thus, the fact that leader of the armed Guerrilla, Kim Dal-sam and his cabinet attended Haeju Conference in August 1948 and supported the establishment of people's democracy only accelerated the bloodshed.
- The Guerrilla was an affiliated organization of the Jeju South Korea Labor Party military, and had their crack unit as a task force, supporting self defense unit and special force. About 350 persons were mobilized on April 3. It is believed that less than 500 Guerrillas acted throughout the entire 4·3 Incident. For weapons, the force began with 30 rifles on April 3 and the number of weapons increased through the attacks on police stations and hideout incidents of the Guards going into the mountains.
- Precise calculation of victims, including dead or missing from the 4·3 Incident is extremely difficult. The reported number of victims with the committee is 14,028. However, we cannot say the reported number includes the total victims. There still are many undeclared and unidentified victims. The main survey estimated the total number of victims to be between 25,000~30,000, considering various resources and population fluctuation

factors. The survey considered 27,219 per Kim Yong-ha, Governor's report in April, 1950 and 3,000 of those preventive custodies and prisoners post the Korean War, but the estimation still requires further detailed verifications.

- The statistics of the assailants who killed the victims reported to the Committee is as follows: Punitive Force 78.1% (10,955 people), Guerrillas 12.6% (1,764 people), Others 9% (1,266 people). Excluding the 'other' category, the total violence was committed between the Punitive Force and the Guerrillas with 86.1% and 13.9% of the forces respectively. The statistics match with the US Army records, reporting that over 80% was killed by the Punitive Force. Such immoral excessive suppression includes the victims of children under 10 years old (5.8%, or 814 persons), seniors over 61 (6.1%, or 860 persons), representing 11.9% of the total victims, and females (21.3%, or 2,985 persons).
- About 180 military personnel and 140 policemen were estimated to be killed during the Jeju suppression operations. The victims of the right-wing organizations, including the Seobuk Young Men's Association, Daecheong and Minbodan thru the 4 · 3 Incident were granted 'National Veteran' status and receive nationally privileged supports. 639 veterans thru the 4 · 3 Incident are reported with the Ministry of Patriots-Veterans.
- 500~700 members of the Seobuk Young Men's Association came to Jeju prior to the 4 · 3 Incident and had many conflicts with civilians and their immoral behaviors are believed to be one of the main reasons for the 4 · 3 Incident. The members consisted of 500 people right after the 4 · 3 Incident and 1,000 by the end of 1948. They participated in the process of the suppression, wearing uniforms of policemen or military. The torture resulting in the death of the Director of General Affairs of Jeju Province was committed by the Seobuk Young Men's Association. Enough documents and testimonies verify that President Rhee Syng-man and the US Army

approved the dispatch of the Seobuk Young Men's Association in Jeju.

- The Suppression Operation by the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment from November, 1948 brought the most tragic result, burning the mountainous villages to the ground. Over 95% of the mountainous villages were burnt down and many people were affected from the Suppression Operation. 39,285 dwellings were set on fire and destroyed, throughout the 4 · 3 Incident. The Suppression Operation brought 20,000 homeless civilians from the mid-mountainous area drive out them to the mountain areas. Around same time, the Guerrillas attacked and burnt the private houses and victimized civilians. The worst cases of villages recorded victims from 30 to 50 civilians per village from Sehwa, Seongeup and Namwon.
- Summary Convictions without fair public trials on Jeju were sent down from the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment. The worst massacre on civilians 'The Bukchon Incidents' was committed by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment, killing 400 residents, regardless of gender or age. According to the filed reports and resources within the Committee, a total of 45 villages each reported over 100 victims per village.
- Various scope of researches concluded the total of two Court-martials regarding the 4 · 3 Incident on 2,530 persons, including 871 persons on December, 1948 and 1,659 persons on June 1949 did not follow the legal procedures as follows: no court records or protocols of trials were found, no trial existed, testimonies of those involved of receiving pro forma sentences after an actual imprisonment, hundreds of people/day were handled without any trial, the killing of 345 persons never was reported in public media and the bodies were buried secretly.
- Some people claim the 4 · 3 Martial Law (enforced on November 17, 1948 and released on December 31, 1948) was illegal since it was enforced without any legal grounds before the establishment of the Martial Law

while others argue the Japanese Martial Law still continues its legal grounds, making the 4 · 3 Martial Law legal. The report doesn't want to debate the legal grounds of the Martial Law in Jeju but would point out the enforcement of the Martial Law breakaway went over its limitations. Under Martial Law, frequent summary convictions continued. Military commanders at that time did not know about the Martial Law well enough, and the Chief of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment and the Chief of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment who participated in Jeju Operations in 1949 after the release of the Martial Law still believed the Martial Law was being continued per their testimonies.

- The first responsibility lies on the Chief of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment and Chief of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment for the Suppression Operations, burning down the mountainous villages with the commanding structures on group victims. Over 80% of the total deaths occurred within the first 6 months (October 1948 - March 1949) of the two Chiefs' operations. However the ultimate responsibility goes to President Rhee Syng-man. President Rhee Syng-man declared the Martial Law and the research also found President Rhee directly ordered the Suppression Operation on the January 1949 Cabinet meeting, saying "The US acknowledges the importance of Korea and is sympathetic. But the US's assistance will only be possible with our accurate removal of the aftereffects of Jeju Incidents and Jeonnam Incidents and the dignity of law is needed at once by suppressing villains including local objectors and thieves."
- The US Military Government and the Provisional Military Advisory Group (PNAG) are not free from being responsible for the occurrence and suppression of the 4 · 3 Incident. Such incidents occurred under the US Military Government regime and the US Army Colonel in Jeju directly commanded the Suppression Operation. The US Army continued Operational Control on Korea after the establishment of the Republic of Korea under the US/Korea Military Convention and supplied weapons and observation aircrafts for the Suppression Operation. Also the US praised the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment's

Operation, burning down the mountainous villages as a ‘Successful Operation’, and one record reveals Commodore William L. Roberts, director of the US Military Advisors requested to the Korean Government to announce publically of Regiment Chief, Song Yo-chan’s active involvements via Presidential Statement.

- The damages affected by the Guilt-by-association System reached an extreme level also. Regardless of being guilty or innocent, the family members of the dead by the Military and Police Punitive Force during the 4·3 Incident were under observation and were also limited for a majority of social engagements under the Guilt-by-association System. The scars of the 4·3 Incident was passed down to the bereaved. Jeju people and the bereaved suffered through the Red Complex of the Guilt-by-association System with no legal grounds. In 1981, the Guilt-by Association System was revoked, freeing people from its restrictions, but the psychological damage of the bereaved still continues.

In 1948, an International Treaty regarding the preventions and punishments of massacre stated ‘Massacre violates the object and spirit of UN and is a crime to the terms of International Law thus shall be punished by the civil world. The Geneva Convention (1949) clearly stated the banning of △ voluntary manslaughter △ inhumane activities including torture △ calculated persecutions or committing mayhems △ mass destructions and plundering to justify any military purposes on civilians even at war time. The Geneva Convention further declares not to accept any judgment or delivery of any verdict by a trial without guaranty of judicial security.

Such basic rules of civilized society, reflecting international standards were ignored in Jeju in 1948. It was the national authorities who broke the rules and killed civilians. The Punitive Force’s killings of unarmed civilians without proper trial procedures, including children and elders were severe violence according to human rights standards and there were serious mistakes. We can conclude Jeju became the poorest victim of the Cold War Era and such

preventive factors delayed the truth commission of the 4 · 3 Incident for the last 50 years.

Despite multilateral efforts, we cannot be sure if the report succeeded in revealing a clear picture of the 4 · 3 Incident. We felt the most inconvenience regarding the wasted documents from involved agencies including the Police. Military commanders refused to testify and there were failures in securing confidential documents from the US.

The Government must learn from such a tragedy and make sure not to repeat these grave injustices to human rights. The committee fully expects that government level consolations take place for the victims and the bereaved, and that government level actions restore the honor of the victims and the bereaved.

# Appendix



## 1. Presidential Statement Regarding the 4 · 3 Incident

Respectable people of Jeju, the bereaved of the 4 · 3 Incident and citizens of Korea, 55 years ago, here in a peaceful island of Jeju occurred the 4 · 3 Incident, a tragedy of the modern history of Korea. Jeju people experienced enormous loss of life and property caused by debris of the historic situation being caught in between the international cold era and national division of Korea.

Prior to my visit to Jeju, I have received the resolved results via Committee conducted thru investigations of the past 2 years according to the Special Law for Investigation of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident and Honoring Victims, and the respectable Committee is formed by eminent persons of various circles. The Committee has suggested the government level apologies for those occurred sacrifices restore victims' honors and establish memorial projects for the victims.

I, as the President, do believe the time has come for us to conclude the historic tragedy that occurred between our Independence from the Japanese colonic regime, to the establishment of Korea.

Many innocent Jeju civilians were sacrificed starting from March 1, 1947 and through the Armed Uprising of the Jeju Chapter of the South Korean Labor Party on April 3, 1948, then to the armed conflicts and suppression operations until September 21, 1954.

I, as the President, holding responsibility of government accept the Committee's suggestion and truly extend my official apology for the wrong doings of those national authorities in the past. I also cherish the sacrificed spirits and pray for the repose of the innocent victims.

The Government will support the 4 · 3 Peace Park building and immediate honor restorations of the victims at once.

Respectable Citizens of Korea,

Truth commissioning and the honor restorations are not limited to the direct victims and the bereaved. We have objectives to promise a much brighter

future by cherishing the enormous patriotic contributions of unnamed people, during the establishment process of sovereignty of Korea, self-examine past mistakes from the truth investigation, and then accomplish true reconciliation.

We can expand the human value of ‘peace and human rights’ by sublimation of the lesson from the 4·3 Incident. We can put an end to all sorts of conflicts and separations with our collaboration and reconciliation and bring peace in the Korean Peninsula hence opening the path of peace in Northeast Asia and the world.

Respectable People of Jeju,

You have reconstructed such a beautiful peace Island, Jeju, from the ruins with your bare hands, and I extend my respect to the people of Jeju for your hard work. Jeju will mark the emblem of human rights and an island of peace from now on. Citizens of Korea, I will help the cause and make it come true. Thank you.

October 31, 2003.  
President Roh Moo-hyun

## 2. Diary of 4 · 3 Incident

### Year 1947

- 3. 1 ■ Jeju Democratic People's Front hosted the 28<sup>th</sup> 3 · 1 Commemoration Celebration. 3 · 1 Shooting Incident, killing 6 persons and wounding 8 persons occurred by Police Reserve's firing in front of Gwandukjeong and Provincial General Hospital.
- 3. 5 ■ Jeju chapter of the South Korean Labor Party formed The Jejudo 3 · 1 Conflict Countermeasure Committee
- 3. 7 ■ The South Korean Labor Party Jeju chapter circulated orders, regarding 3 · 1 Conflict Countermeasure to each Eup and Myeon committee.
- 3. 8 ■ The joint investigation team (Commandant Colonel Castier) of the US Military Government and Korea US Army Commends visited Jeju to investigate 3 · 1 Shooting Incident.
- 3. 10 ■ General strikes protesting the 3 · 1 incident started by provincial governments, civic and public agencies. 16 agencies and organizations (95% of entire business on the island) joined the protest by 13<sup>th</sup>.
- 3. 12 ■ Vice Chief Choi Gyeong-jin (National Police Agency) said in his report regarding Jeju Incidents "90% of Jeju people tend to fall for leftist."
- 3. 14 ■ Chief Jo Byeong-ok (National Police Agency) visited Jeju to investigate Jeju protest. He announced a proclamation regarding the situation on Jeju.
  - Members of Udo Mincheong, burnt down Udo police box sign post.
  - Park Gyeong-hun Governor of Jeju turned in his resignation with Starwood the Minister of Jeju Military Government
- 3. 15 ■ 222 additional police (122 Jeonnam police & 100 Jeonbuk police) arrived in Jeju
  - Chief Jo Byeong-ok (National Police Agency) ordered to arrest ringleaders of protests.
- Mid-March ■ The US Army established CIC Jeju Branch
- 3. 16 ■ Established Special Investigation Unit (Supervisor: Lee Ho) with Jeju officers. The Unit arrested and investigated leaders of strike workplace.
- 3. 17 ■ Jungmun Police Box Unit fired and 8 protesting civilians were injured.

- The protesters were demanding to release prisoners.
- 3. 18 ■ 99 officers from Gyeonggi Police arrived in Jeju. Total number of Police Reserves increased to 421.
    - Kang In-su, Jeju Police Inspector General announced "Total number of arrest regarding 3 · 1 Incidents is around 200 persons."
  - 3. 20 ■ Jo Byeong-ok, the Chief of National Police Agency, reported via his 3 · 1 Incident Investigation Statement "Firing of District 1 Police was an act of self-defense while the firing in front of Province General Hospital was act of immoral."
    - The US Military Government Information Team reported "Both Left and Right participate in Jeju General Strike, and 70% of Jeju people are followers of leftist organization."
  - 3. 22 ■ The South Korean Labor Party engaged in 3 · 22 Nationwide General Strike for 24 hours.
  - 3. 24 ■ The Inquiry Commission of National Police Agency decided to dismiss Shin U-gyun former Jeju Inspector General for committed corruptions.
  - 3. 26 ■ School parents of Jeju Buk Elementary strongly requested to release the arrested teachers.
  - 3. 28 ■ National Police Agency announced "2,176 leaders of the strike were arrested nationwide, including 230 leaders from Jeju."
  - 3. 31 ■ 10 leaders of Jeju province, including Im Gwan-ho, Director of Industry arrested.
  - 4. 1 ■ Jo Byeong-ok the Chief of National Police Agency announced dismissals of 66 Jeju police officers who were involved in the strike.
  - 4. 2 ■ Lieutenant Colonel Veros took the post of Jeju Military General.
  - 4. 10 ■ Yoo Hae-jin from Jeonbuk province appointed as Governor of Jeju
    - Jeju Police announced 500 persons were arrested regarding the strike, and 260 persons from 500 were turned in for military trial
  - 4. 28 ■ 245 additional Railroad Police replaced Support Police of Jeju, increasing the capacity of Jeju Police to 500.
    - Lieutenant commander Jang Chang-guk, Chief of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment posted an advertisement, recruiting the Korea Constabulary members in Jeju Shinbo(newspaper) with a following statement; 'The Korea Constabulary doesn't take any side between Right and Left.'
  - 5. 6 ■ Jeju District Attorney's Office announced "Number of defendants prosecuted by Jeju District Attorney's Office for 3 · 1 incidents is 328."

- 5. 7 ■ 400 members of the police reserves withdrew from Jeju.
- 5. 21 ■ US. Soviet joint committee resumed
  - Lee Chi-eop Lieutenant commander succeeded Jang Chang-guk, the Commander of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment.
- 5. 23 ■ Sentencing for 328 cases regarding 3 • 1 Shooting Incident were completed. Punishment: 52, Probation: 52, Fine: 56, Indictment: 168
- 5. 24 ■ Kang Dong-hyo, Chief of Police District 1 got dismissed from his position for receiving bribe.
- 5. 26 ■ Chief of Hallim Police and Deputy were arrested for suspect torturing.
- 6. 1 ■ Police arrested 20 junior high school students of Jeju for distributing hand outs.
- 6. 2 ■ 9<sup>th</sup> graders from Jeju Girls Junior High School went on group strike against fascism education.
- 6. 6 ■ Commonly known 6.6 Incident took place at Jongdal-ri Gujwa-myeon. 3 officers on duty, enforcing for Mincheong gathering were assaulted by young villagers.
- 6. 16 ■ Jeju Police announced "Fugitives regarding Jongdal-ri Incidents is believed to be 71."
- 6. 18 ■ 10 Jocheon Middle School students received sentences for posting hand outs.
- 6. 20 ■ Charges against many young villagers for distributing hand outs were filed.
- 6. 22 ■ Jeju Shinbo reported '317,118won was paid out for condolence money for the victims of 3 • 1 Incidents.'
- 7. ■ Organization Jeju Minjeon(Chairman: Hyeon Gyeong-ho) was registered for re-establishment with Jeju Island.
- 7. 3 ■ Seniors of Jeju Agricultural School protested for the student's expelling decision from probation status for passing hand outs.
- 7. 14 ■ Kim Yeong-bae, Inspector General of Jeju police after commissioners' meeting said "We'll do everything for the federated operation among lefties and righties in Jeju."
- 7. 18 ■ Park Gyeong-hun, former Governor, became Head of Jeju Democratic People's Front.
- 7. 19 ■ Yeo Wun-hyeong, leader of Geunro Inmindang Party was assassinated
- 7. 28 ■ Veros, Lieutenant Colonel of Jeju Military General said "Anyone can become a public worker regardless the political party of right or left or

same rule applied for any involved persons, and that is rule of democracy.”

- Late July ■ Conflict between farmers, apposing summer rice collection and right wing young members at Myoungwol-ri, Hallim-myeon.
- 8. 7 ■ Anti handout circulated, saying 'Withdraw the US Army from Jeju!'  
■ Jeju CIC reported "The extreme rightwing friendly governor of Jeju is not popular among leftists, and enormous number of handout demanding assassination of him circulated."
- 8. 8 ■ Managers, encouraging barley purchase were attacked by the village young men at Donggwang-ri, Andeok-myeon.
- 8. 12 ■ The US Military Government started a large scale Arresting Operation of the involved leftists in 8 · 15 Violence Conspiracy Incidents. 13,769 persons arrested nationwide.
- 8. 13 ■ Police, during their chase of a boy who were caught posting handouts, fired and 3 villagers were wounded at Bukchon-ri, Jocheon-myeon.
- 8. 19 ■ Anti rice collection hand outs passed throughout Jeju Island.
- 8. 28 ■ Governor Yoo Hae-jin started personnel maintenance with suggestive resigning of 4 supervisors including Lee Gwan-seok of Education Affairs.
- 8. 31 ■ Summer rice collecting rate 67.6%, Jeju recorded the lowest with 13.7%.
- 9. 7 ■ Park Tae-hun, Head of Jeju Food Affair Office was attacked at his house by unidentified young men. Later the attackers were found to be members of the Seobuk Young Men's Association.
- 9. 8 ■ A man claiming a staff from Dept of Inspector General's attacked Hyeon Gyeong-ho, principal of Jeju Middle School and former chairman of Jeju People's Democratic Front. Jeju CIC investigated and found he was a member of the Northwest Young Men's Association.
- 9. 17 ■ 2<sup>nd</sup> US/Russia committee broke down. The US submitted Korean Peninsula issue with UN.
- 9. 21 ■ 22 Rightwing young men's organizations federated, forming the Daedong Youth Corps.
- 9. 27 ■ Department of Investigation at Jeju Police arrested 36 people, including employees of the management office of daily necessities (Sangpilmumyoungdan) and teachers of Jeju Agricultural School and Jeju Middle School for possessing the RED papers.
- 10. 6 ■ An Se-hun, Head of Jeju People's Democratic Front was sentenced for a probation for leading the 3 · 1 Independence Movement Day

- ceremony and the parade by Jeju District Court.
- 10. 7 ■ 5 Daecheon (Greak Korean Youth Corps) members and 11 local young men were arrested for a conflict at Hangwon-ri, Gujwa-myeon.
  - 10. 18 ■ Police Support Association launched (President: Hong Sun-yong)
  - 10. 19 ■ Jeju CIC reported "CIC is investigating those related members of Daedong Youth Coprs, enacting terrorism at a village of island's east side to expand their membership.
  - 10. 21 ■ Daedong Youth Corps of Jeju established by a federation between 2 previously separated branches, including Dokcheong and Gwangcheong.
  - 10. 24 ■ Jeju CIC reported to headquarter "The recent federation of Daedong Youth Corps of Jeju was only possible with our full dedication."
  - 11. 2 ■ The Seobuk Young Men's Association Jeju Headquarter established (Chairman: Jang Dong-cheon).
  - 11. 3 ■ Dean, Director, US Army Military General of Battalion 3 of Jeju inagurated.
    - Kim Yeong-bae, Inspector General of Jeju Police announced a warning, in responding of illegally forced donations from civilians by private organizations.
  - 11. 5 ■ New night curfew period to be between 10pm to 5am.
  - 11. 12 ■ US Military Government Special Parole Officer Lieutenant Colonel Nelson started a special parole investigation on the Governor Yoo Hae-jin. The investigation continued till February 28, 1948.
  - 11. 14 ■ UN General Assembly passed the US Proposal to hold a general election according to population proportion in the Korean Peninsula.
  - 11. 18 ■ Jeju CIC reported "Warned the leader of Seobuk Young Men's Association for their extensive terrorism in fund raising throughout Jeju, and he replied with his apology to CIC."
  - 11. 21 ■ Jeju Military Government Law Officer Stevenson and Chairman of Jeju CIC Merit submitted the joint opinion with the Special Investigation, saying Governor Yoo Hae-jin only permits the right wing member meetings.
  - 11. 25 ■ Jeju CIC reported to headquarter that the leader of Seobuk Young Men's Association Jeju had said 'Jeju is small Moscow of Joseon.'
  - 11. 26 ■ Jeju's rice collection rate 11% recorded the national lowest (national rate: 84.5%).

## Year 1948

1. 8 ■ UN Korea Temporary Committee arrived in Seoul
1. 11 ■ Liaison of the Jeju capter of the South Korean Labor Party arrested by police. His conversion and betrayal exposed structure of the Jeju capter of the South Korean Labor Party.
1. 22 ■ Jeju CIC reported "Jeju Police made a surprise attack for the unauthorized South Korean Labor Party of Jocheon's branch meeting at Sinchon-ri, arresting 106 persons and seized the ordering documents for armed striking."
1. 26 ■ Additional 115 persons were arrested. Jeju CIC reported "63 arrested out of 221 were released free. And they were members of the South Korean Labor Party."
1. 30 ■ Kim Yeong-bae, Inspector General of Jeju Police announced regarding 1·22 Arrests "Police didn't oppress the members of the South Korean Labor Party but want to punish the illegal activities the party commits.
2. 1 ■ Kim Ik-ryeol, Lieutenant commander was appointed as new Chief of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, succeeding Lee Chi-eop, Lieutenant Colonel
2. 7 ■ National Emergency Alert announced  
■ Left Wing started 2·7 Struggle, causing a general strike nationwide and opposed the sole election in South Korea
2. 8 ■ Conflict between young men of Hamdeok-ri, Jocheon-myeon and a driver of provincial automobile occurred. The driver had blocked the road and was trying to remove the remainder of the wall. Police arrested 12 young men.
2. 9 ■ A group of young men at Sagye-ri Andeok-myeon attacked 2 police officers on personal drinking.  
■ Jeoji Police Box was attacked by young men.
2. 10 ■ Jo Byeong-ok, the Chief of National Police Agency, reported '39 death and 8,479 arrests nationwide occurred regarding 2·7 Riot'  
■ Kosan Police Box officers fired at protesting civilians, wounding 1 villager.
2. 11 ■ Jeju Police announced '1 case of fire setting, 9 case of terrorism, 19 cases of protests by aftereffect of 2.7 Incidents, and 290 persons were arrested during 3 days.'
2. 26 ■ The US proposals to hold an exclusive election within UN Korea

- Committee's reach was approved at UN Provisional General Assembly.
- Late February ■ Leaders of the Jeju chapter of the South Korean Labor Party chose armed revolution after a debate (vote 12:7) at Sinchon Meeting.
3. 6 ■ A Jocheon School student Kim Yong-cheol was tortured to death at Jocheon Police Box.
3. 10 ■ Students of Jocheon School and residents protested for the Tortured to Death case.
- 66 young men of Seongsan-myeon announced their secession of the South Korean Labor Party to join Daedong Young Men's Association. Withdrawal announcements from the South Korean Labor Party continued after the announcement.
3. 11 ■ Lieutenant Colonel Nelson, Special Inspector of US Military Government on his special inspection report proposed to Secretary Dean the following; dismissal of Governor Yoo Hae-jin, investigation of police administration and overpopulated jail condition.
3. 14 ■ Yang Eun-ha Torture Manslaughter case at Meseolpo Police Station occurred at Yeongrak-ri, Daejeong-myeon
3. 15 ■ At the leaders' meeting with Oreug, from Jeonnam Province branch of The South Korean Labor Party Jeju decided the final decision to carry out an armed defense and guard, protecting the organization and to fight nationwide, opposing the salvation.
3. 20 ■ Conflict occurred between Self-Defense Forces on training, Aewol Police and members of Daecheong Seobuk Young Men's Association at Saebyeol Oreum (volcanic hill) Aewol-myeon.
3. 28 ■ Rhee Syng-man offered Jeju as one of US Army base to assistant secretary Drapper of US Army on his visit to Korea.
- The Jeju chapter of the South Korean Labor Party decided to start the operation of armed measurement on April 3.
3. 29 ■ A young man Park Haeng-gu was caught and sentenced for Summary executions by Police and the Seobuk Young Men's Association at Geumneung-ri Hallim-myeon, criticizing the US Military Government
3. 30 ■ 5 • 10 National General Election registration launched.
4. 1 ■ Congress Election Committee announced assigned seat numbers for each province. Jeju assigned with 3 from the total of 200 congress members.
4. 3 ■ An armed uprising occurred in Jeju. 350 guerrillas of the Jeju chapter of

the South Korean Labor Party attacked 12 Police Boxes and the leaders of the rightwing organizations by 2am, killing 4 officers, 8 civilians. 2 guerrillas were killed.

- 4. 5
  - US Military Government dispatched about 100 policemen from Jeonnam as the police reserves to Jeju and established the Jeju Emergency Guard Command within Jeju Police Department of Inspector General (Commandant: Kim Jeong-ho, National Police Agency Public Safety Director)
  - US Military Government announced Jeju Province Operation Rules and blocked maritime transportation and sealed seaside, utilizing US military vessel
- 4. 8
  - US decided to withdraw United States Forces Kroea (USFK) by end of December 1948
  - Commander Kim Jeong-ho of Jeju Emergency Guard Command proclaimed the decision to sweep out the guerrillas
- 4. 11
  - Dispatch 100 cadets from National Police Academy
- 4. 13
  - The 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment dispatched Special Security Unit to Jeju-eup to secure Buk-Jeju area
- 4. 14
  - The final electoral registration rate 64.9% (national average 91.7%) or 92,912 persons against 127,752 in total revealed Jejudo to be the lowest nationwide.
  - Jo Byeong-ok, Chief of National Police Agency, announced a statement of pacification
- 4. 16
  - Military General Dean mandated and launched the Hyangbodan (community protective corps) throughout South Korea
  - Kim Dae-bong, head of Information and Communication National Police Agency was assigned for Jeju commission by Jo Byeong-ok, Chief of National Police Agency.
- 4. 17
  - Mansfield, Lieutenant Colonel of the US Military Government ordered the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment to cooperate with police and repression operations.
- 4. 18
  - Dean Military General ordered Lieutenant Colonel Mansfield at Jeju to activate wartime guarding operation authority and to approach the leaders of guerrillas.
  - Guerrilla attacked the election offices, seizing related documents.
  - The Measures Committee for National Status was formed with 32 members, including Yoo Hae-jin, the Governor of Jeju.
- 4. 19
  - Guerrilla attacked and set fire at the election place of Sinchon-ri,

- Jocheon-myeon.
- 4. 20 ■ US Military Government assigned Captain Druce, Advisor and one battalion from the 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment in Busan to Jeju.
  - 4. 22 ■ Jeju Emergency Command amended night curfew hour to 8pm - 5am.
    - Kim Ik-ryeol, Head of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, passed a peace proposal from an airplane to the guerrilla.
  - 4. 24 ■ US Washington Post reported the 1<sup>st</sup> case of Jeju condition under the title 'Riots broke out in Korean island, killing 46 persons.'
  - 4. 27 ■ An emergency meeting held at Jeju among Colonel Brown, Chief of the 20<sup>th</sup> Regiment, Shu, lieutenant Colonel from Operation Dept of the 24<sup>th</sup> Army Corps and General Mansfield, Lieutenant Colonel of the 59<sup>th</sup> Military Government Company.
    - The search operation was conducted by the 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment of the Korea Constabulary and the US 20<sup>th</sup> Regiment scouts.
  - 4. 28 ■ Kim Ik-ryeol, Captain of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment and Kim Dal-sam, head of the armed guerrillas held the peace negotiation, agreeing to seize fire within 72 hours.
  - 4.29 ■ Dean, Military General visited Jeju on a secret mission.
    - Shu, Lieutenant Colonel reported "We have sufficient troop to control current situation"
    - Kim Jeong-ho, Commander of Jeju Emergency Guard announced, "We practice a strong measure, banning any street pedestrian post 8pm. Any violators face death penalty."
  - 5. 1 ■ 'Ora-ri fire incident' occurred, breaking down the peace negotiations.
    - Guerrilla killed the manager of election Dopyeong-ri, Jeju
  - 5. 3 ■ US Army Leadership ordered the Leadership of Guard Commander to attack Guerrillas, solving Jeju condition at once.
    - The US New York Times reported 'Jeju Guerrilla seized police weapons and Police responded with 5 terms of surrender, promising to punish Northwest Youth Organization and cancel 5.10 elections, etc.'
  - 5. 5 ■ The 5 · 5 Top Commanders' Committee meeting took place at the US Army conference room among Dean Military General, Ahn Jae-hong Minister of Civil Affairs, Jo Byeong-ok the Chief of National Police Agency, Song Ho-seong General Commander of the Guards, Mansfield Lieutenant Colonel, Governor Yoo Hae-jin, Kim Ik-ryeol, Chief of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment and Choi Cheon, Inspector General of Jeju Police.

- The guerrilla, killed the leader of Hwabuk-ri election management and head of Naedo-ri town.
- 5. 6 ■ The US Military Government dismissed Kim Ik-ryeol from his position, Chief of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment and replaced with Park Jin-Gyeong, Lieutenant Colonel.
- 5. 10 ■ 5 · 10 Election took place. Jeju reported with the national lowest participation rate of 62.8%. Buk-Jeju-gun Gap and Eul areas' election found invalid for majority under participation.
  - Guerrilla attacked 2-gu Sangye-ri, Jungmun-myeon, kidnapping and killing the leader and his wife of Daecheongdan and the leader of Kugminhoi.
- 5. 11 ■ Guerrilla continued to kidnap and kill the village election management leader, Chairman of Daedong Young Adults' Association and their family in Dodu-ri by 19<sup>th</sup> of the month.
- 5. 12 ■ The US Military Government dispatched the navy vessel Craig to Jeju immediately and blocked the coastal area.
- 5. 15 ■ The Regiment 11 transferred from Suwon to Jeju (Chief of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Park Jin-kyeong inaugurated). The existing 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment emerged in with the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment.
- 5. 18 ■ National Assembly Election Committee suggested to Dean, Military General to confirm and proclaim the invalidity of the election at Buk Jeju-gun Gap and Eul district.
  - Dispatched Special Investigation Team lead by Police Inspector Choi Nan-su from Capital Police.
- 5. 19 ■ Total 450 police including 350 Railroad Police and 100 Police from the 6<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> Divisions left for Jeju under the order of National Police Agency.
- 5. 20 ■ US Military Government dispatched Colonel Brown, Chief of the 20<sup>th</sup> Regiment Gwangju under the 6<sup>th</sup> US Army Division as US Commander of Jeju.
  - 41 members of the Korea Constabulary escaped from the Meseolpo Unit
- 5. 21 ■ The US Military Government announced Oh Yong-guk was elected for Nam Jeju Congressman.
- 5. 22 ■ 20 out of 41 escaped members of the Korea Constabulary arrested near Daejeong.
- 5. 25 ■ The South Korean Labor Party paper 'Noryeok Inmin' first reported,

- regarding the Jeju Incident.
- 5. 26 ■ Dean Military General proclaimed invalidity of dual election from Jeju Gap and Eul districts and to hold 6. 23 Re-election instead.
  - 5. 28 ■ Yoo Hae-jin, Jeju Governor was dismissed and Im Gwan-ho of Jeju was appointed as new governor.
    - Jo Byeong-ok, the Chief of National Police Agency, visited Jeju to check the security status.
  - 5. 31 ■ Constituent Assembly launched. Rhee Syng-man elected as Chairman.
  - Late-May ■ Commodore Roberts, Advisor for Ministry of Unification inspected Jeju.
  - 6. 1 ■ Park Jin-Gyeong, Commander of the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment was promoted to colonel
  - 6. 2 ■ Jeju US Commander Colonel Brown said "An operation, sweeping out the entire Jeju from west to east is being delivered!"
  - 6. 10 ■ Military General Dean announced Administration Order No 22, delaying the re-election scheduled on 6. 23 at Buk Jeju Gap and Eul constituencies indefinitely.
  - 6. 11 ■ Choi Cheon, Inspector General of Jeju Police was suspended from his job for insufficient management, etc.
  - 6. 17 ■ Kim Bong-ho from Jeju was appointed as Inspector General of Jeju Police
  - 6. 18 ■ Commander Park Jin-Gyeong was murdered by his member at the quarter of the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment. Military General Dean and Commodore Roberts came to Jeju to investigate the case and take care of the corpse.
  - 6. 21 ■ The Commander of the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment, Choi Gyeong-rok, Lieutenant Colonel and Lieutenant Commander, Song Yo-chan was appointed, succeeding Colonel Park Jin-Gyeong.
  - 6. 30 ■ Postponed the Constabulary's Operation due to heavy rain
  - 7. 1 ■ Kim Bong-ho, Inspector General of Jeju Police declared to clean up those police related corruptions and to accept the defected from the North as civilians.
    - Abolition of island wide travel documentation. Fishing ban off.
  - 7. 5 ■ Ban off regular ferry travel documentation between Mokpo and Jeju.
  - 7. 10 ■ 100 Railroad Policemen were dispatched to Jeju Island.
  - 7. 15 ■ Dispatched and reformed the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment to the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment. (Regiment Colonel: Song Yo-chan, Lieutenant Commander, Deputy Colonel: Seo Jong-cheol Capt.)
  - 7. 19 ■ 200 Railroad Policemen were dispatched to Jeju.

- 7. 20 ■ Rhee Syng-man was elected as the 1<sup>st</sup> President of Republic of Korea via congress
- 7. 21 ■ 2 battalions from the 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade were transferred from Busan to the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment in Jeju.
- 7. 22 ■ The headquarter of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment moved to Jeju-eup from Jeju Meseolpo Daechon quarter
- 7. 24 ■ The 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment moved from Jeju to Suwon, Gyeonggi Province
- 8. 5 ■ The US Military Advisor of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment reported the Information Sector (S-2) excluded Jeju origin staff
- 8. 6 ■ The 1<sup>st</sup> Precinct Police Agency dispatched the 2<sup>nd</sup> Police Reserve, replacing the 1<sup>st</sup> Police Reserve.
- 8. 11 ■ Establishing the Jeju Minbodan (the People's Protective Corps)
- 8. 12 ■ The US Military Advisor of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment reported the Operation Sector (S-3) excluded Jeju origin staff
- 8. 13 ■ Reactivated Jeju Travel Certificate system
- 8. 14 ■ General Court-martial decision regarding the assassination of Colonel Park pronounced as follows: Moon Sang-gil, Shin Sang-u, Son Seon-ho and Bae Gyeong-yong for execution by firing squad, Yang Hoi-cheon for life imprisonment and Kang Seung-gyu for 5yr imprisonment.
- 8. 15 ■ Proclaimed the foundation of the Government of Republic of Korea.
- 8. 20 ■ About 800 additional Polce Reserves were dispatched to Jeju
- 8. 21 ■ Kim Dal-sam elected as Premier Cabinet at People of Korea Representatives' Meeting in Haeju
- 8. 24 ■ Korea-US military safety Tentative Agreement was signed between President Rhee Syng-man and USFK Commander, Haji, continuing the US Operation Control over the Korean Army
- 8. 25 ■ The headquarters of the Jeju Emergency Guard announced a decree, warning about the upcoming Suppression Operation in the largest scale.
  - One platoon from the 1<sup>st</sup> US Infantry Regiment rotated the stationing duty.
- 8. 26 ■ Established the US Korea Army Provisional Military Advisory Group (PMAG)
- 8. 27 ■ General Colter succeeded Haji, as the new USFK Commander
- 8. 29 ■ 800 Police Reserves Officers arrived in Jeju
- 8. 31 ■ The 7<sup>th</sup> Precinct Police Agency in Gyeongnam Province dispatched Police Resreves Units
- 9. 8 ■ 13 yr old boy from Samyang-ri Jeju-eup was tortured to death at

Samyang Police Box

- 9. 9 ■ Proclaimed the establishment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) with Kim Il-seong as Prime Minister and Park Heon-yeong, Hong Myeong-hui and Kim Chaek as Deputy Prime Minister
- 9. 19 ■ Soviets announced their withdrawal plan of their stationed army from North Korea as per UN Resolution
- 9. 23 ■ Execution delivered for Moon Sang-gil and Son Seon-ho with death by firing squad, regarding the assassination of Park Jin-gyeong. However, Shin Sang-u and Bae Gyeong-yong were granted pardon right before the executions.
- 9. 27 ■ Proclaimed General Act of Grace (Presidential decree the 6th)
- 10. 1 ■ Jung Il-gwon, Chief of Staff, the Guards and Kim Yeong-cheol, Chief of Staff, the Coast Guards visited Jeju for an inspection
- 10. 2 ■ Metropolitan Police Agency dispatched the police reserve of the 8<sup>th</sup> Precinct Police to Jeju
- 10. 5 ■ Kim Bong-ho from Jeju and Hong Sun-bong from Pyeongnam Province were appointed as Director of Police Inspection Jeju
- 10. 8 ■ Rhee Syng-man requested the delay of the US Army withdrawal
- 10. 9 ■ Chief of Advisory Committee, Roberts requested an effective involvement in Jeju Operation with Captain Tridwell, Advisor of Brigade 5
- 10. 11 ■ Established Jeju Security Headquarters (Commander Colonel Kim Sang-gyeom)
- 10. 17 ■ Song Yo-chan, Chief of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment announced a decree, banning access within 5km from Jeju coastlines and violators will be executed regardless his or her circumstance
- 10. 18 ■ Sealed Jeju coasts
  - The 14<sup>th</sup> Regiment stationed in Yeosu was ordered to dispatch an additional battalion to Jeju
- 10. 19 ■ A revolt by the 14<sup>th</sup> Regiment occurred in Yeosu
  - Colonel Kim Sang-gyeom, Commander of Jeju Security Headquarters was dismissed, being accused of responsibility on the incident at Yeosu the 14<sup>th</sup> Regiment. Song Yo-chan, Chief of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment held concurrent position of Commander of Jeju Security Headquarters
- 10. 23 ■ The armed troop attacked Samyang Police Box in Jeju-eup and Jocheon and Hamdeok Police Box in Jocheon-myeon district.
- 10. 24 ■ The armed troop declared war against government under the name of

- Lee Deok-gu, and announced a letter of plea to Punitive Force
10. 28 ■ About 100 soldiers at the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment were arrested being in the league with South Korean Labor Party as their spies
    - The US Army document reported "Dispatched members of the Seobuk Young Men's Association to Jeju thru secretive recruitment."
    - The Punitive Force reported they had sieged and destroyed about 100 members of Aewol and Daejeong thru their grand Suppression Operation on Aewol-myeon district
  - Late 10 ■ Chae Byeong-deok, Chief of Staff from the Ministry of Defense inspected Jeju
  11. 1 ■ A few police officers were accused of being an inner group for the Armed Troop and were arrested so called Police Spy Incident otherwise.
  11. 7 ■ The Punitive Force set fire to 20 houses and shot 10 villagers to death in Hangwon-ri, Gujwa-myeon
    - The Joint Punitive Force of Military/Police attacked mountainous villages including Uigwi-ri, Sumang-ri and Hanam-ri in Namwon-myeon, shooting the remaining old people and children to death. The majority of houses were burnt down
    - The Armed Troop attacked Seogwi-ri in Seogwi-myeon, setting fire to private houses
  11. 8 ■ Chief of the US Military Advisory Committee Roberts reported that the "CIA is doing a good job, and Lieutenant colonel Song Yo-chan, Chief of the 9th Regiment carries his duty very active and aggressively." with Commander of USFK.
  11. 9 ■ Kim Du-hyeon, Secretary Director of Jeju was tortured to death at the Seobuk Youth Association office
  11. 13 ■ The Punitive Force set fire to private houses, shooting 25 villagers to death at Haga-ri, Aewol-myeon and 50 to 60 villagers were shot to death at Wondong Village in Sogil-ri. The Punitive Force, taking the date as their starting point, continued to burn down the mountainous villages and shot villagers to death for 4 months.
  11. 15 ■ Chief of the US Military Advisory Committee Roberts praised the outstanding activities of the CIA and reported "We plan to fill the majority of 3 Korean battalions to Jeju by members of the Seobuk Youth Association." with the Commander of USFK.
  11. 17 ■ President Rhee Syng-man proclaimed Presidential Martial Law Decree on

## Jeju

- 11. 19 ■ Jeju Police Inspection reformed its structure as the Jeju Police Bureau
- 11. 20 ■ Ministry of Defense declared pre-censorship of articles on Army at once, justifying the plans to keep accuracy on reports and to protect the military operations and atmosphere.
- 11. 27 ■ General Colter said "Sufficient progress is delivered by the Advisory Committee under the supervision of Chief of the US Military Advisory Committee Roberts. The members are all stationed in Korea."
- 11. 28 ■ The armed guerrillas attacked and set fire on Namwon-ri and Wimi-ri in Namwon-myeon villages, and shot villagers to death.
- 11. 30 ■ Proclaimed the Act on the Organization of National Armed Forces, the Act No 9
- 12. 1 ■ Proclaimed National Security Law
  - Chief of the US Military Advisory Committee Roberts sent a letter to the Chief of Staff from Ministry of Defense, advising how to operate Martial Law.
- 12. 3 ■ The 1st General Court Martial Law was revised. The Prisoner List shows 871 civilians were found guilty through 12 times from 12/03 to 12/27
  - The armed guerrillas operated a larger scale attack, killing about 50 civilians and set fire to 150 dwellings and 40 units in Sehwa-ri Gujwa-myeon where a police station had been.
  - Song Yo-chan, Regiment Commander reported to the Temporary Advisory Committee of the US Army as follows "We arrested 122 rioters and executed 576 between 12/3 and 12/27."
- 12. 6 ■ Song Yo-chan, Regiment Commander sent a recommendation letter to the Commander of Corps 24 as follows "First lieutenant Erickson, since October 10<sup>th</sup> till now with his scouting flights, has supported the suppression operation of the revolt a great deal."
- 12. 12 ■ The UN General Assembly recognized the government of Korea and suggested the immediate withdrawals of the US Army and Soviet Army.
- 12. 13 ■ 620 members of the Seobuk Youth Association were hired as police officers
- 12. 15 ■ According to the Act on the Organization of National Armed Forces, Ministry of Unification reformed as Ministry of Defense, Joseon National Constabulary as Republic of Korea Army.
  - The 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment was transferred from the 5<sup>th</sup> Brigade to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade.

- The Punitive Force was ordered to gather 150 civilians, including men between 18-40 years old and a few women from Tosan-ri Pyoseon-myeon, kept them at Pyoseon Elementary School then shot them in a group to death on 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> of December.
- 12. 16 ■ The Advance Party from the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment arrived in Jeju
- 12. 17 ■ The US State Department suggested reconsidering the act NSC-8. NSC-8 is the US policy guide for Korea, including the decision of the US Army withdrawal by 12/31/1948.
  - US Army reported "The successful Suppression Operations of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment is due to their desire for better work and to fulfill the success of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment."
- 12. 18 ■ Chief of the US Military Advisory Committee Roberts sent letters to Prime Minister Lee Beom-seok and the Chief of Staff Chae Byeong-deok, praising Song Yo-chan, the Chief of Regiment, again, about his leadership and suggested to inform the general public about his success via newspaper, broadcasting and a presidential statement.
  - The Punitive Force located Darangshi Cave where 10 villagers, including 3 women and children from Jongdal-ri and Haro-ri in Gujwa-myeon were hiding, killed them by suffocation with a fire set toward the cave.
- 12. 19 ■ The Advance Troop of the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment left Jeju and arrived in Daejeon
  - The Daedong Youth Association and the Seobuk Youth Association merged and formed Daehan Youth Association
  - 250 members of the Seobuk Youth Association arrive in Jeju. 25 of them joined the police and 225 members joined the army
- 12. 21 ■ The Chief of Staff Chae Byeong-deok replied to the Chief of the US Military Advisory Committee Roberts, regarding his suggestion from December 18 as follows "A statement to introduce the activities of Song Yo-chan will be released, a presidential statement will be submitted and Song Yochan will receive a medal for his work."
  - The Punitive Force took 150 residents of Jocheon district, who turned themselves in at Hamdeok headquarters, to Bakseongnae Stream and shot them to death.
- 12. 22 ■ The 1<sup>st</sup> Squadron of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment arrived in Jeju from Daejeon
  - The Punitive Force shot 76 family members of fugitives from Gasi-ri Pyoseon-myeon to death at the upper part of Beodeulmot
- 12. 25 ■ Soviets announced the Soviet Army completed their withdrawal from

North Korea

- 12. 29 ■ The 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment (Chief Ham Byeong-seon) stationed in Jeju, replaced the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment
- 12. 30 ■ Section Chief of Press of Ministry of Defense announced through a press conference "Now, we have concluded the suppression of rioters, the Martial Law will be lifted within a few days."
- 12. 31 ■ The Martial Law in Jeju was lifted

## Year 1949

- 1. 1 ■ The Punitive Force attacked the station of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Squadron of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment in Ondeung-ri, killing 10 Punitive Force members and 7 army officers from the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment
- 1. 3 ■ The Punitive Force attacked Samyang-ri in Jeju-eup, Harye-ri in Namwon-myeon and Hyubjae-ri in Hallim-myeon, killing civilians
  - Police members and Special Force of Oido Police Station disguise themselves as the Punitive Force and marched in to Dopyeong-ri in Jeju-eup, shooting about 70 people to death and some of the villagers didn't believe their identities.
- 1. 4 ■ The Chief of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment, Ham Byeong-seon requested continuation of the Martial Law
  - The Punitive Force shot the villagers of Goneul-dong to death, taking 2 days
- 1. 7 ■ The Headquarters of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment moved to the Agricultural School
- 1. 12 ■ The Punitive Force attacked the Squadron 2 of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment, stationed in Uigwi-ri Namwon-myeon but were defeated. The army, right after the battle however, shot to death 80 mountainous villagers who, were kept at Uigwi Elementary School
- 1. 13 ■ The Punitive Force attacked and set fire at Seongeup-ri, killing 38 civilians
- 1. 17 ■ The Bukchon Incidents Occurred. The Punitive Force, avenging the army's attack, burnt down the whole village of Bukchon-ri in Jocheon-myeon, executing about 400 villagers until the following day.
- 1. 18 ■ Established Area 3 Police (Meseolpo) and Area 4 Police (Sengsanpo)
- 1. 20 ■ The 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment released from Brigade 2 and became under direct control of Army Headquarters

- 1. 21 ■ President Rhee Syng-man at a cabinet council said "The US acknowledges the importance of Korea and is sympathetic. But US's assistance will only be possible with our accurate removal of the aftereffects of Jeju Incidents and Jeonnam Incidents, and the dignity of law is needed at once by suppressing villains including local objectors and thieves."
- 1. 22 ■ Army Headquarters suggested the Army Aviation Command (AAC) to dispatch 2 planes to support Jeju Suppression Operation by January 24.
  - The Punitive Force shot 80 villagers from Donggwang-ri and Sangchang-ri of Andeok-myeon to death near Jeongbang Waterfalls.
- 1. 24 ■ The National Cabinet Council decided to dispatch 1 squadron to Jeju
- 1. 25 ■ Two L-5s of the Korean army stationed to Jeju
- 1. 28 ■ President Rhee Syng-man at a cabinet council ordered "The US Navy reached Jeju and brought us good outcomes. And in addition, 1 squadron of army and 1000 police officers were dispatched to Jeju and ought to be able to conclude the situation as soon as possible."
- 1. 31 ■ The Army Headquarters dispatched a special guerrilla squadron unit of the 6<sup>th</sup> Brigade
- 2. 4 ■ The Punitive Force attacked the troop of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment on their way to Jeju-eup, returning their rifles (type 99) at Gimnyeong-ri Gujwa-eup, seized 150 rifles and shot 15 troop members and 1 police to death.
  - The joint operations of the army, navy and air forces in Bonggae area (Bonggae, Yonggang and Hoecheon-ri) delivered. The Punitive Force traced the evacuating civilians, shooting hundreds of them to death.
- 2. 5 ■ Kim Dong-seong, Communication Director announced "Jeju Martial Law (effected on November 17, 1948) was lifted a month ago, but no statement of real effect has been informed yet." The US Army replied with a comment "Both Americans and Koreans frequently refer the state of emergency as Martial Law. It's clearly wrong. No Martial Law has been declared by the Korean Government."
- 2. 12 ■ Gwaneumsa Temple burnt down by members of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment. (15 temples throughout Jeju were burnt down by the Punitive Force, 3 temples were burnt partially and 9 temples were demolished during the Housing Eviction period. 16 monks were sacrificed by the Punitive Force. On the other hand, one temple in Hamdeok was attacked by the Punitive Force because the monk's father was police.)
- 2. 19 ■ 505 membered Special Force of Police (Commander: Kim Tae-il Deputy

- Assistant) was dispatched in Jeju
2. 20 ■ The Military Advisory Committee of the US Army reported "Members of Minbodan under supervision of the Military Police killed 76 people, piercing with bamboo spears at Dodu-ri in Jeju-eup.
  2. 23 ■ The Attorney General instructed in an official document not to show mercy, but take drastic measures for any and all illegal actions against the National Security Law.
    - Titles of police changed (District 1 Police to Jeju Police, District 2 Police to Seogwipo Police, District 3 Police to Meseolpo Police and District 4 Police to Seongsanpo Police)
  2. 27 ■ The 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment executed 39 who were sentenced to death by the Higher Court-martial on December 1948 at Hwabuk-ri in Jeju-eup
  3. 2 ■ Established Jeju District Command Post (Commander: Colonel Yoo Jae-heung, the Chief of Staff: Ham Byeong-seon, Chief of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment)
  3. 10 ■ Prime Minister Lee Beom-seok and Minister of Home Affairs Shin Seong-mo inspected Jeju
  3. 14 ■ Brigadier General Roberts reported in a document to the US Korea Delegation "3 US aircraft participated in the Jeju Operation."
  3. 21 ■ Proclaimed to hold Jeju Re-election on May 10, 1949
    - Prime Minister Lee Beom-seok was released from his dual assignment from Minister of Defense, and appointed Shin Seong-mo for Minister of Defense.
  3. 23 ■ President of the US approved 'NCS-8/2' the policy on Korea in delaying withdrawal of the US Army from the Korean Peninsula by 6/30/1949
  4. 1 ■ The US Army Report briefed the process "The 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment has planned their program of mass slaughter on mountainous villagers to root out further resistance, 15,000 human death toll recorded as of 3/31/1949. Although some rumor speculates if Guerrilla being supported with logistics from either inland or North Korea, no evidence has been spotted yet.
  4. 5 ■ Launched the Marine Corps
  4. 7 ■ Minister of Defense Shin Seong-mo and Minister of Social Affairs Lee Yun-yeong visited Jeju on a presidential command
  4. 9 ■ President Rhee Syng-man visited Jeju with the First Lady
    - Completed registrations of candidates and voters for Jeju Re-election.
  4. 14 ■ Minister of Defense Shin Seong-mo returned home, completing his inspection of Jeju

- 4. 16 ■ Minister of Defense Shin Seongmo and Roberts, Chief of the US Military Advisory Committee had a meeting and agreed to withdraw members of the Seobuk Youth Association from Jeju.
- 5. 10 ■ Re-election delivered for congress post. Hong Sun-nyeong and Yang Byeong-jik elected
- 5. 15 ■ Released Jeju District Command Post. Withdrew the 3<sup>rd</sup> Squadron of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment formed by members of the Seobuk Youth Association.
- 5. 18 ■ Commander of Emergency Security Kim Tae-il and Police Special Force returned.
- 5. 25 ■ Guerrilla Unit of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment was released and withdrew
- 6. 1 ■ Ham Byeong-seon Chief of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment was promoted to colonel
- 6. 5 ■ Proclaimed meeting of Gukmin Bodo Yeonmaeng (Citizen's Guidance Federation) delivered
- 6. 7 ■ General Commander of the armed guerrillas, Lee Deok-gu, executed by Police
- 6. 20 ■ The 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment transferred from being under Army Headquarters to Capital Garrison Command
- 6. 23 ■ Higher Court-Martial delivered and the record of Prisoner List reported "From June 23 to July 7, total of 10 trials took place and found 1,659 civilians guilty being in contact with enemy and spying."
- 6. 29 ■ Completed withdrawal of the US Army. 500 advisory members of the US Military Advisory Committee
- 7. 7 ■ The 2<sup>nd</sup> Squadron of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment withdrew to Incheon (only 1 squadron remained)
- 7. 15 ■ The 1<sup>st</sup> Separate Battalion (Commanding Officer: Kim Yong-ju) transferred from Suwon to Jeju
- 8. 13 ■ The 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment completed their withdrawal after transferring the entire security of Jeju district to the 1<sup>st</sup> Separate Battalion
- 8. 20 ■ Established Jeju District Board Guarder Command (Commander: Deputy Commanding Officer of Jeju Stationed Force)
- 8. 26 ■ National Force renamed as Army Reserve
- 8. 27 ■ Vice Minister of Ministry of Home Affairs Jang Kyonggeun inspected Jeju
- 9. 14 ■ Prison break attempt occurred at Mokpo Prison, and 286 attempted fugitives were executed.
- 10. 2 ■ 249 previously sentenced to death by Court-Martial trial (1949) were executed near Jeju Airport and buried secretly

- 11. 15 ■ Kim Chung-hui, District Manager of the Gukminhoe (citizens' association) appointed as Governor of Jeju
- 11. 24 ■ Martial Law enacted and proclaimed
- 11. 27 ■ Department of Public Order announced 5,283 Jeju people had joined the Citizens' Guidance Federation as of November 27
- 12. 20 ■ Jeju established Jeju Reconstruction Committee (Director: Kim Chung-hui, Governor)
- 12. 27 ■ The 1<sup>st</sup> Separate Battalion withdrew from Jeju
- 12. 28 ■ The Marine Corps (Commander: Colonel Shin Hyeon-jun) arrived in Jeju

## Year 1950

- 2. 10 ■ Governor Kim Chung-hui reported the total loss of 20 billion won to Prime Minister in a document, including 30,000 civilian death toll and 40,000 cases of property damage
- 5. 30 ■ The 2<sup>nd</sup> Congressional Election took place. Kim In-seon, Kang Chang-yong and Kang Gyeong-ok elected in Jeju
- 6. 25 ■ The Korean War broke out. The Commander of Marine Corps also served as the Chief Martial Law.
  - The Director of Public Order ordered police stations to arrest all persons on the black list as per the Order of 'Nationwide Blacklist Detention Measure and Securities on the Jailhouses'
- 6. 29 ■ The Director of Public Ordered Jeju Police Chief of Command to hunt down rebellious elements, including members of the Citizens' Guidance Federation and others and not to release unless Headquarter's special order comes in.
- 7. 6 ■ Jeju District Command of the Court-martial sent down an order to Chief of Jeju Police, requesting to submit the list of Preventive Custodians in Jeju
- 7. 8 ■ The State of Martial Law was proclaimed in Korea except Jeonbuk and Jeonnam provinces as per the Article 1 of the Court-martial Law
- 7. 11 ■ The Director of Public Order ordered Chief of Jeju Police to arrest rebellious
- 7. 15 ■ One squadron of the Marine Corps left Jeju port, heading Gunsan port
- 7. 16 ■ The 5<sup>th</sup> Army Training Station established in Jeju

- 7. 20 ■ The State of Martial Law was proclaimed for entire South Korea
- 7. 25 ■ The armed guerrillas attacked Hawon-ri in Jungmun-myeon, setting fire on private houses
- 7. 27 ■ The Punitive Force buried detainees at a liquor factory in Jeju-eup under the preventive custody near the sea in front of Sarabong secretly
- 7. 29 ■ The 150 detainees under the preventive custody in Seogwipo district were taken out and were buried at sea
- 8. 4 ■ Presidential Emergency Order No 9 'Emergency Homeland Defense Order' was proclaimed
  - Police document (title: Arrest of Rebellious Blacklist) reported 820 preventive custodians were detained in Jeju as of August 4<sup>th</sup>.
  - Jeju Police buried a few hundreds of detainees at liquor factories in Jeju port
- 8. 5 ■ The new Marine Corps members held member joining ceremony at Meseolpo Base
  - 423 students at Ohyun Middle School joined the Student Soldier
- 8. 8 ■ Director of District Prosecutors' Office arrested and detained 16 well respected people around the community, including the president of a court for forming the Welcoming Committee for the North Korean People's Army
- 8. 19 ■ Hundreds of those detained preventive custodians at Jeju Police Jailhouse were shot to death and buried in secret between the night of 19<sup>th</sup> to dawn of 20<sup>th</sup>.
- 8. 20 ■ 252 preventive custodians from 344 of Hallim-myeon, Daejeong-myeon and Andeok-myeon in Meseolpo district were transferred to a military base and were shot to death at Seotal Oreurm in Songak-san Mountain. For 6 years Government disapproved the location of the remains by the military, and the bereaved from Daejeong-myeon had to find any close matches of the remains and made 132 graves with its title as 'Baekchodlsonjimyo'.
- 8. 30 ■ The Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Kim Du-chan ordered Director of Seongsanpo Police Station Moon Hyeong-sun to execute the preventive custodians by firing squad and to report the result, but Moon Hyeon-sun, the mayor replied 'We disobey your order for being improper.
- 8. 31 ■ A partial withdrawal of Jeju Marine Corps
- 9. 3 ■ Jeju released the partial number of suspects of Jeju Welcome Committee

- of North Korean Army
- 9. 14 ■ Jeju Investigators decided at their meeting to release the ones with some repentance from the preventive custodians
- 9. 15 ■ Incheon Landing Operation
- 9. 17 ■ Release of preventive custodians started
- 10. 10 ■ The Martial Law in Jeju lifted
- 11. 7 ■ The Emergency Martial Law in Korea lifted. Security Status Martial Law proclaimed for the area lower than the 38th parallel of Korea, excluding Jeju, Kyongnam and Gyeongbuk regions.

## Year 1951

- 1. 22 ■ The 1<sup>st</sup> Army Training Camp transferred to Jeju from Daegu
- 4. 24 ■ Jeju police announced their achievement of 7 months from 10/01/1950 to 4/22/1951 as follows: killed 56 armed guerrillas, seize 11 rifles and 2 grenades, 17 police casualties (15 death and 2 wounded), 24 Self Defense Force member casualties (11 death, 11 wounded and 2 missing) and 42 civilian casualties (1 death, 3 wounded and 38 kidnapped)
- 5. 10 ■ Established Jeju Counter Intelligence Corp
- 5. 20 ■ Totaled 148,794 refugees in Jeju
- 5. 28 ■ General Commander of Army, Navy and Air Force, Jung Il-gwon inspected the 1<sup>st</sup> Army Training Camp in Meseolpo

## Year 1952

- 1. 7 ■ Appointed the Brigadier General Jang Do-yeong as the new Chief of the Army Training Camp
- 1. 25 ■ The Special Force of Korea Youth Association had opening ceremony at Jeju Theater
- 2. 6 ■ The Commander of the 8th US Army, Vanfright inspected Jeju
- 4. 1 ■ Jeju Police operated 'Search-and-Destroy-Red-Mission' in Jeju for 30 days till April 30 under the supervision of Operation Mapping Team of Dept of Public Orders
- 5. 16 ■ The Army Information Bureau estimated the size of the Jeju armed

- guerrillas (leader: Kim Seong-gyu) as 65(30 armed and 35 unarmed)
- 5. 28 ■ Jeju Provincial Assembly approved "Guaranty of Life for any defecting descendents" as to wipe out any left behind armed guerrillas in Jeju
  - 7. 3 ■ President Rhee Syng-man inspected the 1<sup>st</sup> Army Training Camp with Commander of the 8<sup>th</sup> US Army, Vanfright and the Lieutenant General Yoo Jae-heung
  - 8. 9 ■ Jeju District Defense Commander and Chief of the 1<sup>st</sup> Army Training Camp, Jang Do-yeong left his positions
  - 8. 14 ■ Oh Deok-jun appointed as the new Jeju District Defense Commander and Chief of the 1<sup>st</sup> Army Training Camp
  - 9. 16 ■ The 5 armed guerrillas attacked the Jeju Broadcasting Company, kidnapping 3 personals, including the Chief of Broadcasting Section on his night duty
  - 10. 31 ■ The armed guerrillas attacked and set fire at Seogwipo Power Plant
  - 11. 1 ■ Jeju Police Bureau established the 100 Jeju Riot Police
  - 11. 26 ■ President Rhee Syng-man ordered not to disclose the arrests of Police Work preventive custody at a cabinet conference
  - 12. 25 ■ Jeju district for the complete destruction of the armed guerrillas dispatched 3 squadrons, including 1 squadron each from Gyeonggi, Chungnam, and Gyeongbuk area.

## Year 1953

- 1. 25 ■ The Army Headquarters assigned the Rainbow Corps to Army Intelligence General (Deputy Chief: Lee Cheol-hui) from January 20, to May 27.
- 1. 29 ■ The Army Headquarters assigned 86 members of the Rainbow Corps to Jeju (Major General: Park Chang-am)
- 5. 1 ■ The Rainbow Corps Operation completed
- 6. 15 ■ The Police Force assigned to Jeju from Gyeonggi, Chungnam and Gyeongbuk as per National Security Order 84 prior returned home as of June 15 midnight
  - Appointed Lieutenant General Lee Eung-jun as the Major General of the Army Training Camp
- 7. 11 ■ The US Far East Headquarters Deputy Commander Kendle inspected Jeju

- stationed Army Unit 871
- 10. 13 ■ Inspector Han Je-gil replaced Commander Kim Won-yong of the 100 Police Command
  - 11. 2 ■ Villagers of Dopyeong-ri, and Nohyeong-ri of Jeju-ewp petitioned for reconstruction to Buk Jeju-gun and the Police
  - 11. 7 ■ Villagers of Daejeong-myeon Sansu 2-dong who had stayed one year away from the village returned home
  - 11. 20 ■ Jeju Police Director Lee Gyeong-jin announced the withdrawal of police officers from Jeju police guard posts as of 20<sup>th</sup>

## **Year 1954**

- 1. 15 ■ Jeju Police Director Lee Gyeong-jin announced the resisting armed guerrillas totaled 6
- 4. 1 ■ Mt. Hallasan partially opened. Return and moving in to mountainous villages were permitted
- 9. 21 ■ Confinement of Mt. Hallasan released



**Special Law for Truth Investigation  
about the Jeju 4·3 Incident  
and Honoring Victims/  
Enforcement Ordinance/  
Regulations**

# **The Special Law for Truth Investigation about the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims**

Enactment 2000. 1. 12. Law no. 6117

Revision 2007. 1. 24. Law no. 8264

Partial Revision 2007. 5. 17. Law no. 8435

## **Article 1**

The law investigates the truth of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and honors the victims and bereaved, harming human rights, the progress of democracy and the unity of the nation.

## **Article 2**

The law uses the following clauses.

1. “The Jeju 4·3 Incident” refers to the incident causing civilians’ sacrifices in the process of armed conflicts and the suppression operations beginning March 1, 1947 to 4·3, 1948 through September 21, 1954.
2. “Victims” refers to civilians rendered deceased, missing or with a post-event disorder by the Jeju 4·3 Incident, or imprisoned and designated as “victims” as per Article 3, Clause 2, Section 2 of the law.
3. “Bereaved” refers to spouse of the victims (including partner) or lineal ascendant and descendant. If none of these exist, then the bereaved is the brother or sister of the victim, or those who are designated as the bereaved according to Article 3, Clause 2, Section 2 among collateral blood relatives who perform ancestral rites of the victims or take care of graves of the victims.

## **Article 3 Reporting Committee for Investigation of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims**

① Special Committee for Investigation of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims can investigate the Jeju 4·3 Incident and is supervised by the Prime Minister, commissioned truth and find the victims and the bereaved. (Hereinafter referred to as “Committee”)

② Committee can decide on the following.

1. Collect and analyze data related to the Jeju 4·3 Incident from home and abroad
2. Evaluate and determine the victims and the bereaved
3. Honor the victims and the bereaved

4. Produce an investigation report and form an exhibition hall
  5. Establish a memorial grave yard and a memorial pagoda
  6. File suggestions regarding governmental positions on the Jeju 4·3 Incident
  7. Draw up a ‘family relationship registry’
  8. Other acts decided by President for Investigation the Jeju 4·3 Incident and honoring the victims
- ③ Committee consists of 20 members, including 1 chairperson. The Prime Minister serves as chairperson and appoints, within Presidential Decree, Committee members including Governor of Jeju, involved public officers and well-experienced members of the bereaved.
- ④ Presidential Decree governs the structure of Committee.

**Article 4 (The Practical Committee for Investigation of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims)**

- ① The Governor supervising the Practical Committee for Investigation of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims delivers decisions of Committee and acts on entrusted items of Committee.
- ② The Practical Committee handles the following.
1. Report of the Victims and the Bereaved
  2. Investigations of the reported damage
  3. Payments of Medical Aid and Living Aid
  4. Other entrusted items from Committee
- ③ The Practical Committee consists of 15 members, including 1 chairperson. The Governor serves as chairperson and appoints members including involved public officers and well-experienced members of the bereaved.
- ④ Ordinance governs the structure and management of Committee

**Article 4-2 (Prohibition of Divulgence)**

Members of the Committee and the Practical Committee or those who held posts in the committees before shall not divulge professional secrets. [newly established on 2007. 1. 24.]

**Article 5 (Forbids Unfavorable Disposition)**

- ① Everyone is free to testify about the Jeju 4·3 Incident.
- ② No victims or bereaved will hold an unfavorable disposition for being the victims or the bereaved of the Jeju 4·3 Incident, nor will the victims or bereaved make further sacrifices.

**Article 6 (Collecting and Analyzing of the Jeju 4·3 Incident Data)**

- ① Committee must complete the collection and analysis of the Jeju 4·3 Incident data within 2 years from the initiation of Committee.
- ② Committee or the Practical Committee can request the needed data from government administration agencies for the investigation per Clause 1. (Hereinafter referred to as “involved agencies or organizations”) The Agency or Organization should comply with the request unless a clear reason for noncompliance is indicated.
- ③ Involved Agencies or Organizations should offer any needed assistance to excavate (including to read) data related to the Jeju 4·3 Incident
- ④ Per Clause 2, Government must negotiate with foreign governments faithfully if the requested data is held by a foreign country.

#### **Article 7 (Reporting on Investigation)**

Per Article 6, Clause 1, Committee must complete the report of the 4·3 Truth Commission within 6 months from the expiration. The 4·3 Truth Commission Report Committee is established to report on the investigation.

#### **Article 8 (Memorial Project)**

If the budget allows, Government can support the following projects to honor the victims of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and provide memorial services. In addition, these projects will help the Government, and it should, use the historic value of the Jeju 4·3 Incident in the educational field of peace and human rights.

1. Forming of Memorial Grave Yard
2. Building of Memorial Pagoda
3. Building of 4·3 Exhibition Hall
4. Forming of Memorial Park
5. Other projects

#### **Article 8-2 (Contribution to Foundation related with the Jeju 4·3 Incident)**

Government can financially support a foundation which will be established to carry out projects to promote of peace and improved human rights according to President’s instruction, including operation and management of the 4·3 Exhibition Hall and the 4·3 Peace Park and conducting additional investigations.

#### **Article 9 (Medical Aid and Living Aid)**

- ① Government can support the victims with medical aid and living aid for those who require medical treatment and medical equipment.
- ② The right to aid is non transferable and cannot be used as collateral or be sized for any other purposes.
- ③ Scope of aid and calculation and payment methods can follow the Presidential

Decree.

**Article 10 (Establishment of an Agency Related to Reporting Information to the Victims and Bereaved)**

Committee within 30 days from the enforcement date should establish a report planning group for the victims and the bereaved of the Jeju 4·3 Incident for their registration at overseas registration offices and must announce all forms to the public.

**Article 11 (Drawing up Family Relationship Registry)**

Committee can draw up or correct any family relationship registries that are missing or incorrect due to the destruction of family registries by fire during the Jeju 4·3 Incident, regardless of any other regulations or laws.

**Article 12 (Reconsideration)**

① Those who want to be designated as the victims or the bereaved can object to and request reconsideration of a Committee decision that did not designate the person victim or the bereaved or denied funding for medical aid or living aid within 30 days after the notification of that decision.

② Necessary reconsideration procedures for the above clause shall be determined according to Presidential Decrees. [Newly established on 2007. 1. 24.]

**Article 13 (Committee's Decision prior to Lawsuits)**

① Lawsuits concerning a decision to designate the victims or the bereaved or provide medical or living aid shall be raised after the Committee's decision on the issues. However, this clause is not applicable, if the decision was not reached within a 90-day period from the date of a report or application.

② Lawsuits related to the above clause shall be filed within 60 days after receiving notification of the Committee's decision (including decisions of reconsideration). [Newly established on 2007. 1. 24.]

**Article 14 (Penalty)**

Those who violate Article 2, Clause 2 shall be subject to imprisonment for not more than 2 years or a fine not more than 10 million Korean won. [Newly established on 2007. 1. 14.]

**Supplementary Provision <No. 6117, 2000. 1. 12.>**

This law is effective 3 months after its proclamation.

**Supplementary Provision <No. 8264, 2007. 1. 24.>**

- ① (Enforcement date) This law is effective 3 months after its proclamation.
- ② (Interim measures related with reconsideration) Article 12 shall also be applied to any decision to designated the victims and the bereaved or provide medical or living aid under the prior rules. In this case, application for reconsideration shall be submitted within 90 days after the implementation of this law.

**Supplementary Provision (Law on Family Relationship Registry and etc.) <No. 8435, 2007. 5. 17.>**

Article 1 (Enforcement date)

This law is effective from January 1, 2008. <Provisions omitted>

Articles 2 through Article 7 are omitted here.

Article 8 (Revision of other laws) from ① to <22> are omitted here.

<23> The Special Law for Investigation of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims is revised as follows.

In Article 3, Clause 2, Section 7, “Registration of Family Registry” shall be changed into “Drawing up Family Relationship Registry”.

Article 11 shall be as follows.

Article 11 (Drawing up family relationship registry)

Committee can draw up or correct any family relationship registries that are missing or incorrect due to the destruction of family registries by fire during the Jeju 4·3 Incident, regardless of any other regulations or laws.

From <24> to <39> are omitted here.

Article 9 is omitted here.

## **Enforcement Ordinance of the Special Law for Truth Investigation about the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims**

Enactment 2000. 5. 10. Presidential Decree No. 16803

Revision 2001. 2. 27. Presidential Decree No. 17141

Revision 2003. 8. 21. Presidential Decree No. 18091

Revision 2007. 4. 25. Presidential Decree No. 20022

### **Article 1 (Purpose)**

This ordinance includes definitions required for the Special Law for Investigation of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims.

### **Article 2 (Matters for Decision)**

“Others decided by President for Investigation the Jeju 4·3 Incident and honoring the victims” stated in Article 3, Clause 2, Section 8 of the Special Law for Investigation the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims refers to the particulars in the following section. <Revision on 2007. 4. 25.>

1. Operation of Reporting Committee of Investigation of the Jeju 4·3 Incident per Article 12, Clause 1.
2. Omitted <2007. 4. 25.>
3. Other particulars that are that are recognized by the Committee for Investigation of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims.

### **Article 3 (Organization Committee)**

Committee for Investigation of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims per Article 3 of Law (Hereinafter referred to as “Committee”) consists of 20 members, including appointed Chairperson of Prime Minister, Minister of Strategy and Finance, Minister of Justice, Minister of National Defense, Minister of Security and Public Administration, Minister of Health, Welfare and Family Affairs, Minister of Government Registration, Governor of Jeju, Representatives of the bereaved and well experienced and educated people appointed by Prime Minister. <Revision on 2007. 4. 25., 2008. 12. 31.>

### **Article 4 (Chairperson's Duties)**

- ① Chairperson represents the Committee and supervises its tasks.
- ② If Chairperson cannot conduct his or her duty for unavoidable reasons, Chairperson may appoint a member to act as Chairperson before the vacancy.

**Article 5 (Committee Meeting)**

- ① Chairperson can call meetings and preside over meetings.
- ② Committee meetings can be held with absolute majority attendees, including Chairperson and decide on the same absolute majority rule by the attendees.

**Article 6 (A Clerical Staff of Committee)**

- ① Committee can hold a secretary and staff for effective office work.
- ② Chairperson can appoint the secretary from level 3 public officers of Ministry of Government Administration or the national public officers. <Revision on 2006. 6. 12., 2008. 12. 31.>
- ③ As per Clause 1, Committee staff positions can be filled by those public officers dispatched by related central agencies or local government agencies or public officer on a contract. <Revision on 2003. 8. 21.>
- ④ The secretary follows orders of Chairperson, but can attend Committee meetings and holds the right to speak. <Newly established on 2003. 8. 21.>

**Article 7 (Benefits)**

Benefits or travel expenses may be paid for non public officer attendees of Committee meetings within the Committee budget.

**Article 8 (Declaration of Victims and Families)**

- ① Declaration of the victims and families per Article 4, Clause 2, Section 1 of the law can be filed, using form no. 1, form no. 2, form no. 2-2, or form no. 2-3 (including report forms in the form of electronic documents), attached by documents to the Practical Committee for Investigation of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims (hereinafter referred to as “Practical Committee”). When submitting electronic documents, the chairperson of the Practical Committee shall identify the victims’ family registers through “common use of administration information” regulated in Article 21, Clause 1 of the Law for Facilitating Digitalization of Administration Duties in order to establish an electronic government. If reporters fall outside the identifying process, then verifying documents (explanatory statements in case that there are no family registers) shall be attached. <Revision on 2001. 2. 27., 2003. 8. 21., 2004. 3. 17., 2006. 6. 12., 2007. 4. 25.>
  1. One certified copy of dismissed family member registry (if the certified copy of the victim’s family register can’t identify the victim). If not available, turn in a statement of reason.
  2. One copy of medical certificate issued by national general hospitals, medical college affiliated hospitals or hospitals designated by the Committee for post-event disorder

3. Evidentiary materials explaining the reasons for application. If these materials are not available, a letter of guarantee under joint signature or one that is separately written using form no. 3 in the annexed document by two people who lived in Jeju during the Jeju 4·3 Incident and more than 65 years old at the date of application.
- ② Declaration period is from January 1, 2004 to March 31, 2004 per rules of Clause 1.
- ③ Chairperson of the Practical Committee upon accepting the declaration form of the victims or the bereaved per Clause 1, must list separately in form 4, ascertained matters of fact, add opinions and then pass the request to the Committee. If the declaration was filed at overseas diplomatic offices the chiefs of the offices, then can directly submit the declarations to the Committee.
- ④ Chairperson must notify the declaration place and means stipulated in the ordinance within 30 days after the enforcement of the ordinance.

#### **Article 9 (Investigation)**

- ① Chairperson should investigate the submitted Clauses per Article 8 before making a submission for Committee Decision ruling.
- ② Per Rule of Clause 1, the Practical Committee Chairperson may request related data from relevant documents or any individuals. In such case, requested agencies or individuals must respond in good faith at once.
- ③ Committee Chairperson can decide scope of the needed investigation Clauses per Rules of Clause 1 by a decision of Committee

#### **Article 10 (Matters of Decisions)**

- ① Per Article 8, Clause 1 Rule, Committee upon receipt of decision request must comply within 90 days to the Practical Committee after investigation and verification of facts.
- ② The Practical Committee must inform the decision to the submitted file per Clause 1 Rule with no delay at once.

#### **Article 11 (Execute List)**

- ① Per Rules of Article 10, the Practical Committee must keep a list of the designated victims and the bereaved.
- ② Unless it was approved prior, the Practical Committee should allow any request from reporters or relatives of the victims to read the list or provide copies of it per Rules of Clause 1. <Revision on 2007. 4. 25.>

#### **Article 11-2 (Excavation of the Remains and etc.)**

According to Article 3, Clause 2, Section 7-2 of the Special Law, the Committee can ask for cooperation or related data from administrative bodies or public bodies concerned with investigating sites of secret burials or massacres or excavating the remains of the victims. [Newly established on 2007. 4. 25.]

**Article 12 (Installation and Operation of Planning Group)**

① Per Rules of Article 6, Clause 1 in collection of data and analyzing, and as also per Rules of Article 7 in reporting Fact-finding of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims, Committee can designate the Reporting Planning Group (Hereinafter referred to as “Planning Group”).

② Planning Group consists of 15 members, including Chairperson of Committee as the Chairperson of the Planning Group, appointed directors by Minister of Justice, Minister of National Defense, Minister of Security and Public Administration, the Legislation Minister, Governor of Jeju, representatives of the bereaved and Committee Chairperson appointed well experienced and educated people. <Revision on 2008. 12. 31.>

③ The Planning Group can have a few special members from contracted public officers for truth finding.

④ Chairperson can decide other operational clauses through decision process of the Committee.

**Article 12-2 (Contribution to a Foundation Related with the Jeju 4·3 Incident)**

① Governor of Jeju Special Self-Governing Province can ask for contribution from Government to a foundation which is scheduled to be established in order to conduct necessary projects such as operating and managing the 4·3 Exhibition and the 4·3 Peace Park and additional investigation.

② According to Clause 2, projects conducted by a foundation to which Government will contribute are as follows.

1. Operation and management of the Jeju 4·3 Exhibition and the 4·3 Peace Park
2. Additional investigation on the Jeju 4·3 Incident
3. Conducting business in order to cherish the memory of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and welfare work for the bereaved
4. Conducting cultural and academic projects related with the Jeju 4·3 Incident
5. Other projects related with the Jeju 4·3 Incident which are determined according to the articles of association of a foundation [Newly established on 2007. 4. 25.]

**Article 13 (Supporting Medical Treatment)**

① Per Law Article 9, Clause 1, post medical treatment including cost of medical

treatment, nursing and medical equipment purchase follow the set structure per each item. <Revision on 2007. 4. 25.>

1. Post medical treatment cost is calculated by estimation from national general hospitals, medical college affiliated hospitals or hospitals designated by the Practical Committee (Hereinafter referred to as “Designated Hospitals”). In case, estimation of cost is unprovided for the set needed treatment, the Practical Committee will make an estimation based on close cases.
  2. 562,000 Korean won per month nursing aid is paid for a person with disorders even after completion of treatment and unable to be active without others' assistance.
  3. Aid for protection equipment is calculated with an approval from designated hospitals. Expected durability of equipment and the expected times of purchase will be multiplied to come up with the amount, but if the expectancy of equipment is shorter than durability of one time, the expectancy and durability of equipment are treated same.
- ② According to Rules of Clause 1, when calculate the post treatment cost and protection equipment purchase, mid interest following legal interest rate rule of single discount is applied and the expectancy of the protection equipment follows the National Statistics Office guidelines.

#### **Article 14 (Living Support Fund)**

- ① Per Rules of Article 9, Clause 1, designator refers to a person without any dependent and currently suffering in self support by losing work capability, or even if with dependents but still suffer to support the family, and they will be excluded from the support if the person is current beneficiary of other living aid system by other laws.
- ② Per Rules of Clause 1, Committee can pay monthly living aid per the minimum cost of living set by Minister of Health, Welfare and Family Affairs per National Basic Living Security Act (based on three member family/household). <Revision on 2003. 8. 21., 2008. 12. 31.>
- ③ Regarding details for supporting living aid shall be determined according to ordinances of Jeju Province.

#### **Article 15 (Effective Date of Medical Treatment Aid and Living Aid)**

Article 9 of the law finds the effective date of medical treatment aid and living aid follows the declaration date of the victims or the bereaved according to Rules of Article 8.

#### **Article 15-2 (Reconsideration)**

- ① Those who plan to apply for reconsideration according to Article 12 of the law

shall submit the application which conforms to form no. 5 as stated in the annexed document.

② In case of receiving the application for reconsideration according to Clause 1, the committee shall finish the reconsideration process within 60 days after the date of the application and must inform the applicants of the results immediately. [Newly established on 2007. 4. 25.]

**Article 16 (Detailed Rules)**

Chairperson can decide the needed details to implement this enforcement ordinance.

**Supplementary Provision <No. 16803, 2005. 5. 10.>**

This enforcement ordinance is effective with the proclamation.

**Supplementary Provision <No. 17141, 2001. 2. 27.>**

① (Enforcement date) This enforcement ordinance is effective with the proclamation.

② (Interim measures regarding forms) Forms prior to this enforcement ordinance can be used, but shall reflect this revision.

**Supplementary Provision <No. 18091, 2003. 8. 21.>**

This enforcement ordinance is effective with the proclamation.

**Supplementary Provision (Revised Ordinance for Managing Civil Service Related to Parolees and etc. Electronically) <No. 18312, 2004. 3. 17.>**

This enforcement ordinance is effective with the proclamation.

**Supplementary Provision (Revised Ordinance for Common Use of Administrative Information and Reducing Paper Documents Related to the Law of Managing National Bonds and etc.) <No. 19507, 2006. 6. 12.>**

This enforcement ordinance is effective with the proclamation.

**Supplementary Provision (Personnel Regulations Related to Senior Government Official Group) <No. 19513, 2006. 6. 12.>**

Article 1 (Enforcement date) This enforcement ordinance is effective from July 1, 2006.

Article 2 and 3 are omitted here.

Article 4 (Revision of other laws and regulations) ① or <193> is omitted here.

<194> Some of the Enforcement Ordinance of the Special Law for Investigation of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims is revised as follows. In Article 6, Clause 2, “National public officials with class 2 or 3 belonged to the Ministry of

Government Administration and Home” is changed into “National public officials with class 3 belonged to the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs or public officials in general service belonged to Senior Government Official Group”.

<195> or <241> is omitted here.

**Supplementary Provision <No. 20022, 2007. 4. 25.>**

This enforcement ordinance is effective with the proclamation, but revised regulation of Article 13, Clause 1, Section 2 is effective from August 1, 2007.

**Supplementary Provision (Organization of the Ministry of Public Administration and Security and its Agencies) <No. 21214, 2008. 12. 31.>**

Article 1 (Enforcement date)

This enforcement ordinance is effective with the proclamation. <Conditions are omitted here>

From Article 2 to Article 4 are omitted here.

Article 5 (Revision of other laws and regulations) from ① to <76> are omitted here.

<77> Some of the Enforcement Ordinance of the Special Law for Investigation of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims is revised as follows.

In Article 3, “Minister of Justice, Minister of National Defense, Minister of Government Affairs and Home Affairs, Minister of Health and Welfare, and Minister of Planning and Budget” is changed into “Minister of Strategy and Finance, Minister of Justice, Minister of National Defense, Minister of Public Administration and Security, Minister of Health, Welfare and Family Affairs”.

In Article 6, Clause 2, “Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs” is changed into “Ministry of Public Administration and Security”.

In Article 12, Clause 2, “Minister of Government Administration and Home Affairs” is changed into “Minister of Public Administration and Security”.

In Article 14, Clause 2, “Minister of Health and Welfare” is changed into “Minister of Health, Welfare and Family Affairs”. In form no. 2, (A) of form no. 2-2, form no. 2-3 stated in the annexed document, “the Law for facilitating digitalization of administration duties in order to establish an electronic government” is changed into “Electronic Government Act”.

From <78> to <175> are omitted here.

## **Enforcement Regulations of the Special Law for Truth Investigation of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims**

Enactment 2007. 01. 03. Ordinance No. 163

Partial Revision 2007. 07. 25. Ordinance No. 253

2009. 10. 7. Ordinance No. 526 (Ordinance of Establishing Administrative Bodies of Jeju Special Self-Governing Province)

Partial Revision 2011. 1. 18. Ordinance No. 683 (Ordinance of Establishing Administrative Bodies of Jeju Special Self-Governing Province)

### **Article 1 (Purpose)**

The ordinance defines necessities of entrusted clauses and to exercise of the Special Law for Investigation of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims (Hereinafter referred to as “Ordinance”) and entrusted clauses of the same ordinance.

### **Article 2 (Organization of Practical Committee)**

① Rules of Article 4 of the law designate the Practical Committee for Investigation of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims (Hereinafter referred to as “The Practical Committee”) and the Practical Committee consists of 15 members, including one chairperson and one vice-chairperson.

② Chairperson of the Practical Committee (hereinafter referred to as “Chairperson”) shall be Governor of Jeju Special Self-Governing Province (hereinafter referred to as “Governor”) and vice-chairperson shall be elected among the commissioned committee members. Governor can appoint the committee members among those who go for each one of the following sections. <Revision on 2009, 10. 7., 2011. 1. 8.>

1. Vice-governor of environment, chief administrator of Jeju Special Self-Governing Province, director of Health, Welfare and Women's Affairs
2. Representatives of the bereaved
3. Experts on the Jeju 4·3 Incident
4. Man of learning and experience

### **Article 3 (Chairperson’s Duties)**

① The Chairperson of the Practical Committee represents the Practical Committee and supervises the Committee’s projects.

② If the Chairperson of the Practical Committee is unable to carry out his or her duty, the vice-chairperson presides the duty in place of the Chairperson, and if the vice-chairperson is also unable, pre-designated member by the Chairperson can

carry out the duty.

**Article 4 (Terms of Committee Members)**

The term of the commissioned members of the Practical Committee is 2 years and they can serve consecutive terms. However, the terms of the supplementary members is the remaining terms of their predecessors.

**Article 5 (Meetings)**

- ① The Chairperson of the Practical Committee calls for meetings of the Practical Committee and presides them.
- ② Meetings of the Practical Committee is assembled when a majority of the current committee members are present and the issues are decided by a majority of those present.

**Article 6 (A Clerical Staff of Committee)**

- ① The Practical Committee can have one secretary and needed staff.
- ② Secretary can be appointed by the Chairperson from local public officers with class 4 or 5 belonged to Jeju Special Self-Governing Province (hereinafter referred to as “Jeju Self-Governing Province”)
- ③ Per Rules of Clause 1, staff can be filled by dispatched public officers of city, district, or contracted officers.

**Article 7 (Consultants)**

- ① The Practical Committee can have no more than 15 consultants to consult them about agendas of the Practical Committee meetings.
- ② The Chairperson of the Practical Committee commission the consultants among those who have knowledge and experience in related fields.

**Article 8 (Province-wide Movement Headquarters for Collecting Historical Materials of the Jeju 4·3 Incident)**

The Practical Committee can establish a province-wide movement headquarters for collecting historical materials of the Jeju 4·3 Incident in order to collect historical materials for setting up the 4·3 Exhibition Hall.

**Article 9 (Allowances and etc.)**

For those who are consultants, commissioned members of the Practical Committee and the members of a province-wide movement headquarters and don't belong to Jeju Special Self-Governing Province at the same time, the Practical Committee can provides an allowance and travel expenses within budget.

**Article 10 (Declaration of Victim and Family)**

- ① Per Ordinance Article 8, Clause 4, the Practical Committee Chairperson must put the announcement of place and means of declaration with more than 2 daily newspapers.
- ② The Practical Committee Chairperson should install the declaration reception desks at administration public centers consulting with mayor and governor.
- ③ Directors of public administrative agencies of the set service centers of declaration should appoint public officers for the special duty, providing effective service of project.
- ④ For benefit of Jeju people who reside off Jeju with their declarations of damage from the Jeju 4·3 Incident, civic organizations of Jeju people in other cities may take the work and report the result directly to the Practical Committee.

**Article 11 (Decision and Notice)**

- ① Upon receiving the decision of the Committee for Investigation of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims per Ordinance Article 10, Clause 1, the Chairperson of the Practical Committee should notify the filers of the decisions on designating the victims or the bereaved using form no. 1 or form no. 3 as stated in the annexed document.
- ② If individual notification per Rules of Clause 1 is not practical, public notification and open to read method would be sufficient way.

**Article 12 (Way of Providing Supplementary Living Aid)**

- ① Those who want to receive supplementary living aid shall apply for it to the Practical Committee using form no. 4 in the annexed document.
- ② Omitted <2007. 7. 25.>

**Article 13 (Detailed Rules of Operation)**

Necessary matters regarding organizing and operating the Practical Committee, consultants, and Province-wide Movement Headquarters which are not stated in this ordinance shall be determined by the Chairperson through decisions at the meetings of the members of the Practical Committee.

**Article 14 (Enforcement Regulations)**

Necessary matters to enforce this ordinance shall be determined as regulations.

**Supplementary Provision**

- ① (Enforcement date) These regulations are effective with the proclamation.
- ② (Abolition of other regulations) The prior regulations for establishing and

operating the Special Committee for Investigation of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims are abolished.

③ (Interim measures on the Practical Committee) The Practical Committee for Investigation of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims, consultants, a province-wide movement headquarters in the previous regulations shall be the Practical Committee for Investigation of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims, consultants, a province-wide movement headquarters on accordance with these regulations.

④ (Interim measures on commissioned consultants) The members of the Practical Committee, the consultants, and the members of the Province-wide Movement Headquarters who were commissioned according to the previous regulations shall be regarded as commissioned in accordance with these regulations and their terms shall be considered the remaining periods of the previous terms.

⑤ (Interim measures on previous actions) Actions taken according to the previous regulations shall be regarded as actions taken in accordance with these regulations.

**Supplementary Provision <2007. 7. 25.>**

These regulations are effective with the proclamation.

**Supplementary Provision <No. 536, 2009. 10. 7.>**

Article 1 (Enforcement date) These regulations are effective with the proclamation.

Article 2 (Abolition of other regulations) From ① to ⑦ are omitted here.

⑧ Some of the enforcement regulations of the Special Law for Investigation of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims are revised as follows.

In Article 2, Clause 2, Seciton 1, “vice-governor of administration” is changed into “vice-governor of environment”.

**Supplementary Provision <No. 683, 2011. 1. 18.>(Regulations of Establishing Jeju Special Self-Governing Province Administrative Bodies)**

Article 1 (Enforcement date) These regulations are effective with the proclamation.

Article 2 is omitted here.

Article 3 (Relations with other regulations to disbanding and establishing institutions and organizations) While these regulations are enforced, if other regulations cite “Management and Planning Office”. this refers to “Planning and Management Office”. If other regulations cite “Special Self-Governing Bureau” and “Self-Governing Administration Bureau”, this refers to “Special Self-Governing Administration Bureau”. If other regulations cite “Culture, Tourism and Transportation Bureau”, this refers to “Culture, Tourism and Sports Bureau”. If other regulations cite “City Construction and Disaster Prevention Bureau”, this refers to “City Design Headquarters”.

If other regulations cite “Bureau of Eco-friendly Agriculture and Livestock Farming”, this refers to “Agriculture, Livestock Farming and Food Bureau”. If other regulations cite “Fire Defense Headquarters”, this refers to “Fire Defense and Disaster Prevention Headquarters”. If other regulations cite “Institute of Manpower Development”, this refers to “Institute of Human Resources Development”. If other regulations cite “Institute of Environmental Resources”, this refers to “Institute of Health and Environment Research” and “Institute of Mt. Hallasan Research”. If other regulations cite “Water and Sewage Headquarters”, this refers to “Water Resources Headquarters”. If other regulations cite “Culture Promotion Headquarters”, this refers to “Culture and Art Agency”, “Folklore and Natural Museum”, and “Stone Park Management Office”. If other regulations cite “World Natural Heritage Management Center”, this refers to “Culture, Tourism and Sports Bureau”, and “Hallasan National Park Management Office”.

Article 4 is omitted here.

# Form

- ◆ Enforcement Ordinance
  - [Form 1] Declaration of Victim (for Disabled with Aftereffect)
  - [Form 2] Declaration of Victim (for Deceased or Missing)
  - [Form 3] Reference
  - [Form 4] Register of Declaration of Victim
  
- ◆ Regulations
  - [Form 1-A] Notice of Determination of 4-3 Incident Victim (for Disabled with Aftereffect)
  - [Form 1-B] Notice of Determination of 4-3 Incident Victim (for Deceased or Missing)
  - [Form 1-C] Notice of Determination of Family of 4-3 Incident Victim
  - [Form 2] Application for Life Supporting Fund

[Form 1] (A)		[Form 1] (B)		
<b>Declaration of Victim (for Disabled with Aftereffect)</b>				
Reporter	Name	( ) National ID	Description of Disorder	
	Address			
Victim	Relation to Victim	Phone Number	Name	Sex
	Name	( ) Birth		Address
	Birth Address			
	Address	Phone Number		
	Damage	Date		
	Major Content	Age		
		Job		
Review of Medical Aide Support				
Description of Post disorder		Use Separate Form 1 section Na		
Post Medical Treatment		<input type="checkbox"/> Need	<input type="checkbox"/> Not	
Nursing		<input type="checkbox"/> Need	<input type="checkbox"/> Not	
Support Equipment Purchase		<input type="checkbox"/> Need	<input type="checkbox"/> Not	
I apply for a VICTIM (Post Disorder) status according to Article 2 of the Special Law for Truth Investigation about the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims and Article 8 of the Enforcement Ordinance of the same LAW.				
To Chairperson of the Practices Committee for Truth Investigation of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims		Date		
* Required Document		Reporter		
1. Medical Certificate issued by National General Hospitals, Medical College Affiliated Hospitals or Committed designated hospitals		Fee		
2. Evidence Materials (or 3 References written by guarantors over 65 years old who resided in the same dong, myeon or eup with the victim during the Incident can replace evidence materials)		Free		
* Fill in order of when, where, who, what, how and why in full detail				

[Form 2] (A)				[Form 2] (B)			
<b>Declaration of Victim (for Deceased or Missing)</b>							
<b>Reporter</b>	Name	( )	Resident Registration No.				
	Address						
	Relation to Victim	Phone number	Birth	Sex	<input type="checkbox"/> M	<input type="checkbox"/> F	
	Name						
<b>Victim</b>	Declaration Reason	<input type="checkbox"/> Deceased	Deceased Date				
	Birth Address at that time	<input type="checkbox"/> Missing	Missing Date				
<b>※ Use Section B for more than 2</b>	Address at that time						
	Detail	※ Fill in order of when, where, who, what, how and why					
<p>I apply for a VICTIM (Post Disorder) status according to Article 2 of the Special Law for Truth Investigation about the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims and Article 8 of the Enforcement Ordinance of the same LAW.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Date Reporter</p> <p>To Chairperson of the Practices Committee for Truth Investigation of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims</p>							
<b>※ Required Document</b>							
1. 1 copy of family registry of VICTIM (deceased) or Dismissed (deceased or missing). Explanatory statement if no such record is possible.				Fee			
2. Evidence Materials (or 3 References written by guarantors over 65 years old who resided in the same dong, myeon or eup with the victim during the Incident can replace evidence materials)				Free			
<b>Name</b>		( )		<b>Victim</b>			
<b>Declaration Reason</b>		<input type="checkbox"/> Deceased		<b>Birth</b>		<input type="checkbox"/> M <input type="checkbox"/> F	
<b>Place of Family Register at the time</b>		<input type="checkbox"/> Missing		<b>Deceased date</b>			
<b>Address at the time</b>		<b>Missing date</b>					
<b>Detail</b>		※ Fill in order of when, where, who, what, how and why in full detail					

[Form 2] (C)	<p><b>List of the Bereaved</b></p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="width: 25%;">Name</th> <th style="width: 25%;">Resident Registration No.</th> <th style="width: 25%;">Relation to Victim</th> <th style="width: 25%;">Place of Family Register</th> <th style="width: 20%;">Address</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr><td>( )</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr> </tbody> </table>	Name	Resident Registration No.	Relation to Victim	Place of Family Register	Address	( )					( )					( )					( )					( )					( )					( )					( )					( )					( )				
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[Form 3]	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Reference</b></p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="width: 20%;">Personal Information</th> <th style="width: 15%;">Name</th> <th style="width: 10%;">Birth</th> <th style="width: 10%;">Sex</th> <th style="width: 15%;">Address</th> <th style="width: 30%;">Remark</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Items confirmed ( )</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>※ Using Backside in case of more than 2 people</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>※ Fill in order of when, where, who, what, how and why in full detail</p> <p>I hereby certify that the above details are true.  Date  (guarantor) : Address Name  Resident Registration No.  (Phone Number: )</p>	Personal Information	Name	Birth	Sex	Address	Remark	Items confirmed ( )					※ Using Backside in case of more than 2 people
Personal Information	Name	Birth	Sex	Address	Remark								
Items confirmed ( )					※ Using Backside in case of more than 2 people								

[Form 4]	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Register of Declaration of Victim</b>  (Receipt Organization : )</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th rowspan="3" style="width: 10%;">Re-ceipt Num-ber</th> <th rowspan="3" style="width: 10%;">Re-ceipt Date</th> <th colspan="2" style="width: 20%;">Reporter</th> <th colspan="3" style="width: 40%;">Victim</th> <th rowspan="3" style="width: 15%;">Remark</th> </tr> <tr> <th style="width: 10%;">Name</th> <th style="width: 10%;">Address</th> <th colspan="2" style="width: 15%;">Name</th> <th rowspan="2" style="width: 15%;">Birth</th> </tr> <tr> <th style="width: 10%;">Phone Number</th> <th style="width: 10%;">Address</th> <th style="width: 5%;">① The Deceased</th> <th style="width: 10%;">② The Missing</th> <th style="width: 5%;">③ After effect disabled</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> </tbody> </table>	Re-ceipt Num-ber	Re-ceipt Date	Reporter		Victim			Remark	Name	Address	Name		Birth	Phone Number	Address	① The Deceased	② The Missing	③ After effect disabled																																																																																	
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				Name	Address	Name		Birth																																																																																												
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[Form 1] (A)		[Form 1] (B)					
<b>Notice of Determination of 4-3 Incident Victim</b> (for Disabled with Aftereffect)				<b>Notice of Determination of 4-3 Incident Victim</b> (for Diseased or Missing)			
Reporter		Name ( )		Resident Registration No.			
Address							
Relation to Victim				Phone Number			
Name ( )		Birth		Sex <input type="checkbox"/> M <input type="checkbox"/> F			
Place of Family Register							
Address							
Victim		Declaration Reason		<input type="checkbox"/> Deceased		Deceased date	
				<input type="checkbox"/> Missing		Missing date	
Place of Family Register							
Address							
Post Medical Treatment		<input type="checkbox"/> Need		<input type="checkbox"/> Not			
Nursing		<input type="checkbox"/> Need		<input type="checkbox"/> Not			
Support Equipment Purchase		<input type="checkbox"/> Need		<input type="checkbox"/> Not			
<p>This is a notice that certifies the above applicant has been designated as a victim of the Jeju 4-3 Incident according to Article 2 of the Special Law for Truth Investigation about the Jeju 4-3 Incident and Honoring Victims and Article 8 of the Enforcement Ordinance of the same LAW.</p>							
Date				Date			
Chairperson of the Practices Committee for Truth Investigation of the Jeju 4-3 Incident and Honoring Victims							

[Form 1] (C)

### Notice of Determination of Family of 4·3 Incident Victim

Reporter	Name ( )	Resident Registration No.	
	Address		
	Relation to Victim	Phone Number	
	Name ( )	Birth	Sex <input type="checkbox"/> M <input type="checkbox"/> F
Victim	Declaration Reason	<input type="checkbox"/> Deceased	Deceased date
		<input type="checkbox"/> Missing	Missing date
	Place of Family Register Address		
Family	Name	Resident Registration No.	Place of Family Register Address

This is a notice that certifies the above applicant has been designated as a family of the victim of the Jeju 4·3 Incident according to Article 2 of the Special Law for Truth Investigation about the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims and Article 8 of the Enforcement Ordinance of the same LAW.

Date

Chairperson of the Practices Committee for Truth Investigation of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims

[Form 2]

### Application for Life Supporting Fund

Re-report	Name Address	Resident Registration No.	Relation to householder	Income per Month	Re-mark
Family	Relation to householder	Resident Registration No	Whether live together or not	Educational Background	Health (Disable, Disease)
	Himself/Herself				
property	House	<input type="checkbox"/> One's own house ( won) <input type="checkbox"/> The Lease of a house on deposit basis ( won) <input type="checkbox"/> Monthly rent ( won) <input type="checkbox"/> Permanent Lease ( won) <input type="checkbox"/> Lease for Free <input type="checkbox"/> Other ( won)			
	Lands	<input type="checkbox"/> Farm ( won) <input type="checkbox"/> Forest ( won) <input type="checkbox"/> Other ( )			
	Cars	<input type="checkbox"/> Type ( ) <input type="checkbox"/> Year ( ) <input type="checkbox"/> Appraised Value ( won) <input type="checkbox"/> Owner ( ) <input type="checkbox"/> Car Number ( ) <input type="checkbox"/> Use (Occupation) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Supplement <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> One's own <input type="checkbox"/> Commutation <input type="checkbox"/> Other ( )			
	Deposit	<input type="checkbox"/> Cash ( won) <input type="checkbox"/> Bank Deposit ( won) <input type="checkbox"/> Stocks etc ( won)			
	Domestic Animal	<input type="checkbox"/> Cow ( won) <input type="checkbox"/> Pig ( won) <input type="checkbox"/> Other ( )			
Movables	<input type="checkbox"/> Farming tool ( won) <input type="checkbox"/> Other ( won)				
I request life supporting fund according to Article 9 of the Special Law for Truth Investigation about the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims and Article 14 of the Enforcement Ordinance of the same LAW.					
Date Reporter Chairperson of the Practices Committee for Truth Investigation of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims					

**Detailed Enforcement on the Special Law for Truth  
Investigation of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident  
and Honoring Victims**

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Detailed Enforcement on the Special Law for Truth Investigation of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Committee Decision No 1(2000.8.28)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Chapter 1 General Provisions</b></p> <p><b>Article 1 (Purpose)</b> The By Law defines the necessities of entrusted terms and to exercise of Special Law for Investigation of The 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims(Here in after called “Ordinance”) and entrusted terms of the same Ordinance</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Chapter 2 Committee Management etc.</b></p> <p><b>Article 2(Committee Meeting)</b> ① Committee can have by monthly regular meetings and special meetings called on by Chairperson when needed.  ② Chairperson notifies each member with date and time, place, objects and agenda of the meeting 3 days prior. For votes in writing or agenda being found undeliverable may be waived from mailing.  ③ Meetings should be closed door meetings but can be opened upon decision of Committee.</p> <p><b>Article 3 (Item Introduction)</b> ① Chairperson introduces the items  ② Item is separated by Delivery, Resolving and Decision</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Section per Form 1.</p> <p><b>Article 4 (Committee Deliberation)</b> ① Committee meeting can be held with absolute majority attendance including Chairperson, and absolute majority of attendees can make a decision.  ② When Chairperson recognize the need, the item can be voted in writing, and such decision should be notified to each member.  ③ When Committee sees the needs for the deliberation, the Committee can listen to the involved personal, agency or professionals.  ④ The Decision Notice by Form 2 should be used for the Committee decision, and members should write in each name and sign.</p> <p><b>Article 5 (Proxy Attendance)</b> If the below members cannot attend the meeting proxy attendance is permitted if submitted prior to the actual meeting. Minister of Justice, Minister of National Defense, Minister of Government Administration, Minister of Health and Welfare, Minister of Planning and Budget, the Legislation Minister, Governor of Jeju.</p> <p><b>Article 6 (Minutes)</b> ① Secretary should record minute of each meeting and can have one clerk.  1. Date and time of meeting, process of meeting from beginning to adjournment  2. Place of meeting  3. Signatures of attending members  4. Items(Deliberation and essential point)  5. Other items</p>
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<p>② Minute following Rules of Term 1 is signed by secretary and Chairperson designated member.</p> <p>③ Secretary must announce the report per Rules of Term 1 and Term 2 rule at the following meeting.</p> <p><b>Article 7 (Small Committee)</b> ① Chairperson of Committee can form and operate a sub Committee for pre studies on the item if it found essential</p> <p>② Members of a sub Committee per Rules of Term 1 can be appointed by Chairperson from members, and presiding member of Sub Committee also can be appointed from the sub Committee members.</p> <p>③ The presiding member of Sub Committee can call on meeting, deliberate discussions and report the result to Committee.</p> <p><b>Article 8 (Advisory Committee)</b> ① Chairperson can appoint Advisory Board for the effective operation and advises.</p> <p>② Advisory Board per Term 1 can have the following Sub Committee.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Sub Committee for Truth-Finding</li> <li>2. Sub Committee for VICTIM/Bereaved</li> <li>3. Sub Committee for Medical Aides/Living Aides</li> <li>4. Sub Committee for Memorial Projects/Honoring VICTIMS</li> </ol> <p>③ Sub Committee per Rules of Term 2 can have up to 5 related professionals appointed by Chairperson, and the Chairperson of Sub Committee can be elected among the members.</p> <p>④ Chairperson can set separate items in operation of the Sub Committee.</p>	<p><b>Article 9 (The 4-3 Incident Handling Support Group)</b> ① According to the Ordinance Rules of Article 6 Term 1, Support Unit of Investigation The 4-3 Incident and Honoring Victims formed by secretary and needed staff can be operated (Here in after called Support Unit.)</p> <p>② The Support Unit handles the following.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Meeting of Committee and support the management</li> <li>2. Planning Group meeting support and managing per Rules of Ordinance Article 12 Term 1</li> <li>3. Provision of truth according to the Rules of Article 18 and Article 23 Term 1</li> <li>4. VICTIM HONORING according to Rules of LAW Article 8</li> <li>5. Cooperation and communication with related organizations and agencies</li> <li>6. Other Committee decided items and orders of Chairperson</li> </ol> <p>③ Head of the Support Unit also is secretary of Committee, following orders of Chairperson in operations and supervising special members regarding their duties according to Rules of Ordinance Article 12 Term 3.</p> <p>④ The Support Unit can have Department of Support. The Chief can be appointed among level 4 public officers and can have the need staff.</p>
	<p><b>Chapter 3 Management Task Force of Preparing Investigation Report of the Jeju 4-3 Incident etc.</b></p> <p><b>Article 10 (Planning Group Leader's Duties)</b> The Rules of Ordinance Article 12 Term 2 finds the Director of Planning Group manages the Planning Group, call for meetings, and presides the meetings.</p>

<p><b>Article 11 (Planning Group Business)</b> the Planning Group handles the following.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Collection and analyze, and truth investigation for Truth Commission Report according to the Rules of Ordinance Article 12 Term 1</li> <li>2. Committee designated other items or Chairperson ordered items, regarding Truth Commission</li> </ol> <p><b>Article 12 (Planning Group Meeting)</b> ① The Planning Group can have regular meetings and special meetings. Regular meeting is due once in month's 1st day and Chief of Planning Group can call for special meetings as needed.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>② The Planning Group's meeting follow the absolute majority rule of attending and decision by the attendees</li> <li>③ Decisions of the Planning Group need to be reported with Committee.</li> <li>④ Director of the Planning Group can operate a Sub Committee if further pre study is needed for deliberation of an item</li> <li>⑤ Members of Sub Committee per Rules of Term 4 can be appointed by Director of the Planning Group, and presiding member can be elected among the Subcommittee members.</li> <li>⑥ The presiding member can call on the meetings and report the decision with the Planning Group</li> </ol> <p><b>Article 13 (An Assistant Administrator of Planning Group etc.)</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>① For an effective management, the Planning Group can have a Secretary and one clerk.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>② Chief of the Planning group can appoint the secretary from the members of the Planning Group and the clerk from the professional members per Rules of Ordinance Article 12 Term 3.</li> <li>③ The Minute follows the Article 6. Such case, "Committee" is "The Planning group", "Chairperson" means "Director of the Planning Group", "Member" means "Member", "Meeting of Committee" means "Meeting of the Planning Group".</li> </ol> <p><b>Article 14 (Expert Member's Duties etc.)</b> ① Chairperson, according to the Rules of Ordinance Article 12 Term 3, can designate a Top Member to comprehend and adjust work among the Planning Group's professional members.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>② Special member handles the following. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Truth investigation per Rules of Article 11 and Article 23</li> <li>2. Director ordered items and Chairperson ordered then Committee secretary's confirming order</li> </ol> </li> <li>③ Chairperson sets separately regarding recruitment and work of special members</li> <li>④ Special member can attend the meeting of Planning Group and express his or her opinion.</li> </ol> <p><b>Article 15 (Investigation Agent)</b> ① Investigation Agents can be appointed to support the professional members per Rules of Article 14 Term 2 and for the support of truthful investigation per the Article 23 Term 1.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>② Chairperson can set separated guidelines for recruitment and assignment of the investigation agents.</li> </ol>
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<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Chapter4 Declaration about The Victims and The Bereaved, Investigation and Deliberation</b></p> <p><b>Article 16 (Diplomatic Office Receipt and Dealing with Declaration)</b>          ① According to the Rules of Ordinance Article 8 Term 3, Committee must send the Declaration Form of VICTIM/ Bereaved which was filed with the Chief of the overseas Diplomatic Office to the Practical Committee.          ② The Practical Committee upon receipt or the Declaration Form, according to the Rules of Ordinance Article 8 Term 3 and Article 9, must investigate the truth commission then submit the request of decision.</p> <p><b>Article 17 (The Principle of Investigation)</b> ① Chairperson of the Practical Committee, per the Rules of Article 9, in regards to the Truth Commission must put the best effort to deliver the truthful investigations, interviews, date reviews of the involved agencies and other practical procedures and means to define the relevancy of the damages.          ② For those involved individuals, participating in the Truth Commission must follow the rules of fairness and faithfulness.</p> <p><b>Article 18 (Committee Investigation)</b> Chairperson can proceed an investigation on the individual filer of the declaration form and the report of the result must be filed with the Committee.</p> <p><b>Article 19 (Installation Research Group)</b> ① Truth Commission Investigation Team can be established, and its director can be</p>	<p>Vice governor of State Affairs, Deputy Mayor and Vice Governor.          ② Truth Commission Investigation Team can be formed among public officers of city and district of Jeju and members of the affiliated agency and organization.</p> <p><b>Article 20 (Investigation)</b> ① Mayor and Governor of District must conduct a truth investigation, confirming the truth to the report and the evidence of the declaration.          ② After completing the investigation of each declaration, the Mayor and Governor of District must send an individual report to the Governor of Jeju.</p> <p><b>Article 21 (Adding Survey)</b> ① Governor of Jeju, according to the Rules of Article 2 Term 2, upon receipt of the result report can review the report. The Governor can conduct an additional investigation if he finds the report lacks evidence according to the Truth Commission or further investigation is required.          ② Governor of Jeju upon completion of the further investigation, must complete the investigation report on individual base and submit the result with the Practical Committee.</p> <p><b>Article 22 (Making An Written Opinion)</b> ① The Practical Committee upon receiving an investigation report per Rules of Article 21 Term 2 must hold a meeting, evaluating the report.          ② After receiving the result of the Investigation Form 1, the Practical Committee Chairperson must fill out the Form 3 on individual per the Rule of Ordinance Article 8 Term 3.          ③ The opinion statement is filled based on the contents of declaration and decision, opinions from the related agency,</p>
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<p>witness, reference and investigating officers.</p> <p><b>Article 23 (Deliberation Victims and The Bereaved)</b> ① Per the Rules of Ordinance Article 8 Term 3, Committee conduct a statement investigation first, and if the investigation is not satisfactory, a truth investigation can be delivered.</p> <p>② Evaluation on VICTIM/Bereaved is based on individual investigation and decision. However, according to the Rules of Article 7, investigation in bulk can be proceeded for the Subcommittee reviewed VICTIM/Bereaved.</p> <p>③ Approve or Disapprove of VICTIM/Bereaved can be decided based on the content of declaration, opinion of the Practical Committee Chairperson, truth investigation per Rules of Term 1 and opinions of related agencies.</p> <p>④ Means to decide whether approved or disapproved of VICTIM/Bereaved can be practiced upon collecting comprehensive opinions of members.</p> <p><b>Article 24 (Computation Post Medical Treatment)</b> ① Post medical treatment expense per the Rules of Ordinance Article 13 Term 1 can be decided by Committee based on the cost estimation made by national general hospital, medical college affiliated hospital or designated hospital by the Practical Committee together with the opinions of Subcommittee for Medical Aides/Living Aides per Rules of Article 8 Term 2 Issuance 3.</p> <p>② According to the Rules of Ordinance Article 2 the request of Medical Aides/Living Aides follows the opinions of the Subcommittee for Medical Aides/Living Aides and Committee makes the decision.</p>	<p><b>Article 25 (The Process of Registration Family Register)</b> ① Per the Rules of LAW Article 3 Term 2, the designated VICTIM/Bereaved complying with the rules of Article 11, anyone who wishes to make any amendment and registration on the family registry status must apply the Decision on VICTIM/Bereaved in Form 4 issued by the Committee under the guidelines of the Article 4 Term 1 of title under Form of Family Registration Report, complying with Administration Guidelines per Special Law for Investigation The 4-3 Incident and Honoring Victims (Here in after called “Administration Guidelines”) with the Officer of City, Eup or Myeon at the time of dismissal of the family registry.</p> <p>② The Decision on VICTIME/Bereaved must be requested to Committee via the Practical Committee.</p>
<p><b>Chapter 5 Supplementary Rules</b></p>	
<p><b>Article 26 (Entrusting Practice Commission)</b> Regarding historic record per the Rules of LAW Article 3 Term 2 Issuance No 4, the project for memorial park and pagoda project operation in entrusted with the Practical Committee according to the Rules of LAW the Article 3 Term 2 Issuance No 5.</p> <p><b>Article 27 (Benefit etc)</b> ① Per Rules of Article 2, Article 7, Article 8 and Article 12, non public officer members who attend the meeting is provided with some benefit and the needed expense.</p> <p>② Per Rules of Article 4 Term 3, non public officer members who attend the meeting and submit an opinion is provided with</p>	

	<p>some benefit and the needed expense, too.</p> <p><b>Article 28 (Investigation Agent Token Issue)</b> Per Article 15, Chairperson can issue Identifications in the Form 5 for the investigators for the convenient investigations.</p> <p><b>Article 29 (Management Detailed rules)</b> Chairperson can decide the items and necessities for the by-laws.</p> <p><b>Supplementary Provisions</b></p> <p>Rule is effective with the proclamation.</p>
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<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Resolution</b></p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 20%; padding: 5px;">Number</td> <td style="width: 30%;"></td> <td style="width: 20%; padding: 5px;">Date</td> <td style="width: 30%;"></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">Name</td> <td colspan="3"></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">Matters for Decision</td> <td colspan="3"></td> </tr> </table> <p style="text-align: center; margin-top: 10px;"><b>National Committee for the Truth Investigation about the Jeju 4-3 Incident and Honoring Victims</b></p> <table style="width: 100%; margin-top: 10px;"> <tr> <td style="width: 60%;">Chairperson</td> <td style="width: 20%;"></td> <td style="width: 20%; text-align: center;">Seal</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Member</td> <td style="text-align: center;">Member</td> <td style="text-align: center;">Seal</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Member</td> <td style="text-align: center;">Member</td> <td style="text-align: center;">Seal</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Member</td> <td style="text-align: center;">Member</td> <td style="text-align: center;">Seal</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Member</td> <td style="text-align: center;">Member</td> <td style="text-align: center;">Seal</td> </tr> </table>	Number		Date		Name				Matters for Decision				Chairperson		Seal	Member	Member	Seal	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Opinion</b></p> <p>1. Recipient  <input type="radio"/> Deceased:                      <input type="radio"/> Family:</p> <p>2. Detail  <input type="radio"/> Investigation on Request  <input type="radio"/> Opinions of the Bereaved Association, involved Agency and organizations and Data Research  <input type="radio"/> Comprehensive Review of Investigation  <input type="radio"/> Decision of Committee, etc</p> <p>3. Opinion  <input type="checkbox"/> Deceased                      <input type="radio"/> Not  <input type="checkbox"/> permission                      <input type="radio"/> Not  <input type="checkbox"/> Family                      <input type="radio"/> permission                      <input type="radio"/> Not</p> <p>4. Reason</p> <p>I submit the opinion, deciding if the application met the criteria of the VICTIM or Bereaved request according to Article 8 Section 3 of the Special Law for Truth Investigation about the Jeju 4-3 Incident and Honoring Victims.</p> <p style="text-align: right; margin-right: 50px;">Date</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Practices Committee for Truth Investigation of the Jeju 4-3 Incident and Honoring Victims Seal</p> <p>Attached : 1. Decision on ○○ -1  2. List of Deceased and Bereaved -1</p>									
Number		Date																										
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Chairperson		Seal																										
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<Separate Form 3>

<Form 2>

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Decision on Deceased or Bereaved</b></p> <p>Reporter : Address :      Notification of decision and registration as VICTIM / Bereaved according to Article 3 of the Special Law for Truth Investigation about the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims and Article 10, Section 1 of the Enforcement Ordinance of the same LAW.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">A. Deceased</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 30%;">Register Number</td> <td colspan="3"></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Place of Family Register</td> <td colspan="3"></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Address</td> <td colspan="3"></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Name</td> <td colspan="3"></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Date of Birth</td> <td></td> <td>Sex</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> M   <input type="checkbox"/> F</td> </tr> </table> <p style="text-align: center;">B. Family</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="width: 20%;">Name</th> <th style="width: 20%;">Resident Registration No.</th> <th style="width: 20%;">Relation to Deceased</th> <th style="width: 40%;">Place of Family Register Address</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> </tbody> </table> <p style="text-align: center;">Date</p> <p style="text-align: center;">National Committee for Truth Investigation about the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims (seal)</p>	Register Number				Place of Family Register				Address				Name				Date of Birth		Sex	<input type="checkbox"/> M <input type="checkbox"/> F	Name	Resident Registration No.	Relation to Deceased	Place of Family Register Address																																													<p style="text-align: center;">(Front)</p> <p>No</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Investigator</b> (The 43 Incident Investigator)</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 40px; margin: 5px auto; text-align: center;">       Picture (2.5cm×3cm)     </div> <p>Position : Occupation : Name : Period :</p> <p>This is to certify the above person can investigate the Jeju 4·3 Incident according to Article 7 of the Special Law for Truth Investigation about the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims and Article 12, Section 1 of the Enforcement Ordinance of the same LAW.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Date</p> <p>Supervised by: Prime Minister The Chairperson of the National Committee for Truth Investigation about the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims (seal)</p>
Register Number																																																																					
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Name	Resident Registration No.	Relation to Deceased	Place of Family Register Address																																																																		
<p style="text-align: center;">(Back)</p> <p>1. Non transferable Certificate. 2. Investigator must show the Certificate for any conduct in investigation. 3. Any national agency or local government is asked for support with manpower or material when this certificate is presented to them.</p>	<p>Please deposit in the nearest post box for found certificate.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">55mm×80mm Paper(Type1) 70g/m<sup>2</sup></p>																																																																				

**Rules for Family Registry per the Special Law  
for Truth Investigation of the Jeju 4 · 3 Incident  
and Honoring Victims**

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Rules for Family Registry per the Special Law for Truth Investigation of the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Enact 2000. 4.29 Supreme court Rule No 1648</p> <p><b>Article 1 (Purpose)</b> This Rule defines the terms and the necessities of Family Registry report or amendment(Here in after called Family Registry Report) per the Rules of Article 11 of the Special Law for Investigation The 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims (Here in after called ‘LAW’).</p> <p><b>Article 2 (The Recipient of Register Family Register etc)</b> As ruled VICTIM in the Rules of LAW Article 2 Term 2, the recipient is limited for the one who has a dismissed report without recovery at the year of The 4·3 Incident, Omitted report even from the amendment in the same year of reentry or wrong information on the report.</p> <p><b>Article 3 (Person Having right to apply)</b> According to the Rules of LAW Article 3 Term 2, the registration of family registry is practiced by the designated as VICTIM/Bereaved by Committee of Investigation The 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims (Here in after called Committee).</p> <p><b>Article 4 (The Procedure of Application)</b> ① Anyone who wishes to request of record of family registry can submit the</p>	<p>application form to assigned Director of City, Gu, Eup or Myeon(for the complex city and rural area, city means mayor of District Head and the area of Eup and Myeon goes to the district officer of Eup and Myeon)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Anyone who wishes to request of record of family registry can submit the application form to assigned Director of City, Gu, Eup or Myeon</li> <li>2. For non reentered family registry of dismissed record, the record of family registry can be submitted with the Director of City, Gu, Eup or Myeon of the incident time (record of family registry can be submitted with the successor Director of City, Gu, Eup or Myeon of handling office if transfer of work and Dept had taken place)</li> <li>3. The application should be accompanied with a letter of decision as VICTIME issued by Committee However. If registration is made by Bereaved, a letter of recognition as Bereaved must me attached within the application</li> </ol> <p>③ If more than two applicants register in the same registry, the record can be done with the attached identification.</p> <p><b>Article 5 (The Director of Si · Gu · Eup · Myeon’s Work)</b> Upon receipt of application, the Director of City, Gu, Eup or Myeon should follow the below order.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. For reentry but still omitted by The 4·3 Incident, reenter the family registry of the same year(dismissal entry on the dismissal report and enter the deceased at the same time)</li> <li>2. For non reinstated registry, form the new family registry but for the deceased, form and dismiss the fact at the same time)</li> <li>3. For reinstated registry with wrong information due to The</li> </ol>
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	<p>4-3 Incident, correction can be made only with an attached statement of request to correct the family registry.</p> <p><b>Article 6 (General Instruction)</b> Any other item beyond the RULE obeys the Rules of Family Registry Law and Family Registry Administrations.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Supplementary Provision</b></p> <p>Rule is effective with the proclamation.</p>
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(Separate Form)

Application for Listing (Correcting) Family Register									
Re- porter	Name	Resident Registra- tion No.	Relation to Object						
Address		(Phone : )							
Name		( )	Survival		<input type="checkbox"/> Decease <input type="checkbox"/> Survival <input type="checkbox"/> Missing				
Family Clan		( )	Date of Birth	Resident Registra- tion No.	Sex		<input type="checkbox"/> M <input type="checkbox"/> F		
Place of Family Register		Relation to householder							
Previous Family Register		Parents' Name		Father :		Mother :			
Deceased		Date		Place					
Re- gister Items		ID							
Correction									
<p>I request the amendment of Family Registry Record according to Article 11 of the Special Law for Truth Investigation about the Jeju 4·3 Incident and Honoring Victims. Date</p>									
		Reporter				Seal			
<p>※ Required Document</p> <p>1. 1 Copy of the Committee issued VICTIM Notice</p> <p>2. 1 Copy of the Committee issued Bereaved Notice, if applied by family member</p> <p>3. Evidence materials to support identification or the amendment of family registry status</p>		Fee		Free					

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## 5. The Committee for Memorial Projects of Jeju April 3 Incident and List of Projects

### The National Committee for Investigation of the Truth about the Jeju April 3 Incident

(2003. 10. 15 Current)


Section	Name	Position	Note
Chairman	Lee Han-dong, Kim Seok-su, Goh Kun	The Prime Minister	
Official Member	Kim Jeong-gil, Ahn Dong-su, Choi Gyeong-won, Song Jeong-ho, Sim Sang-myeong, Kang Myeong-sil	The Minister of Justice	Member of Reviewing report
	Jo Seong-tae, Kim Dong-shin, Lee Jun, Jo Young-gil,	The Minister of National Defense	"
	Choi In-gi, Lee Geun-sik, Kim Du-gwan, Huh Seoung-gwan	The Minister of Government Administration	
	Choi Seon-jeong, Kim Won-gil, Lee Tae-bok, Kim Seong-ho, Kim Hwa-jung	The Minister of Health and Welfare	
	Jeon Yun-choel, Jang Seung-u, Park Bong-hum	The Minister of Planning and Budget	
	Park Ju-whan, Jeong Su-bu, Seong Gwang-won	The Minister of Government Registration	"
	Woo Geun-min	The Jeju Governor	
	Entrust	Kang Man-gil	The Chancellor of Sangji University
Kim Sam-ung		Previous Chef Editor of Daehanmaeil	"
Kim Jeong-gi		Previous Chancellor of Seowon University	
Park Jae-seung		The Chairman of Korean Lawyer association	
Park Chang-uk		Previous Chairman of the Jeju 4·3 Victims' families	
Seo Jung-seok		Professor of Sungkyunkwan University	"
Shin Young-ha		Honorary Professor of Seoul National University	" (Supervisor)
You Jae-gap		Professor of Kyonggi University	"
Lee Don-myeong		Lawyer, Previous Chancellor of Joseon University	
Lee Hwang-u		The Chairman of Graduate of school of public Administration in Dongguk University	
Lim Mun-cheol		The Provost of Jeju Jungang Catholic church	
Han Gwang-deok	The Chairman of Security Subcommittee		
Assistant	Kim Han-uk, Kang Taek-sang	Leader of the Jeju 4·3 handling of affair	


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	Ha Jae-pyeong	The Director of Research of Military abstracts in National Defense department
	Kim Ji-sun, Jang In-tae, Kwon Uk, Kwon Seon-taek	The Director of Public Administrator in Government Administration department
	Yun Jang-guen, Chio Jeong-il	The Director of Administrative Registration in the Government Registration
	Kim Ho-seong, Seo Yu-chang, Kim Yeong-taek	Jeju Vice Governor
Entrust	Kang Joung-ho	Representative of Jeju 4·3 Victims' families in Seoul
	Kang Chang-il (Assistant)	Professor in Baejae University, the Director of Research about Jeju 4·3
	Ko Chang-hu	Lawyer
	Kim Sun-tae	Dean of Broadcasting College in Chungnam Daejeon
	Do Jin-sun	Professor of Changwon University
	Oh Mun-gyun	Researcher of the public safety in the Korean National Police University
	Yoo Jae-gap	Professor in Kyonggi University
	Lee Gyeong-u	Lawyer
	Lee Sang-guen	Previous Director of publishing Modern Korean History Committee
Clerk	Park Chan-sik, Kim Jong-min	Expert Committeeman

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